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India*! pollejr tovards th« United <<?tatM Mk«t a ^•tf 
;^t«rtttlng study a« i t Is contittuslly subjtot to ups and 
dovns and Is saldoa on ths same plteh. But no stud/ of 
raXatioBs iHitvaen two countrlas can be eoaplsta vithout f irst 
UBdarstanding tl-a orgas and aspirations of th« psoplttf ths 
hlstorieal toidcground, thsir needs and the principles ^ l e ^ 
provide substance to foreign policy* Renee« the introductory 
chapter exaaines In detail the roots of Indian policy^ its 
chief deteiainants, especially national interest, i ts aias» 
objectives and principles, vis*, oon«align«eat, peaceful 
co^ezisttfice, antl^oolonialism and anti^raeiaiisa, fs lth In 
the United Nations and t ies vith the Contonvealth. These 
principles, f i r s t forsnilated by ^ehru, %fho vas the chief 
architect of India's foreign policy, heve been adhered to 
even biy his successors « Iha^tri and Indira • and there has 
been l i t t l e deviation froa thea* Whatever difference «xists 
is one of eaphasis smd not of content* 
The f irs t chapter provides an insight into the back, 
ground of Indo*Aaieriean relations* Although India and Aaerlca 
bad started off ve i l , as India was fascinated fay t^e AmerScan 
redaration of Independence and aspired for the /^neriean ideals 
of progress and deaocracy, but soon their relations becaae 
subject to stresses and strains owing to differences of VIB^B 
«» s «» 
r«gftr<iiiig iioiiu«Xignii«fity natar« of th« CoaDnmltt thr«at and 
maiiit«ziane« af p«ac« and ••eurit / , India r«fua«d to b«oost 
an Amarlean ca«pfoXIov«r or tot the w«8tem Una of oppoalng 
th« ConBuniats, Conaequantl/i to th« ^agrin of India, 
U*e»/* began to «ioo i*akiatan, India's rival, in ordar to obtain 
a foi)thold in Fouth Atia« India*a attitude further hardened 
iih«n the U«r,A», diaregjarding a n Indian protests concluded 
a militarjT aid P^et vith Pakistan la 1964* Aaerlean stand 
on Ksshnlr also deepend Indian suspleions of Aaerlean Inten. 
tlons* But this situation was reversed in 1962 vhsn tl%e 
CMna attacked India, and the U*r«A« ia^edlately rushed to 
India's help In reaponte to a request froa Nehru« India vas 
fu l l of gratitude to the U«E«A« for the tiaely help without 
strings and Indian opinion vas n9'vx ao favourable to U.S.A. 
aa at this tiae* Indeed, aoae Indians vent so far as to de» 
mand an alliance vith the ^99%^ but Aaerioa vlaely refrained 
froa encouragiut, such a aove as i t vas no longer Interested 
In inereaaing the burdena vhlch such a relationship entailed* 
Hehru also flraly atuidc to his basic position, although noa-
alignatfit \iiieh had hitherto aeant refusal to accept ailitary 
aid %A8 nov reinterpreted to include a i l i t a r / aid as veil* 
IPakiatan haa been an laportant factor in Indian forel^i 
policy* Indeed, i t i s the touehatone of Indo-Aaerican rela. 
tlonship* Therefore, the second chapter deals vith the nature 
of Indo»Pak relations, Paklatanl factor In Indian pollejr. 
• 3 • 
Unitsd rtat«a roX« In th« Indo»?ak •utweontlMnt «-• th« 
HiXitarjf Aid Pact of 1964 and i t t r«p«rcuesloiit on Indo. 
JUMricaa r«lationt» th« Kaghair iatua and tha 1966 Xado. 
?ak war and Its rspareuaalons. Xhe 19&6 conflict narrad 
th« happy relationship existing bctvaan India and U,$;*A« 
First ruabllngs i^ieh had bean aroused in India vhan Pakistan 
employed U«r« arms in Kat«h and Am«rlca failed to taks any 
action, baoams norc audible after Pakistan's vUf^il aggression 
in Kashalr In August 19f)6, This var proved true the Indian 
fear th^t Pakistan vas aralng Itself vlth Aaerloan veapons 
not against the Comaunlsts but against India and that the 
U»S«A« oould be no sore than a sUeat spectator of Pakistani 
chauvlnlni. Although Aaerlca tried to retrieve i t s Mistake 
by stopping al l i tary aid to both India and Pakistan but i t 
could not convince ^ e Indian alnd* Lateri the resuaptlon 
of supply of spare parts to both countries in 19&7 also failed 
to placate India as this aeasure vas favourable only to 
Pakistan vhich had aostly American arms and equlpoient vhile 
India had ii9j:y l i t t l e Aaerican arns. Thus India was not to 
benefit fioa it* The decision of the U.S.A. to supply a m 
to Pakistan in 1970 once again brought forth a volley of 
piotests fxooi India >^lch has becoae V9rr sensitive on this 
aatter. 
Another issue Which has in recant years plagued Indo* 
Aaerlcan relations is the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, vhieh 
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hat b««n dlteutsod In t>)« third ohftpt«r* Ftine* th« btgiimlng 
Indian and /serioan poaitlona havt differed vldeljr* These 
dlfferenees are du« to the geo-atrategio position of the 
Middle East and Aawrican and Indian interests In the area* 
Ourinii the 19l»7 oonfXlet Indian and /loerlean dlffereaeet 
becaae aore pronouneed* t^Ue the U.F.A. usually took a 
posltlon« both inside and outside the U«If«y vhleh %ias faiH»miw 
aule to lsri*el| India sided vlth the Ara]»s* India ms. sees 
In ^erlcan support of Israel a aeans o^ the fulfUaent of 
Aaerlwn iMperlallst designs, or a return of a vhlte colonial 
pover* Hence, vhlle India has extended recognition to Israel, 
^ e has refrained fro» establishing dlploaatle relations vlth 
i t unless Araias, espeelalijr Palestinians are accorded Justice 
and the aggreasor is prevented fro« enjo/lng the fruits of 
aggreaslon* India has also refused to support U,S« sponsored 
resolutions on the ^ est Asian crisis* 
Chapter HI deals vlth the Vletnaa crisis vhioh has 
caused great heart^tournlng in Indo*AiBerlcan relations* Ajserica 
i s as sensitive on the Vietnam issue as India is on Kashalr* 
Lvery Indian statement on Vietnam is regarded vlth suspicion 
and t^ls might be accountable for the poatponement of Prime 
Minister Shastrl*s v i s i t to U*S*A, since he had openly con. 
demned 'merloan bombing of Vietnam* India does not agree vlth 
the American vlev that America is in Vietnam to prevent the 
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spread of Coamuiilga, If there Is a vaoaiai In Agia It omst 
be f i l l ed by ^ e Aslant theneelve*. Moreover, Coanniniim 
can beat be combated by econoalc means and not nllltazy 
means. 
An analysis of a l l these problems leads us to the 
conclusion that thoUf^ other factors have influenced Indian 
attitude towards U.S.A. from time to time but none has been 
so Influential as India's psychological obsession vlth Pakistan. 
But recently, most of these Irritants have been removed . 
Pakistan has be^ n weakened by the emergence of Bsngla Desh 
and It no longer poses ^ real threat to Indli, the relations 
which had been spoilt due to Bangla Desh Var of ''971 have 
been Improved vlth t*aklstan*s recognition of Bangla Desh, 
conclusion of rtmia pact, return of POVs and the agreement 
between India and Pakistan to open communication and other 
links. Ihe Vietnam crisis has also receded with the conclu. 
slon of Paris Agreement In January 1973 and the ^rab-Israel 
conflict also seems nearer solution. Hence thert^  Is a chance 
of Improving Indo-Anerlean relations In the future through 
a better understanding of each other and better comnunicatlons^ 
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For anjr nation \mr i t an avant vhleh avokaa two fianda. 
aantal rtaponaaa. Firatljry i t coneantrataa attantlon to tba 
d«fanca na«da of thm oountry* f^ acondly, i t laada to Introa* 
paetion« a raappraiaal of ona*8 policiatf aaauaptiona and 
asaooiationa, and vajra of daaiing vith othar nationa* 7hara* 
forof tha Chinaaa Imraaion of 18&e vaa a trausatio axparlanea 
for India* It adainiatarad a ruda ahaek to tha aaaiMiptlona 
and lda*la • paaoaful eo^axiatanea^ Panchahaal and non • 
aXignaant • va had bttXd daar for ao long* Hanca t^are vas a 
daaand froa aix aeetiona of paopla not only for a raappraiaai 
of foraitffi policy but aiao of our ralationahip vith tha two 
auparwpovara* 
On tbe Intamational plana alao oartain changaa v^rn 
taking placa a tout thla tiaa • thar« ver« aSgna o^ t^av in 
tha oold var and tha vorld was aoving tovarda polyeantriaa* 
Hanca* t^ a na«d to atudy and eoapr^and tha irarloua aspaets 
of Indo^ u*;:* ralationahip in tha ohangad world m oontaxt* 
13ia thaais la* tharcforof daaignad to daal firatly vith tha 
ganaral aapaota of Indian foralgn poliay princlplaa and 
national intartat and tha sajor irritanta in Indo^aarican 
ralationahip in ^a aarly yaara of Indiana indapandanca %fhi^  
profoundly iafluanead har attitude tovarda tha Unitad rutaa, 
and aaoondlyi vith tha anaiyaia of th« thrac iaauaa Pakiatan 
(var of 1906j, Arat^Xaraall conflict of 19&7 and tha Vi«tnaa 
. 11 . 
cr is is - vnhleh have poisoned Indo-Amsrloan relations In the 
last decade. The 3angia Desh Issue and the October 1973 ^rab. 
Israeli conflict have not been Included as they fa l l beyond 
t^e scope of the study which Is restricted to the year 1970. 
VIth the help of various doouaents off ic ial or other. 
vise* Parllanentary Debates and Congressional records, hear-
ings of coamlttees of the House of Representatives, Reports 
of Ministry of :jctemal Affairs, vhlte i'apers. Department of 
State Bulletin, speeches of Kehru and American leaders, U.N, 
Security Council Resolutions and General Assembly Records, 
articles In various journals and newspaper reports and 
comments, I have tried to make an objective analysis of 
the Indian and American stakes, Interests and policies 
regarding China, Pakistan, West Asia and Vietnam, their 
respective x^les and the repercussions of their toslc stands 
on Indo-Amerlcan relations. The analysis reveals that India's 
policy toviards the United f^tates has been determined mainly 
by her foar of Pakistan, her adcnovledged rival, although 
there have been other factors vhich have temporarily affected 
Indo-Amerlcan relations. Pakistan, therefore, constitutes 
the touchstone of Indo*American relations. ITovever, recently 
with the removal of • most of these Irritants, one hopes 
that India's relations with the United rtates would improve 
In the future. 
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The roots of India»• foreign poXloj way b« found In 
th« irr:riou« r^solutSona patA«d b/ th« Indian National Congrait 
before indepcdndtfioe and the apeeehes and vritinss of Pandit 
Neliruy the fir at t^ rloa Klnlater of India. A etudy of the 
reaolutlomS| &• point«>S out lay Nrtrman Paiagr* reveals that "the 
Congress tonik a deep Interest In eertaln external questions 
froa i ts Inoeptioni and ti^ i&t i t tsssed i t s iK>sitlon on certain 
fundamental principles vhich s t i l l s^ape the foreign policy of 
t 
India today,** Out of thes«y the general foreign policy resolu. 
tion passed lay the Aii.India Congress Cowsittee in r^ elh) in 
1921 is **» landaartc in the history of India's foreign relations.** 
It "is ifliportsnt in as nuch as i t vas the f i r s t s i^ i f l eant 
deeiaration on the part of nationalist India tiliat i ts interests 
in the field of foreign poll«y vera diaaetrically opposed to 
those of iirltain. It further laid lovn the basis of an inde-» 
2 
pendent India's f o r e i ^ policy." ^no^er important resolution 
i«as pased at the Congress session In >4sdras in 1927, vhich 
protested against the use of Indian tro'>ps in China, Kesopotasila 
and Persia and deplored the "extensive var preparations vhich 
the British Govem&ent is carrying on in India. ** Indeed the 
1. *7ornan D.Palmer, Xlli lu&Xin fntUlcai >?yil«»lt (^tton t 
*'oughton Miff in Co., 1961), p. 238. 
2. ^T.V.Kajkumar, ed., Th« -Ack ground nf In<<la«a FageigB 
Pftilflyy (Nev !>elhi t Indian Ifatlonal Congress, 1962). 
m a m 
foundt tions of India's fortlgn policy had b«en Is 11 dovti i t 
thfc Madras svisslon of the Com^rest In 1927« 
Xli«} main cxudU far formula tint; fp«« Indl?»»8 foreign 
policy, ani D<-f3i«j that of the Tndlan National Congress, goes 
to *'«hru vHo v3» "the sole architect of the foreign policy o^ 
Independent Tndla," Michael Techer " I^so points out In ':.1B 
biography ths»t ''«hpu was "the philosopher, tho architect, the 
entjln^er and f^e voice 3f ^ Is country's policy to'^rds the 
4 
outsldu vorid*** Indeed, the ^'orelgn policy of Indi* *'? co-ae 
to be Identified vl th the personality of ^i^hrix hlmsel*'. It 1e 
Int^rystlnc; to n-jt^ that India's att itude towards t^e ^'est has 
oeen conditioned oy tJit* p^rsonajL coaplexes of i^andlt "» hru *ind 
when trtinsia t«3d Into action these complexes have become our 
f o r e l ^ policy, Xhi£ contention has bten supported ky V,B. 
K^rnlk who soys thsit, "The ^roiaewoilt vss provided froa tlmti to 
time qy N^hru » i i s idtj^s and Id^olOi^y, ^i^ ^ins snd aspirations, 
h i s jud|^eat& and iapressions, b i s desires and ambitions, his 
llki^s" and disllkt^s, bits passions ^^nd prejudices, and soaetlires 
even hi;. *vliiat and oaprlces* constituted the tljnber vhlch 
went Into the wulidlnt, of that fr^Bevorit." 
J. V.B.Kamlk, "Javaharlal Vshru i foreign Policy**, in f.B.rhah, 
^•^Ift*" ^ f a " g « an>^  Foralcn P/^llclea. (!3oabay t Manaktal^S, 
•!9t6), p . lO, 
4« Michael 3recher, IfiibXtt t *- Po l i t i ca l 31ography, abridged 
ed. , (London t Oxford University t^ress, 19b1}, p«£l6« 
6 . V,3,Karalk, SliU&Ui'f P* ^ *^ 
• a • 
llo doabt thdr« is m. dlaa^cil of ttnitli in th« i^m^^ 
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ra9iiti<H'.«d vl«w9f btit tiso polleir as tsodsliad hy r.«hm *!• A 
pol&oy InhdTont tr. th« direnastancts ^ Isdlaf ichorvnt In 
tho past thinking of Indi&f iit)03>#nt in tho vhole lOdnt&X out* 
looli of Ir.di&t inherent in ^lo con^litioning of tb9 Indian tsinft 
anrlng our 0tjnicgl« ©^^  fyeedois arid iiditrdnt in «ia ciswostaneas 
oi today*'* Zndead the polloy was not eonstitntad at (Mia tisa 
itit is ovoltitioimry in natura drt^ irinfi i ts inspiration frm 
post hlstoryy p:^t thinking and ddeXuratio^ and tha taaeliinga 
o£ Ii^ataa Gandhi« tha iTathar Q4' %M Nation* This is mply 
horna out in the statofnant i&ade bf 4>«J»^ »^Tma in tha l«ok Sahhs** 
7 
;le obsorvad:%.*«»**&ar iToi^ aien poXiey has tha rranaiforlc «r 
oiir Ii^ian oultuxo ai^ d tradition whidi hiis lastad for thouaanda 
Q£ yaars* It is rooted in tha philoa^hy whioh "ahateia Oandhi 
gava tts and It is also groundad in tha tboory and praotioa of 
tho foreign policy irtJieh fandit llahm ax^ csttndad to us tind to 
tl^ whola vorld*** 
ia3./§ tfynairfit rgitigx um ii.,;ii^ i<iA irt,iiryi» 
i.ational interast is sofsathir.g basie to the ntrustttra 
and fianctiOTiing of tha foreign polioy of avery country^ Th®ra» 
fora the promotion of national intorast alvays rae&ins tha 
G, Jawaharlal >^ahrut Mji'iu&Qrfllin ffillgY«* •l^etod apoochas, 
i^artanbar 1046 to ;»pri3. 1861| CHav i alhij i iMlcations 
l-ivisioni 1061) I p*80« 
?• ^^ ^^h^g imMXmi 4th ..eriasf 4A.nj^y.o^A2^ JtUylSi 1P67* 
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aain oaj«etlve of not only th« for«lg|i poliejr of a oountry tet 
of six gov«riMi«nt policy. Morax, r«Xi(iottt, ldo9loglc«X tad 
oth<ir conildoratlons do pXty a part| but th«y art utuaiXy 
&ec«pt«d onXy 8^ a part of and through th« ai«diua of natlonaX 
intaratt* HatlonaX Intaraat aXvaya doainataa aXX othar eonil . 
daratlona, 
r^ a Brookings Inatltuta pubXloatlon on aajor problaaa 
8 
of U.^'.Forelgn PoXlcy dafinad "Intarasta (aa) vhat a nation 
fa«Xa to b€ nacaacary to Ita aaeurity and veXX*balnc| objactlvaa 
ara intarasta aharpeobd to aaat partlouXar intarnatlonal 
situational poXlelas ara thought out ways of attaining objec. 
tlv«ay and coomltaanta ar« apoelflc uadartaklnga in support of 
poXlcy* National Intaraata raflaot tha ganaral and continuing 
ands for vhieh nations act." 
Tha Indian foreign pollcyt Intarpreted In the light of 
th« foragolng daflnltlon of national Int^reatf is seen to be 
9 
actuatad by &3o8«i int«r«sts* As ti«hru onoa told t^arllaAant 
**! affl on aiy country's slda and on nobody alss's*" 
Although national Interest is the Prlaa consideration 
in policy formulation, 'i succasaful foreign policy should ba 
a balanced ooablnatlm of Idealisna and enllghtantsd self*lntere8« 
to 
's '^ ehru observed In a letter to the Presidents of the Provin-
cial Congress Coaalttees during the suwier of 1964 i *** policy 
i l Brookings inBtitUve» ?ftJor PrabitMi of UnUifl rtatii 
FariUa t*Qllfiy latilafiSt ('^shlngton ( D . C . ) t The Brookings 
Inatltuta, 1961;» p* 4£9. 
9* India*a rogMtgn l^lifiy» op.eit . , p. 64* 
10* Quoted in Michael Brecft«r, Qf»clt,t p, S16» 
m 9 » 
•utt tm in k««pln« with th« tr«ditlotiftl te«kgxouiid and «tBp«r 
of th« eountry* U tf^ uXd b« ld«allstlo ••• and ••• rttlUtle* 
If i t Is not Idvailstic i t b«0o««s out of thmr opportitBitai 
if i t i t not r«aXiatiCy th«a i t it lilctljr to bo advoatarist 
and vhoUy inoffootiv**** Xadia*» foroign poiley it a happty 
blond of idoBlisn nnA national intorott| vSth a aoro proaooneod 
inollnation tov&rda Idoaiiaa or IntomationaX intaraat than 
toiiavda a«lf»intaraat* 
Oaaplta a l l th« taJJt about idoaliaa and intamational 
int«raat ona faet anarfoa «hieh ia trua for a l l tiaaa and all 
countriati aaaal/i national intaraat pradoainataa tha thinking 
of avary country • Hahm %«aa eo^nisant of tha faot that "iihatht] 
a country ia iaparialiatio or aoeialiat or eoasimiati its 
foraign aiaistar thinks priaarily of tt)a intaraata of that 
11 
oountryt** and further that "in tha final analysis, al l foreign 
policy oonoams itaalf ehiafly %rith tha national intaraat of 
tha country concamad*'* Bisphasising tha iaportanca of national 
18 
intaraat ^ahiu said, "viiatavcr policy va say lay dovn, tha 
art of conducting t$ia foreign affairs of a country lies in 
finding out % a^t is «ost advaatageoas to the country. i<% say 
talk about International goodwill and aean vhat ve aay, v« 
nay talk about peace and free<k>a and earnestly nean vhat ve say, 
11 • Javaharlal Nehru, asafill^t P* ^* 
IS* ihiA.f p. ee* 
* o «» 
3ut in th« ttItlB&t« analjvls s goir«raiftnt fuaetioat for th« 
good of th« eountr/ i t govozoi uid no goToannitnt dsrt do MI/* 
thing %ri':loh in th« thoYt ftnd lon^ xun it manifottl/ to tho 
ditadv&nta t^t of tho oountiy*" 
In othttr wrdSy tho wijor eritorilon of th« fortifH 
policy of « country it tho oold and itttionti etJleulation of 
ita national intaraata* Although tha Indian Govafmant haa 
not axplioltly dafinad ita natior»l intaraatay i t ia ototioua 
to a eaauai obaarvor that allitary aaeurity and aoonoaia dava. 
lopaant are inaxtrlaaialy bound up vith our eountrr*a national 
intaraata*^ ^^ t^^ at conatitutaa Indiana national intaraatr*•••••• 
India*a quaation ia 8ttrfiirali»aunrival aa a fraay uBitad and 
proaparoua nation* Indian poopla ar« intaraatad In atability 
and aaourltyointarnal and axtarnal*" Thia ratiuiraa a poliey 
of peaca and< co»opar«tion in India*a aalf^intaraat* '*Thar«» 
fore**! ^ehru saidf "vd propoaa to look aftar India'a intaraata 
in t^ a oontaxt of vorld eo«.oparation and vorld paaeat in ao 
fai aa vorld paaca can ba pr&aarvad* 
' a propoaa to kaap on tha eloaaat tama of friandahip 
vith 9thar oountriaa unlaaa ttay thaauialvea craata dlffieultiaa^ 
13. K.P^Kaxunakaram Qijtildt Tlit Caatat i ^ t^udy of I^ on. 
/ligmant and Xno Foraign Polieiaa of aona Won a^lignad 
eountriaa,(Htv nalhl t ?aopla«a Publiahine louaa, 1963)t 
J. W. 
14« J«U^ahzU| flJ2*AlS*t P* ^* 
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arlttflji th« IndlAii foar«lgii poXley in att«ipting to 
dtflA* national, intaratt. In addition to addraaslng ItaaXf 
to national salf-intaiaat. waa alao oognisant of and raapon. 
16 
•iva to tha vidar and tinoadar intaraata of tha votldm It 
confonaad to aoaa of tha idaaa of Hainbold Itlahbuhr* vho daola« 
lb 
rad I **/> narirov national loyalt/ on our part ••• viU obacura 
our long.range intereata vhara thsy ara Involvad vlth thoaa 
of a whole alliance f^ frao nationa*** 
thuai nahru*a ida%liaa vh«n ooabinad vith raaliaa 
dictated & liutrai policy on tha part of India in har anlight* 
anad aalf.intaraat* 
In ganaral taraay tha aiajor goala of Indian foiaiga 
polioy vera ai«pla and norucontro^araial t frlandahip vlth 
%y/Bry nation, attachsant to no oloOf ayapathy vlth atmgglaa 
17 
for fraadoM and oppoaltion to racial diaeriMination avaryvhara* 
But according to J*C«Kundra a daaaiflad attitaaaat 
of tha aiaa of Indian foraign policy ahould indudat 
!&• K.F.Mlare. 9iUf Jnfe«^^«tl<in tn fltudl— i n Indinn rftyalim 
^i^«v, (Naw Sttlhl I Vikaa Publieationa, 19&9)» p»XTn. 
J». r>aa hia phrlafelAn ItattliM stilt I»ftlitiflal PmblnMt^ 
(Hav ioxk» 1933)» p«1d7, 
17* '^^ rnar Leviy fg*a inriia in Aaia^  (Hinnaapolla i Onivaraity 
of Hinnaaota PT^BB^ 1954), p«7« 
• e « 
!• **lfoiwlntolv«B«fit in a third %i9rld nar* 
2* D«if«XopB«nt of Iniian •conoay and for that purpot* 
kooping opan al l channels of Inttmational tradt 
and aid* 
3* Maintananca of India'a indapandanca in tha aphara 
of axtarnai affaira. 
4« winning of Intamational aupport on tha Xaahair 
quastion* 
6» Intagration of tha Pranch and i^ 'jrtuguaaa aattlaiiaRta 
vith th« Indian Union* 
i>* Saourins a fair traatmant and tha dignity of tha 
loSiana settlad abroad* 
7* Chaapionship of the eauaa of oolonial paoplas* 
8* Aiaoiition of racial dlacriaination avary^ara bat 
particularly in r*Africa* 
9* Craatlon of a consultatiTs aaohinaxy in cooperation 
vitb neighbouring and othar ^nian oountriaa^^lS 
India*a foreign policy haa baan diraetad tovarda ^a 
achlavan««nt of thaaa aiaa* The difficult poaition in iihidi 
India found haraalf aftar indapandcnca^ tha naoaaaity of 
obtaining aaaistanca froa abroad to aaat har aconoaio naadSi 
and the daalrability of Maintaining paaca for the fulfilaant 
of tha taak of social and econoaie reconstruction^ led Indli 
to adopt non^alignBent and the purauit of peace as the cardir»] 
features of her foraign policy* Other objectives vere r^oval 
18* J*c*Kundra, IntlliB Fnraign ^fllUr 1»i7ti19fi^  i A f^ tudy 
of Halations vith tha Vestem Sloe. (Boabay:Vora 1 Co** 
Publishers Ltd*, 1966), p*69* 
• 9 • 
of th« root eaus«9 of var by o!mmpioalng th« IltiofoUoa of 
tt.B iubJ«Gt pcopXeff thtt ollaination of xaeUl dlterlaiivitlon 
and th6 ollalnatlon t>f want^  dls«at& and llXlteraey* Tho 
Indian Oovoxnaont felt that in order to fulfil these objeetives 
succeeafull/i It oust give uoQuaXlfled aUeglanoe to the 
19 
United Nations and foXlov an li%3ependent foreign polley* 
^t Its Jaipur 'Session the Indian ffationaX Ooagress 
affltvedt 
**Tbe foreign poUey of India aMSt neeessarlly be based 
on the prlnelples that have stiided the Congress i^ the past 
years, these prinelples are prMDotion of vorld peaeet the 
freedoa of au. nations, racial eQuaXlty and the ending of 
iaperlallsa and eolonlalSsa* It should be the constant aisi 
of the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and 
co«operatlv« relations with a l l nations and to airold entangle-
fflent 1A sllitary or slBllar allianeeSi vhleh tend to divide 
up thi. vorld In rival groups and thus endanger M)rld peace*" 
19* <^ ee Jftwaharlil tlltoi'l rntififiaii 1M7eftS» (Nev OeXhl t 
Publications Division, 1967)» p«40l» Also K.P.Karunaksran, 
iniatft In voyXd 'ffalri f^ tagnit fgiZgiTina I860t ^ Beview 
of India's Foreign Belatlons frosflndependence Cay to 
Eepubllc nay, (London t Oxford University Press,t96e), 
nrtten Ifatlnnai amiffig Prncitaingii J^ipur;i948, 
ff ev Delhi I / • I • C* C. Li brar y), pp* fbd^ TO* 
IfeM* orlnclpiti today feira t»)« batls of Indli't 
foreign poli«jr« 
India's poXiey of non-allgmtnt vas dictated by h«r 
•oonoBl« and security Interests, India being econoBleally 
retarded and BiXltarliy veek after IndepiAdenee needed a l l her 
resources for eonstnietlve voik and could not afford to enter 
the aras race with other countries or ha>re Its weight fe l t 
In t}« Intem&tlon&X foruos. In faotf peace was essential to 
tbe vt7 «xast«ce of India, i^ ence^by assunlng a non-all^ned 
posture India tried to steer dear of power*blocs and pursue 
the path of peace and co*operatlon with a l l which enabled It 
to obtain aid from wherever possible* **In such a policy she 
found the triple coincidence of serving Indians own Interests^ 
the Interests of world peace and finding a moral justification 
!n a policy of peacci which Is not easy to find In mere neutru 
llsn*** This peace Is to be maintained not "throu^ a system 
of alliances with ti v two power blocs but through an iruiependent 
approach or the policy of norualignment*' M 
Non-allgnmenty howeveri Is not new to India* It **ls a 
mtturai development of the manner in which i t had carried on 
£1* For crit ical study of Indian foreign folicy see B*r,?f« 
f^urt/i Tfilint't Ffirtlin ^fllla¥> (tVev Dalhii The Beacon 
Information and PubllcatioaS| 1963)* 
2&m J'*C*Kttndrat XUbAJJ^ t »• ^1« 
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i t s stiuegl« for lnd«ptind«ne« hy non»viol«nt means whl^ 
le f t no bitt«m«ts or refentaent agmintt our eritvhlle rulers* 
VIth th!i background, It vai only nfttur«l thtt our generftl 
polio/ should be to eultiv&te friendly relations vith a l l 
countries* v« are of course nore friendly v i ^ tone countries 
th»n vith othirs* For inatance, we hriT« aore eeonoale and 
trade reXationa with &omu eountrl«S| ve hate alto sMie special 
t ies vith soae of our close neighbours and vith CkMMonwealth 
countries* vhat ve try to avoid, hovever, i s being unfriendly 
to any country uniese that country chooses setively to pursue 
23 
a hostile policy tovards us*** Again, *'Thit policy i s nt>t 
t^ ie product of *tny inspiration or arbitrary choice, but hss 
i t s roots in thtt past history and vay of thinking at ve i l as 
24 
in funtfeiaentai national exigeneies*** 
India eeoheved pover polities in her polioy and adopted 
instead th«i iaethod ^f peaceful persuasion or influence poli-
ties* Vehru alto avoided joining the ai l i tary alliances in 
order to r«aBain out of the sphere of t»^ e pover.polittcs of the 
26 
Great ('overs* 's "^ ehru explained, "Our general policy i s to 
avoid entanglement in pover polities and not to Join any group 
of povers as against any other group* fhe two leading groups 
today are the Busfian bloe and ^ e / aglo»Aaerioan bloc* Ve 
23* •f*l>«Nehru, guiuStl^»t P* ^^* 
£4* S*?f.chakravart/, India gtteaks to /^erJca* <!»ev &rk i 
Orient Longp^ns, 19l»&),p«6« 
26* J*L*Wehrtt, ^a.eit* 
•» 18 «» 
•Hit bt f]ri«ndl/ to l»th and jrtt not jola •ith«r«* Thus 
India triad to koap out of tha antanglaBaiita of Cold var 
dlploaae/ and foilovad Ita O%A indapandoat path* 
An Isportant aapaet of India *a nofwalifnatfiit ia iiida» 
pandanoa in foraign poUajr* **Xt dot^ a not »aan aautfaXlty in 
any oonfliet. tet a poaitlva polioy of diaantanclaaaat fioa 
86 
tha apparent or ooneaalod doainatlon of a vaatam povar*** 
Aa Vidya Charan ShukXa, aupportlng tho noiuaXigoBoDt poliey 
87 
in ParlitBont aaid tba poliay of non-alignaant ia *OBI/ an 
intamational axtanaion of our national fraadoa*** Faaantially, 
*'noiwalignnant ia fraadoa of aotlon «liieh ia part of iadapan. 
£8 
d^ iaa*** It vaa vith a Yiav to rataining thia indapaadant viav 
S9 
of tha mrld that If^fu vahaaaatly oppoaad ailitary Uoeai 
"vtiat doaa Joining a hlo9 aaaat Aftar al l i t aaa oaiy 
mmn ona thing s giva up your viav about a partiauiar quaatioa, 
adopt tha othar party'a poiat of viaw oa that quaation in orda: 
to plaaaa i t and gain ita fa^ur." 
Haaaa India rafUaad to 00iK>parata undar »r—waf or to 
baooaa a **aaapfollovat'* of any bloa* Hovavari Nohxtt vaa alio 
0 6 . K^P-lfagiMiakmjan- »»1^>ifc>Alifwa«t**y fiMiinftg. March 1 9 . 
1»1 , p.14. 
87* T^ rA^.m nahat*^ ^ 3rd Sariaa^ Tol«XL| f<d*dOt April l , 
88* 1f^|tt| flBijii*! P« 486* of-clt-
89. Jawaharlal Wahru, IflaU'J flaWlm PQJiflyt ftftffttti.tP*^ ,^ 
30 
pr«par«4 to ^*«oaproait«*^ and <Sld not *'nil« out tht pMtiMllt/ 
of our tuliordlaatlag our vlonpoint In Intorattiontl conf* 
•r«ao«« la ordor to gain toaothiiic northwhllo.** 
31 
Indopondoaoo of JudgoBont aoMit *to ooatldor oa^ 
quoftlon first in toiai of 2iadi«'« iatoroit «ad foooadiy on 
its morlts • I aean to sft/ if i t did not affott Indifti natorall 
on It* Borita « and mt aaraly to do soaathlng or givo a 
trota Jttat to pXaaaa thia or that povory though, of ooura«| i t 
ia parfaotljr natural that in our daairo to hava friondahip 
%dtti othor povortf %ra avoid doini^  anything nhith aiglht irri . 
tata th«a«** thoraforai tho oaaantiaio of noa»aiignB«it ara 
iion.a^«r«no« to niXitar/ Uoea and oonfidaration of aU isauos 
of Korld affairs on their aarita. 
Furthort India*a aon-aligmont policy ia *poaitiY«*| 
*eon8trttetiv«% Mafinita' and *dynMiie* and not nogativa or 
•paaaiYo* or *naiitral*« /l^soug^ India iiaa unalignad a t i l l 
sha vas *'coaaittad to various policiaai various urgss. various 
38 
objoetivas and various prlnoiplos*** Honeo, India*a non» 
aligmint was quit* diffaraat fioa elassioai nsutraliSBt i^ieh 
Aoant isolationiSBi osoapisa and statioisa* '^Ifautrailtgr as 
30. 2MA»9 p* 36. 
31. I t t ^ t p. 33. 
38. JMA*9 P« 86. 
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33 
a poller ^ « iitUtf mt^ aaing «xe«pt In tlatt of «ar«" In 
contr&at to tha pollojr of ii«ttti«litar| India **iihiia vtaalalng 
qulta apart from povar blooSf** «aa| *'ln a far battar position 
to OS at our valc^t at tha r l ^ t aoaant in favour of paaoay 
and fltaanii^ila our raXatlona ean baooaa as eloa« at poaaiblo 
in tho ooonoMio or othor doaaia vith aueh ootmtriaa vith hoa 
A 
v« can aaslly davalop ^as* !^ i t it not a quastion of our 
rasainlag laolatad or cut off fioa th« raat of tha vorld* 
y do not wiah to ba laolatod. ^ viah to hava tha olpaaat 
cont^aetai tMoaua* ^m do floa th« basliiai&f tinlj baliata 
In th« vorXd eoatat eloaar togathar and ultiaattly raaXiaing 
t^ t« Idaal of i^at la nov baing oaJUod oaa lorid* Oiat i i 
34 
our ganaraX outlo^ in ragard to our poliojr*" India pla/od 
an aetlva rola in tha eata of K r^aan and ^9* eriaaa to 
loealiaa the oonfllct and proaota a paaoofuX loXution of th« 
probXaoa* 
HahTtt did not Xika tha appXiaatlon of tha tam *poaitiv 
nautraxitr* to India's poXioy* Ho dacXarad, "vitdiout doubty 
va ara unaXignadi i#a ara uneaMiittad to aiXitary blooai but 
tho inportant faot is that va ara ooaaittad to various poXl« 
eiaSi various urgaa, various obJoctivaa^ and various prlneipXc 
36 
varjr aueh ao*** 
aa^ Ibid., p. BR. 
34. Ibid-, pp. 47«48« 
36* illld*9 »• 8b* 
u • 
Shl» shows ttMt norw&ligwsat doss not sssa a *'BiddIs. 
df 
of.ths.ro&d p9llo/* 9f "hsdglng and avoiding tha pitfalls'* 
or "sitting on th« f^ nea*** It la a posltivsi oonstruotlva 
policy dalibarataly aiaing at soaattilng and delibaratal/ 
trying to avoid hostility to other oountrlas, to any ooontry 
as far as posslbla* Moraovari India navsr haatitatad to 
fulf i l i ts obllgationa to th« i^ orld coami^ity and took savaral 
constxuetivs inltiativas for vorld pi>aoa and intamatlonal 
eo^oparation^ aought to strangthan tha (toitad lfationS| shaa. 
pionad tba fraadoa of nations and aquality of raoaa and higiNt 
lightad tha das ira bill ty of intsrnationai eo.»oparatlon for 
aoonoBlc advanoamont of tha Industrially uadar-davalopad 
paoplea* Sasldaa this posltiva rola India did not wish "to 
intarfara in intamatlonal affairS| axeapt tl^ ara va faal that 
wa sight t>fi aiaa to ba of soaa h«lp, ••••••"^ buty "vhara 
India's intarasta ar« diraatly thraat«aad« whathar in Qoa 
or in Pakistan, %ra oust hava our say| a loud aay^, a posltiva 
37 
say* Xhax« va cannot raaain Qulatc** 
38 
In th« words of Clovls l^ faksoudf **l?on»8li0ra«nt| thua^ 
was a daflnita rajaotion of isolationist or classioal naatra. 
l lsa and a gradually dynaslo Involvasant in tha huaan altuatlon 
Uaatiot PUbllaatl ns mvislon, t9M)fP« wl* 
37* Javaharlal ifshru* juuAl^t PP« 7i»73« 
36* Clovla {^aksoud, "Tha Boots**! fi^inm^^ ?ol*46| May 
1963, p« t « . 
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IndlaU poXlG^ of ndiw«llgnn«At is further Xlflk«d vlth 
Us ftoonoBie Iftttrflfts of tb« country* It It ••••ntlsl that 
th« foraign policy of a couatr/ aust be eXoscl/ linked vltb 
its •oonoMle policy* India had achieved political indepen» 
denee« but eoonoaic independence ves s t U l deluding her* 
rhci tr^ereforC;ne«ded tl«« to sake herself econoBlcally viable 
A third world v^r i t this stage could prove disastrous to 
the country! creating econoaic havoCf generating trtfiendous 
Intemaii political and social pressures and perhaps taming 
her into a battle«fleld* rush deveXopnents could Jeopardise 
the ^«:y existence of the Government Itself* Paced vlth the 
treneodous task of having to Improve the shattered econoaj 
of the country* reaove social evils and reconstruct the 
educational system on modem llntts* India %ias In great need 
40 
of pe*ice* ^ Vljaya Lakshal Pandit observed! *'Our need for 
peace is imperative* It Is not merely desirable or preferataci 
i t is a vitaX necessity and a dalXy prayer* '^e h?3iva probXems 
to face in India that vouXd tax the energies and resources of 
a nation far better equipped nnd developed than ours* **'e 
need pt^ ace not in order to become more powerfuX or more pi^s* 
perousi but in order to exist* v« need i t in order to eat| 
39* ?ee UUl^»in^Wt fo^^ft and tht ynlttd Statu ,(Wev fork,: 
The MacmlXXan Companyi 1960)t p* 36* 
40* Vljaya Lakstaml t^ andit* **India*s Foreign poXlcy^* ftt^ixm^ VoX*d4! !Vo*99 April t966| p* 436* 
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to b« cXothtdy and houMd and aad« JLitvfftU.** Froa this 
point of vl«V| V^9 poliey of iion»«XlgaBoat nftt aott cong«nl&i«^ 
3«sid«s k««pin£ India out of cold var ontanglMontt, i t 
halp«d to eroato &n area of p«ae«« India could k«ap on 
fri«ndljr t o n s vith bo^ th« lOoos and rooalvo aid fioa th«i, 
India vae jraady to v«loon« tooi^Blc aid fzoa v^•rev•r i t 
oaai«« /i8 ^«hru »Sild| "riran in accepting aoonoBic h«Xp| or 
in gattiog politic&I :^lp| i t ia m t ^ vise policy to put 
a l l our «gga in on^ baskat* Nor should va gat h«lp at th« 
coat of our a«>lf•resp«et* Th<in \m ara not raspaotad by any 
party} va aay gat aona patty banafitSi but ultinataly avan 
these may us denied us* Thereforsi purely froa the point of 
viev of Ml opportunism, i f you l ike , a straightforwardf honest 
polieyf an independent polioy i s the best*** 
In receiving eoonoaie aid Indiii %IQ8 not prepared to 
subordinate her policies to those of the donor country. HeVm 
48 
aade this cl«ar in no uncertain teras« H« saidt "Our pol l . 
ciea cannot be affected by and there aust be no strings 
attached to any kind of Velp t^^^% ve get| and that ve vsuld 
rather strug£;l<^ throu^ ourselves vithout any help t^an have 
our policies affected in any «ay br outside pressure*** 
41* Javaharlal ?7ehrU| QP*cit** p* 36* 
42* llilii*! P* <^ 9« 
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Tbe deftnoe and •«curltgr tm^As of Untflt t l to dietst« 
s poliey of norualigfwont* *'Ev*rjr oountrjr*! foreign polley, 
f l f i t of ally i» coRctamA vlth Ite own ••eurltjr and vlth 
proteeting It* own pxogrets* f^eeurltsr ean be obtained In nani 
vaye* 7h€ nonwx Idea la that aeeurlty is ptoteeted bir poll* 
clea* A deliberate pulley of ftiendahip with other oountriea 
43 
eo«8 farther in graining ateuYlty than alaoat anjrthinc else*** 
Wi^ yii had to adopt thlt atanee beeauae India ^AS 
• l l l t n r l l y ^•ry veak and Insignificant at that tlae and thla 
state of defence was to eontinue t i l l she was adequately 
Industriallaedy vhich seeded unreaslisabl* in the naar futttr«« 
?lon»alignsent %ouid enable her to reaain non»subservient as 
a potential great povery aet as a go*betveen In relation to 
44 
the tvo bloesy exert her infiuenee by Baintainlng the toaianee 
and thus enhance h«r prestige* India's **non»alignMnty far 
fron being based on a negation of pover polities^ vas a eal . 
culated projection for pover* and a sove* vlth a difference 
46 
of pover polities*** 
43* iJ2l4l*i 9» 79* 
44« D.N.HaUik, i^ht-QittjiflaaiBt flf WorViAllgfwtnt in Xndla'i 
196?l P*40« 
46* ^ee M,N.aal»ian| Ij^ f Pftlltlflg gf HflftiaUyMlin|y (Hev Delhii 
Assoeiated Publishing Housey l9&9;y pp* 61.66* According 
to his^ <*v<iry fev' paoplc seea to realise that this policy 
of noiwalignaent with ai l i tary blocs and friendship^with 
Contd****** 
• 16 • 
Init ial ly, 8«v«r&l advantages aeoru«d to India fros 
following th« policy of non.ailgn3i«nt. India gained a high 
and respected place in vorld cotmcils, disproportionate to 
i t s capacity and power} she received aid froa a l l sideSi was 
able to avoid violent conflicts and cold war intrigae8« oon* 
tributed constructively to the aalntenance of world peace 
and was able to devote her aeagre resources to the inpioveatnt 
of her people's standard of l iving. 
TTow^ e^r, as an afteraath of the Chinese invasion of 
1962 India's policy of non.alignaent lost the unaniaous 
support i t previously enjoyed and has been greatly eriticired 
In scMie quarters. It was pointed out that the non.aiigned 
countries in deciding their foreign policies wer« really led 
47 
*'not a> truth but fear of displeasure.** Tha Indian isxpr^.a 
also ironically reaaiked that if alignaent aeant a bit of 
(Continued froa the previous page) 
a l l countries to pzt»tect the security of the nation is in 
reality a policy based on the balance-of-power principle.** 
The desire not to antagonise the Coviet Union Is due to the 
fact that i t was the aost powerful state on India's border, 
Oiich could threaten India's security. United rtates* 
friendship was essential because i t was the only power 
having the means to help India a^leve econoaic prosperity 
and also check the Bussian aabitione of territorial 
espanslon. 
4&* v«rner Levi, "Indian Neutralise Btconsidered", Pacific 
Affaire, Vol. XXXVII, Ho.2, E^ uaaer 19b4, p. 138. 
47. gwaraiva, Deoeaber 29, 19&2{ see also editorial in 
Ihi nindWt 'November 4, 19b2. 
• 80 • 
•ov«r«l|Atir lotty notwAllgnsent a^ant a good bit of t«rritorjr 
lottU Critlcft &lso aouUt«(!l the validity of th« trt|Mi«it 
that noik.sii^ui«at teoaght fri«iidt txom sfryx^tt^ ftft«r th« 
luktvaxa «Ki)rMslons of tjfBp&t^ y fioa 3th«r noiwillfiMd 
QOuntrl«t on h«r &pp«al for support* It VAB f t i t thftt It vat 
India that %raa iaolatad by har policy of norwaligmmt and 
not China* ^Uij.s/a vaa t>e onX/ country to support India 
opanly and «>ndaffli Chinase a^grast^ lon* It vss felt that the 
foraer par-^on of non.aIi£aa«at f^d b4«n b«s«ir«hed and 
beaired n^d Inllh had to drop out of the ranks of those \^ 
are in a position to coneet others* t^ uXtSy and that aon» 
aligmeat > id outllired Its usefulness* The elaia of 4ls«Chagia 
that th« violation of India*s non^allgnnent did not prove 
46 
that thi principle was bad was countered by the assertion 
that if i t did not work In relation to China, there vaa 
l i t t l e reason left tot the existence of the polioy* The 
Chinese attaok had demonstrated the fauXtiness of non^alignaenl 
It vas further pointed out that tha policy failed to provide 
security for India or to save hmt twm a cold or a h t^ var* 
rinee aggression had taken place t^ iere vas nothing left to be 
49 60 
non-aligned about* i^ charya Sriplanl also contended that 
India Is belligerence in relation to China aiade non»allgnieRt 
^ft- < f^eft».^ «Mariy J a n u a r y lA^ ^Qfta^ 
4&* Werner Levi, aii»JBli»» P» '^ 41. 
50* T-P-P>t Third seriesi Vol*}(IX,lf9*6| August 19t19t>3t 
col* y Is4* 
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ridiculed iioiwallgiMi«iit and pressed for Its mMnrtonint In 
fav{Mur«d'of an &lllan«4i vlth thm %%8t« Th« PBP alto quaatlona^-^ 
Ita voriclng spirit In to to* 
Dis Dctokx^ r £5| 19&2 Hthru »ald In n^y Dal^l that **asa«li»a 
iniraalon of Indls fcn/ China*' hs.d aada 2hdia realize tVat aha 
had b««n *'o«t of touch w5th r^riHtf and that ba htd baan 
"ahookad out of tiiu '^rtlf Icli^i &taoap^ >«r€ of our owi craation*** 
^Itharto Indlii ba2 devoted haraalf aalnly to economic davalop-
laant e^ nd ^^1& l i t t l e :utt«sntlon to dafai;ca« Moraovary India's 
dafaat at U^ e '^^ nd^  o^ t^ t« Chln^sa \m» also biaad on a a l t . 
calculation on the ^ r t of S«hru of th« nature of CMnaaa 
intentions £^ nd tlit^lr MQtldi pov^r aspirations and his pra« 
occupation vlth vorld affairs vMcV pr«?v«nted hla from paying 
dua attention to the t«Ottrlty problan of t^e country* I t naa 
only %^(Mi tba Chinese had enterad India that India vas awakaned 
froa her stupor and appealed to the ''est for al l l tary support* 
t^ erhaps tho aoat perceptive c r l t l d t a of Indians policy 
of non^allgaiaent and i ts irrelevance In the context of the 
ehanged vorld situation haa been given lay i'atvant Clngh* ^s 
he hsis put Iti 
61. ?atv&ttt ringht M l t , ami ttlt FatttM at h§i%f (London t 
- _ . '^^h9» HOB. Fai>er and Fairer Ltd«| 19t>6i 
"ZiUllft was aoxusXigiMd ia r«iatlon to th« two opposing 
vorld pov«>Mf Aatriea and th« U«0«E«R, Blaeo thoao pov«r« art 
thaBKtlvaa noiwallgiiad in tboir h o t t U l ^ to China, 2iidia| 
baeausa of har ova confioatatSon vith Chlna| if obtSoutly In 
alignaoit vlth th«R, mt habita dia hard. Iht onljr do ladiaij 
a t i l l fancy thtrasfelvaa aoa»aJLigiied but aany In tha %iiBt a t i l l 
raaant India*a past policy of noivaligniaQt.*' 
Thia gives rise to tha question of non»alieniaat 
batvaaa .^fiat and vhoai? Ha further coBaentodt 
*'»««*«non»aIig|B«Bt was m^fl^f a policy for national 
survival! not » norsl ooncopt* vhara !lahm vent wiong was 
in tirasoaaly treating i t as such, and continually irritating 
thoae at the receiving end of Xndla*s 8elf«.ri|(hteott8 a o m i a * 
ing| vhlle Sadie's non»aligiHsaat proved useful vhen opposing 
povers needed an interMediaryt i t was unneeeaaary to paddle 
I t ia the international aai.^ket*plaoe on every occasion*** 
The oontroverslBi r«sctions to the policy of aon-
alignnent in the vake of the Chlneae Invailon reflected *he 
f i i lure of the Govemsant to create s national concensus 
regcxdlnc Its Imjjltcations. 5.o«e people have argued thst 
aiignsant with the ^eet nould hcve saved the country froa the 
hUHlllstlng Chinese imrpslon «n<f vi t l t ted the full slgaifican* 
6S« l^iXA*9 ?• 112, 
of iikl«p«kd9no« and in%9gtity that India valued ao na^* **Ih 
th« purattlt of p«aca and noiwallgnaaiit**! obaarvad tho rvantanti^ 
63 
partjr '^aeratar/f "va hava lirought var on our tanrltorar*** 
Hovavari tha iion»aiigi»ant policy haa baan aueeaaaful to tha 
axtant that tha eino^Iadlan eonfUet raulaad JLoealiaad and 
did not baeoaa a oold i^ ar laaua* Purth«»r| It la alfinifleant 
th&t tha repfaaantatlvaa of tha oountrlaa Xaading t^ a two 
bloea haTa thaaaaXvaa axpraaaad appraoiatlon of and intaraat 
In th« Qontlauad •aiatananca of ooiwallgBBaBt by India* In 
faett non-ailgiMiaBt haa baooaa al l tha aora ralavant in tha 
aoataxt of the nav altuatlon aa ahom by tha incraaalng muibar 
of natlona adoptlac noiw&ligiaaiit aa the guiding prlneipla of 
thair foraign policy and attending tha non^alignad auaiit 
eonfaraneaa* 
But the virtual i4antifleation of non^aiigniant vith 
the vhole of India*a foreign policy instead of viewing i t aa 
only an aap«ct and an instruBant of that policy haa blurred 
the proper perapectlve and tended to audie i t aa an and in i t . 
self I divorced froa national interest* Aa an and In itself 
non»aiigBBent is nothing^ but negative* /*> doctrinal m faith 
in i t deprives i t of its realistic relevanee* 
63* Caa M*B«Maaani*a apeach in tha Lok Sabha on "ugust IQ9 
19&di^ *p*Xodaaaa Hao, **Augment will help us contain 
China", if^ ffpui' TiM<rfiy Pabsuary 10| 19(»d| p*4* 
How«v«r| la the vake of the Chinesa Invasion India*• 
policy of non«allgnm«nt undervtnt som« chang«. T in 1962, 
India had aco«pt«d only scononic aid and rejected nllltary 
aid. But nov she erigerly accepted oillltary aid fk^ os foreign 
oountrios, specially U.S.A., vhlle Insisting that foreign 
basss and troops would not be permitted on Indian soi l . Hovs. 
ever, this step did not constitute a deviation froB non. 
allgnaent as India received aid froo both the blocs siwaltaneou. 
s ly . Moreover, a number of non.allgned oountrlesi for example 
]K:ugoslavla, continued to be non.aligned vhlle sooeptlog 
military aid. Thusi this development brought no fundamental 
change In India's non-aligned position which remains the 
same even after Nehru* s dmath* 
The principle of peaceful co*exlstence which foxms part 
of the foreign policy of India i s nothing new. I t is a recog. 
nised principle of international law and international politics 
that no state shall interfere with the domestic affairs of 
another, and the form of ^vernment i s the ooncexti of the 
people of the country concerned. 3ut India has made this 
principle more sacred by Including It in the Part IV of the 
Constitution dealing with Directive Principles. Article 61 
declares that "the state st>all endeavour to promote intern, 
atlonal peace and security, maintain just and honourable relatioi 
bttvMn natlonti foat«r r«sp«et for ifit«fnationRl lav %nd 
tr«at/ obligations In the d«alliigt of organlttA paopl* vlth 
on« anoU cr, and •ncoaraga ••ttlanent of Intarnational dStputas 
by arbltj^tion,*" India had attained Independenee through QO« 
operation and frlendabi|) and It vaa only natural t^at she 
s^uld be easier to a^opt this policy in her relations vlth 
other eountries after she became a sovereign republle* 
Peaceful co^exlstence is ano^er aspect of Ittdla*s 
foreliU polio/ vhleh Is eoapleaentary to the policy of non* 
aiignaent. This policy has arisen natiii«lly froa oar vital 
need to aeeonaodate different religious vievs and cultures and 
to be able to devote enough tiae to solve the nuserous •conoalo 
and social probiens esnfrontlng us* India's foreign policy Is* 
thereforcf detenilAed by her doaestlc policy* India hat 
refused to join alliances, vhlch Instead of proaotlng peaeci 
created an atmosphere of rlvalryi and did her utmost to lessen 
tension and assist In bringing about agreement between rivals 
^fy>Br&v^r possible* 
Nohru propounded the Five i^lneiples of co*exlst«ice 
or *Panoh rheel* for the f i r s t tiae in the preamble to the 
rino*lndlan Agreement on trade vltSi Tibet on April 29, t9&4* 
b4 
The Panch ^heel, vhlch the l>rime Minister has explained as 
64* For details see, Ulrilal Jain. Pfnahah^^l and After t A 
he&ppralsal of rino»Indian heiatlons in the context of 
Ilbetan Insurrection, (London t Asia Publishing '7ouse,10tiQl 
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India*t siifwr to th« dootrln« of t^ourity pftott| l i sts thess 
"1^9 noitts of intsnwtionAl Miaviour i (^  ) mtosl rsspsst for 
m&eh other's tsrrltorisl iatsgrity snd sovsrsignturi (S> aorw 
<>l£ir«ssion$ (uj norwlntsrfsrsaes in s a ^ othsn individual 
Skffairsi (4) squalitjr and mtual advantagsi and (6) paaocfm 
oo*«xist«nos and «ooncMii« oo«>o pa ration. 
•psnehshaal* stands for '^pftaeafUl sattlaa^nt* and afaova 
66 
al l non»intarftr«nea" of any kind, politieal, aeonoaie or Idao* 
logioal* 8^ ?f«hrti axplainad, **The eoneaptlon of Panahshaal 
oaans that thara as/ t« dlffarant v@/s of pxograss, possibly 
diffarant outlookS| but that^ broadlyt the ultiaata objaetlva 
66 
nay ba tha saaa." FT«as«« tha assanca of Panohshaal le that 
**va valcoa« friandsbip and association with all and tha flow 
of thought and idaas of a l l kinda» but va resanra tha ri|^t 
67 
to ehooaa our ovn pa ,^** Thasa princlplaa vara to i»^ani 
India's relations not onl^ vith China but also vith other coimt-
riaa aa vai l * 
Xh« aaln obJaetiVa of India has always baan tha proaotion 
and taaintananca of world paaet. To this and ah« has ranounead 
66. Jawaharlal N»hru» Indii't Farjlm PotliByt p.lOO. 
66. ibld*f P* ^00. 
67« ibid*! P* ?CS« 
« 87 • 
th« tts« of fo£e« In the t«ttleaumt of diB|Mt«s and pr«f«rrod 
flolvlng dlsput«>s l»y p«ae«ful ncans. In shorty foroo hat b%«n 
rapiscod fay porsuatloii aodlstlon and ooneiXiatlon at a saant 
68 
of solving iaauas* At Profettor ^ppadoral hat obtarradi 
*'lhe Indian approach pfooaadt on tha atsusptlon that paaoa 
oannot iM proooted by cra-itlng potltlont of ttrangth i on t^a 
contrary, the creation of potitioni of ttraagth night baooaa 
a tKr«at to paaoa^ f^r avary party viXX naturally try to 
Inoraattt Ita strength via»&«v3a iia eoapatltors for povart 
and tuch an attanpt i t tuicidal in tha atoalc aga. Fiitaring 
Into military ailianoaa,ana tla aati^bHahnant of al l i tary 
bataa in foraign tarritory accantuatat dltoord and tha pottl* 
bi l i ty of war* Tha paacaful approach \^.idtx alto doaa Rot 
gwarantaa paaca . h a s to ba triad 1^  only bacauta thara i t 
no other* It t ataantial It tb^ dataxalnati^n to avoid forcay 
fr^ r the uta of violanca oraatet «ora problant than tha one 
it4 tolvat iC| Indaadi ita uta doaa not lead to vorld dattruc. 
tioni hanoa dltcuttioni negotiation! said aeooaaodatlon are 
the only way l e f t for t^e 8attla«ant of diffarencat." 
Hlttory alto tubttantiatat tha Indian approach. More 
diaputes have oaen solved by ditcuttion and agraaaant than by 
resort to vari fox axanpley tructa have baan aecured in Korea, 
Indo•C^ina and Kashairt progratt haa been achieved over nuclear 
bS* /.'ppadoraii **on Undarttanding Indian Foreign Policy**, 
Inttrnatlanat JiiHttoni» voi.ii, NO.S, October, i9(>o«p*7b. 
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dltaxsMatnty the principle of Intsmfttlonal control uid in». 
ymetion b«ing also &ec«pt»d b^ th« rovi«t Union aftor y««rt 
of negotlatloni th^ cansl v»t«rt disput« b«tv«i«n India tnd 
c^aklst^n h&» b€«*n tiBttlvdi tnd tb« differ<»nce8 b«t%r«en the two 
oountriee ov«r bord«r adjastnents hav« also bssn successfully 
r«solv«d« 
Hsno«| i t i s alvsjrs Indians sndtt^vour to oast Its 
velgbt on tbo slds of peaos in eastts of conflict in vorld 
affairs* 
ftim m sac, uniai) rsioitfri 
India YASk bftsn associated vith th« United !fations siiMs 
i t s inception. £h« is one of th^ f i f ty one original •embers 
vbo particlpatcid in the drafting of the Charter of a^n Francisco 
in 1046* 3n October 30f 1046y India beoane i t s member* 
Ag early as t9^ f^^ hru unequivocally declared India U 
69 
faith in and support to th« United Tfatlons* He declared^ 
*'1b«ards th« United Nations India's attitude i s that of whole. 
hearted oo«<»peration and unreserved adherence in both spirit 
!md letter to the Charter governing it* To that end India could 
participate fully in i t s various act ivit ies and endeavour to 
59* Jawaharlal f?ehrtt, Th« inMttn ftwrniAi H«gi«t^r. July.mcenbei 
t94t» J (Calcutta i ll*N*Hitra| I947}t PP« S6S.63* 
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play that iol« In Itt counollc to v^leh h«r gMgrophlesl 
posltloHi popttX«tlon «nd contribution tovmrds p«ac«ful progress 
• n t i t l « 8 h4Mr*** 
For unooMiltt«d orations U*N» la ^ graat aourca of Ina. 
plr^tion* India haa ''urgad th« Unitad Nationa to davalop into 
a truly intarnatlonal Inatitu ion of %iorId vida praatiga** for 
t! € ae^i«ir«aant of th<. idaais of J^ w&n r i ^ t a i aoono«ie dava* 
lopsanty fraadoM of dapandant paoplaa and end of raoiaX dla« 
criaination* In the vary f lrat 99BBior\ of ttie Oanaral ^atanbly 
in 194I&I India playod s laading rola in raialng t^ ia Quaation 
of rsclal dlsorinin&tion agalnat the peopla of Indian origin 
in ^outh 'frJcs. rinoa tben eba ^ag ixien ralantlaaaXy oppoalng 
t^9 aparthlad poXley* 
Indi& opiH>a«d th« eatabiiahaant of organlaationa for 
collactlva s^Xf^dafaaea evt«n If i t la vlthln th6 fr&aauoik of 
tha ymtad iFlatlona Oarter as i t Xaada to conaolidation of 
power bloea* '^ha thus triad to do away with oold war politlca. 
In I960 India oppoaad tba Unity for Pmn^M Raaolution 
on tha ground tbat i t iwoultf glva Unitad ^Tsitiona Forea a ''ooapuX. 
aiva" rathar than a *'aitdiatory rola** which vouXd not help in 
creating a propar ataoaphara for paaoa* 
«>0« iarar hasa BlXcraaii "India and tha Unitad fatlon8''>laJlafl 
Jfiuraax nf PnXlMcaX f^iUncfl» VoX.xxTiy ??o«Sy 'prix-Jtana 
\96b^ p.62. 
61. Jafar Basa iJiXgraal, Imtia mnd th« united !f»tiAn« rw^ w 
York $ Manhattan FubXiahlng. 1967). p*30. ^ 
6£* Ibi^-t p, 144. 
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Indift Is deslroue to oXlnlnat* vaat» dlfceftst and 
imuraejr that W'ft^et th« greatar part of the vorlA^ Fanoa 
aha votad for tha Unlvaraai DBclaratlon of Hiaan Rli^ta app* 
roYad ta^ tha Unltad Natlona on Dacanbar tO| 1046* 
rha h&a f u l l / partleipatad Irge tha vofk of apaelailtad 
agancies of the U*^ ,^ and finds this International approadi to 
aconoBlc and taclmlc^l islp t^rafarabla to aaaiatanea throash 
bllataraX raiationa. 
India beXiaVbS that tha Charttr should ba adopted to 
the changing world cirounatencM* Iha avovad objaet of Indian 
policy is to a^Xp in tha ariiliitananca of paaca and «o««xistanea* 
'graanant aaong the great Povers la indlspansabla for this 
purpose* India 'itt^ches oore laportanca to practical orgDniza. 
tlon than to Ita structure and theoretical principles.^'*''''© the 
n«ce«Blty to operate saootMy the aachlnery of tht United 
Natiora as It atunda today s^ould be accorded greater urgency 
06 
than vranglings over the ch&ni;es in the charter*** At th« tine 
of ttie franittg of th«> chartar India vas one of th« twenty eight 
Gountriea ii^lch voted for ita revision vithin tan years* The 
#3. fas The Text of the Declaration, Xf,lT Ihlh flif t^t United 
Hiktlim T8ll7«1ifit (U.H.I Daptt. of Public Inforaatlon,I960), 
pp. bTfiwT^ 
^n. J.h.biJL«»raal| aOaMXHt^f P* b4. 
«»6. Lakshal ^.Menoa, JUtfU JBd tJM RwlflV gf tlht tfnitid Ifatlnni 
rhartay • f Syaposiufli,(fVev Delhi j Indian Council of ^orld 
Affairs, 19W»}, p.6b. 
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Indian d«l«e»ttt V&9 particularly lnt«r<^at«d tiiat th« voting 
pfocadurt in the r«curlty Council te re*axaaliiad at tha and 
of tan yaora. 
India Is in favour of an lnoraaa«» in th« Maabtrahip 
of the u«^ « Until 19^2 India vigoroutl/ and eonaiatantly 
aupportad th^ raprcssantatlon of the P«opla8 Bapubllo of China 
In tha U«?T» bt^ caust. sh« a«tll«Vfc& that th« U«N. should not b« 
aada im escoluslve club of llka.iBind«d natlona. but ahould 
raflact tii& vorld ag It is* -Hri<'Mtinon d6clai«d in the a«n«2^1 
/ssambly that ti lb atap vould 09 *'th« moat aubatantial eontri* 
butlon tovards ectabliahing atability in aouth«ast aio and 
tovarda providing for non*lntarf«rano« in tha affaira of oth«r 
m 
atates and for arrang«a«nt8 on non.aggraaalon**' India*a atond 
v-^ s vindicatad wh«n China vat finally adBlttad in th« United 
Nations* 
India has totally supported the U.*T, in i ts wrk o*" peac 
kaaping and pacific settlaaent of disputes, ^ a h%a vaiiously 
aoug^t to strengthen thci pt;aee«kft«ping rola of the Unitad 
Nations thjTou^ tfia M3;I^  of hsr nodical alssion In Koraa in 
^&« "-^-^^P^'^^*"'^? "" Intitmatlr^nBl r^ripaniaatlnn !>%aimant«^ 
L.VII, p. Vol. lI, P.24&. 
^ 7 . Trulia and th<i UnttgtA nat i f t im, ( l i«port o f the ''tudy Group 
sat up by ths Izidlan Council of v^ orld ftTixits)^ (New fork: 
i^job&ttan i'u;>lis:iln^ Co«| 1967;, p.^« 
«»8, UaHitttMMl Aia«biy» 9Ui fiiaiton QfflBtat Bamydtt 
40Snd Planary Mo«tiek«t Octobar t>9 19b4| para 107* 
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* 
196d| hmr r«6ord as th« Ch2»lim&n of th« ]f«uti«l H^pstriation 
Cosaialttioni h«i> contrioution to th* U9 uMrg«ne/ Foro« in 
Q^ iaga smd L«t)aaon| und th« r9i« »h« playtd in supporting 
th« Unltttd Ms^ tiont In finding a tolut'on to the Congo Crisis, 
Indlt » has b««n a e^sapion of dlsamamtnt and is the 
s«nb«r of the 16-Nation Dissnamtnt Cosalttss* ^ s is also 
a signatory o^ Hoscov .«at Oan Irsaty.signiid in August 1963* 
Th«» faith vhieh India has in ths United Natl'Yns Is also 
apparent froai the fact that dsspite being a vict la of Pakistani 
aggression she responded to the United Nations* appeal for 
cease-fire and her faith in the goodness of tVe world body s t l l ] 
70 
renains unshskvn* 's l^ ehm once said« **Tn spite of ^ese 
faultSf th^ United Nations 8<^ nres an ssscntlal purpose and if 
ve did not have It today, undoubtedly countries v l l l have to 
come closer to build up sone^^ing like i t again*" 
For t'n*> vchleveBient of Most of her foreljin policy objec-
tivesy India has inirok«d the United l^atlons principally %s a 
vehicle of coateaunioation* For the pursuit of peace she has 
rr 
invoked i t principally as a vehicle of negotiations* *:he i s , 
^9* fiMftB TrttMnti October 24, 19o6* 
70. Parliftf^ntarv Hmh^trnm. Part II, par* ?;*S*lt»*II, 6S/96S ^ 
Col* 1C^ 7T^  Jun« 12, 19&2* 
71* J'*H*ailgraal, pp^oit^y p« £6, 
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thartfbrtf in favour of strtngthenlog th« haodi of tfi« Qui ted 
?7&tlont and asking It a aorc afraotlva body* To bring toga. 
thar ^€ divergent pointa of vlcv and aeek to heal a bctaeh 
vMoh aay ultiaataly spell dlasat&r for aanklnd have been aaong 
the oaln alaa of Indian policy In the United Nations. 
Indi^ h^& ^en the ehaapi-sn of tiiK freedom of suujeot 
peoi^les ani ulvsiys ralaed Its voice against the colonial and 
racial poUC'^ s^ of laperlalitt povvrs* Tiavlng herself suffered 
at the hands of a grestt colonial povery Britain^ she syapatltU 
•es MW the countries^ % l^ch are s t i l l under CK>lonlai doalnationi 
fhe polit ical es&nclpatlon of subject and colonial peot^les has 
received India's consistent support* / s *fehrtt a%ldy **Let us 
i3^ a l l a^ans put an i^d to vhat rvaains of colonlalisa In 's la, 
72 
in 'frlea and vherever else It exists.** Thus India has ua» 
equivocally declared Itself in favour of patting an end to 
co lon l s l l^ vherever i t s exists , partlculary In 'tlii . ^ence, 
she has supported the independence aoveaents in Indonesia^ 
'Igerla, Horoccof Tunis, etc* Indians anti.colonial policy 
vas alj»> detexmlned by ^er ovn Interests^ fox colonlalisa vas 
a t i n ati^ng and tenacious during the f i f t i e s and there vere 
foreign pockets vlthln India Itself, and colonlalisa vas a 
real and l ive prouien for tkie nevly awakened peoples of ''sis 
72* V.'^lkhaffljJ'"India's I^ole in Vbrld fffairs**, intamatinnai 
HlMXJOkf Hoscov, Mo.l, January 1968, pp. egi^O* 
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and Africa, EnphaaUing thla ^ohru jrvsarkcd, **«• talk about 
th« eriala of our tlciii and many ptto^la vlav It In dlff«ri>nt 
va/a« Probai)!/ In th« U*r*.*. tha erialf of th« tim« i t tuppoaad 
to b« ooiaaunlaa veraua antl«.eoaaimiaB ••• 3ut tha crlal* of 
tha tlB« In ^aia is coXonlallais varaua anti-eolonialita, Lat ua 
ti€ qulta claar about It*" 
India daairtsd an end to eoloniaiiae not only baeauaa of 
tha threat It posad to hor but axao baoauia aba waa intairaatad 
!n t^e liberation o* tha ailXiona of paopla in A«la and Africa. 
Tha and of eolonlaliaa vouid faci l i tate tha aeoiwiie and 
polit ical davalopaant of a l l 'alan countriaa iacludlnfi India 
74 
h«raelf» ^B %hru had obsBrr^^ In ?9S0i "'Paaoe «an only 
coaa wh«n tha eauaea of var are raaovad* So long as there 
if the doninatlon of one country over anotheri or the axploita. 
tlon of one claaa by another» there wil l alvaya be atteapta 
to auuvart the existing ordart and no a table aquUibrlufli can 
endure* Out of laperlaliaa and capltaliaa peace can never 
coae* And It la because the arittah Esylre stands for these 
and bases i t se l f on the exploitation of the oasaeay that ve 
can find no vl l l ln^ peace In It**" 
73. V'^iy^"* »»<» ^^^^^ RitDftrt. January £7, I96t;». 
74, J.L.??ehrtt, Mln «ina tfli.^aat (London i George Mien i 
Unvin Ltd.f 1936), p. &4« 
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India i i not looked upon vith favour tagr th« wMtorn 
ooloalal povors kMieauso of h«r poXioy of "Xftihlng oat «g»intt 
«iv«rir vwttlge of ooloBlalisa." Tho laporlftXistt otnnot rooon. 
Clio thowolvot to tho fact that India's forolgn poUe/ "vima 
dlr«otX/ oountar to th«i U«S«A««s aaln aiai to Una up ^a 
fraa oationa of th« vorld agalnat ooaMBiMu" 
Anothar prlnolpia to lAleh India adharaa vary atrletl/ 
7? 
ia tha abolition of racial dlserlnlnatlon* fha piograaa of 
soma raoaa In knovladga or Invantloni thalr aueeaaa la var and 
ooncjuaaty haa vrongl/ lad th«i to ballava that thay ara vaolall> 
auparlor and hanoa oan traat othar raeaa vith oontaapt* nia. 
crlolnatlm la aiao pr^otltod on grounds of tha oolour of tha 
akin, ^hlta aan look dovn upon ooloiarad paopla and subjaot 
than to tyranny and oppraaalon. Haelal dlaerlalnatlon s t i l l 
axlsta in mor^ than ona eontlaanti notwithstanding tha vldaly 
diffused sentlsant against it* 
76, Utfi.HiiVt ina mtlA nuWtU ^^^n S7, 19b6^  p. 106, 
«^ »* ^e ln^aa ^^^^ Apri l 7« 1966, p« 1S3, 
77* Aaongst tha aany fundaaantal rights guarantaad by tha 
Ikidlan eonstltutloa is tho right lo oquality, irraspaotlva 
of oastat raoat rallglon, aax or placa of birth. But 
fa6lallsa^ nhioh is basad on a sansa of suparlorlty and 
dlaerlainatas batvaan paopl€ on grounds of colour or r^ ca 
nagataa tha vary princi^la of hunan-and equality and hanca 
goaa agalnat tha aplrlt of India and tharafora cani^t ba 
andorsad by har* 
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India haa vlgozouily opposed th« polioy of a^rthltdf 
in touth Afrioa* It vst India vhieh initiailjr ralaad ttit 
•Question of th« Treatacnt of the Paopla of Indian ^Igin In 
the Union of ^outh 'frica* and th« laaua of r«i«lal diterial« 
nation In the Union of r>outb Afjriea^  bafora tha Unitad Nations 
78 
in tha y.ar IM169 a ym^^t bafora sha achlovod indapandanoa* 
f^ lnea th«n sha has left no stonas unturnad in tha U!? to put 
an and to this but idaoausa of tha support e«^frlea has had 
fro« Brltaltti U«S«A« and other Vsstam nations shs has failad 
to aohiava any rt^suit* Evan in tha Coiusonwaalth India has 
triad to put praaaura on tha Govtmaant of routh Africa to end 
its raeialistic and disoriainatoxy policgr* 
If tha vorld oontinuas to suffar fioa this nalaisa of 
raeial diseriaiaation and ooloalal opprassion th«ra ean ba no 
haalthy and strong vorld ordar* 
on f ining indapandanoa India savarad har connactlon 
vlth U«K« but sha ratalnad har ngibarship of tha Coiaaiomfaalth 
of Nations* This stop vas takan baeauaa India doaa not vlsh 
to raaain isolatad and foUovs a polioy of "vorking for peaea 
and friendship vith all oountrias and of avoiding alignaants 
76* q^ w-QrtoiMtomi No* A/149» Datad JUaa sa, 19«b* 
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79 
vith pov«r t)loc8*** India's neabsrthlp of th« CoMioBtf«aith 
did not aff«ot b«r toverelgnty* ^«hi«i vat confinoad that 
"tha ^oviaraign Indian HepubliC| ff^^y aiaoalatlnc haraalf 
vlth th« othtr oountrlas of the Conu^nvaalth, v i l l b« eoaplatal) 
frae to foXlov this policy, perhaps in an evan greater maaaura 
80 61 
and vlth greater lnflu#m;« than l»efor6«** Agalaf **«• to^ik a 
pladfe long ^^ o^ to achieve Purna ':%Araj (complete independenoa)< 
Ve have acMeved It. !>3ea a nation loae i t s Independence b/ 
an alliance vlth another country^ 'lllancea nomally mean 
mutual ctnBaitiienta* Dbe free association of sovereign Coanon. 
wealth natians does not involve such coaeitients. Its V9Ty 
streniith l i e s in i t s f lexibi l i ty and i t s ooaplete freedoa* 
It is ve i l known th.^ t It i s open to any aenber nation to go out 
of the Coaaonwealth if It so chooses.** 
:4>reovar| the Co^anonvealth i s not a * super state* and 
**as far as tht> constitution of India i s concemed| the king 
62 
has no place and ve shall ove no allegiance to hia«** This 
i s aade cltsatr in the declaration on India *s BeBbership of the 
83 
Coanonvealth of April 19t 'i949 i^loh states that "this nev 




83, Ibid. p« 136. 
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R«pabIio of India conplttely sov«r«l|P and ovlng no alXtgiane* 
to tbe king, at the othir CoKBonvatlth oottntri«t do ov«« if i l l , 
n«v«rthel«9S| be a full ••ab»r of tht Conaomrtalth ind tbo 
aer««« that the king v lU IM raoognlMd se a tysbol of this 
froo partnarthip or rather aaaoeiation." 
India*a aaaoeiation «ith tha Coanomraalth doaa not 
Inhibit her intereata but on tha aontrary hat proved adirantagei. 
out to her* *'We Join the CoaiioniMalth obvioutly beeauae ve 
thildi i t beneficial to ua and to certain oautea in the vorld 
M 86 
that ve vith to advanee** Nehxu further reaaxked that, **ottr 
aaaoeiation vith the Ooaaonvealth it renarkable in that i t doet 
not bind ua dovn in anjr vay vhattoever and, if I aay repaat, 
i t hat not done to during the latt tvo or three /eara either* 
It Vat gi^m ua eertain adirantagea vithout our having to 
aocept any llabilitlea in return •*•*• If any honourable Menber^  
vantt ut to vithdrav froa the Coanonvealth on principle, ay 
aatver vould be that vhat they object to la precitely the reaaon 
i>ihy ve t(sould reaain in the Coaaonwealth **• Sjy doing a» ve h^ ve 
better chancet o'* being able to influence the larger polieiea 
of «he CoBfflonvealth than ve otherviae vould* Being in the 
CooBonve l^th aeana u aeeting once or tvice a year and occaaional 
oonauitationt and referencet* Curely, that ia not too great 
6i« iMd»t P« ^41* 
86* JidiUt ?• ^U 
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a prl6« to pa/ for th« advantagos that v« get* If tht Coanoiv. 
vo'^lth bad thtt right to iiit«rf«r« vith aqy c^nttitaant oountrjr 
than I should cartaliUy oaaaa to ba In tha Coflnom#aalth*" 
Ih« Sjssadiat* eonaIdaratlona vhioh proaptad India to 
retain bar BaratNstahlp of tha Coanomia'ilth vara tha laak of an 
aitamatlva to roBlnlon atatua vhicb Incladad aiambarshlp of 
tha Co•Bonv€alt^| the link %ould help retain tha loyalty of 
the 3rltl8h doalnated c iv i l and defence aarvleaa and faoilitata 
neg9tiatl:>na with rulers of prlnoaly 8tat<.a for integration 
vith the rcat of India* It was further to Indiana advantage 
to **retain an international conneotioa.a vladov on the vorld 
vhich autoaaticaily earae her voy • at a tine %«hen she vca Just 
laun^ed on thu vorld eoene and her foreign policy and dlploaacy 
vera only beginning to ahape*** 
Besides these short teni oonsidofationS| other long-
tern interests also influenced the Indian Goveraaent*s decision* 
These related to trade« defence, econoalc asaiatance, and ^ e 
intereata of Iniian aettlers in Cooaonvealth countries* 
T>-e bulk of India»s trade since 1947 has been vith 
U*K«| vher« her exports enjoyed t i l l recently the benefit of 
Cow^onvealth prefeiwicei vMch vorked to India's advantage* 
8&* r*c*Gangai, indli ind tiht rrfUMfimfMUht (^&n < ^^ ^^ ^ i^i 
and Co*^1970H P9« 94.S6* 
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India's arm d^ forc«8 vare organised on the Brltlah patttrn 
and rell«d m&irily on U,K, for defence equipment* Hence the 
desire to rfisaln In the CoaB»nwealth. 
Tndia*s Interest In the veil*being of Indians vho 
had settled in Con!monwe''Uth countries vas another consideration. 
It was f«lt that India's meabershlp of the Cofflflionwealth vould 
help India to be In touch vith the *legitiaate aspirations* of 
87 
these ^£ople. As Nehru stated In his repl/ to ^ e debate on 
the ^Presidents' Addres:$ on. February 3f 19&0t "••••• there Is 
one major reason for our remaining In the Commonwealth and that 
Is that a very large number of Indians l ive abroad !n what 
are called British colonies or dependencies Or our 
remaining In the Commonwealth| these Indians are In a better 
position than they vould be otherwise*" 
88 
Buty most important of &11 the advantages was that, 
••It gave India the opportunity to forge without any direct 
commitment or alignment a partial **affiliation** with the Vest* 
Perhaps that was, In the beginning, India*s dominant objective 
!n see ing or retaining ^ e Commonwealth membership*** 
Apart from other factors, India's deols:!on to retain 
the Commonwealth membership was apfarently influenced by the 
67* Javaharlal Wfihrtt'a gaaiiflhBi> 18i»'ff6a> op*cit*, p* 278* 
88* £:*C*Uangal, j2JbJBi£*» P* ^ * 
coMldtration that th« Coaoomitalth •••btrahip vouia provid* 
S9 
an additional link and ehannaX of Covunlcatlon %fith Paklatan, 
l>r«aaMalaJLy the prlnaipal Indian ot»J«ctiv«, In tiila oontaxtf 
vaa to naatraXlM an/ axeaailva British partiality for 
90 
Pakistan* 
kith th« daath of Kehru andad th« foldan era of India 
in vorld affairs* ''Ha succas8or« Lai 3&hadur iThastrl^ vat 
Inaxparltftotd and had no Independent vlcvs regarding foreign 
affairs* H«ne« there vas no deviation ftom the pat^ ehalked 
by 91 
out nehru* In a speoeh In i^arllaaent Hhaatrl declared« "In 
regard to forsign affairs ve stltik to our basic policies* Th«iy 
are quite clear and i^turally our desire is to resaln friendly 
vlth al l eountrltts* And ve ai a developing country want thit 
there should be peace in the vorld ••••* It is laportant that 
U e^re should be tY% policy of co^existence which generally be 
acceptable to all* Because «ven if ve differ in Ideology or in 
other aattera with othur countrleSf It should not be iaposaible 
foi us to l ive together peacefully* Therefbrci t^e policy of 
non.aiigttBent and co*eitl8t«ace b«BoMi^ absolutely laportant 
69* a.?f*iiau, iidUla,Cflnitltttliin in Iht Haitingf (caicutte, 
19b(^ 9P* db6. 
90* ^.C^^ngali aRUm«t ?• S8« 
91* "The ^astrl era was therefore diatinguished fron the 
'lehru era not so inach by radical inroYstiona In forei^i 
policy a« by the further developttent of trenda v^ose 
origin could b« traced in a»n/ cases to the last years 
of ^ehrtt's regiae*** 
vemer LeTl| "Foreign l>ollc/ t Xha rhastri t4ra**| 
Lag mm Woridt repteaberwOctober 1966« p*lll* 
and Matfitiftl for at* W« of oourte stiek to th«a and i t vouid 
CO 
te oui: effort to a^ t^  that wt.oparftt* vith oth«r oountritts 
^ 98 
aito 1 ^ purtu* th«s« smXlGiaa*** 
^Xthou|^  thtt clrouattancM in i ^ l ^ th« notwaXlgmant 
policy vat propounded had ohangad oonaldarahly rhaatri oontinaad 
to aubacri)i« to it« In hia flrat apaaoh aa Priaa Hlnlatar in 
Jana 19t>49 Bhaatri affiraad that, "Hon^aiignaitnt viU continua 
to toa tb« fundamental of our appioa^ to world piotsleBM and 
our relatione vith other oountrlea*** On tk hia arrival at 
London on T c^eaber ^9^ for taUta v i ^ the Brltiah Prise 
Hiniat^ri he vent even further and reiterated that t^are Blr 
%iould be "no deviation" from the linea of policy laid do%m 
t^ !7ehru. Hovevery the acceptance of oilitary aaaiatanoe fioa 
both the ur/ and the Soviet Unions la t> change in Indiana pre* 
19(»S brand of non^alignaent, but i t dbea not in itaelf algnify 
the abandonaent or ooaproalae of notwallgnaent aa auch, India 
Had apumad until the end of 19I»S external ailitary aaaiatance 
in the doctrinaire and alaplaoed belef that i t vould ooaprcNilae 
the purity of her noa^ligment poliay* But novy i t becaae a 
98. IifcSiJkt 3rd rerlea, Vol.XXS^vni, Tloao, March 2, 19&6, 
93, r'.r.pajan^ "India in t^rld Politiea in the Post.'rehra 
E»a"t jflttttifttlnnil iTfianult vol. xxir, iio*i» i96e^9, 
p. 143. 
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ji^bOl in i4ios9 nm9 man/ pollelos oould b« rtirmMd ulileh a 
fov 79&r« b9Coz« 'joam havo boon raj^ e^tad in th« naat Gothic 
very polioy* »^nd this l«d t^rnar .*wi to aeidly cotanonti 
<*^ ipfarontly us long as thdr« vas no aiseriaination ^oog Indians 
bod'fallo^^i or i:«rhups aora correctly, as long as Indiana 
f roeiao^^lty Vv^ s total, tha mi&3|^  t^t^ts oT nor^ «>alignaaf}t MQTB 
Qoti3l69T9d. 03 prop^rly tAilhorad to. lo bo aligmd with wary-
body nov aoa!!^ o<3 to bo m aoooptablo au boing alignod vith 
BOQodyi n 
Adh«dronoo to non^allgiiBo&t did not provont its rolntor* 
protatlor.* Groat variations to tho oxtont of ehanging smplately 
tlm oontontS' iroro penaittod tm long as l^ roodos o£ isunooiKrro on 
tho intornatlonal seor^ e vas presorvod* loward th® ond oT the 
uohni oTa and t!:.rove..m t^ tho Jh&stri ora, non^aligtEiont ynm 
strif^od of i t s ailiti^jry connotations* It was no loncor usod 
to allow tho •:i^ortation or Cideaonition of tho groat nations 
of tho vorld* Instoud i t was appliod In u aoi^ ssodost googra* 
phio contact* Iho govomaont l^pliad in tho uck iabha in A-rll 
1066 that,tho improvf^ iont and fostoring o£ good bilateral 
roiatloos with n i^tions in th© rogion of ooath and o^^th-eost 
.9 la war. laor® teportant thcr a i^r^at oxpor.cl! twr© of of forts on 
global at4 OGllootlvd rolatlonships ••• iho '*r<>sitivo'* and 
r4, .omor ^ v l , o;i8,U*t P« l i l» 
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Mynmio'* asfHiots o£ ftm»e3S&m*fi^i •xpMsslvo oT dAsira for 
wOtlve p4irtiol|>utio& In the grand si'A'airs o£ norld politlos, 
g«y« way to tfvs morn ht»ibl« pr»»oo<5U| atlon w!fch 84*vlr.g India 
^oc predatory nolghbccjsrs cud staying <mt ci' otlttr a^ilons* 
oompllo&ted iU,Valrt ••• t^on-oligisiwnt tended to turn ifito non» 
involvement* ** 
Xh0 noed for iKrlenentSns »concrete Ir.tereste* by 
•concrete mecji!** further reduced tha scope of fc '^algn r^oliey* 
"In assence, the relitterprotatlori of Indian foreign policy 
during the Jhastrl period ^icmts to a loee of the ^vls 
y^ndroiae* in&itx vus nov satisfied with being i%o«3* rhie, 
irosum&bly caeant soae los@ of intern&tlooaX et&tuSf uQt aade 
India's foreigr. polioy more reall; tic." 
the Indiur Oovemmerit no loncer believed that non* 
^igaaent in itself oowld mstxre security or that the develop-
2^ent of military strength with fdie aid of external assi!;tsynee 
iras incompatible with non»aligment» i^n»aligrf!ieiit is no longer 
treated as m. end ia Itself but a pragsiatie end latilitarioxi view, 
i«e« aa a ne&ns of proD t^ing India*s interests| has been adopted 
und Own be giver, tip v\mn i t f\^s iiot promote t^ iose interests* 
Xhvsi "in proBoting the siae old objectives t-y the saee 
old Kieansj post«::^na India abLn-ioned the IdeULlstio BM 
'^^ * IbJUl*! p« iv* 
D6* \h±A^ 
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dootrlnalro i)oatur€)8 that was se ehar&ot^ristio of ^^ahiti's 
India* i^ho Qovsrm^Qt is now wnseih motit prtipifttie* ** 
Mrs* lodira atmdhi i s also folioirlng in thd foj ts tors 
oC hor father as w»Ii as bar pr«d909eii«r» Jht also Cesvcy^ rs 
th© luiloptiOG of the loliey <>f jioa»iaigmeRt| bjjt har approach 
i s sore reiilii^tie thm ifieslleitio. ?hile the Coverj^ent Is 
s t i l l opposed to the -sj^ fiyiiiAettire ol" imeleur weapons» i t no 
Xonz&T subscribes to ths view that India \tov.ld never "go mselear'*! 
the declared off icial policy is i-»ot to do so '*.*-t prosent.* 
Ilescef whUe lndi& S lD4i« tinder lehm eritiiusiastie^lly signed 
the j o r t i a l i^est £^  n .re&t;r in WBZ^ lodla trnder his daughter 
as frime Hinister has declined to s igs the present drcft 
nuclear non*protiSeratlor. treaty* fhe Governsieiit feels that 
the driift i s mt i r oonfomity with some of the sienlfleant 
provisior;s of the lii^  Gerseral AsBsesbly resoltitioii of IS l^oveaber 
1066f i^nd ignores tiie seeiirity Interests of India vis«»a»irls 
whii^ a* .^ i l e Iruiia eoi^tinue^ to follow the policy of noc* 
&ligr:£3ent| I t no longer makes iaXl claims for 1&* I t Is also 
:-ru^ufcic in I t s is:|l«.nariti»tlOii* luJlu s t i l l 'Upholds the rep^o* 
sonUition :u.' leople 's Zhiaa '!h t;io United ..'utions« \mt no 
longer ol&lsis th&t i t woitld conl'er irecilsulable berefi ts OR 
the United 'i;titioriS| India Is s t i l l oppoe^d to n l l i t a r y paots 
and oilliinoes ar*d fcrdl^ii |s raiiitury bases bi2t no longer 
D7* i4«4<*i-iajan| o? >ai^t. ^  p* 145* 
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dd&oao8«s Umm as loudly and p^rsist^riUy ua b^fem* li^int 
emphatloalXy ddno»iie«d •¥«{; tb« p^ t i l>Ui ty o^ ^orelgfi forMs 
on Xnflla*a soilf but h is mieotssors do not OVMI rofor to tho 
issua* 
**!& 8UBy r'Ost«>4.4ih^ ^ India hus Idarnt to ;^oid p&tantXy 
IdaulistiOy moicJLlstiOi aal dDQtrisudra i^attxrasf stat«santaf 
'v'lth ra^ard to Jhina th?»r^ 9 has bean a s l ight n va 
forvaord • alba i t s t i l l tontativaly • toward iiagotiationa with 
;hina« liahru Insiatad orj his ataml that th#ra could b® no 
^ a s t i o n OJC nagotlationa nhlass ^hlna aooaptad a l l the t?rovi» 
siOQS of tho Colo-.bo proposals, ^iaoontly thar^ haTO taan soaa 
signs that India would ba will ing t o ooi^aitlai* oee;otiations if 
Uhina i. dieutad i t s i^udinass t o nagotiata* '^B f^r baek as 
• •ae^Rntar 19€4 Jhastr i said that India was prepu^^ad SOT tallss 
with Ohlna tsonsistant wiOi haT salf^raspaot* 
undar tha riaw ragii^ o£ Mrs* ^^ andfei tha talk of nago* 
t;i .tioQS with <*hiiui ha£$ inera^^ad* i^paoiiiag in farlianant on 
^.abruary IC. 106r>. ilrs* Gai)dhi suid that India was ptApcijad 
to ta lk with Uhina "should f^op^Jf conditions liPlsei* ^&n as 
""• iBaiarraBf - o . ^ ? , '-©eambar Sg, i r64 , p*2, 
1"^ % ibid^f :;o*sr, .^binary i« ,^ 1P6C| p*3* 
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r90«nUy us 16 lif^f^ 1074 In im ivitmrtimri v i th tvo Bangle h^tlti 
joanrnlls ts sh« reit«r<«t0d Imt d<s@iro Tor i'^ riQ:.dly r t la t lons 
with ahinu* I t i s to b9 hoj>dd th&t In the ; d&r futarv bol^ 
sides vouXd t&k« st«pi3 tiav&Tds togotiatlorit* 
India s t i l l elings to i t s tisaoalcitioo with ^ccsaor*^oU.th 
aiid ostsads sispport to th« l«n» 
ThtJSf w« 9«« t'siat *^h« old roj»«ign policy of 'ndia 
yQi!!uins <nt'*«t, a^  "i thcpi^ st^ttin^t'jd to va*-i(»;t» dlsto^-tlni; 
roroos i t 3*10'v'8 ' strong •:«*;i'?e ^J7 to contino* in t l ^ e:?anr-,0l£ 
102 
I'orosdon for I t by :.9hfi3.'^ 'Ih9r®foi«^any ehang® one rioiScos 
i s India 's pole in vorid ..tCuirs in reeent /-.mrs if nore cf 
**eiph4A3*s, stfisjand torn il^Tc^iy 'tse to oh-^ nge of '-.•jTsomli-
1^3 
t ios Sit tl^ ij h^lH of affairs) t:i. n of anbstanoes." 
1D2» ..rthur ^saXl^ '•JhejBfe ar.d ^OBtlfraity In Irwila's /oreign 
«oiley**| i i rp^t vol«10| 106O€7| p« 104* 
100* h»a*ivi4&ny op>filial p« lba» 
irororo India gidnod laSmpQM^mmf thoro were fow aireet 
(jontMictt with the Uoltod Jt&t«i oC .jsArlea* TUl th© first 
half of tha nin»t««»th o«r.tuiy the only o^staots war* through 
soldl078 ana tailors vlsStii^ Xnillay who had no curiosity to 
loarn about Iti&im oultttrof history or politlos* Iron the 
^^orio&n Bissionaxios 1^0 esi&9 to voHi la India did not #viQeo 
any real Intar^st in Xndiaii roligion tmA ettlturof indood, »i«y 
thm.ght th^ir owi^  oulttirt md oivillsation to bo anporior to 
tho Indian eultaro* It vae only in 19^0 th&t a <^ ang« appoartd 
in iiaorieun u,ttitudo ar.d thlnliing duo to tho InflxMneo or 
r.ahatffla Gamaii's philosoi^ of non-violonoe and non-coop^r&tlon 
in national aorosont or.d tho /i&orloans bogun to adopt a sysipa^ > 
th^tic int^orost in and attitti^o towards Indla« 
India had shown intor^st in tho Unltod :itato8 evon 
b«fOIS indopondonso* i>itt It vas ^^orioa^s Indlfforont attitisdo 
to India ^&t hli^drod tho deiroXopaoiit of Indo^Aaorioan frlond* 
ship* ^ doisbt Asioriea hod sj^pathisod vith India's froodoa 
aavmmitf hot it novor oano oat in og^ on support* Only onoo, 
in 1D41 vhon ..noriea wsttrtd iorld 'lar 11 and IwSia rofttsod 
to fight for tho alliosf did tho ^tato Uopartmont advlso 
Lrltain to grant tsmporory ^oainioc tutus to Indiaf so that 
! • S M 4«i»o»an Broun* y ] ^ v n i t ^ , a t » f • and India and PalHfltii.n (Hstsashusotts I Harvard Unlvorilty Fros8| 10^)« p*362* 
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India* 8 t^ol«»h»&rtod support ooold b3 gaimd to e&rrf on the 
2 
war ori^«otlv«l7* 
Mi^tMnri itiiu*^ kUimm ikMm^ Htgiini 
India's pOlioy tou^^s tho linitod ^tatos vas indleatad 
iJi the vary i*irst polloy stateeoat of liahra on aepterabar 7| 
1£46» t^hm SbtisnowleAgad tha aoain&Qt roXa that the U*G*/^  
was destined to play in vorXd attulTftm On that ooe&slon he 
eaidf ^ e 3dni our greetings to the pe^le of the United states 
Q£ i^ aerioa to vhon ddotiny has given a aajor role in inter* 
national affairs* M trust that this tremendoos responsibility 
will be utilised Tor the '^urthercyr^ oe of pease and hueon freedce 
3 
everywhere*** Ihis proves that Itidla aeknovledged that the 
U 111 ted wtateSt has vast a&d onerous responsibilities^' If at 
tiaoB there have bean differenees of (pinion a@ to hov these 
rooponslbilities sight best bo expressed and discdiargedy parti* 
ciilarly In relation to li^te^ i ts neighbovor and other states 
of Asiaf this is no negation of the general reoognition by 
India of Washington's responsibilities* 
other eleeients in India's attitude towards the Inited 
states inelnde reeognitior; thatf although great hasards 
pany the possession of great poirerf the United rtutes hus 
vur wvvt»4Mbi» »wm n*w«cjr » w ^ * w9UUyUM4''9**il<a£M • '''**e 
'•M* Hole in Indian Indopenaeneef Ciashlngton i lublio 
Affairs Press* 196B)* 
3* J«L«iJehn2, jaaift'M.fgiflfijB MlfllT * ^«l^oted wpeeshe£?, 
^rteeiber ie46«^.prll ID€1, (^ev Delhi; f>ublieaticns 
l^lvlsion* 1061). p*3* 
4* Ibld^ 
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vl«ld«d i ts pov«r in such a nanii«r that the vorld has avoided 
major conflicts. India i s also unquallfltdly grat«ful for 
ths largs nsasurs of •oonoalo assistance providsd tty th« 
United rtates especially in tisies of cr is i s such as the Chinese 
aggression of 19&S and the food shortage of 19&t>. In regard 
to this asslst^neei President Eadhakrlshnan stated In his 
address of Feturuary 14, 19b&, "In particular ve vould like to 
thank the President of the United States and his adniaistra. 
6 
tion for this generous help, at this t i s e of nesd." 
Direct Indian»AiBerican relations began In an atnosphere 
of outu'il sympathy. During the war President Roosevelt had 
l « i t America* s soral support to the Indian struggle for inde-
pendence* Fbr tMs Indian leaders vere grateful and vanted 
to see the development of fficndly relations with the U,S,A« 
As early as 1941| ^ e f irs t diplomatic establishment of the 
U.S. Govemmsnt, the office of the Personal Representative of 
the U«r* President, was set up In Hew Delhi, !»hen the interim 
Oovernoent was formed at the centre In 194i&| the Personal 
Representative's office became the office of the American 
C(MBfflissioner* vhen India von i t s independence in 1947 i t was 
6. India grant Wo,£4, February 14, 19&6, p«3. 
»• 6.L«Popiai and Phillips xaihot, India and Tiairlca s ^  
Htudy of their Belations, (Ifev Delhi t Indlsn Council of 
Vorld Affairs;, p.&. Alio see. Jaifihaflal Iftftftt t Visit 
to America, (New Xoik t the John Day Co*, 1950), p*67* 
ralttd to & full«>fl«d£«d ftgcaoy* Azid U«^ «A« IAS th« first 
country outtld« th« CoaBomf«alth that Hohru irislUd mft«r 
t>oooBlnc Prlflio Minis t«r« 
Aa«ries had hoped to eash in on Kthxa*s visit to 
i^shlngton In lats 1949 and bring his vithln tht vastom 
fold* 3at Nahrui %^o ^^ d already indlcatad that India would 
follov tba poUoy of non»aligin«nt in ragard to vorld affairs, 
by his onaquivoeal daolaratlon that India vould dafinl|aly 
follow tha policy of nozvali^mant, rasad to ground i^at 
l i t t la hops tba AaarJoans antartaln«d of aligning India* This 
policy oraatttd disillusionaant in Aaariea and Nahru oaas to 
ba ragardad as antl»'jsarloan and pro-Kussian* Xhaneafbrvard, 
Aaerican attitude on Kaahair gradually tuxnad in favour of 
Pakistan and i t vaa decided to aake Pakistan a nllitary ally 
to f i l l up the vaeuuB created by the withdrawal of the ^i t i sh 
from India, thu victory of the eoauBonists In China ;^ ave 
furthttr li^etus to iia«ric&n atteapts to befriend Pakistan* 
nince theni India's relations with the United states 
have suffered froa a curious sicknessy a sudden alternation 
between vara cordiality and bouts of either hot anger or a 
deathly G^lill• The r««l&tionshlp has been kept alive by eadi 
realising that it U laportant to bo^ to keep i t alive* But 
a fruitful and vigorous relatianshlp, though it has alvays 
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•tOitd po8slbl«9 has always ftludvd th«B* This Is t i l th« 
sore rtgrettable since there are many basic slallarltltt 
bctveoi Vr% tvo countries* 
Xhs aiiis and objsctives of th« forsign pollclss of ths 
tvo countriiis ar« saillarf naasiyi the fluilnt«n«nes of the 
sovereign and Indeiiendent states In the world} the pursuit 
of p«£iGe and security | eupport for the United !ratlons| support 
for the right of self-determination of the nations (non-self* 
governing territories)} a feeling of anti.isperielisn and 
antl«r3Gialisia etc* 
Besides t^e similarity In foreign policy objeetlveft 
India ind U.n.A, ^ave *'a striking identity on basic fuadasental 
aatters which detexalne the structure of a country end its 
8 
political phllo8oi^ hy«" First of al l , India and *m6rloa share 
a coauBon historical heritage* lioth were und(<r the yoke of 
British colonialists and they had to carry on a long struggle 
for freedoBi altliough thtoir methods of achieving freedoa vera 
different* Aiaerlcans fought a war to wrench their freedos out 
of the unwilling hands of 3ritlsh zulers i^ile India adopted 
>ee £JSftliittaO» •^^s S* 19t»6* 
a* :^ C*Chagla. J\p ff«b^ a«i>ft/>» r..^ak^j (Bonbay t Asia Publishing 
louset 19& ;^t p.83* 
^ 0 path of noiwviol«no« and non.ooop«r«tioii to t^ak6 off 
fortlgn rul«« Th« Aaerie&ns not only lyBpathljitd vlth th« 
Mplratlont of t^e Indian people liut Indian political ltad«n 
al io found a platfora In U*f«^, to piopagatc their irievt* 
H«ne«, Indians have aive/e looked upon the United states ss 
a country v^ l^ch not only bee^ nie free herself but his alveys 
stood for freedoffl ind has helped dependent countries to 
achieve freedoffl* the Pmaritan I^claratlon of Independence 
aade a profound iapression on the Inlian patriots* 
Furth«ry there Is a great alaHarlty betvem the tone 
of early -mftrican and present Indian foreign policy* The 
ksenness and interest of the early generations of ^aerloans 
in Vti^ Indepandence of other colonial areas was vty nud) 
like the aamier in vhich Indians cr i t ic i se oolonil^isa % e^iw 
ever It exists in Africa and Asia* The suspicious and aeser-
tlve attitude of early Aaerloan policy-aakers strikes a fast . 
l iar cV^ ord In Indian ainds* thust ''Hehru is suaplclousi as 
vas George ^shlngton« of **the insidious vi les of foreign 
influence" and has refused to Interveave the destiny and 
ents«n£,ie tha peace and prosperity of his people *in the foi ls 
9 
of European aabltlon md rlvarly*" 
9* ?oplw>l dt Xilisoty OikiUJk*! P*d« 
• Urn 
lnai&*9 polle/ of noiwailgnnant is nothing n«w« It is 
&«r«l/ a vindication of th« U,r« policy of n«utyalin In 
th« o^rl/ deoades &ftor h«r indopondonoo* LUto AaorlOAf in 
the po8t»lndopendeno« poriod India vti aloo faeod by the probl< 
of consolidating a fitoal, civil and Bllitary ttxuoturo iraakam 
t^ •lou^^ partition^ of integrating th« 600 prineoly atatoti layj 
foundations for % more viubie aconooy 'and« aost Isportant 
of alif protactln^ its i3ord«ra fk'om (external throats* TTgncoi 
Indians ovn aconoaic and security interests dicatod a policy 
of p6uc« vhioh ttouid hb achieved by staying out of mtangling 
milit&ry alliances and tli4 two cold v-ar camps into vhich the 
world vas thiin divided* Hovever^this has not pravtfitsdf ss 
10 
Poplai and 7alJbot^  1 avt obs«rv«d| "both post»Hsvolutlonary 
/aerica and preeent«day India »•« in lecturing other states 
on matters outside their ovn »nes of responsibility vhiie they 
theastlvee pursued national interests • the westward aarch 
for t^ c United '^ tateSi Kashair and the Trench and Ptrtuguese 
**pockets** in the Indian cass^vith dstsraination and vigour and 
with the clear purpoa« of gaining their full objectives without 
coaproalses*** 
Another aspect where Indian and American views coincide 
is the value they attach to th« high ideals of deaocracy i rule 
of lav| freedoa of thought and expression and governaent by 
10* X)il4«f »*> 4* 
ooatMit bBB«d on univtfsaX adult franctilt** Although India 
hat adopted tha Jaritieh syatae of parXiautntar/ dtaocraoy 
initaad of tl:« /^ a^rlcsm prcsldantial eystesii the XaSian 
constitution has frealy cdoptad tht li&aic prlnciplas of the 
Antriean eonftl^ution . v i s , , Xlbartyi aquallty and respact 
11 
for thto rl«-t» of :r;tilviduai«. 's richard UPaxk points outi 
T i e vjo.istltullon of the JfeyU&llc of India of i960 
inoorporatas fund:^ental principles of polit ical thaory in the 
foiB of dasocratic Institutions that axe to be found In the 
Unitad C&atas constitution. Fadaralisa, the rule of lav, 
rapraaantsitivtb gavarnaanti adult suffragai equality of oppoiw 
nity vltl^ioat dlscrlfflination« free secret and regular eleotlons« 
an Independent judlclsry« a quailfl«id and responsible d u l l 
servicct c i v i l and polit ical l iberties • these and aany sore 
of the b^ic principles oi* deaoaratlc ^overment %i't shared 
by India and ''sierica* Moie than thsit the principles are part 
of the po l i t i e i l practice of the tvo countries*" 
The above analysis reveals the fundaaent^l s lal larlty 
of Aaerlcan and Indian foreign policy* Ifet one is bevllderedt 
llm Richard UP^ -^ rk. **Basis for Political Accord Betvesn 
mdla md 'JSerica**! Thti Indian j t i^r Sahit »f InternaHl/^nat 
MfiUXfti ige?, Vol*6| (Kadras a The Indian ^tudy Group 
of Intexnatlon-ii Law imd /ffi:ira| Unlvei'Slty of H9kdras}| 
p* 441* 
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for at ft mutter of fact tht x'oXc^ tlons b«>tw««a the tm G0untri«3^  
hav« mt bben as fri«n<21y ac they oould be* Iht iiMurreDt 
oritit ftnd olaunderstandlngfi plaguing 7n<b«»Aairioaii relations 
sugg«kat a dlaquietlng tandaney raadUy to •isoonatiua aaeh 
oth«r<s flu>tlv«a and a fundaaental. dlffaraaoa of app^ 'oaeh and 
phUoa^l^ on Inta^nationaX pioblaat batwaan tba ti«) oountriaa* 
Salf-rlKhtttOUSZKoSi* on «»ltrti4. uldM Jillnda tliata fxom 8««lng ^« 
o<^ar*a vl«iipolnt und «x&g^ «riittta tl)« diff«ratto«a« 
In fi t^aoratloal analyaia^ t%o axplanatlona ara poaalble 
for thlai 
(S) In Indls*s vJtfVf Amerlean pollo/t In practice 
Sttpporta poJLlelea and povers vlthout due regard 
fox t^ « justice of Ihdlu's own point of vlev and 
in flucb aannAx* MB &dveis<'l> to affwct India*s 
¥lt&i Interests* 
(iS) India's poilc/ in practice slaUarX^ appears to 
America as inadequatei^ apprt^elatlve of the 
Anerlcan point of vlev and interests* 
First of a l l there Is the Aaerlean nlsconceptlon about 
th« orientation of Indian foreign policy* American Irritation 
over t>Q unvllllngness of some non^oooounist countries to side 
openly vlth the U.J.A. in the "Defence of the Free orld" had 
• 6 7 * 
l td to th« ovsrly-slfflple conclusion t^.st thoso ^ o v«ir« fk>t 
v i l l lng to join /merlca; icust| deflalUlyi b« egQlRit Aatrlca« 
th« Indian disasi^«<D*nt vlth this eonelutlon i t ooapt. 
l«t«« In th«lr view ^aarlea is tramgrstting h«r l i a l t t 
vh«n flha daa&nds t^at countries vhich vish to bt friendly to 
tb« U»S«A« au8t also consider /««riea*e eneales dn th«lr own 
•neaies* B«8ldeS| tl v Indian policy of non^alignaent and 
friendship vitb a l l nations vas adopted at the ver/ outset 
of th«lr independence. Xhereforei this policy of India Is not 
a coirertly pro»iiU8£i&n response to Ainerican overtures, as 
/JMrioans oay believe* tut an expression of ^ e nost fixaly 
12 
held and long standing principle 0;iidin£ t^eir foreign policy* 
Indlft's policy of neutrality has been evolved keeping 
in view tti% uekward social and eoonosio conditions of the 
country* I'he essential need for India, her govenaent and 
people are convinced, i s peace at least for a generation or 
two, U>ia would enc^tle her to take stock of her resources and 
develop thitt and to raise living stand&rds so ntcess^ry for 
peace and contentnent* Hence Indians are of the fira viev thst 
they onist follow lik% Jefferson, the policy of "•••••• peace. 
12* See Grc^ yson Kirk, *" Indo»^aerican i l lat ions .. Prol^leos 
and ?rofr|.ect8*'. MM Bhimm iA^i%M§ Vol* U};:xn, ?lo*C^ , 
June 1064^ , p*#«£« 
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eoascxc* and lioiMttt friendship vitti aU nations • intanglinc 
aiiianoaa with a^ona*** 
Tha nature! ^^saiiccn rasponaa to any auth praaantstion 
of tha Indian position on nautx^XlV i* that i t ia baaad on 
an unraaxistitt vl«v of tv« CouL-mmiat tl raat to tha outaida 
vorld* 
Iha saoond oajor dlffaranoa is that Inclla bnd ^marica 
ara vary far apart In th^ir cstiiaat«a of Buaaian intantiona 
in th« flaid of fo2«i^ policy* Ihtsa diffarancaa aprlng 
naturally froa th« *<tvo countriaa* dosaatic situations and 
oapaaltiaay from the thruats to national Intarasts Vti&t th«y 
parealvsy and froa t^ ia taska tKsit art angaglng thair attention* 
Parhapa isost vit&l in dataxftinin^ tha postura of th% tvo nit lor 
in foraign affairs ara the diffairvancas in n^^tional peyehology»* 
aconoMic strani^th and national tixperianca* Thase dlffarancas 
vara Bk>at avidtfit In tha major poliey pattamsi especially 
In security m^ t^tars* Fear of the U»^«?,E. and the urge m to 
gain Military advantages as s datarrant to v&v vera the 
ooaponanta of U«r, policies* TToa the Uginnlng the United 
'"tatas adopti^ d a hostile attitude towards Conaonlsa and was 
profbundlaf s!.o]|ked by the conduct of the '"cvlet Union w!^ ;lch 
13* Poplai and Talbot, op.cit*. pp» b.7* 
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«i«vg«d 8s th« ssin eitad«l and ehl«f «xponiiit of COMranita 
at tb« and of the ^oeond -^brld ^^ ar* Th«f«fort« th« tupirtfio 
pxota« ia ite«rle«n • / • • vat to «t«B th« tido of ^ovltt ax. 
panaloalMi, and tha vhola of Unltad rtataa foralcn polio/ 
14 
vaa tharaaftar attuaad to that fuodaaantaX naad* Conaldarlns 
Itaalf dlractly thareatanad ^ ooHnmlsa and poaaaaalng anough 
povar to offajr a daalalva maaaura of oppoaltlon to r^viat 
daaigna or daalraai tha Unltad rtataa has triad to faloak 
Qomualat axpanalon through diploaacy and othar aaana. In 
tha last fav yaara i t has not only increaaad ita o«n aUitary 
aataiaiiahsant and halpad to iattild up tha araad atrangth of 
tSviaa nationa in ruxoi>at ^ala and Latin Aaorioa y&^ aharad ita 
oonoara bat alao uaad ita o%«i raaourcas and man to bloek tha 
apraad of intamational oonmuilaa tgr taking ailitary oountaiu 
aotlon, aa in Koraai and axtanding aoongale aid to dafaloping 
eountriaa* 
Tha Indian aaphaaia haa baan quita diffarant. In India 
ona doaa not anoountar ^tm foar of and hoatility tovard tha 
.<?oviat Union ao gan^rally pravalant in Aoarioa. Th«y do not 
ahara tha viaw tiiat auiaia ia lUialjr to undartaka tha apraad 
of coMBttniaa lojf a i l i tar/ eonQuaat| or that tha povar of the 
auasian amy and air forea ia likaly to ba uniaaahad againat 
14* P*C«Chidiravarti| *'Indiaa !fon»Allgniant and Unitad rtataa 
Poliay**, cuwaftt Hiatftgy^ Vol. 44, !fo« 869. Mar oh ig^d. 
p. 189. 
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th«i or an/ont •!•« in th« for«f««abl« futurt. Indians alto 
f««l that thfi/ art b«ttar aia«t *^ feUov Atlanai to tndtxw 
stand and ap^ralsa Russian polls las and notlvss than ths 
ABMrlsans* MorsotsTf bslns r«»aot« ttom the ataosphsrs of 
crisis vhlcb rsvoltttlonlssd i^ 4s«rlca)i( polley and laprssaad Iqr 
tba ''ovist linion*s antl»oolonlal propaganda and support for 
frsadoB aovsttsnts in 'slan eountrSsSy India dssldad not to tos 
ths vestsm Xlns rsfardlng rovlet Union but to foXlov a nsutra. 
llsty indsptftdtfit polloy of th«lr ovn. Thus India has assossed 
Intsrnatlonal oosBMnlsa and ths kind of thrsr t^ It pos«s In 
Asia in a vay that has l«d to an advscaey of paacsful so* 
•xlstsnes vlth ths Coanunist oountries and an saphssls on 
rapid soolal and econoalo dsvslopBsnt* It Is this polley vhleh 
has eaused i^ rsat oilsuaderstsndlng iMtveen India and th« tinltsd 
rtatss* In Dsosub«r 1966 Vlos-Frssldsnt Nlzon oondtansd th« 
"brand of nsutrallsa that makes no aoral distinction bstwtsn 
ths ooBBimlst world and ths frss vorld*** Xo this ^shtu rspllsd 
tiiat hs did not bsllsve that '*ths world ean t» dlvldsd up Into 
good and and svU" and thst "It Is not dsaoeraey to vant all 
lA 
psopls to think tho sans as jfou do*** 
Furthsr, India eonsldsrs that the fasrlcan polley o^ 
entangling alliances and a»ed Intervention is not the real 
16* Quoted in P«C«Chakravartl| ga^dt.^ p* tdl« 
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aatwtr to ooMranist «xpftfision« India's potltl-iii It thst th«r« 
is a <ar«st«r thr«at f^oa oowaitnist iaflXtratlon sad subtsrslon 
fioB vlthln than froa ooimuilst ag^rsselon. Th» solution, 
thstvforo, Xi<iS in boosting and Strangthoning ttia Moi^Bias 
of th« d«v«Xoping oountrias so as to aialJiisa the dangar of 
intarnal subvaarsion. 
**th« AsMioaa dootrina of anoirclamant of eoHnmlsa 
t^ •tt8 oai-as no appall to India, Giving ailitajrjr aid to uadaiw 
davaXopad oountrlas in lunrisai tying thaa up in paou ia futiXa 
For ail ltar/ aid vaakans tho raglon hy giving tha Russians 
a foothold* It Bakes for Intarnal disrapti<^ ••• as* for 
instaneat in Jordan.** 
Xha ^aarican vitfvpoint was azpressad in a bittar eovoant 
aada by '^^ tyles 3rid^aS| C^alnsn of^Rapubliean Pol toy Coanittaa 
**X loss patianea with t^^sa nations i^ioh ara not only nautra. 
l iat in thair ailitary positioOi but insist on nautralisa in 
th«ir aor&l position* I knov of no «orsa offandar in this 
ragard tiian Hehxii| ytho proolaias tilasalf tha aoralist of ^sia* 
I know of no instanca of Nehra having opanly and sincaraly 
takaa ^ a sida of fraadoa and daaooraey. I knov only of vaasai 
wrds and idla pratansions«* 
Id* s,N*Vaiaa. &iHtCti ttf todU't FfMrtign Jtellttonit Papara 
praparad for ^ a Idth oonfaran«o« (ll«v Oalhi t Instituta 
of ^aeifio Halations, ld67), p«d2« 
17* rY%ng>^ MMi^ nfli «Ma<%«i> Prooaadings and Oabatas of e4th 
Congrass, 8nd Sassion, 27^ JUaa 1966, V»l«1oet ifo* 107, 
p. 10099. 
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InaowAotriean dlff•t«ne«s further <I«tp«id hf th« 
triiaip^ of th« Conaanistt In ChSna and th« eloM rtlatlont 
that oHB* to b» «stafall»h«d bfttvaea Piking and Kiv Dtlltl* 
Aaerloa conalderod the attabliaHBaat of Comnnltt raflaa In 
China and th« eonoXuaion of the rino.^oviat ''^ iiianoa aa an 
•xtanalon of tha threat to Ita aecurltjr alraady poaad by tha 
fovlat Union* Xhic vaa furth«r oonflfsad tnjr Chlnata agfra. 
aalvanaaa in Ilbat| K r^as and Indo«Chlna, Tha Unltad rtataa^ 
tharafor«y daaldad not oni/ to refuaa raoogttltion to tha 
Chinaa« PaoplaU Rapubllc and tOatk ita antiy Into tha 0*19, 
but aXao to drav a *oordan aanltalnl aiound i t by aataULishlng 
dafanaiYa baaaa in Kor^ ani Foivoaa and n.E.Atla* 
Convarsalyf India n t^ only axtandad ioaadlata r«oognl» 
tion to CoouBMBlat Oiina but alao took the laad in praaarvlng 
F«king*a clala to China's aaat In tha Q«N,| in opan opposition 
and dafitnaa of the /aariaan stand on tha la sua* ^an in 
Fabruary 1961t a Unltad ^tatas*sponsorad rasolution was aovad 
In t^ .a U«H« Ganeral ^ssesibly oondaanlng Chinasa aggrasslon in 
Koraai India votad vith tha F^vlat bloe ai^inst tha reaolatlon, 
India also strongly disapproved of tha U*f;« policy of contain, 
aant of China and rapaatadly advooatad tha restoration of 
Foraosa and tha off«sh«re Islands to tha CoMRtnist ragiaa* 
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Althottgli both U«r«/, and India h&f« at th«lr saiii 
objactive tha aalntananoa of inttrnatlonal paaca and •acurit7| 
thay dlffar on th« bast aatl^ oda of aalntaining It and on 
Urn point at vhioh daciaiva aotlon baeoaaa i«p«rativa« Botti 
ara conaeiout that tha nav vaapons leianca ha a pXftead in 
oAn't h»nd6 tiAka paaca a condition not marely of atability 
but evan of aunrl^ai* It ia on quaationa of bov to aeooaplith 
thair m^l9 t^at India and tha y«r« hav« diff'arad* "Tha 
graat dlffarenca batiiwan ^aarioa and India**, aa th« vataran 
Indian la&dar and fosnar Qovarnor-Ganaral of India, C.RaJa. 
18 
gopBlso^ari| obtarvadi **!• tbat tha oaana Aiiarioa it adopting 
for attabliahiag paaoa on a«rt^ do not appaal to India.** 
^ long dabatad quastion batwean India and the Unitad 
etatas vas vbathar i t la pottibXa to antui*a p«aca without 
dafanslva arrangaaants or vhath^r adaquata dafanaiva arranga* 
B«nta 4r« » £»rcoondition to thci aaouritjr on nfixith paaea 
dapanda, h^iXa tha U»^ » hmie that aggrastlva povart oould 
only u« kapt In che^ by tha faar of nataive rataliationt 
India, on th« othar hand, ttuck to tha t>aory that i t waa 
Inharantly vrong to thitk alvays in taraa of foroa, that 
»iai&aanta and military aXliancaa only creatad t«naion and 
18« .Ptl HlndUateB Illtt» Haroh 8, 1966. 
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alarm, and that th<i so-called aggraaalva pov«rs could be 
von ovar by patience, trust and friandshlp* 
A.noth«r area of dlaagrean^t between India and the United 
rtates conoernsd the beliefs and attitiidas of the tM» eoun. 
tries regarding the best vay of ensuring peaoa and security 
under contemporary conditions. To the U.S. proposition that 
the road to peace ia through collective security of the 
frea vorld, India's l ikely reply i s t **One doss not sssk 
peace through security, but security throuilh peace*** Thus, 
while the United states considered the fonatlon of such 
defensive alliances as ??Aio, s::^ IO and the Baghdad Pact as 
of vital ifflportance for security against coaounist aggression, 
India viewed then as basically wrong since they tended to 
create insecurity, uncertainty and instability. The United 
Ftates regarded thca as *'an armour but not a lance, a shield 
but not a sword", India viewed then as a provocation to those 
powers whose aggressiveness they %#ere designed to check, India 
f e l t particularly sore about t ^ s e pacts as Pakistan, i t s 
'distant^nel^bour, was a signatory to both the rE'^ TO and 
19 
Bsghd^ id i'aets* 'ttiiu policy not only brought the cold %rar to 
18* J.UNehxu, aiU£JU«f »»• 94|9b« Nehru oii99rvd i "All this 
aming of Pakistan i s a matter of concern for us •••••• 
we have no right to interfere with what i t dhooses to do 
• •••• It is a matter of concern for us because the quia. 
tessence of hatred for India plus accuoulstlon of arms 
may lead to bad results," ^Iso, P.C.Chakravartl, aiUJSJJi«» 
p. ISSt and Kuldip Wayar, OH tent ggllttfaBttM t A Tale of 
the sub»continent, (New Delhi, 1972)• 
Indla'fi frontiers b/ disturbing tha balanoa of power In the 
8U£}-contlnent, but also estranged India froa U.^.A, Ag Heaiiy 
20 
rig^ti/ r«maxkedi "The United states foreign polley in Asia 
has placed undue eaphasls Uj;K>n n i l l tar / pover» all itary pacts 
and aillt-iry alliances. This over^-^phsais on aillltary power 
hti8» in my opinion, tended to trade reliable deaocratlc friends 
for doubtful military allies*** India was thus led to se^k 
friendship with U«C«r,R« against American military aid to 
Pakistan, 
CaLQlfXAlilSH <fc fif.ClM.lSMi 
Another source of misunderstanding i s the Indian^ impre-
ssion of the American attitude towards colonialism* Ihou^ 
both are opt'osed to colonialism as such, tiiey approach the 
issue from different angles. The U« .^ policy i s conditioned 
by a new form of imperiali8m.communist imperialism. Considering 
U«S«A« as the champion of the freedom of colonial peopleSf 
India naturally expected U.S.A, to extend unequivocal support 
without taking Into consideration the antl*oomfflunist policy 
of that country. But America could not take up a clear.cut 
stand on colonialism since communism. Its greatest bogeyt vas 
aligning i t se l f with the national movements and aspirations 
20. Reuther Vs Meany, "Is fehru Friend or Foe?**, l | . s . iy«we 
and Vf>i:ld liflBoftf April £7, 1966, p. 140. 
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of th« subject pco?ls« of Asia, particularly In Hftlaya, 
Indonesia and lodcwQiina* 
The United F'tateSi therefbre, advocated an evolutlonaty 
approach to the prol>I«0 of colonies and supported the colonial 
poverswiostl/ tied up witli the United f^tates » i^erever i t 
appeared tiiat a nationalist BoveoMit vas dominated or led bif 
SI 22 
the coKunists. As H.uoovils pointed outt 
"••• 'l^enever the United ^tates was caught betveen t^ e^ 
issues of Golonirilisia and coniaunlst expansion she had always 
defended the ^oxaer," 
The Indians have not had any direct experience of 
comsunisa vhiie their aeaory of the evi ls of colonialisa i s 
recent* fo thea colonl&liSB is far aore of a bug bear than 
oooauaisa* In Indian eyes a state v'.lch practices or even 
condones colonialisa is %iorse than a state vl^ dch advocates 
cooBunisa* They are therefore lapatieat with the United ''tates 
21* HenrXf -.Syroade (Afst«Sect, of f^tatoi U*r./ ,; , «ihe 
ibrld*s colonies n^d Ex.eolonies**y IkLj^t %•« 1@» 
1963, pp. 066U»«0. 
22* MotUai Govila. ** Indo»Aaex'lcan hiil:itlons In the post 
%Ar decade*" I Int, Indten jTottraaai of ftiHitaBaX nclgfvfigt 
Vol*20, No*2| April..June 1969, p* 121* 
Tee also TtMII Of Tflftlllt ^P'U 16, 1966. "i^ henever 
Washington is forced by t^ te contending powers of cooaunisa 
and oolonialisa, i t has invariably plunged for a *lesser 
evil* • colonialism ••• Jnfortu^teiy no country had done 
more In the post.var vorld to identify i t se l f with oolonlf 
regiaes t^ a^n U*r«, vhlch i t se l f cherishes no colonial 
aabition*** 
• ©7 • 
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for Itt fallur* to takt » ttor« olttac out itaiKl oa thla x Ittuo* 
Mbr«ov«r| unlikt Aacrieanfy lolisns r«fU8« t9 ooiifut« th« 
tM> Usu«s of coloni&llM and oownmlva* This %«• aid* eXoar 
by ^ehni ia a 8tat«B«!it bafora th« parXlaacBt on >lBtrch 17^  
"It is no good tailing u« t>^ at v« hava to support soaa 
colonial povar boeauaa If va do not oooMunists vSll antar 
tharfe." 
It V3S vl&i thasa dlffaring points of vl«v that India 
and th« United rtatas approa^ad th« qusstion of In^naalaa 
indap«tiuiinoa« 
Anot^ ar point i» that vhllt India is ooaplataXy agalnBt 
eoXonlailss^ as she considers It aiaoat ajcelualvaly as an 
aliwtract ooral Issua rather than as a aosale of eoaerate 
polltieal problaBSf U»f?«A. has no hastltatlon In siding with 
colonial povars vh«a Its national Intarasts ara at staka* 
Thus on tha question of Goa^  maan and PlUf l«ilaya and Indo-
Chlna^  Uaitad rtataS| supportad tha oolonlal povart* 
23* Grayson tlik^ QSUJlLUt*t P* ^^* 
&«• l»«<i«^  w f^ff March Cl» iMa, p* 9&. 
S6« ^urorai fmaSiSft P* '^^ « 
S6 . ntratisa Hupc» ad*, fmarlaaiuJLalMt rmn»ii%nmj (Nov ¥ork t 
Fradriek A,Pra«g«r| 196i»)t p«d4« 
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On thfi l«su« of raoiallfB also, th« U,F, took a stand 
diaaetricaliy oppostd to India. India brought th« issus of 
th« treatnant of paraans of Indian origin In fouth Africa 
befora the UN Oenaral Assaably* ''outh AfTien took tha stand 
that the oattar lay vlthln h«r donestle jurisdiction and that 
27 
the G«ineral Assaably had no cospatanea to daal with tha aatter. 
S8 
Although this stand vas rajeotad by th« General Assaably, tha 
United rtataa delegate supported the fou^ African poaltion 
that the natter be refexced to the International Court of 
Justice for a decision as to whether the General Assenbly vas 
competent to daal with the question. This attitude of the 
United rtates was not pleasing to India. 
The incidents of racial bigotry In South Aaerica of 
v^  Ich Little hock beoaae the syabolf also 9 raised doubts in 
Indian alnds of the capaclt/ of the Aaerlcans to deal on terns 
of equaiityi Jjustica and autual reapect v l ^ the coloured 
29 
peoples of the world* The Negxo protalan In Aaerica persists 
even t^ this day. 
27. u-'g.Y^e.. a^k iQ47«AR^  (W«w Xoxic I Departacnt of Public 
Infomation), p. 62. 
28 . fl^in^i^l Am^eahlv iteeftlutiftn XLIV^ I , Deceaber 8 , 1946. 
29. *1oman D.Palaer, ** India and the United f^tatea t Maturing 
Kelatlons", Cmrfftttt lIlBttiryy Vol* do, No*211, March, 
1959» p* 131* 
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Th«t« teslc diffsrcncts 3n th« attitudes and fortien 
poliolct of the two oountri«s h&v« b««n reflAettd !ti th« past 
In their stands on various lssu«t« !^ ioh irritation and h«art» 
burning hat b««n caused In the last deeade or ao beeause of 
thtit confXietinf positiona an the iasuea of tmteh rule in 
Indoneslai Hyderabad and Kash8ilr» the establiahaent of the 
Coamunist regiae in Chinsi the K'srean oriait of 1060t the 
Japanese i^ eace Treat/ <t961}| tiie U«r« attenpt to keep the 
Tunisian question froa being put on the ^eourity CouneiX Agenda 
in April 196&t ^« ^^*s Canal disputOf Canbodia and 7i etnas 
and the Aaerican Military Aid Pact vith Pakistan 1964* f^ever 
being able to seu eye to eyey Indo»A«erlean relations have 
suffered from serious setbaoks in ^e period before the Chinese 
invasion of 1962* 
^^ma m^TMm i\m^) AID irnxkUifii B^'iMgt 
It was the Chinese invasion of Indian territory in 
)etober 19^2 which brought India and the United '^tates to a 
l<ivel of understanding never reached before. Fore the first 
tine the vievs of the national interests of the tvo countries 
converged and both displayed the saae degree of eagerness to 
cooperate a vith each other to vard off this unexpected criais. 
Being unprepared for such an eventualityi i t %ias in India's 
self*interest and self*defence to obtain ailltary aid fron 
wherever i t came* 'Xhe United €tates» on its part, provided 
. 7 0 . 
• i l i t a r y and BattYial al<i as • pairt of i t s gXotel sttstsgy 
to •alataln tbs bsisnos of povsr In Asia agaiast th« CoMNUilst 
ivar sines t^o CooDunlsts came into povar in China 
t^a ralations batvean tli« two countrl«S| India and Chlnsi 
ranalnad axtramaiy cordial apo^t tram a fsy diffaranoaa on 
Sib«t« Inaia v»8 not oaLjr ona of tn% f irst aountrias to axtand 
racognition to China^ Uut sh« had aiao adopted a polio/ of 
frlandshlp, basad on the f ivs-prineiplas of Panoh .^ hoaX* thU 
signalled and sjfBbol^aad tiia opaning of a pariod of dsaonstva. 
tiva friendship b«tvean India and China, This did not aean 
that ''lahru vas r^t UVAT% of Uw pol it ical diaansion in % i^ch 
India and China, vith th«ir oppoalng syaitdos eaust b« rivals in 
^sia and th« \«orld| but he baliavad that this naad not spoil 
relati'>n8 of th« tv^ countries* HeneSf hs actively supported 
tVfe c:ise of the Comiaunist Oovemaent in Peking to be the 
representative of China In the United *?atl'>is« 
It vas on Januaiy 83^ 1069t that Chou»En»Lai, in a 
3(1 
lettar to bandit Hshiu« for th« f irs t t i se questioned the 
30* For details see Girilal Jain, Paneb <^ .ftai ^na Af f g i 
rino-Inilan f.cdations In the Context of the Tibetan 
Insurrections)(aonbay i Asia fuolishlng -ouse, '*9to)* 
The five principles vera t Mutual respect • for 
. each other's territorial integrity and sovereiffityt siutual 
Contd«««««« 
. n * 
established boundaries b«tv««n India and China* His eont«w. 
tton vas that thtt Tlno*Indian boundary had n«?sr b««a d«>il. 
ml ted** and th'.c the so-called '^Mo Hahon l ine «ss a product of 
the British policy of &g^resslon against the Tibet Begion of 
China** and th^ireforei an "Illegal line*** It vas only on 
wsptember 8, "^ IMiQ, t^ '^^ t specific territorial clalas ver« n&de 
vlth risgaid to bCOO square rallts of Indilan territory* This 
action on the part of Chlm. va^ a dellberatt attenipt to se«^ 
quarrel vlth a yricefal and vell^lntentloned India. It Is 
significant th^t Chin% m^iint^in^d complete silence regsrdlng 
territorial olaliss %fhen the 1964 Agreeaent on Tibet vas nego* 
tlated and also vhen twSce (once In October 1964 and secondly 
In 1966; »tehfll coniJlalned to Chou Zn Lai about Chinese maps 
v^lch shoved a vrong boundary between the tvo countries* On 
those occasions Ch-ju En LiJ bad clearly accepted the Mc Mahoa 
34 
L?n« ac t^e border between India and China* Dnce agaiUi on 
(Continued froa th^ prevlouf ysge; 
notusji^  1^685Ion, Kutu&i notwinterference in esch other's 
Internal affalrsy equality and autual benefit, and pesce» 
ful co«exlsttrnoe« r>& te s^t in ^t^fft Mta»ftran?te Bni*. 
U t t i r i Wfiliangrt and /greeaents signed between the Govern. 
sients of Indiii uuc China 1964-£D, ^Mtfe P'l^m^ y, (Ministry 
of Lxternai AffalrSf Oovenwent of India), pp« g&»107* 
as* Ibld*» mXU. PSBiir JfOi UtScpteober-^Vefflber 1969,pp*27-33* 
3o . '^>^ <fc* ^^ au>.r I, 1964-69, Op .c l t* , pp* 96-1C*. 
34* Ministry of ' xternal ' f fa irs , loAtUQlXOA ftlflflUtt (^ ew Delhi I <»ubllc»tlon» ^vis ion, 1964), p*S* 
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/iugast Sl» 1966» India prot«gt«d to th« Chiii«te rsgtrdlng a 
nap In »n off ic ial Chln«a« fflagailn*, Ihi ghtlli PUtffirlll , 
which »how«d flv« divltlont of India*• Worth-Eatt Frontier 
Ag«no/y aoB® araas In U»P« in t^ n Mlddla r«etor and large 
areas In L&dakh as Chinese territory. India also dealred 
that revision of naps sho\ad not be delayed further as the 
Chinese aovernaient had beim In |K>ver for nearly nine years. 
36 
In his reply to NUirUy Chou Hn Lai adnitted that there 
vas bi dispute i'Sii^rding these territoriea and If dilna had 
not raised thu question at th«i tlm« of th«i ' greMicnt on Trade 
and Intercourse between Tiiaet region of CMm and India tt 
was because "conditions were not yet ripe for Its sattlenent.*' 
"Ihls shows that Uie Chinese l«ad«ra were shrewd and too clever 
and auirked tine for the opportune time when their troops were 
flrAly entrenched in Xluet and in a ^ s l t l o n strong enough to 
suJQjeot th«» Issue to as-rbltraaent of aras. 
As early as 1967 China consolidated i t s position by 
building ^ road across the Aksal Chin area of India. The 
Indian oovernaent r»act«;d to the discovery of the /ksal chin 
road m a note to Pdclng on October IBf 1968 In which she 
'^* y^ite paper I. '!064.69» op .c i t . , p. 45. 
36. fee the reply of C1>ou En Lai on JB^nmry £3| Id69, 
101^9 B9* b2.64. 
^ . JUOi^t p. a». 
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«xpr«st«d surprltt and r«gr«t that Chin«t« sbould hftY« tak«n 
sttoh a tt«p unilatrtAUy. Froa 1966 onwardSi Cfelnt b«fan to 
occupy parts o^ Indian t«rrltory t^  xough eXAiid«9tln« Imrasiont 
Into rtBot* 3r«»f* In th* sunsier of 19t8| In reply to a pxo* 
taftf tbe Chln«8« r«f«rrad to their "frontier ftterds** having 
detained the Indian patrol 1»ecatts« they vere in Chinese terrl* 
tory* In JtOy 1969 thay entered Khuxnek Fort in Udskh and 
arresUd an Indian patroX party in *J(sai Chin and aade other 
Incursions aeross Indian territory* Agsini in 3etober 1969y 
they further penetrated into Z^ adakh and opened fire on an 
Indian patrol necar th*. Ron^a Passf ki l l ing nine Indians and 
naking ten o^ers prisoners* Thus* by 1969 China had already 
37 
«a]aarkii»d on t^e course of aggression* 
'Ithough India desisted froa taking any drastic stepS| 
Nohru took a yry grave viev of the situation and «emed that 
should necessity arise India vould nr>t hesitate to talk in 
the language ^ i o h ^« Chinese seesied to understand • t^at of 
38 
force • in defence of her territorial integrity* 7h a state . 
39 
•ent in the Lok f^ abha on August S89 19699 H«hiu declared, 
37* InMs^QilM ftmflUfa op«cit*, po* 4U6* as« also s* ,^ 
Mulllck, ily yeaw Ifllh Btoblli t Tha Chinese Betrayal, (Doabay I i^Uled Publishers, 1971}, pp*S41.44* 
38* [Unamten rtlMt October 299 ^9^9. 
39* ^g'>!^, VoLSdi ?fo*19» /ttgttSt £69 19699 00ls*4796»4e01 
and 48oS»70* 
Neville Maaveu* i m i a ' i QiXm \ifcr?(Bo«bay t Jsioo 
Publishing ilousci 1971 U Chapter I* Contrary to th^ Indian 
Contd*••• 
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"MiU* Z do not wish t9 take aXaxalst vlo% f^ th« gituatloni 
y% tbaii naturaii/ t» praparad for any avantUfiXity and without 
fuaa or ahoutln«, ka«p vigilant*** 
Tha Beating of t^c /riaa Hiniatera of India and China 
waa h«i.d In April t9i»0 to ravlaw tha datarlorating altuatlon* 
But i t m«raly aarvad to oonfln th« sarloua dlffaranoaa in 
ragard to tht, undaratandlng of avan basic facts atiout tba 
bordar* It was, hovevar« agreed that off icials of ^a t%o 
Qovammenta should meat and axaaina the relevant dociaiants. 
Accordingly, three naatlngs of off icials ware held in Paking, 
Delhi and Rangoon during t*ie l^ttar half of ^96o» 
In 19^1 with a view to assuage public y opinion and 
take action short of cohfllotf Nahru fozsed tha "forward 
policy** %ihoae purpoae was to astabliMi aoma ayabolio posts 
40 
both in Ladakh and in HLPA, and thus aaaart India(s control 
(Continued froa th«. previous page) 
clalB that China was rasponsibla for the var of 9^&£, 
Maxwall has painstakingly proved that i t was India*s^for. 
ward policy* on the Northern frontiers vhich actually led 
ts a headlong clash* In this respect he: quotes ?7ehztt*s 
directive which sayst 'Both as flowing froa our policy and 
as a consequt^nce of our agraenent with China, this (northern) frontier should be considered a firm and da» 
f inite one. which i s not open to dewsaion with anybody. 
' ayatem of cheokpoata ahould be spread along this entire 
frontier* ^ r e apecialiyi we should have checkposts in 
such places a<t mig^  t be considered disputed areas.^ Thus, 
^ehru had taken the &tap %bich was to tranvaute a boundary 
prablem into a dispute and t^e dispute ultiaately Into a 
border war* (Thla is a transcription fron the original 
menorandua %«hich appears in D.R.^ i^dcdcaS'i Guilty Man af 
'^9b2m (Oonbay i Tulsi Chah Enterprises. i968)tP*T38* 
40* 3.M,£aul9 T^ ^ 11.**^^ »^^ tnr, (BoBbeyt / i l i e d Publishers, 
I9b7), p*£81* 
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ov«r %h«se ar«a8« 3y th« and of the y««r India had attabliihad 
aoout fifty posts along the border* 
China reacted to this poXio/ vlth aore aggressiireness* 
Larly m 190&, Chlnase troops stepped up their fomerd patroll. 
ing in th«i v«3stom st^ ctoir* In July 19b£| Chinese troops en« 
circled an Indian post in thb Galvan VaUey. On July 8&, 196S, 
the aovemnent of India conveyed to the Chinese QoveniBent its 
d«8lre to enter Into discussions on the bos&s of the officials* 
Beport as soon as the tension had sul3Sided« vJille notes were 
s t i l l t>eing exchanged regsrdlng prellainary discussions to 
east: t^ ie tension, the Chinese troops, suddenly on Teptefflber 8, 
196S| marched across th£ vell*establlshed boundary in the 
Eastern ^eotor« the *toMahan Line* Then on letober 20| ^962 ^ 
eaae the ntsslve Chinese attack In both the vestem and essteir 
sectors, ovenrhelaing the Halted %dian frontier posts* The 
Chinese amies or "frontier guards** (as Ch!r» described then) 
entered about 100 fflHes deep into Indian territory. Then on 
October £9, 19(»2* Prealer Chou En Lai put forvard his three* 
point proposals for cease«flre and disengagement* India rejeo* 
ted t^«8« proposals as they laplled ^lat China would retain 
her fruits of aggression and negotiate in respect of other 
41* For det:»ll8 Sbis Goveitnent of Iidla, Ministry of rxternal 
/ f fa lrs , Nr)tes, «^ ak>randa and letters exAhanged betveen 
th«» uoverments of India and China October 19f»£ • January 
i&^i ^hitfc t^ aagyr ffn> Ylllt p*ii* 
Urritorlal olal«8« India, 911 th« oth«r hand, put tonmwd 
^ oounUr prot^tal of haa. ova vhich oftilod for th* fvilojratlon 
of tU ttaUkt quo a* on r«pt«atwr 8y 19l>S,follovtd toer di«* 
etiislons iMitv e^n the tvo countries* Oiln« replied vlth further 
massive attacks into Indian territory* Th«n| suddenly in a 
dramatic move on Novesber 21, China sBnounced i t s deelslon 
of unilateral oeaaeflre and vithdraval* Thereafter the Chinese 
forces wlt^dr€lv so kilo aetres beMnd tfm !4BMihsn Line, ^ 1 ^ 
t^ey called "the 1969 line of actual control **ln the Eaetem 
rector, end alao £0 kilo aetres behind their latest Sfgression 
In Ladakh, which they Identified with the so oalled *'1969 line 
of actual control" in th« western seetor* China \m» s t i l l in 
i l legal possaaslon of about i4|b00 seqare a i les of Indian 
territory in I^ i^ dakh, inoludin^ the fruits of their latest 
aggression in f .^ia sector* Aithou^ India could not agree to 
the unilateral terms of the aggressor, ihe decided not to "ilUtr 
t^ 'to ceastt^f ire* India once again repeated her demand for t^e 
res tor t ion of atetttfl mn JBti '>f September e, 1968 In a l l 
sectors of the boundary as a precondition to a mutually agreed 
cease-fire* ' stalemate msued as the Chinese rejected this 
42 
Indian proposal* 
42* ln<iiatiC?ilna Cnnfllfitt op*cit*, pp* u.7* 
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M«siiv^;lle| on tht init iative of Mrs* a&ndtiTiaik«f Prist 
Minister of Ceylon, six nort«s l^igned /fro^slan eduntrltS| vis* 
C«yXon| Bursa, Indonesl^i, Canl^ odia, U«'\H« and Ohftoa, act at 
Coloabo ttoa. Dscsmbsr 10 to ^2, IQ&S in an attampt to l>r«ak 
tha daadJLock anl ^ovide a basis for agra«d e«as««fira arrsnga. 
43 
atfits* IlM proposals, Colombo proposals as thigr eaaia to ba 
Gall«d, anvlaa^ad (a^ th'it in tha utst, tha Chinasa; mat vlth. 
draw to tha HeMi^ han Lina and Indian foreas anist ba ^Uovad to 
raoO(mp/ thair positions right upto that llna» <b) in tha 
vast also, t^ ia chin^st must vlthdrav CO kiloaatrae and tha 
araa vacsitad 0/ vitiidravals vas to bt rogardad as; daBllitarisad 
xon9 to ba adnln la tared o^ e lvl l ian posts of both sldas until 
a neiptistcd sattlaaant of t^a bordar. India aeoaptad thaaa 
proposals in to to* But cMns i.'hila announcing aocaptanca of 
t>^ c proposals '*in prlncipla", f lat ly refused to retire froo 
44 
i ts nilitary positions In Via vest* 
}n April Sf 19fc>3t in a note to the Chinaae Gov^mBent, 
India suggested various constructive steps. Including inter* 
4b 
national arbitration, to reaolva the problem* In a note on 
43* For the text of the proposals see Ibid,, pp* ^7»18* 
44* D*h*Acharya, Inilii infl gl lni i ' » i « f Purvey, (%v I>elhl$ 
l^foraation rorvlce of India, 19&6}, pp* 3«>4* 
4b* vhlta PaoT M .^Ut, January 1963.July 1963, pp* 34.35* 
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3etob«r 9 | 1933, t^« Chlri«s« aat only r«j«oUd ^ « proposals 
tWLt also accused India of having proposed thot* tttps "to 
nake negotiations Inpijtsibla by satting up an array of obata. 
clots** Chins indlcatod Its apathy to the disottsaions on the 
basis of t^• Colombo proposals and also refussd to subait tho 
dispute either to the International Court of J^t iee or 
International Arbitration. In Octobsr '*6| 19639 the Qovrmmm 
of India wrote to C i^na exprensli^ the hope that ''wiser 
sels would prevail and the Chinese Govemsent would ravsrt to 
47 
the paths of pt.ace.*^ The Chinese in trans i|;ence and their 
rejection of various proposals resulted in a long staleaste 
v4iich Gontinttt»s to this day. 
)ne fa i l s to understand the reasons aotiv'^ting the 
Chinese attack as India had gone out of her way to befriend 
China and had lt>ft no stone untum&d to seours Oilnese interest 
even at the risk of earning the displeasure of U*^ *A, 3ut 
the nature and weight of the attack nakes i t evident that i t 
was t^e result of long and eareful planning, sade with a view 
to secure positions on India's natural frontiers so as to 
render India completely vulnerable* China feels t ^ t Indl,^  is 
^•. t^hisa paaur iftt.^, Jbly 1963-January 1964, pp. 8-11. 
47* JiilA»f P* 18* 
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th« only largt d«aocraey of Asiay and if sh« could b« hiabl«d 
and hiailllatedy the rdSt of the contliMAt vould b« •ati ly 
8ut>Ju^at«d* So th« Chines«t threat is not a aoatntarar ab«rr3« 
tlon but & planned ttrateg/ to lapo*« Comnunist id«ology on 
48 
unvilllng p«opl«* 
'^ n t^hor plausible reason could bo t^e guying under-
standing b«tve«n India and U,r,/., after ^067| Just vhen 
CoflSBunlst China had adopted s policy of intensifying the 
struggle against the United rtates* ^ gradual Qhaoge had 
laanifested i t se l f in the policies of both India and the United 
''tates* Prine Minister Kehru realised that the ere of rigid 
polarisation was ending and that the United states Oovernment 
vas abandoning the Dollesian viev of neutrallsn as laaoral. 
Though this transition In American policy had begun In the last 
year of ::lsenhover adnlnistration. i t becanie more earked in 
40 
the tiae of President Kennedy* ^B C r^ga naS| correspondent 
60 
of the ^ftian ..itormmm reported! "The reason vhy Indo*U.r. 
e 
relations are most friendly today is that President Kenndy and 
his advisers have accepted India's idealist ic approach to vorld 
48* This vas the view expressed W ^shok Mehta, leader of 
the roci&llst t^ arty of India and quoted in Louis Fischeri 
Kueala, J^p^rica and th« vi^ rld^ (BoAbayt 19^2), p«166. 
49. A«M.Halpern, Ld., j f 'nimn ahvtgfll C M M S Viev' froa six 
*t«T*T»*» ContlneatSi (Hev JCorkt M«c«Crav Hill 3ook 
Conferences lObb), p« £00* 
60* Inrtton bi,iV»%f ItovembMr 14^ 19bl. 
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pxobI«BS and th«> sine era and se l f less Banner In ^ loh It Is 
being pursued by Mr* Nehru. The current v i s i t of our Frl«e 
T^lnister t? 'aerlca has turned out to be the aost tlsely and 
also Bost successful because the ^hlte House has put Its seal 
of approval on this laage of v«hru«** Moreover^ f^ere has 
been a auch greater degree of aoceptanoe of India^s oon. 
allgnaent vhloh i s by now the ofriolai posture in world affairs 
of about sixty countries* 
vhen Kehru nent to tsshington in ffoveobcr 196lt he vas 
b1 
hailed by President Kennedy as "a vorld leader of t>'e stature 
of 'brshaa Lincoln and Franklin n.T^oosevelt** and **vhose esaaple 
oausQd not Just his ovn country tut airo the peoples of ^ e 
world to look up to hlB*** npeaking of Kennedy, ''ehrtt said 
that he carried **perhaps the greatest responsibility in this 
vorld**y and addedf *'fo ve look up to you and to your country 
and Seek to Uarn fioa you*" But these nutu&l tributes did not 
synbollse any shift In their basic s tnds on foreign policy. 
India, as befoic, r«aalned aon.8ligned and United states oon« 
tlnoed to be t>^ e leader of ni l l tary alliances against the 
expansion of conauBisa* Ihere vas, hoveveri a greater appre-
elation of each ot>er*s point of vlev and less annoyance at 
tixm differences existing between then* 
b l . a3i,?^tatfiMan» *?ovember b, 19bl* 
52. ]{iw,iftrit TiBflit ^oveaber 7, \9>U 
China v»s not happy about this growing frltndthlp b«t. 
ym*n India and th« Unltad ^tatas. Hanoa from id68 onwards 
Nav DtXhl and r'aking tmg^n to aova in oppoaita dlraetlons* 
Iha Chinaa« fa i t that t^ <ai^  national intarttata oould not ba 
S6rv«d tif a ^ovlaUAanrican datanta bat by hali^tanlng tansion 
i^ila Indian intarasts lay in lassaning tanalon and proaotlng 
datanta. China, >^ich %mB intaraatad In oraatlng a nilitantf 
antl«U«S, fronts vss tla svorn anany of t^osa who sougt't frlandi 
ship vlth U«r«'» Tnd!!iy thus, bvoAoe auapact as i t r«fusa<^ 
to toa tha ChInaaa Xinm and did not f i t Into tha pietura vMc>^  
China had dravn of an **antl»iBparialist front" of 'fro-^slan 
and Latin Aoarlcan and ooovaonlat bloe nations undar i ts 
laadarskip« 
T: i> principal objsctlva of China in India v&s not only 
t^  e territorial a^4:randisaBantt but also gaining sooa strataglo 
advantai:($ by occupying larga areas in Ladakh and establishing 
itsfalf doap insida Indian territory* Pmth^pt ths the principal 
od 
aios of Chinast^  varai 
63* According to Krishna Mimon china's aia in attadclng India 
vas that, "They wanted to dlsoradit India and the Priaa 
Minister*.*** 
Thigr vented to discredit India in the eyes of '^ outb 
tast Asia* Thwy vanted the hegcBony of 'sia« They found 
that the Fusslans vera friendly with utt^they did not 
like i t ." 
They %ranted to undeniine Indian economic developaant. 
'•****They wanted to ehow that nobody oould stand up to 
China*** Tee Michael rJreoher, India and VnrXA Palitloe. 
Krishna Menon*s vlev of the vorId,(London i Oxford Unlver. 
s lty Press, 19t»8), p* 166* 
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(I) To dtnonstrau to / s i s and th6 vorld tbat Chins was 
the only pov«r to r«ok-t>n with In Asia and eorrespon. 
dlngJLy to damoXiah India (^  preatlgay influ«nc«; and 
•oonomy* 
(II) lo ahov that the pollelaa of peaoaful oo*axl8t«no« 
and n9i%.allgnffl«nt foJULowd bjr India wcra unaound and 
transitory and tl-ua to prov« t^a fals i ty of Kruahoh«v*8 
Ueals regarding the laportance of non.allgned oountrlas* 
(III) Lastly^ to toppla Seiixu*B Govarnmant and ovflntually to 
•atabXlah In India one mora aubaarvlant or statall l ta 
atata* 
imiTTrn <?TATK?; POLICE Ann cnimnr. '^GCRrs«-in!?. 
It tma th« unprovided Chinese invasion of Ibidla In the 
autuan of 9^6& vMeh reversed the ebb-tide of Indo«^Berlcan 
relations and set in motion foicea that brought about a pro« 
found change In their a t l tude to%Axds eaoh other* *'\knMfU. 
ttlngly, this act of China led to a reoMUldlng of Indo*U«?« 
relationship^ breaking dovn of American resentoients for the 
present, and there caffle about a raallgnatnt of forces in the 
64 $Bree Vorld o^ incalculable lapaet in the coailng decades*" 
54* i l l l l aa H*Hti8£ler| "India as a ?rosp«»ctlve i^rfeer**. 
United Ftatflg Nana! Pr<Mx»»A±niim^ Vol* 90, Ho*S| February 
19b4, p. 73. 
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Th0 Chinese threat to India's t srr i tor ia l lnt«gr l t / 
d«ffl3ll8hod much of our intsroatlonal outlook. I t btcas* 
suddenly clttar thiit India could not defend herself fro« an 
advancing Chinese axtay without effect ive B i l i a r y aid froa 
the Western ^ v e r s , particularly the United rtateSf vhlch regard 
China as an actual or potential &num'/» India sou^t /gwrlcan 
assistance, and the United ' Utes responded favoursbly, because 
th6 st^curlty Inttirests of the two countries coincided at the 
t ine . But, pezhaps, with a vlev to Keeping up a semblance of 
non-alignm&nt betveen t^e '"'^vlet Union «»nd the United "tates, 
?^ ehru dlrecttd h is appeal for military ass l tance fctfierallyi 
and at the easts t lae enphaslzed that the Tovlet Union had been 
66 
approachfcd ss v e i l as the United ' t i t e s . According to The 
TlMoft, December 6, T9t4, la te In Ve nlt!>t of '^ovtuber 20, 
196E ^ehru nade an urgent and open appeal for th€ J-^terventlon 
of the United 'States vlth bomber and fighter squadrons to go 
Into action against the Chinese. "Is plan var that 'merlcan 
alrcrii^t vould undertake s tr ike against the Chinese troops on 
Indian territory if th^y continued to advance, and 3lso provide 
cover to Indian c i t i e s i f the Chinese airforce raided them. The 
6t>. M.!^.Venkataramani, "India and the United 'States i Tome 
Issues r'osed By heoent DeveloiMsents 
Vol. 6, Nos. *»-£, July-October \9toQ i' pm a", IntTnatlftnal rturtia^ * * 't p. 134. 
b«j. John Kenneth Qslbralth, f^fl&aasadar.'fi laMrn^J : * Personal 
Account of the Kennedy Years, (London t Hamish VTamllton, 
19t>9), p. 385. 
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Unlt«d ''tsfss retponi«d im«dlat«ly by (SUpateMng an ^n^rlcan 
alrorsft cnrrlery but as t^ Q erlftls p^tsed twenty four hourt 
aft«r ?^«bru nade tbit appsaXi th« slrersft carrier turntd back 
•T«n b«for« It r«aoh«d th« Bay of BiAgaX* aat tb« appeal for 
transport 8lrcr&ft»C«1d0f«v«s i«n«dlat«ly fulfllXsd. 
Prsildsnt Kennedy vrote to Nehru, "3ur syap&thy in the 
situation i s vhoI«*h«art«dly with you« iou have displayed an 
ii&pre«6lve degree of forbearanee &M patience in deallnc with 
the Chinese* :^u have put into practice what a l l great religiou* 
leaders have uri;ed| and so fev of their follovere have been 
aole to do*** He offemd sfiteriai assistance to India« The 
American Aabassador to India, John Rtfineth Qelbraith, played a 
vr;f active and Isportant role »t this juncture* T^e did his 
utaost to encourage the sving of Indian opinion tovards the 
United "tates* Accordingly, he Issued a statement f-at his 
aovernment recocnlEed the Me Mahon Line as the intematlonsi 
border •sanctionet! by nodem uf?age»# this was the ^Irtt cle'^r. 
cut statement rtf the United "tates* viewpoint on this score* 
Until then the 'ra©rleans had deliberately avoided &ny eoasltaent 
and even nov Galbralt^ had to overcome the reluctsince of the 
rtate Department before be was autiioxised to endorse tHie Mc MahOn. 
Line* 
67* For details see IbJ^.^ pp* 440*88• 
. 86 • 
68 
Ih« United rtate« •xt^nd^d aUitary aid and Inlia 
unhesitatingly accepted it* Xh« raal criais in India«• foreign 
policy nov beifan sa the oajor plank of our non-alignaaDt^ non-
aeoaptance of arma from either pover bIoC| vas put In lantdiate 
jeopardy* 
R< r^u had always explained his earlier reaistanee to 
acceptance of nil itary aid b|/ pointing out that to incur such 
depand«rice upon other governments vould inevitably entail a 
reduction In India's independence* But nov, Af&eriean jet 
transports vere landing In India at the rate of eight flights 
per day^  carrying automatic r i f les , heavy mortars, recollless 
guns etc* tlovever, Nehru maintained that because the supplies 
of aim^Bents vere 'unconditional and without any strings* they 
69 
did not affect India's non-alignment* Furtheiaore, there vas 
a fundamental challenge to the ooncsptual structure of non. 
alignment because of China's open defiaiuse of both the U*r.A, 
and t^ 1e roviet Union and i t s desire to bk recognised as t^e 
world's third big pover and Asia's first* This brought about 
a qualitative change in the post-var pover structure* !7ehru 
ves In a great dilemt&a. {'resident Kennedy, hovever, did not 
ask for a formal alliance and even made appreciative comments 
68* Department of rtate 'Statement on November 17, 19^2, '*U*??* 
rxtenda Military Aid to India", n^^rtmmnt rsf ^tatp ain^ti 
Vol*LXLVlI| No*ie23, December 3, 1962, pp* 837.36* 
69* L*r.D* 6.11.42, t^flgg MJntltlf on Slt¥hilrtflBn RiiftttflMt 
op*clt*, 9 11, p* 161* 
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on Indift's fiorwalignaitfit* Amtrican ame were ru8h«d to India 
vltbout any condition whatever* Priaa Minister ^«hru hlaielf 
conf imed that the United ''tates had nBVT raised the Issue of 
our giving up non^ailgnnent or joining any a l l iUry alXianoe. 
He also correotly pointed out that the United states sigjbt 
not be particularly Interested In getting directly involved 
in India's current oonfllet with China %rhieh a military alliance 
Bight necessitate* fjnmriCBn Aabsssador to India, JbhQ X« 
Oaibraith voiced the sane thoughts as Nehru in a speeoh at 
rapxu Houset 
**2ut just to be ^ o l l y clear l e t ne say that ve have 
no Interest in extending our systea of military alliances ••• 
n^d neither are ve In the market for military bases* For years 
ve have been vlthdr^vlng from various overseas Installations **• 
T^ e notion that ve seek nev* ones in India is x^ther s i l l y ••« 
5^ 0 if next veek you vere to propose a fu l l scale defensive 
arrangement to ^^^shlngton vlth troops, depots, joint coasaand, 
and a l l of the jt paraphernalia of comsoon defence ve vould 
almost certainly have to ssk you to reconsider* And If any 
such treaty ver« presented to the i^ enate of the United rtate **. 
i t vould, I am afraid, be overvhelmingly defeated*** 
60* See a report of Mr* Nehru's speeoh in Hitnduatan XlBMt 
February 2£. 19t>d* (61* Speeoh at the Indian School of International r>tudles. 
rapru House. Nev Delhi, February 20tl9&3* ^eatt reprinted 
as, *'The United rtates and the Current Scene',**' (Nev Delhit 
US IS , 19bd}* 
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Th« /mld8«sador was reflecting t^ vl«vt not m%fly of 
th« Aawrican aov«xnaent ^ t also of lnfox««d allltaryy political 
and noni>offioial opinion in bis country on dlract **allgnBtnt'' 
vith India* 
Further, Prime Minister Nehru*a efforts to stick to 
non«aligraient were no longer ridiculed in Washington but care 
was taken to se^ that Indian non^aiignoient vas not put to 
greater risk or test than vas unavoidable* ^s America vanted 
to take advantage of the rino-^oviet rifty she vas disinclined 
to do an/thing which might embrass liussiag which was helping 
India against China, Ihus India's non»allgnment become useful 
i9otl:i tai 'oerloa and Mussi£>| both lo(riied upon India as U^ e 
only Asian country % l^ch could| to soiM ei^tent| contain the 
exp&BSion of Chinese power* 
Cofflounist China has been a great rival of the United 
f^tates in the Fmr last at ve i l as in routh«.East Asia and to 
deter i t vas th«j major policy objective of the United states* 
The Chinese aggression in India offered the most desirable oppos 
tuBity to America to win over India and contain the Communists* 
8^ regards the India.China border dirput« i tself i the 
United rtates had alvriys been sympathetic to India. As early 
as December 1969 Eisenhower had backed Vehru*s China policy and 
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criticized the use of force by China to scttXtt th« uord«r dls . 
pute, Hr>v«ver| as Ni^ hru had n^t antloipfttflid that China vouid 
attack India, h& stuck to the position that "under the present 
clrcumetAnoes India Is not to se^k United rtates aid to resist 
64 
Chinese aggression.** 
It vas only in the f irst veek of February, I960 that 
India requtosted the United states for the purchase of defence 
106 
Stores in view of tbe recent flare-ups on the border. The 
American reaction to t.be request vas favourable since they 
believed that India and China ver^ racing for the eeonoalo and 
polit ical leadership of Asiai. rpttakin^ before th« I'conoiiie 
Growth Comnlttee on Hay 6, 19^0, Ttfiator Kennedy pleaded for 
such American aid aa would enaijle India to "overtake th^ chmllen«; 
<»2. Xtona nt Ifldla» December d, 1959* 
o3. In an Interview with Zaya Ilnkln after the Chinese invasion, 
Nehru s^ld that China "let ae down, they deceived me. I had 
no Idea that they would do something which really was not 
in their own interests* Ve hnve been their strongest 
advocates in f^ala. and also at the United Nations. But of 
course they do not want to be represented at the United 
Nations, so perhaps we are not so useful to them*** Taya 
rinkln, .fitanrttaing IndUt (London I Chatto and vindus,l9k>2), 
pp. 217.18. It i s interesting to note that this statement 
contradicts an earlier stat^cnt made by him In an interview 
with X!*ya Einkln In 1964. He then remarked i *'3ut In say 
twenty years* time, when they are stroni; and modern, then 
the picture wil l be quite different and they will probably 
be a menace.** ijBiiL*iPP« S06-9* This shows that ^ehru did 
anticipate but wanted time. 
<>4. Hlriffustan Tla^ igy November 16, 1969. 
^b. Ti«i.a f^f Indlay February 13, 19^0. 
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of Communist Chlm", n« gmphaslifed tha t India followed a 
route In keaplnt; with huaan digni ty and Individual frwdom. 
!'e further said t ha t , " the r«ni b a t t l e Is not the recent f l i r e -
up over Chinese troop movea^nts around disputed bounderles, 
^or I s I t the var of vords over China's annlhl lu t lon of Tloet. 
Xhfc re-ii India-China stru^ji^le Is equally f i e rce but l e s s obvious, 
He sr^ld t ha t mort d i s t i n c t l y the s t ruggle i s for "the p o l i t i c a l 
and economic leaders ' i lp of the Last, for the respect of a l l 
/ 'Sla, T-yi- the opt>ortunlty to demonstrate whose wriy of l i f e i s 
be t t e r " , and added tha t , "ve vant India to win tha t race with 
ived China, '© want India to be a freti and thr iv ing leader of 
a fiet. and th r iv ing 'sla.** Thus, united f^tates vac more than 
wUllnt; to hfelp Inula aga ins t Chin-. 
In January fgo"*, i^reeldtfnt Kennedy assumed office and 
continued the policy o" f r iendship with Indls 5«nd o** ^ 1 * >ni 
• iss l f t ince to '•'er to vl thst ' ind the challenge posed by Ch*na, 
' i though,according to ' ' r thur ' chleelnger,*Tehru» s v i s i t to f ' e 
H. '^. '^ln Nt>veBuer "^ Qt^  l e f t Kennedy disappointed In h i s «xpecta. 
t lons f 'it tn the n^-vt few years India would be 'a great afflrma. 
^aerica 
t ive force *n the world o r even In *"outh Asia*but /continued 
uo« Inaian m^uiui&t Noveaber 10, 19&0* 
(u7, ^tataaman^ December 1£, ISi'O* ?ee a lso ' r t h u r M.Tchlesln^er 
J r . , A XlMUaand Daya i John F.Kennedy In the ' h l t e House, (London a f^ndro Deutsch, '^965;, p . 4<J0. 
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to h«lp India eoonoaleally %nd ev«n back her In h«r quarr«l 
with China, fenator *'parkoan, then acting Chaliaan of the 
Tctrelgn Keiatl->nc C(xmitt9e^ ooserved thus In JUna t9&2 t (^v^  
knov right nov that India la pressing vary hard agalnat Cownu 
nlst China upon h^r n?rth.er.stem frontierf and urged that It 
v9uXd i3e unviae to discourage Incls t^ redoing aid, *^at the 
\i9Fy tine tliat ahe Is moving in the direction that ve hate 
been wanting >^ er to roovt* for a long tlne«*^ 
Furthermore, "^ehruis v i s i t to the United ''tates reaulted 
In thti recognition by U«'','» of Indians special position vla^a. 
vis t>e J'ovlet Union. I* c Americans realised that "while world 
ooiamun:!sa Is th« objective of the Tovlet Union, in the isaedlat 
future, thfe fovfbt Unior Is lnt«ireated In seeking I?ylian build* 
69 
up as a counter-poise to China,** Deing convinced that India 
would not go the cooffiunlst vay, the United rtates evinced so 
much interest in India th^t i t was ready to provide military 
70 
equipment at low cost against China If a request was received, 
India was also assured of United rtates* support in case of 
n 
Peking's attack on l^er territory* 
o e . '',uy Start Tlai^g, June -lo, l o e s . 
to9. £1iatoamant November 8, 196t* 
70. liln<1U8t^n„TllBa» December 7, fgC)!. 
71 • Tines n" T^ di%y December 7, 1961. 
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In keeping vith i t s policy^ the United * t^atea T)epart«ent 
72 
of State made a etatement on ?7ovcaiber 17| 191^ 29 by vftleh 
al l l tary aid vas extended to India in the vake of ^ e Chinese 
invasion, n^d on NDveober £0. t9b2, President Kennedy Issued 
a stateaent In this oonneotion* 'fe dispatehed 'verell Parriaan 
to India vittx a team of high-level state Departm«it and Penta. 
^n advirers and Central Paul "dasas, CoEJCiander of the mobile 
strike foice which tht United '^tates kept In readiness for 
Mifcrgency ground action. In s^lte o^ the announceffient of 
cease.flre by Chinsi, tH« Harrloan mission arrived In Tifev Delhi 
on th& evening of Nov«Maber S^ t ^^^ »^^ i^  ^t once tak«fi to Beet 
the Prime Ministfer, Ihough ^thT\x and !farrla»n met as friends, 
there vas a constraint In ^ehru»s attl.ude* ''His letters to 
Kennedy asking for help had pointed a desperate pleturei but 
face to face *'ehru seeotd to vant to avoid talking about It 
all," Roger ^Ulsman, a ae-Doer of the alssloni wrote in Ms book, 
and observed that. It must have been difficult (for hla) to 
greet Americans ov^r tht ruins of his long pursued policy of 
neutralism/ /fter a ten day v i s i t to India, the Mission 
reebwmended that the United rtates %iould have to take major 
72. For fUU Text see ^fiBartaant flf PtStfl I3UlltUnt Vol*>LVII, 
N'o*12£d, Decernoer a, 19t>2, pp. 837.d8. 
73. Full Tuct In iJ2M*t December IC, 19&2, p. 874. 
74. hogei- HUsman, iv> Mnv6 / Watirtn ; xhe Politics of Foreign 
Policy in the ^ daAnlstratdon of John F.Kennedy, (Ifev itork: 
Doudleday, 19t»7}, p.ddl* 
• 9S • 
d«el»ion8 on th^ dogree and nature of the Bllltary aid to India 
and to continue thft «m&rg*,ncy &xms aid thljaaotf that atarUd 
a montti agOy and pr«paied thct groundvork for eubttantlal B i l l . 
tary asslatanca to India over th« next thrae yaarai undar an 
agraanant reached aoon after this between Kennej and the Brltlah 
Prime Mlnlat«r,'^eBlXXan,at Vaesali* 
Ch«:8tar 3ovlts rcc^arded Vf> ttsergence of a dynaalc and 
expansionist C l^no 3s th© rit)8t sl^^rilflcant posti«r developaent* 
n© argued that if China adv^ no«»d towards ?^»i;,',sla, It wouXd oomi 
into dlrdet conflict vlth tine U«B*A, Therefore^ "t eountexw 
balance oiuat be created.** IMa oould be achieved if India and 
Pakistan found an acceptable agreanent on Kathnlr. Then the 
defence against Cooaunist China wouldift be **A lot easier i f thosi 
two countries would pull together*** But Pakistan was aaong the 
bitter cr i t ics of the United rtatea al l l tary aid to India as 
It was afraid that this equipment would be used by India agains 
her. Pakistan refused to appreciate the Indian predleaaent ss 
caused by Chinese aggression and tht Indian case for a l l i t sry 
aid from ^ e United States* However^  American ams aid to Indi 
continued In complete disregard of alarmed protest from Paklsta 
until Pakistan's attempt to ^In Kashmir by force)s4t off the 
?&• t^V yilrit UmUt December 4, ig&2« 
?&. T^e nindUy May 2 , 1963* 
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t^re«*v«ak var in "^gbb* r en 'flwHoan a n t sld vas oat 9f% 
snd Tndla turned to the '^ovlet Union for al l i tary «ttlttane«« 
-mnv^ ?^ Pi^ iflM Aim u.n,imr.v.. 
A definite ohan«e occurred In Indian thinking aft«r. 
the Chinese invaiion. The Indlm people In gen<£ral vere 
^esteful to th<. United rtates for hex ttoely help without 
strings. The ''ovlcit Union and tho \j*S, Mk,v& no longer plao#d 
on the samt ptideetsl 'ilthough th^re vas a desire to keep 
Russia too on our side in th% etrug^e Ki^ alnst Coiaigunist China 
Bitxd her silly^t^aklstan* Moreover^ eQphasls vas nov laid on 
the Ideological similarity between the two countries* President 
77 
Hadhakrlshnan during M£ v i s i t to the United " t^at^ s obsenredt 
'*It is not mcir^ ly a question o^ imposint^  a militar/ defeat 
on us, of defeating us on the battlefield, but of disrupting 
our way of l i f e and making people feel t^at CoacBunlst China 
Bathes more rapid progress, that denocraey is slow and cuabersoae 
Thft mnAuj June 7, Idi^ S went a step further and wrote edlto. 
r iai ly , "Ihe Chinese threat to India is a threat to the whole 
d«socrstlc world and the United ' tates as the world's mightiest 
deaocracy, has a special res^nslo l l i ty to stcnd s'r:ouider to 
shoulder vlth Indl^ *, the vorld's largest democrriey, in facing 
this ohaiJLengo*** Lvcn aost 'miricane, v-hat^ sver th«lr resenra. 
tlotti »boot India's Inteiaal or external policies in the patt. 
77. ?}inf1Vtf tap Itefcg, June 7, 19bd. 
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v«rtt in ful l agr««a«nt vlth Ch«st«r aavl«^ 8 that "a rrt«» proa* 
psroua and p«io«fui India i s a prlaary vaquiraBant for a atabia 
and fraa Asia and trmt a d^^ocratlc India v l U oonatltuta a 
78 
long atap forward tovard a dasoer-tic and fiaa vorld aooiaty*" 
^' strong and danocratie India, tiiarafora, iB in aecord vlth 
"marlcan national sacurlt/ and in hamon/ vlth thalr ysal of 
saveraign danger'tic nations* 
Tha Chlnt8« war, Bmraover, t^  rav up oonplax and o^ten 
conflicting forces !n Indo«-aerloan relatlon8^ip pattams* 
'Ithottg*! at th€ Oovarnnant leval Uoth countri^a triad to look 
at tha problaa from the controlling point of national interaats, 
out vithin tha Indian Govamaant thara vara contradictory 
elaaants pulling In divaraa diroetiona. Tha traditional **gto-> 
Astarlcan** forces in India assarted thasaelv^s nn<* tried to 
bring her into tht; * estern caap* fbeir irgumant was Vint India 
oould not rely foi^vg on r^ovlat support &ni that national 
defence a^^ainat Coauoonlsa can be best aecureil by joinln;; the 
^ostein eaop* Xhe forces had the auoport of a section of 
79 
oabinet •inistara as vail* 
78» Chester Ibwlrg, "Indo-fiaarlcen Rel-^tlons » * Curient 
View,; iJBIMrn rsonnimy Vol, 46| *ro*S£, MovefflOar Sby 
^9u6f fip, 10^8, 702t«22, Text of a speaoh dellvarad at 
t*^ e laskl Inst'iutt In 'haadabad on "loveaDer 17, 1966)* 
79* Chanakya^ren, 2iA»Mll»9 P* ^*>» 
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Thusy India*a noiwailgnaent policy baoaae the aubjact 
of attack from varloua quart«rt| v i ^ S n and outalda India, 
Ihft fihrlatJian rcliinBg ilanltni vrote on my 7, i9t>d that "it 
Is this Chinese pres^ica vhlch has forcad the nev Indla.U.S. 
relatlonsMp. Ind^a v i l l henceforth reoaln *unailgned* de 
jure but she has been forcibly a l l i e d , *de facto* with the 
vest*** The general mood wae best reflected In an editorial 
In the Indian i x p f e of November "?0I)2, which saidi 
"Var teaches a country many valuable, lessons. One 
of the useful lessons vhlch Chinese aggression hac highlighted 
i& to dettonsti'3te to th@ Indian people vho their res l friends 
and foes are • • • • • Xo pretend that our policy of norwalignatfit 
has not received a Jolt by recent events and developatents i s 
to continue to l i v e in vhat the Prime Minister has r l ^ t l y 
labelibd as an ' a r t i f i c i a l atmosphere of our ovn creation* 
Let th« Prime Minister, therefor*, give a lead to the country 
by impleaentint^ h is ovn advice that the massive invasion of 
India by China should make us realize that ve are getting out 
80 
of touch v i th rea l i ty in the modern vorld." 
80, ^ehru confessed that the invasion *'has brought us, made 
us rea l i se , that ve were, shal l I say, getting out of 
touch vith r e a l i t i e s in the ONsdern vorld* Ve vere l iv ing 
In an a r t i f i c i a l atmosphere of our ovn creation and ve 
have been shocked out of I t , a l l of us , whether i t i s 
the Oovemment or the people." Address to <"t^ te In^oraia-
tlon Minister's Conference, Nev Delhi, )ctober 26, 1962. 
India, Fxtemal Affairs (Ministry of — ) , Prim* Mini«tar 
nn Clllnii«^SgrMg<LQn» (Nev Delhi I Ilxtemal Publications 
Division), p,2o. 
But tetu&lly India did not align with the v«at« India 
and United ''tates merely shared % mutual defensive <K>ne«sn to 
t>^vart tH designs at Chinese aggression against the Indian 
subcontinent* There was no foraal alliance and none «es eiren 
81 
conteaplated* The United rtates gave no undertaking to go to 
India's Sid vith i ts o^ tt forci^s if the Chinese invasion recurs* 
But I t agreed "to consult** in that 6ontlngenoy« Pur^eXBorei 
ve havi^  had a continuitd flow of defence i&sterlals fxoa the 
United t;tateS| ve l^ave received alssions In ^ loh the United 
rtates vas represimtedi and they have been given extraordinary 
fac i l i t i e s to inspect our defence instai lst ions| detailed 
discussions by our repres^itatlves with .*aiericen and EIritlsh 
tailitary officers on Bea8ur«^ s for strengthening our air defencei 
and the significant statenent of the Prime Minister that 
runa '^ays and ra^r installations \iould be iaproved for possible 
use by the ^ir azas of "ffHndljr nations** in the event of an 
all-out Chinese var« a l l point to the fact that there had taken 
place a significant developnentf in our relations with the 
86 
United states • a nev ai l i tary relationship* ^s ^nbassador 
Galbr^ith pointed out« ''certainly vhen American planes deploy 
Indian troops or t^rry aunitionr: fron one military base to 
b1* It f^as contemplated but could not matei'lalise on account 
of Kennedy's murder and then Nehru's death, re« J*K* 
Galbralth| iuufillUy P* b04* 
82* M*S«Venfc:*taramaniy ajUfili«> P« 1^* 
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anothc^r th^re has b««n $oa« chsinge in the miHt&ty relatioru 
83 
•hip o«tVtt«n our tvo countrlts*** f l l this had the •araaiks 
of an umorltttfi aiilanctt fox dofenelve purposes* Th« merit 
of sudi an alilanc« \^s that It alXoved India to ooUabOfQt* 
frMly with iiussia and exploit the rino«Hu«8ian ri^ty vhile 
reaping th« deterrent effect of an iapXied U.fr* and 0«K« 
assurance of direct aid if China should noire again* Theref^re» 
India accepted veatem ama gratefUlJL/y but slBttltaneousl/ 
tried to persuade the "^ovist Union to sake at l e ' s t a token 
supply of ai l i tary aircraft* i'residtfit Kennedy, also wss 
guided by similar calculations* He was not anxious to put 
pressure on the r'rime Minister as i t vas not in /iserican 
interest to narrow thit Blno*roiriet rift* If India became a 
major point of different between Moscow and Peking, i t was in 
/.aerioan interest, at best for th% time being, to strengthen 
Moscow* 
But Soon the chaxm surrounding this nev Indo»U*n* 
r<»lationship began to wear away* Ihe Americans had expects.d 
a reorientation of Indians foreign policy and changes in Indir.*: 
external posture and policies • changes which to them vere 
logical in viev of the demonstration to India of the validity 
^^ their view "»f the world's major problems, especially com i^unl 
83* 'Speech at the fchool of International rtudles, rapru 
'*ouse, e^w Delhi, February So, '*0&3* 
fc4* vllliam H, Ilessler, aaM£l3k*f »• 79* 
Xb« (Slopping of Krishna H«non fron th« Union Cabinet vat 
retarded as the t^eglirtng of ^ thorough reorientatl^ of 
Indian 4>9llcy and a veXeoae step* But the eubeequint apeeehea 
and statements of "lehru shocked many ^Mrleans* ' s n'>senthal 
86 
put Ity **Indians policy in a day.to-day practice vas a three. 
legged stool* Two legs are gone ••••• rT^ v the Prl«e ^flnlster 
teeters on n t i lrJ iejt, tJ^ )» hope that one day t^ -e ''ovlet Union 
wil l be able to shake of i t s coanltaents to i'eklng and back 
India. This ^oyu ^as produc«d soae strange ^nd^ to ^estemers 
and aany Influtmtiai IivllAng, disturbing liolltlcal acrobatics 
on the part or .U» ''«'iru . . • • It is diff icult ^ find any 
rtai diffttAuTicc drawn lietve^n t^ it fovlet Unljn and th« Jnittitd 
rtates ••• It ho^ts *>« t^«ini6>a t^ find Hr« T^^ hru apparently 
quite 38 int«»rested In thuoratieul help from thtt United ' tates* 
It hurts to see a man who announced the «nd >f is illusions 
Gllng so aard to th% dream tt^t oosmmisai Itself is of no 
Importance* ** 
f'll 'aerican hopes were belled and once again It 
beeame dlaillusloned vlth India, rhe varath generated in 
Indo*^!aerican relations by the Chinese attack cooled otfm 
^?ovever» later when i t vas realised l^at Russia vas also siding 
v5t^ India 'Against China did the /merlcans recognise the 
wisdom of ^«.hrtt*s policy and modified their criticism* It 
6b. ^i¥ j^art ^lafti» November 1 ^ 19b2« 
• 99 • 
vas 'v«r«lX Tiarrlmany U«r« Assistant r«orctary of ^tat« 
vho ^ave t^ «, l^ad In t I0 respeot ^ stating in a t«l«vition 
Interview that It v^s co^d. for India and for the leat. that 
•he kept up >er frl«^ndX/ relations with the Hoviet Union* 
ither libfei^l elements in t^e liHited rtates qulelOy endorsed 
^ I s view* 
66* The /merican ' obassador^ GaXbraithy adopted sotaevhat 
the same l ine i^en he declared in a speech at the 
Constitutional Club that **ve vera not in oooipetition 
vltii the Soviets to serve t>-e Indians,** ..^ ^ Tee 
Oalbralth, OAAAU^M P* 40a, 
c H ik p T 1? R n 
The touQhstone of Indo^tmoriean i^l&tions is i Q:kistaQ| 
whioh Qsarolses eomlddrablQ Influenee on thQ foTvlgn policy 
of India* iho vary feet thut India's r«I&tloi» with ial^stan 
have moved in a vicious circle iver since th^ir birth us 
sovereign states in 1&47| every dispute praaotine M^ added 
Qlesent of strain and tension vith hate feeding on i t se l f i 
ho.0 Qontribtited to deterioration in Indo*.aseriourj relutlons* 
Hence I in order to view ^ e Indo«^«J* relations in c pi oi^ er 
fjerspeotive i t i s f i rs t essential to grasp the basic nature 
of Indo^Pokistan relations and tensions* 
"fhe area of Indo^'akiatar^i relations is by far the 
most crucial in the entire coopass of India's foreign relatior.s", 
as the whole background has be@n poisoned tqr the loa^ &nd 
bitter conflict between the riuslici ^eagtse #iioh ruled lal-istan 
after 1047 m& the Songresn whi^ ruled India. The mitncl 
suspicions aiid fear h.jve nude the relations between these two 
li^ediate neithbours other than i*rle dly. 'Itiat India has 
accepted the creation of t^akistan as final and ertertaim no 
I* L.G^/ergheset "Indo-iaklstan »^lations"| ^onaraetaia^ 
/ 61 • 1(2} I -eeond J^L1arter» 10C6| p* 9* 
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desire to ui.io i t vaa £«3riy Q^d oloar toy Ilohm la sn interview 
^ t h 2ll«ba«l braeh«r tiihon hd £^sorted that "This (the !&lElstanl 
fdor o£ India) Is totaiXy tinjustli^lod b4»«imso under no oirooBS* 
tancQSi nhatoveTf even l*rcia XhQ tuiTTc^9»t imtional intdrostS) 
do wo v 5 ^ to 'nterrero i. slLlston* .% vant thorn to toe &n 
andorendent country and a il^ouii^liig cooBtry." ;Jthough J!«hni 
favoured a elosd assoeKtlon wStis iakistany h* mia not at a l l 
©agor to raimlto with sfeititan. Tn his address at tho .ligurh 
l!i?sllss Lr-lv0rslt7| ::ohrw declaroi* on Tammry S4| 1948 that« 
" I t today, by eny chancft, t wor^ offdred th© r«miion of Indie 
a'd Jiakist&n I would deoline i t for obvious r«asoi»» 1 do not 
vu.n% to oarry tho bur dor; of iakist im's groat problams, I havo 
OQOu^ Of sy o«m« ..ny elosor assoolatlon mxc>t coso out of a 
BoraiiikX process und in u frio.' dly vs^ vhich does not and 
i uliintctf; as a statQ, but m i^kes i t ui e^ual part of ^ larger 
2 
tinioi. v l th whldi several coactrles o l ^ t be aasoclated*" But 
I^BdElstan has along beor< s'jspicioos that India has desicns on 
her integri ty ar.d indepo :der.ce bocuuae of the faet t h t the 
Jongrees was aXvays qpposod to tlio par t i t ion of the smmtry 
and agteed to i t In the l^st resort as tho oidy v ^ of u<:^ lev«» 
log the i '^reedoc of India* ^>irther| the extroraists on loth 
sides h«Ave clunoitred for war as the only final scAutlon of the 
differences between the two countries* 
2* »i4.ter Grookeri ijah r^n t A ::ont<^por&ry*s 'stlsatey (iiondon t Alien and Unwin^ 1966), p* 38r^ » 
Th« «tudy of Ind^-* aklstan jrelatlorun Is t^ug a study 
of CDifilct vhlch ef!iamt«» from snd msnireBta i tsel f In a 
number of p o l l t l o l profcileos b«tve€n t^s two countries. At 
t* 6 base of this lay Ve conflict of Interests and 9b;;eetlves, 
3 
o^ Ideology! image and plover betveen t^  e tvo countries* 
In s'-)rt, V (^ .aklttanl posture ^as been dictated a l l 
4 
f-dse yt&r8,as polntei out by s^hok Kapur, by Its *'doainant 
t psycl olofelcal fixation of hosti l i ty to Indlla, of huring India 
v^ fe>re p38£lbl«s« 1 at is tht, dominant motif in i^akistsn*s 
limitedf dog«;,edly pursued objectives, and this pt^rsistaney 
( s lc ; of limited oojifctives accounts for comparative success 
vls.a«vls Indians foreign policy or ratber a number of Tndian 
foreign policies. It vould attempt to make headvay, with 
success^ whenever i t found that Indian efforts were tJdvancing 
either with uussia or with China, r'akistan's policy ^as been 
highly competitive and has adied to the pressures India vas 
already facing from the super-powers.' 
ThuS| f^e problems of Indo-PiMciatan relation? arose 
out of t^e fact t^at ^"elr mutual relations did not pose t^c 
3 . ^or details see, D.C.Jha, In^n-Pakistan helatlnny nctofu 
^QLh\ (Patna j 3iarat Ifiawan, 1972:j, pp. 1»2£. ^^ iso see 
r i s ir GUt^ ta, Kaehalr ; A ftudy in IfKlla-e'akietsn mlatlonj (Tomuay a 'sia Publishing Mouse, I9t>7;. 
4. 'shiok Kapur,":merging Prouiems in India's Foreign l.ei^tlor 
m t:>e reventles'; F/^ rtii^ n ^ffalra rfeortrts, Vol. >>, Mo.7, 
July 1971, p. 160. 
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Qoraal prouisois of relations l>«tv««n tvo 8«parat« natlong* 
It >as not bttii «aay for tbt present ^emration of Indiana 
and i'aklct'>nlB to forgut the p:^ st and evolve a noraai attitude 
toiisrda th^lr neighbour* 1 ach ia involved vith other throu^ 
facts of histor/y £«^ r^£iphyf culturef language, and seoories 
of tht riHsent past. It la against this background that India 
and .akistan be^n ts function as sovereign states and found 
thefflseives engaged In conflicts over many issues, o^ v-hi^ 
6 
Kashsir is ^ne. 
The high cost of Indla.t^aklstan tension cannot be 
missed by ^ven the most irrational enthusisstics of this 
rivalry. Ih«i economic burden of defence expenditurei the 
socio»politlcai ef^bcts of a state of tension and the inevi. 
table dependence on outside support which the disputes iaply 
for both thi. countries vouid be readily adnltted to be harmful. 
^hat is uven more Inportant Is tVe loss of positive benefits 
v' Ich can accrue to both fioa a reiatlons'^ip of coidiality} 
t^ ie econor'lc O3»operation between ^ e tvo countries t^at It 
vould havti made possibiey ^.^ role that India and rHikisi^ n 
could jointly have played in this part of the v s^rld s t a tlae 
s^en It was ficed with threats, the reassur'.nce It vould have 
given to sizable minorities in both t^e countries^ and the 
6. ''*sir rupts, QMxStll** P* '^^^ 
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strength It vould 1^Vt Imparted to t^e foundations of dsD^cr^ej 
could al l hav« Oktmn consid«r^bX€, gains for tht^ se nasesnt 
states* 
India's nel^hiaour, r'akistan, therefore, occupies tht) 
k«y position and is ont of the cMef detemlnant factors In 
Indian foreign policy. Although fic Impact of India upon 
Pakistan's foreign policy set^ ms to im muc^  greater, actually 
thtt Influence of ^aklstan up-^n India's foreign relations 
Is no less sl^nlflcr^nt and evenmolfe pervasive t^an ibs 
generally realised or admitted* 
India's attitude tovards other ountrl es J especially 
U*''*'., l ike that of akl'-tan, Is deeply coloured by Its 
mutual antipathy and bty t^« way other <^untrles vle^' i ts 
quarrels vltb I'akl^tan* However, hosti l ity tovords r'sklstan 
do^ .s not Impinge upon India's foreign relations so directly* 
For instance, India's policy of noiwalig7iffl«mt vas formulated 
in tiixns of i t s operation In tb« vorld at large, ana not with 
refer(tnce to r'Skistan* India's journey from non.aii£;nmfint 
b* Jayant Kumar t.ay, **India and ?aklbtan as Factors in lach )thf»r's Foreign Policies", Inttngtlnnai rfartiig, V0I.&, 
Mos* 1.2, July.:)ctober 19U«», p*49* 
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to qu&llfitid notwailgnment vas oocasionvd by China's mourting 
ag^essivenefis, and .Pakistan's tol« In th is nat ter vas con. 
fined to I t s attempted coliaoopatlon vlth china to hnrass 
India, 
One major foreign policy move of India aft«r indtipendenc 
was to ac^uleic* in China's domination and colonlEatlon t of 
Tibet. India thus a^ret^d to dismantle a va i l of defence scross 
the no^t^t^n frontier vhlch an Independent Tibet might Vave 
constituted, x JIS strange lack of security consciousness 
cannot be explained «txcept Oj an ov^rconcern for thb threat 
from {Pakistan. India, pe.laps, vas So busy countering the 
moves of i'akistan, ii^.ich behaired as her enemy number one» and 
tht Jangtr to her security from t^at country ^ s t sVc might 
vei l have thought that China vould be placated by India's 
rt:C04^nltlon of hci suzerainty in Tibet and vould extend supt^ort 
to India's stand on KasValr 'agiinst .Pakistan. India niso 
failbd to note the expansionist designs of China and negleetei 
hfcr defences on the ^lorth r - s te rn 'frontier >^ile concentrating 
her troops ->n the Indo-t'aklston border, j^er^sps, i t vould not, 
therefore! be incorrect to surmise t>ist India vaa pei^apr too 
muc^ preoccupied vlth the threat from Pakistan to apyre^Iats 
t^ fc long run consecuerces of Va Chinese thrust ^nto Tioet. 
Thus, "involvement vlth Pakistan can r ightly be rebSided 
as %\.ii ' c h l l l e s ' heel of Indian diplomacy. Fiexiui l l ty , cl'il'aed 
• l o t « 
to t>« a vlrtufc 9f non»all^nai«nt| i s often d6ni«d to Indian 
diplomacy i a i g t i / on account of tht Invoiv^atent In th« K^ihalr 
7 
probXflB.'* 
Pakistan's oi«pb«rsMp of the ^tisttm a l l i a n c e also 
affected Indian policy. ' I t h o u ^ India herself oontinuad to 
adhere: to th^ policy of non»allgna«nt but In reaction her 
att itude towards I'akietan hardened to a ccm»id«rabl« extent. 
In ^u^ust 1963, in agreement vlth (Pakistan with regard to 
Kashmir vas almost in sight} in 'Ut^ust ^964| I t had disappeared 
completely, rince then India has taken up the position that 
vlth Pakistan's particip^^tion In the v^stem system of military 
al l iances thts circumst'^nces hav^ changed completely, as i t 
h'js tarout-t t^e cold • ar to f-y Indian sula-conttrcnt and madu 
India morit vuln^ratdt; to catfcrnsl threat, and i t Is nov 
d i f f i c u l t lo s e t t l e th«; Kashmir dispute on th« IOS^BIS of 
8 
plebiscite* 
rxternally, as Pakistan came closer to tht. v^st, India 
took a series of steps to oppose i^ eO i^stani and es tem moves 
and forge closer l inks (economic and p o l i t i c a l ; vlth the 
Communist powers, and assert h^r neutral ity more energetically. 
?• iM^«, p* 58* 
8. For detollfcd malysis see, Jyoti 3iushan nas Gupfi, TL 
Tnd/>,pakifitan Tialatinna 1547-1 QSfey (Amsterdam t n.^a 1 bitait, 
1d&8), p. £38* "^  
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In r«actlon to military aid to Pakistan by U,''.'.,India 
patc'-ed u^ j V-er differences with China (vlt>- a vlev to tHart 
th«i ' estexn mov«i In Asla^ on 'prll £9} '^ 954, yfh^n an agr««a«nt 
vus conciu..«3d tMitvet^ n V.% tvo ^untrle8| defining Indl'iU 
relations vlth china and Xlaat in terms of t^e Flv« principles 
of Co««xlstbnc«« It has also Indlractly helped to intensify 
India's strong, Independt^ nt stand on Kor^a, Indo-Chlna, on 
t ie question of admission of Conaunlst CMM into the United 
9 
Nations and over tbtt oroader issues of the cold var* 
Ki^.erto Uie polloy of the Government of India has been 
to ste^r clear of the hsst l le and friendly approaches and take 
on *» c^-'-racter v* Ich appears lardly distinguishable from "the 
10 
middle course*** Indeed the essence of Indian policy tonmrds 
i>ak!st'-n Is i ts attempt to live in pi^ce with thlf dissatls^fe 
neighbour, to reassure .'aklstan f^ India's peaceful Intentions 
to re^'^in from addln i^ In any vay to jaklEton's enormous prob-
l6Bts of stabilizing ^ structurally novel, if n^t ausurd, st'^te 
to make generous concessions to Pakistan on minor mattt^ rs in 
dispute, but to make na concession on tht one issue vhlch , 
partly as a result of th*i elimination of othiir problems, beoam 
focal point of a l l i-^aklstan's demands on, snd grievances sg^ l^n 
9* JJilii»f 9* «^d. 
10. r is ir Uu^ta. "India's policy tovards Pakistan", Internatlf>na 
'-tudlflg, Vol* &, noa» '••2, July.Octooer '*dio*Jf p.30« 
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India t Kashalr* In shorti the posture of India Is a status 
ouo pos^re t Its pollcJas are directed tovards guarding a 
regional status quo in the face of t^e apparent and Inevitable 
urges of a Sfflaller* d i s sa t i s f i ed , and unsettle^V neighbour 
If 
to upset the status QUO. 
^^aerican interest in i^&klstan grev in the cold var 
context. The expansion of ctMBmunlsa had to be countered not 
only In Luroi/e but In / s l a as v e i l . The 'merican choice f e l l 
on dtsoocr'^tic India as a countexuforce to oonsunisn in ^sla. 
But VQ United ^tates vas sorely disappointed vhen "Tehru 
rtfuaei to be dra>rn into the Cold 'ar and decided to follow 
the policy of noa-allgnment or equal friendship vlth both t^e 
blocs* 'having f i l l e d to Secure Indian support for i t s pollcy» 
the united 't<^tes ultimately turned to /*aklst9n| a nueh soal ler 
country than India, but w*^  Ich offered a foothold to 'merlcsH 
In *sla. " i^nce '»9&4 the touchstone of these relations haa b e ^ 
' skist'-n, vhose s ize i geograpMc^ti s i tuat ion, vo la t l te «8o-
tio'^-s, not to spenk of ** single-minded h.tred of India, add up ] 
to a ftiCtor to be reckoned v l t h . If Pakistan w^re large ervjugt* 
to De a real t reat to India, tho U.''. might have reacted more 
cautiously tovard DelM* )r|a£aln , i f Pakistan vera l e s s 
"^ l* iMLX't P« •»!• 
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aaXl«abi«f v^'ashington probably would hijve be«n moro pruder.t 
la Mtt ing I t up as a power. The combination of Ial:i?.tan as 
a rdl&tivoly second rate power in outh xlsia -oad tho susceptl* 
b l l i t y o£ i t s Id&dero to foreign imTltteooe huve m^d^ i t easy 
of wooing as aueh t o the Jhinese ao to the ^ttissians ar.d the 
.fflerieans* 
Ihe reasons wh i^ might have pra&pted United ta tes to 
be ^aidstan*6 ully could be that iiJiistQc wa^ the f i r th largest 
St td of the worldf on the lortlors of Chin& and adjoining the 
soviet Unioi^ * one regior. of ^iidstan was on the periphexy of 
tlie Middle r^ast and the other in Jo»th i^ 'ust /isiu« both op<»iing 
oiJt an the Indian oeoun* Ihe solf^evider.t toportanee of 
these x\«ts could not have been los t on tm^ricua !3ilit>;^ry 
experts* Xhey must also huve p«roeived the opporttsnity rrovlded 
to th^a by the dispute betx^ean a small lakistan and i t s lurger 
neijghboQr Xndit^ « to ftirthei the i r aims in Asia, irotoction of 
os tem oi l in teres ts in the ;:lddle "ost frcn a potential 
^ovtet threat tsm% also hi^e been c factor in AcsericiJi. policy 
in the area, ^^nother major cofjsideiation wus that the iakis* 
tanie were good fighters^ ^ a t they were good I'.uslixss and, 
therefore, would oppose corissunisoi and pexhaps, iiost inportant 
of a l l , iaklst-.ni a i r f ie lds wo(? Id provide the Inited ta tes 
with bases whidi i t needed for uea against the uoviet . idon 
ur.d Jossmnist China, i^ecrotury of utate JeAin i^ortor n l les 
therefore oobraced the concert of a I .;^t with i-akistun, d'^sflte 
• n o . 
ationg opi)Oiitlon froa the /oorioan As^tsador In neihl, 
and India*tf op^oaltion to th« an&s aid t? Pakistan vaa alto 
18 
iiS& r^ad* 
Iha United rtatca' daelalon to auppi/ ansa aid to 
Pakistan In 1964 vaa no mors than a sv«oplng dtclalon to 
8«t up 1nd«s>'and«nt rclatlonthlps vlth H«w Delhi and Karachi 
for such cold var benefits a» could be gained* "In atralght 
oath ttrmty" as ^ellg :farriton hat pointed out, ''t^e SUM vat 
laid out In a pr«i«doalnantly grant aid prograoDe for the 
•xpl lc i t ^amiXmmnt of ?akictan*8 forces and th« tacit proalss 
of her airstriys in tae tv«nt of wari for thtolr *'deterr«nt*' 
vaittty and for ce>rtaln iocfidlaitd ailit:.i:y *.x:vlit.-gas.'^ Further, 
*'thtt U»£ affair made Si<«ct:^ cai:>i'ly «3i|/llcH ^v^ P&klstsin has 
had an unshekaoic bar^inlng pDVer In M-ehlngton and has been 
aul« to ottt«in throuijh the ur c l i l t u r / slcl pzog^tim sttall but 
sl^niflcint nvisiltiee ^^  ^ighly sophlct^catt^d we^poni/ • 
including, sideovinder «lr-to»alr nlss i les and F.1C4 supersonic 
14 
JeU . . ** 
18» K,if!arvar 'fss&n, *'Th*fc inclt.sround of >*m«rlc£n /rns 'Id 
to i'akistan*', Pakistan Ifarli^an, Vol. XK, r o , £ | Ttcond 
Cuartsr, t9ki7, p«lE3* 
13# r.ellg ^•niirrlson, •'Indlr*. paklatan and The Ur^ Ti Case 
History of A fUsbk**", Xf-§ ffi^ v htpyUlfi, Vol. ''Ii, 't^s. 
ti-.7, August 10, l e t s , p»io* 
14. rellg r.narrlson* '*f"outh Asia and U.r.Policy", W^-t 
D«c*3tt«r '•I, I 9 b n 
..Qothar fiietor r^s.-on^iblo for -s^lean intorest is the 
m'l*eontlnent was the probloa c£ hon to rrevont l.9d China trwt 
ostublishlng a Iong*r.oiight roothold in tlie mib^ontlnort of 
..sl6« *h9 real di-nfjer was not thut .»d -hlna wo^ iia cor.sii3«r 
India by mliitLry aaam bwt that I ©d ;3hiRa vonld caf ttir® 
rukistan by political Daens, rith ragard to InSli*, As«rlc& 
has believed that by sldlrs i^lth Paldrttin o^er KiishBlr St 
aould St HI h;-vo u hold on indlc bes^se she has beon dospo" 
rately In need of the kind o£ aid lifhleh only the 13 was in a 
position to elve» 
;athough India choso to Txrrjla non«alleaed| etUl 
^oerlcu h£i0 sustained the h<^ d for the possibility of neo» 
Gleined pollclpy-«jaking being rrQSsurlzed Is^ u-to the desired 
direotion. 
It is In this context that iaklstar's aeoeptsnco of la 
rroteetion has to I© vioved« i'hSs '*unnattirol" allianee oould 
at best bvj i:. seoond bist alte^ TJCtlire for the tnited tu^ toS) 
i .^ereby the l;.tter oo-jld T^ssttrise Jndlu: rolloSes l^ t^o the 
daslred dlreetlon t positivelyi by Increasing th© tiilitary 
potentials of irn unfrie dly nelghboorf and| negutlvoly, by 
dcu gling close by a showrleoo of t2^ e beneficial coiico^pances 
of ar aligned status* rhe foot l^at Pakistan^ contrcry to l^ 
e:q)ootations, has bean c-ble to be '^imghty* has, \irhile en^ b^ling 
the liitter to h>-ve oxtr** ioverage, enabled the h'j to p«fsme 
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India and sufficl«nt hold over It . 
But i^ aklst&n did not priitajrlly Join t^e pact baeauat 
sh« fe l t any threat, «ith«r ideologloal or terrttorSal^ frtMi 
t^« CosKcunlst Povera. Keith Cali^rd has tlgntly reaarked 
tiLal Z6 r&r as th<; *ld«ologic&l rift* i^ etve^n the .^eatem 
Q:j.j^itiillea anU. th« Tovlet CoaQunl&di vua concerned, ^r'aklatikii 
had no strong onvletlone soout the lalancc of ri|^teouaneta«** 
Indeed, vhat fear <'aki&tfin had of Fussia and China vat indirect 
r»ther than direct aa t^eae oountrlea vere frleadly to India, 
vlth vhoa Pakistan had long-standing disputes^ and not because 
Uese vere conaunlst countries* In Pakistan's poliey the aaln 
danger v^ &t froa India, Ac vixileA r^ i^^ ts has pointed outi 
"Pakistan 5s an ^x-asple of a nation h^ nrlng r^song 
her neighbours one other n6ti'>n l'»rg«r snd more poverful than 
herself vlth vMc** her relations hs¥« been constantl/ unfriendly. 
16, Pakistan vas ra^re Inclined to build her lallltary strength 
as a bargaining factor in dealing vlth India on the K^shair 
issue than as a defence against other eountrieS| including 
the rovj«t; j-slott. 
1«>. hfclt'v Calx^id, t!?ihi.t&^Q',a faraifSnu^ltcy s --» Interpreta* 
tlon, (!»ev Stork » Institute of Pacific Belntlons, 1967), p. *»' 
l ? , v i i i iaa r.iiats, i^kiataq i Goverment and i'olltlcs. (Hew 
nav«n i9t,6}, p»l7i. "lallarly M,*h»en Chaudhrl, In his 
article , "Pakistan and the U*!?.**, fafclgtiOJfnrtlflnt Vol. 
I^, Deeemoer 196Q, p«20, observed that in Pakistan the 
d^n^er of conquest by a Conaimist Pover %S8 very respite, 
"coapared vlth the i»°se<Si3te and continuing danger of 
forcible mergex vlth India*** 
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That nalgVbourlnii nation, which In *'akl»tan»8 Cft8« 1« Indli, 
ia theriiforei th^ nost Inportsnt, constant and tbc controlling 
f&otor In ?alilstan»ii fr»re!tn policy •••«• Th«>rtefor« t^§ asln 
problea of i^aklntin'e for«lgn polio/ ha» ueen to turn for 
support In her dlepute vlth hmr nslg^bouri and for soae r«K!retf 
of t^ -e pov«r {'Jsparlty between t*ist neighbour and harMlf** 
Poklatsin In r«siLlty vant@d to be strnngthanad ai^lnat 
India. rh« n«!ad«id modern aras in sin appraelabtlc quantity to 
count«rU»xanc« India's fiov^r position. It could not aoqulrs 
thest srns vlth Its ovn finsinclal resouross. -'enca It eagsrly 
Joined th« vertem <"r*Tl and cr'Tn Pacts which gabled It to 
18 
obtain aras ets l ly and also to get support on the Kashalr Issue. 
Indeed, ('aklattin vas not merrily thlidclng of dealing vlth India 
on th«s Kashalr Issue but of providing against a possltde 
threat of Invasion oy India, According to r>ellg Harrison 
Vice PresldMit, Hlxon, too had urged this alliance not 
for Its purported defence value against Soviet a^^ession but 
for the ver/ reason Pakistan had sought the aid • "as a countexw 
19 
force to t^e oonflmed neutrs^llsa ^f Jawaharlal Nehru's India.** 
t8« llhls vlev Is eorrobrated by K.fhsan Chaudhrl. Ibld^^ OHL 
of the BSlB reasons night have beun i'aklstan's hope that 
! er alliance vlth the United '^tates vould aiake the letter 
to ^Ive ?aklst^n "besides eoononic and nll itary aid, ful l 
ia>ral and political support In finding an aaileable 
aettlenent of the Kashaslr dispute*** 
19* Tee Selig Harrison's articles published In StxJififiEbLlfit 
August 10, S4 and ^epteaber 7, 1964. 
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'11 Indian protosts ligainst the t&ot of ^964 v«nt 
unheeded and tVe only effect of the op,^o*ltlon was to annoy 
fmerles as It was deoabd as an uncalled for Interfertfice in 
Aa«rlcan defence and foreign policy Uy India* Explaining the 
reaction of th«: United '^tates t^e '^shlngton correspondent 
£0 
of th^i ^ HtW terh IXMt oosfcnredt 
"f.s a nat'-er of f:^ct tVe o»p:>39ltion of ?rlae Minister 
JavalaiXai :'t>'.xu f^ India vas so pronounced that the ^tate 
Department f^lt the u«£, had to go throu^ vlth the agretiMnt 
jr fact, up to t^« conoequtACtts of turning the li^dersMp of 
'~out^  Asia -^ ver U neutralist India." 
^^ c^T Mi-ncrr ^T wr. ^QSA PACT. 
The 'isarican moire va; a significant landaark in the 
relations of the United ''tates vith i^akistan* It « Inevitably 
had a profound impact on the relations of the United states 
%fith X India, helations between India and United rtates were 
embittered and antl^/^erloan eleaents and sentitttfits were 
strent^thenad in India* ihtt u,r* found Itself, in a Halted 
but crit ical aenae, on the side of division. Far froa pro* 
noting staol l i ty on the aub»oontlnent . frequently prodaiaed 
as a vital objective of 'aerlcan policy - the military aid pact 
intensified dlvlsloni encouraged Pakistan &nd Indian intransi. 
gence In r<i>spect of outstanding issues and thereby hindered 
20* M«*w ynrir Tii^a^ February 8« 1964. 
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IndcKt^aklstanl reconoiliatlon* Tb.« laa«(liot«| and of far. 
reaching cons«nu«mces, vas t^« colXaps* of the neeotlatlons 
t^at had reached an advanced stage for the solution of the 
Ksshalr quiistlon. '^ r«sover» Instead 'tf acting as a bulinrfc 
against '"ovlet eX|>an8lonlssa It pro^rlded an opening for the 
entry of ''Ino-^'ovlet Influence In the aub.contlnent, The 
r:ovlet Union nat^  c'^ ifle out In fujLl sap;^xt oT Indis* S^ e 
United ' tatcs f&iitd tn exploit i t s ^eat economic leirej^ge 
to dri*v %l^*i tvo countries to^ i^ut^ er and* at the sane tiasi 
lost vh&^ever c^j^aoiiity It had to Influence Ne^ I^elhi in 
furtht;r«ini2<3 of 'aerlc^n foreign policy objectives* 
^ther polit ical consequences of tht. pact vere tl'ie 
arousal of mistrust In India of t-akistani !nt<mtions and 
marited Increase in tha tensions between the tv3 st'^tss* "nd 
no less a person than '^^ thru gave an authoritative expression 
'sf the reactions of the Govemoent ani peojle of India when 
he sold on March 20, 196^1 *"bbody here laagines that the 
n « ''•"•Venkaturamanl and Parish Chandra Arya- " '^'ajorlca's 
Military Alliance vlth Pakistan ; The I volution and 
Course of 'n Uneasy «'&rtaershlp'', iBtttmalJlflnal ^t\iflUi» 
Vol*8, Nos. 1.2, July.October ?9bt>, p. 74« 
t-r Jawaliarial, Nshrtt^g Sntmr] AHI 1t?fijkii7i QPtBltiM P* ^'^^» 
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t'aklstan uovemnidnt entered Into th is paot t>6o&U8« i t «xp«ct«d 
soati loiBlnttnt or distant invasion from th« Toviet Union* The 
t^akistan n«v8p4 |^«i;rs ^nd the statements of responsible people 
In Pakistan mudt i t perfectly cie^r thst they have Joined this 
pact becaustir of India.' ' 
The U,r ,Hl i i t - ry ?sct v5th Pakistan changed the vhole 
context of tht piobi«»s txlstlnji i)«tvi.fen India nnd Pakistan, 
The bi la t»ral Indo»Pakletan relations now assvsied a triangular 
relatlonsMp, vlt>" the United ''t'stes as the th ' rd pj'-rty. 
XVus, tY^ rollitary nUl-ancs "sharpened Indo-i^k ten-
sions. It bec^mo 8 constant ''actor in t! e reliction and 
counteraction wMc- characterized subaeQuent relations betvcen 
23 
t^e suspicious n-.*tKbourSt*' 
£4 
According to ntiilg '^axrlson, the coat of tMs blunder. 
In^ 'merlcan deciaion, vhlch had only a fflarglnai and doubtful 
military advantage! vas very hesvy In pol i t ica l and dlplwaatlc 
tvrais to a l l the thre<ii parties Involved • the linlted '^tates* 
P*aklst')n and India, In the cape of India 'vhat be?*in as ^n 
emotional outburst has hardened Into an enduring sense of 
injury',^ Host Indians concluded that i t was "essentially 
23« ussel '.brines, I^ 3,a I^oaa.'Ri::3ts;lflt'?,nt, Canutett (liondon i 
?a l i ta l l t^ress, i»»6), p* 104* 
£4* ' 'el lg Harrison, o u . c i t . . p. 21, 
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antU^ehru manoeuv^r**' designed to force h i s hand, "The 
aHltary necessity (for the aid) Is so questionable snd 
?aklstan*s preoccupation vSth India so conspicuous that It makes 
sense to them onxy in thtse terms» tl:i«/ c nnot seriously 
26 
believe the gre^it U,?, simply blimdered into a mistake.** 
Thus, 'i beginning yns s::?de of *mtjrlca«8 -Jctlvti role 
in the sub-contlncmt. 'rh^nctfoiVf^rd, 'adi'lca cu>ae to be 
retarded as anti-Indian anj ^^iro-^akistan, India displayed 
nlatrust and ejrtreta Sfnsltlvenei-s t") every step V"^t 'uerica 
took In relation to Indlu and 'akistan with far.retehlng 
cons«iqu«nce8 for future Inda^Am'^ rloan relat ions, l^e Jan 
ran^h Is knovn for Its antl.rovldtlsm and pro^^merlcan bias, 
yet om of i t s le^d^rs, Teen rayal Upadhyaya, could not h«ip 
expressing concern and angulgh 'it the ^'raerlcan attitude to\^rds 
.'aklst-in vls«a»irls India. "D.r.f. has f i l l e d to understand 
the del icate relationship betveer India and Pakistan," he sald^ 
"Ve cannot comprehend or apprecl'ste Ui-ltil ''tatea* wlas In fjt 
favour of Pakistan. In a l l matters '^.gainst India, 'nklptan 
can safely rely on United 'tates* support. Indl'^ is unaole 
to see any pl9us1ji« lus t l f l ec t ion for f^ls behaviour of the 
U . " . ' . , uBptciaiiy after t^aklstan's f l i r ta t ion vlth Comraurist 
£5. Ifilfi., >JiUst 'n'', "^fiijo, p .2 i . 
£t .^ Detn Dayai gj^adhyiya, "v.anted t f^n indurJn^ Das Is ^or 
Indo-U'^SAmlty", J t saa la t t i Vol. 18, -^"0.42, Nay 31, I9t6, 
p. t>« 
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Chlna« "merlca's JLov« for Pakistan Is a mystery as d«ep at 
i a t e pandit 'Johru*8 lave foi Krishna Menon." 
Cosim«ntlng on tht^  dri!aa(^ « caused to United ^tates iay 
27 
-no, 
aid to i'aklstan, ' a l t e r Llppljam said, ""e have sllenated 
India and 'fgranlstan by our meddling and we have not made 
secure t^e ad^4;r3n06 of ^aklstan ••• The dstmage done to ^raeric i^ 
position by tbe .^ aJcistsm antangloaoent alont; Js enormously 
greater than v^at can ba done to repair t^e daaege done by 
economic aid**' 
^ Ith the develop«€rints In tb*- f i e ld of ba l l i s t i c nlss« 
l i e s '^ nd polar i s nuclear submarines and t^ aaw Jn the fiosen 
relations of t^e United ^^tates with the <"ovlet Union, the 
-*mericr.n leaders bcg**n to have a more b9l".nced evaluation 
of India's roii.^ f^an '.-mfi previously i>oS6lble« Xhey >^ ad, even 
t isr l l tr , souj'-t to courteraot t^ fc adverse Impact on Indian 
opinion of U^r.mllltary aid to Pakistan by <nntlnulng econcwlc 
assiststnce to India, Dut i t was vl th the advmt of P e^nnedy 
that there appeared a marked Improvement in t*-e relations 
between India and tYn United '"tites. ¥ennHdy Ujgan to talk 
^n terms o^ creating a c l laate o*' ps^ce and diu not pay the 
same attention to r'aitistan aa was don« )>r^«vlously* Like his 
£7. ISit-21XUii»» January o , 19U-
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yi^dnGM&oif h«nnii<3y announced t^at the «rStat)ilshBeiit of 
c lose rtii&tlons b<jitw««}n India and t'aklttan vag '*a atijor policy 
Qbjectlv© if the United '^tatci.*' ihe mergence of t^6 Chinese 
threat to India In "^ 9t£ led to a further reorientation of 
'aerican policy tovards Tndla and broug^.t India and United 
'^tates Very closb to ^ch othtr, '« *Tehru hlaself wiote In 
'pr l l 19ud| *" Indo-Affierlcan rdlations havb aeldon been as close 
and cordial as th«^ ar^ ^ nov)," *mt>rica gave a tymt^&ietlc 
hearing to tht Indian rcqutiSt for aid to aet t the CMneae 
invasion, ''he promptly rushed ^aerican aras and equipatnt 
wit*^out putting any kind of pressure on India, 'oerlcan aid 
has continued to f lov incessantly Into India i^en after the 
Chinese announced and India accepted t^e cease-fire* 
Xh«» *Qerican|^wer« not slow to grasp th« lium«nse s igni -
ficance of t^  4a chineStt atti^ok on India. Ih i^y realized that 
containaent of China depended upon colleooration betveen Indfa 
2B. J,L«N«.hrU9 ^^Chan l^ng India*' F^r«i^ Affaii-a, Vol« 4% 
'\9b2mbii^ p« «ub« Mso see J,K*Cialbraith, aA«£i£*t P«b1£« 
/"ccording to h la | ''3y strongly cosing to lndia*8 support) 
but at t^e same time giving no grounds for suspicion of 
ulterior aotivesy there has been a s laply enoipvous 
enhancement of 'merican prestige. The press, aray>poli« 
t iciana. indeed th^ country as a %^le« has cc»ie alaost 
ovezlBigr.t to regard us as a f i r s t friend, . ' s i iiredlc* 
tedy even tha vord non-allgnoent has disappdured froB 
everything but *<whru*s speeches and the le f t -v ing pol i t ics 
and there i s a l i v e l y discussion as to vhcther ve v l l l 
Insist on i t . u,r,I,'", has f i r years conducted a pool on 
att itudes tov-ards the United '"tates. In ictooer ^967, 
£,5"' reported a ^'vwy good** opinion of the United ""tates 
Jn aid-October '»9fc»£, i t %fa8 7'^, Last week It vss b2*' 
86*^  of those asked reported an improved vlev of the 
United "tates . 
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and Pakistan, and start«d axplorlng way« and moans to bring 
India and Pakistan together. In a confldsntlai comaiunleatlon 
Kennedy urg«d Ayub Khan to sake 3 friendly gesture to India 
In i t s *iour of great peril, Ltst Ayub Infoiia ^ehru prlvJtely 
that Indian troaps posted in Kashmir could be safely with. 
drawn to fight against the Chinese InvaderSi Kennedy suggested, 
ruch an offer would win Indian goodwill and proD^bl/ put 
them in a favourable frame of alnd for a settlemt^nt of the 
Kashalr is8Ue» the {'resident added. But fyub brusquely 
29 
brushed aside the appaal, Pakistanis response to the Indian 
and Anglo*/'iaerlcan aoves was cold and disappointing. In his 
meeting with the United Ctates Aac^ssador on October 29« the 
Foreign Minister of t'sklstan indicated that If the U,f,A, 
Insisted on supplying arns to India, Pakistan slight have to do 
some rethinking aoout Its membership of the Vestem allitary 
30 
pacts and reassess Its alignments, On Kovomber 6, President 
Ayub himself issued a statement expressing his concern i>ver 
the 'nglo.Amerlcan military aid to India, sayings "For one 
thing H may have the effect of wilarglng and prolonging the 
conflict between China and India and secondly add to the 
29. ^ee Xheodre rorenson, JUOQftd^ t (London, 19^6), p.t>64. 
30. £bi XtotiBi November 1, 19b£. 
31. r.ee Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-American / l l lance, Stresses 
and strains**, ruif^im 'VfTalrBt January 1964. p.63. Also 
Ayub Khan, Frlande Sat Mastarf } A Political Autobiography, (London, 19&7;. 
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8«rlou8 coneexn already ftxlttlng In the alnds of our people 
that these veapont nay v e i l be used against then in the 
absence of an overall settlement with India,** 
m "fovember ^4, the Government of India agreed to provld 
f a c i l i t i e s to the U.^* representative to observe the use of 
sraaaents supplied for thvt def«ice of India agslnst the 
Chinese aggression and gave the assurance that any a i l l t ary 
assistance received vould be ussd only to repel the !)ggresslon 
'62 
of Conaunlst China* A s l a l l a r agreeasnt vas rsaehed v l ^ 
3rltain on '7?veouer 27, 19D2« Pakistan, therefore, inforauiliy 
promised the ^-est t\ at It vould not attack India during the 
33 
Chinese attack on Indian frontiers* 
iesponsioie Indian leaders also became cognisant of 
34 
the importance of se t t l ing differences vlth .^aklrtan, 1>is 
sentiment vas ap^^reciuted In the United ''tates vhere the 
o f f i c ia l s held th^t the defence of the sub-continent called 
3d 
for collaboration betveen India and i ^ l s t a n . In other ii^ r<£B, 
only U:e suo-oontln«it as a vhole could oseet a m Chinese 
sttadc by lilnlted effort , by common defence t»4ilch vould enible 
32. Iw intiti HBi8» ^'ovtober '^B^ '>9&£. 
33 . Jfild., *^ovember to, '»«>2# 
34. According to Galbr-1th there vas a Congress -arty ^^ roup 
vMch vas urging reconfi|i(Liation vit^ i^akistan, "^ e^hru 
also told ''arrlman of Ms "concern for a settlement 
XkxiiXt that vould make posslOle a common defence of the 
sub-continent." "^ ec J, K, Gal bra 1th, ou .c l t .y pp.47&,497. 
36* ^ee JkLfcikf Vol.L.'fo. 1291, ?^rch 23, 19t»4„ pi». 449.42. 
"ecretary P.usk*s Nevs Conference of y&rch,<*'c» 
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both India and Pakistan to spend Ie«8 on mlXltnr/ preparedness 
and yet achieve much oiore, and make It possible fox* U.S.A. 
to render more effect ive aid vlth more posit ive results . 
Moreover, the U.S. oould certainly consider It to be a major 
gain If It could s tab i l i ze thu po l i t i ca l and emotional s l tua . 
t lon In the sub-continent. This vouid achieve effect ive 
containment of China, Some years ago United S^tates supported 
Pakistan ae^alnst India, tAxt in I9t>2 Kenned/ declared that 
"Paklst:tn needed a strong and independent India for her very 
37 
survival," 
Between November 23 and ?7ovenber 29, 1962, attempts 
vere made by "verall H'rrlman of the Ur/. and Duncan ^ndys 
of Britain for an Tndo-Paklstan rapprochement. Ult lmstel / 
.candys was able to prepare an agreed draft which w^s Issued by 
PresSdent Ayub and Prlae Minister Nehru as a jo int statement 
(Continued from the previous page) 
"•••••And fxoffl the United rtates point of view we 
have a special Interest in this sense i th»t i f these 
two great countries In the sub.oontln«it could find them, 
selves working together In the c loses t co-operation, then 
that sub-continent would be Invulnerable from external 
attadc and they could both proceed with their economic 
and soc ia l development programmes as their highest priority, 
36. Cnn^reaainnai Racftrdy Proceedings and Deoates of 88th 
Congress, l e t Cession, Vol. T09-Part &, *prll 4-24, 1963, 
p. b8b7. Broomsfleld*s speech In ^ e House of the Kepresen. 
ta t lves , *'Xhe aim of United rtates policy i s to strengthen 
the security of the India.Pak sub-oontlnent as a whole. 
uhat Is needed to s t r^ethen this souftd policy i s that 
the Indian and Pakistani forces in Kashmir and along the 
Contd 
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slaultsneously from Hiwsipindl and "few Delhi on Nov«Bb«r SO* 
1962* /ocordlng to the joint statenent "yub and '^ Tehru "agreed 
that 1 rt^ newed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding 
differctfices between t^i^lr tvo countries on Kashntr and other 
related matters*^ and,''decided to s tart discussions at in early 
date vltb t^e object of reaching an honourable and equlttible 
settleaent" which would bQ "conducted i n l t l a i l / * at the a i n l s . 
t e r l a l levul and ''at t* w appropriate stage** directly ty ^ehru 
and 'yub. 
Thti statement vas hailed by /yub as a "historic docu-
39 
ment" and bath ! rirrlraan and fandys f e l t happy over i t . In 
tl e united r tates sat i s fact ion vas tapresssd In various «ri|; 
40 4^ 
c i r c l e s , Inciudln*; the i^ress. Sfag Nw jtart TtoB8^ said 
(Continued from the previous page) 
IndOojc^ ak borders be disengaged. This could lanedlately 
release s ix to seven divis ions of the best equipped Indian 
forces foi deVelo)^ent against the Chinese, vlthout t*ie 
U.*^ , having to spend a s ingle sdfMtlonal dollar o^ a l l , , , " 
37. 'uoted In '.avlnder "^ ohan '^Ingh, •'Indo-U.'', le lat lons", 
f*Sr3>3^«flnt?ry rtUllga, Vol.o, *TOS. 2 .3 , Febru^Jry-'^arcf 
19b2, p.23. 
38. ^or the text see , India, Lok rac^a Tecretarlat, >7o*40, 
p«3ti»8« 
40* :ifi^  JQtkk *lifeit neceaber 30, 196£« 
4T. Ibid. , r^ovtjsaoer 30, I9bl^. 
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«dltorlalJL/ fox the f i r s t time on ^ov«ab«r 30^ 19i>£ thnt 
'*thte i>i6bleclt<B««,,niay not us the only posslolfe solution for 
th« Kashailr prooltA. .^^rtltlon acceptable to the nsjorlty 
pbopli^s of tli! 8€p rate ^V^ts may be attainable ^nd condoolnluB 
Blight Utt ^joxkaole." 
The t&lk8| hov<eV6r» begsn in an atraosphere In ^ I c h 
both V c s ides t-jok an InfltiXlbic position from the very beglna 
Ing, 'ft©r some talks at tht o f f i c i a l l eve l , d t t i i l s of the 
tslka 3bout to commence vere finali£sd* lavalplndi was fixed 
as the venue o^ the f i r s t meeting and the talks vers to begin 
on ''^ ©ceob^ p £7, ^9bl;. ''ardar f^ vmran ringh, Tndia*s Minister 
for la i lvays , and r . f , 3 i u t t o , iSklstan's Minister for Tndus-
tr leS | "Natural nesources and 'orks, were 'ip^inti^d as leaders 
jf tht. resyfcctivt delegations. The tvo delgsttlons ^'uXd six 
rounds of talks (between December ^9t2 to 'ay l9t>o) before 
thby admitted failurtt. '^ e^hpu rt,s^t«gd what k he rebarde<! ss 
unfair /^nglo*U.'~« pressure on the Kashjair Issue. '• even 
suspected that 'Bshl^^'ton v^s trying HI to undemlne India's 
policy of non-alifenment t^  roUt,h inslstttncc on Joint air 
exercises 'ind VOA de^l* This feel ing oould b*: due to a change 
In the military situation on the border and a certain Inepti-
tude o" 'BShlngton's diplomacy* Ihe Chinese h^d announced a 
42* %C«Jha, ilfi*£lSt*f PP* &7-97« 
43. Xlies of InXUf ^uiy ''y "tSbQ* 
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unllator&l cease-f ire on *^ ovemb«r £09 ^9&c, and a decision 
to Withdraw troops asck to tre other sld. of t^e Macftohan 
Line* Ihl8 | to a largb extent, otiilterated the p^y8ical faet 
of aggression, y^ the t ine the .arriffl^n o lss lon arrived In 
!T«w DelMy the invasion vss practical ly over^ and the (lovtnu 
laent of India v^ as no longer under thti pressure of Chinese 
advance to be compelled to isakc '>• dramatic gestui*e to i^aklstan* 
^.'fclthtr couid o.^,", succeed in persuadlnt; *yttb to «ake a 
44 
posltlvw gesture to Indl!i| probably bec'^use It vas too late* 
Ihe i'akistanl attitude had hardened and the Chinese Qoverrasent 
vlth remarkable ala^^crlty had made a notaisle diplomatic bre'>k. 
thiough In raklstan* 
Tht^  prospect of prolonged '"aerlcsn assistance to India 
to Beet t* e Chinese chsllenge, \n utter disregard of Pakistani 
concern and protests , w s a nlghtmaro ftt sklst-^nl leaders* 
They cr i t i c ized openly 03th India ind f^e United tates* . re-
vlously nlso, speaking at the "^'atlonal i^ess club on July 13, 
46 
1901, .^resident /yub had warned bluntly that any move to provld 
fflilltary aid to >'ndl&^ would ,>ut a strain on our relationship 
with 'merlcii***' '-'ow he took *meilcan aid to India as direct 
threat to i^'aklstan's security* Pakistan's argument was thi t 
44* Chanakya Ten, "India and the United ''tates.V-In the f?tce 
of ChifittSte *i;^-eSslo'T', i^alnatyaany Vol*£, *To, ''O?, 
'Tovefflber 9, 19*>ii, p. 14. 
40* Al^ fa ?lfiw AaA I3afla» •^uiy 14, i g t i * 
tMs aid olei^t be used against It by India despite the fact 
that Indls had assured the United ' tat ts and other 'esttirn 
Pov&rs, that t^  esfc arms vould be used exclusively "Against the 
Chinese. In Ms l e t t e r to ^'resident ^yub, Fennedy assured 
that 'tserlca's limited assistance to "^ ndla vould not pose any 
t ^ r t t to taklstan and that thtre vould b« no dlninutlon of 
f tt even gre:iter u.r . aid t'-at .^aklst'Jn vas receiving, These 
assur'<nci»s f i l l e d to assuagt^ th« fury and anguish of r*aklstanl 
47 
leaders. In his re;ily, '^ yuo said that large-scale supply of 
mllltai-y equipment vould not further the cause of peAoe and 
international understanding between India, .'aklstan and China. 
I'aklst^nl leaders refused to be pacified even by the clear 
statement of '^ifence ''ecretary !^ .cNnm«ra that the Joint ur-
Cofflcionve-'iilth team vas Hi ely to recoinnend only modest e>pendl-
48 
tAres. 
n^y%fay, t>"e United '^tates persisted In Its policy of 
continuing to aid India and ignoring i^akistanl objections, m 
June 30, ^9t>3, President Kennedy and ^rlme Minister Macmlll?»n 
49 
reaffirmed their *'pol'cy of wntlnuinf to *"elp India by 
4b« Ipld.y )ctouer 31, I9t>2. 
47. Thta mim, "'oveaber £, '»9i*2. 
4&. ""Be 'l.^.Vbr^'jtafamani, "i;. ".Military ' id to Indiai 
rjuicms snd . rospects", Coras arc e^  * nnual No.19C3,p.l4, 
49. "wr:.J., Vol.^alX, (1£bo>, July £,£, 19t3, p."»33. 
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i^rovldln^ furtVbr n l l l t s r y s ld to s t rengthen ^er defences 
•igainst V-.ts t h rea t of r^neved Chinese Conaiunlit n t tack," : h l s 
ai^ouncfc'a.nt was termcsd by .Pakistan as '-in "un%rr!tten al l iance ' ' 
tH£tv««n t^ fe ' a^lom,American oioc :and "unc<MBniti„wi India".*' In 
fac t ) Pakis tanis resented t ^ a t *'vlt^out entering Into a formal 
a l l i ance v l t ! the "^ehru ' d a l n l s t r a t i o n , ^resident Kennedy and 
t'reesier "scmliian lave nov decided to bestov upon Tndia miny 
of the >bwnefits* tund secur i ty noraai iy sccxtiing to neabers 
of a mi l i t a ry -^iliunce,*' 3ut, spe'iking befoi e t^ ^e '"^^nate 
sub-cot^tnlttvie on ^ f e n c e 'pproprl ' i t ionc In 'coruary ^9^4, 
Defence "ec re t i ry loucr t 'c''''»m3ra axpressed ^ I s Inr^blllty to 
share t ' ak l s tan ' s concern over t^ t modest m i l i t a ry ass is tance 
tha t India was be t t in^ from the Unlttd " t s t e s . "'e declared* 
•"# See 3. \t^i'^ r e a l need for Indlu to Improve t i e 
c:uality of I t s defences a^jslnst the Chinese Communist f - rea t i 
tina Wb ;^clleve I t Is in our n'^tlon^l I n t e r e s t to a s s i s t t*^e!3»,. 
I t Is Important to the e n t i r e fre« vr>rld, including / 'aklstsn, 
tha t India should be sole to defend I t s e l f :ic' l»^st Chinese 
Communist agi,reS£;lon, Ihc United ' ' t a tes has taken ^reat pains 
b i . . j . r . renatr i , Congrese 8fc, "esslon £, '*uU. commit tee on 
T>epartment of 'defence of Commlttet. on 'ppropr la t lon 
and committee on <*lined ""crvlces, hear ings , r>ep3rtment 
of Defence ' pp rop r l s t i ons , '*dob^ '^-js^ington, *'.C, i9o4, 
Vol, I , p,17« 
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to BBBUra the uovernment of .Pakistan that our aid to India 
v l l l not ba 3t thts 6Xy«>ns6 af r^aklstan's security to vhleb 
Vti Dr« coaslttttd und^r our mutual dafene« agreements*** 
I t V9S to iiH «£Xyected that the Chinese aggression 
a^'alnst India and 'sii^rlce's t l a ^ i / help in her tour of neeif 
vould help cet^cnt Indo-U.f, t i e s , lut i t fai led to do so for 
3 vnilety of r«sgons, 'thru, on the orui h nd, f e l t that 
*m«:rlca was ucerting ur^ due ^rtjssurc on hia to aak* x concess. 
Ions on Kashmir. The 'maria^ns^ similarly^ vure liked by 
h i s refusal ta mak^  c^nctissl^ns to "iklstan, '-is reluctonce 
to publicize u,r« mliit&ry £>ldy !^is lack of entiiuslasm for 
Joint air exercises , Y it rupudletlon of the W agreement, 
and Ms adi ertnce to thuconcapt of fr iendl ies t possible 
relations vHh f t ''ovict Union* M l e "ishln^ton complained 
that '«'ew Delhi's r«i uts ts for military hardwrire vtra unreason, 
aoly high, t '« l e t t e r suspecced thut th** fonaer vas dragging 
62:* {'resident i.enntiidy vas dlsunchanted uy tho nevs stories 
coming out of I^lhi • "'tyni's Insistence thut noru 
aligruaent i s ag good r^ s ever; tJ at this i s the policy 
that we rteaiiy v:mt, ana that our aid i s Dein^ played 
do'-n to protect the s ens i t i v i ty of f^o '"oviets.'' ^f. 
oaluralU*, o.i:* 'mbassador to Indlii coraplalntsd to *'ehru 
auout t*"l8 and warned him that, "we canrot decently ^elp 
someone vho i& afraid to ot! Biian in our compr.ny*" ""e*. 
J.r.Galoralth, aB,fiU»» PP. 47b JC 474>^ 64-« 
63. ^ee 'i«y inrk llmt^^ :*;y 3 , 19k^ 3 and ftecemoer £, "»9U2. 
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It* f ee t cither because I t vanted to extract soae concessions 
or because I t vas not 8ufflc?«ntly Interested In strengthening 
India's defence c8p«^blllty. 
Thus Kennedy, by his "Inability or unvlllingness to 
revise U.", pol ic ies tovards India and Pakistan sharply enough, 
falldsd to extract the aaxiaufls b«n«9flt froa the Chinese attack. 
lind the U.P. Uovernment caplti^ilsed on the Indian people's 
response In their hour of need, I t could haVk> von a staunch 
frltnd for thfj doubtful loss of an uncertain ally* Instead, 
the united rtates att itudes vuvereu oetveen sympathy for India 
and concern over Pakistani reactions • thus creating doubts 
In one country vithout removing them in the other.** In a 
press c^nf^rence on Fepteabur 72, 19t»d, President Kennedy 
bo 
stated the dUecma vhlch confronted the United ' ta tes ; 
"The fact , -if course. Is ve vant to suftsln India, 
vh!ch nay be attacked . . . by China. To ve don't vant India 
64. T1«^« nf JnAi^^ July 1, 1963. 
66. Ttinrtuatan Tl«ft«y ed i tor ia l , March 30, igt)3. 
66. y«w York Ti««ey f^eptefflber i 3 , I9f>d. 
;;liBllar t: oughts were expressed by f. Bradford Morse 
In the '^ouse of FUpresentatlves, June £4, 7g63, Cnnyrnae. 
;ona;L iiacirdf op.cit., p. ii46£. 
" Xre Coxaunist menace la too realt the Implico. 
tions of India's resolve to f ight back too important for 
tht future of ""outh and Toutheast Asia. 
on thti other hand, ve must honour Pakistan's leg l* 
timate concerns, '^nd ve canmt In any respect . morally, 
f i s c a l l y , mi l i tar i ly • nfford to support the n l i i t ary 
establisnments of tvo nations inimical to each other.Ihis 
Is the nuo of the problem . . . The United states can neither 
abandon Pakistan because It has not been attacked by 
Contd . . . . . . 
to 06 hfcipleBL v l th ^ . i f a u l l l i o n p«opl6« if o u r s e , If 
t ha t country becomes fragpiented and deftjat«rd t ha t vould b« a 
laost d isas t rous blov to the bsl^iince of ix>wer, ')n the o thsr 
h'^ndi everything ve giVij to India idvsrseXy affec ts th* 
balance of power v l t h . ak l s t an v^ilch Is a aiuch saal l t t r country, 
"^ o ve arts daailnt; v l th a very^ very coaplicated problen, 
bttcsuse tVe h o s t i l i t y betvefen thesj im in so deep.*" 
Ihfe wniteu t a t e s , hovtViir, c te ' l t v l th .-akistan v l th 
rwaarkibic yationci. and r«s t i r i l n t , '^itVougb I t noted v l t h 
concern .^akUt'in»s ovtjrturfas to China In tbe context of r ino-
Indlan c o n f l i c t . In / p r l l -fOt*, .^hlll lps l a lbo t , ' s s l s t a n t 
''tecrtjtary fox ti^tt! foi '^ <»ar : :>sUrn &nd fout^^ /'slan ' f f a l r s , 
gave t i e foliov^ng, tcsstloiony before the 'ouse of Represent'tlve^ 
b7 
Comtnlttet! on F o r e l ^ / f f ^ l r s t 
*'lhe Govermaent of .aklftsm has reacted strongly against 
t? e provision by i t s a l l i e s of mi l i t a ry ass i s t ance to India 
to neet tin Chinese CooiDunlst thre'^t^ without sue' ass is tance 
oelne, contlngtoit J:X a lu&haLis settl^iffltdit. ' t cl & sajae time, 
i^akistsn hue moMac to take i*1vantage of CoB.minlst over tures , 
(Continued froffi th*. previous pagej 
Co'smunlst China nor Ifcjnore IrwllB's o i l for ^olp occ^Ufe 
i t s mi l i t a ry str'engt^ poses a po t en t i a l t h rea t to t^akirts-n 
(»fev nel^ 1 t Jovemsent of Ind ia ) , p , 7&, 
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designed to fsolata India« by concluding trade, boundary and 
olviX a i r agreenents vlth Rod Chlr^ and by expanding cultural 
exo^:inge8•** 
In Spite of growing i^aklstanl friendship vlth China, 
the g^n^r&l feeling among 'merloans urns that t'okista^ v t i 
genuinely antl-comraunlst and a loyal ally of the U, ' ' . ' . If 
I t v"S moving to^'srds Chl^u, I t vas through fear of India. 
Ihe U.r , / , believed that by giving military aid to India I t 
hud los t tht friendship of I t s a l ly laklstan. If only India 
could accede to .aklatanl demands In rt^gard to Kasha! r, 
t'aklstan could bt prevented from moving c l o s ^ to China. 
Instead of being annoyed vlth i^aklst&n for i t s pro-Chinese 
move, "raerlcans vere inclined to shov more annoyance vlth 
India. Thuy simply Ignored the repeated as8«rtl->n8 made by 
Pakistani leaders t*^at even If the Kashalr pa^blem wns sett led 
sa t is factor i ly , under no clrcumst'inces vould .Pakistan go 
^galnst China. Ihe Americans are s t i l l pro^e to believe that 
once r.ashalr is out of the way, t^akistan vijuld join la l la in 
ha 
t) e defence of th«< sub-contlnent-a belief which Indians cannot 
share. In view of the clear statements to the contrary by 
bbm ^ee c^n^rMi(%n^i nfecnrd^ o p . c l t . , p.b&t:?. Hr^oasfield 
ooservedi "jtet the key to t^e security of the entire 
•"outh 'slaH clearly l i e s in f^c settlement^of the -sshalr 
Issue £ind thfa estaollshment ->f a reappjo^tchment oetveen 
India and i^aklstan vhlch only a Kashmir solution can 
0%-lng about.*' 
Pakistani lesdeis. The Indian attitude Is slaple and cl«ar 
that If tb« U,r, ' , is prepared to be black-malied b^  Pakistan, 
that ie nnt doubt Its own business, but t*'e U,**,'. ^B§ no rlg> t^ 
59 
to expbct Irvila to pay t^e price dtfnanded by Pakistan. 
'nd In ^9U>, hardly t^rm years afttr the Chinese 
^g^es&ion Pakistan, with t^a aid of China embarkttd on a course 
of aggression to 8<;ttle the Kashmir dispute. China declared 
Its open support for r'^klstan and laoelled India as aggres^sr. 
China's Increased activity on the IzMllan boilers forced the 
Indians to Veep a large part of their amy on the Chinese 
Uojrd&r n^d t! us hulped the much smaller r'aklstan to flg^it the 
Indians to ^ standsti l l . 
pifUt uTiii,^ r i n r A:^ n KAfrMRt 
It is obvious to any student of recent developaents In 
politics that thtt beglnnl'ig of the deterioration In Indo-
'merlcn relations can be traced to ^aerlc^n Inability to 
appreciate the essential justice of India's stand on Kashmir 
and for sponsoring vltl Britain the resolution on Kashmir In 
Feoruary lab"*. Xhe broad facts are clear enough} 
t»9« Tee iJ.*i.Ch?2kr:>ivart/, Q,j>clt,|. p. Ido. 
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Unllk« other princely states % .^lch acceded either 
to India or to .'tiklst^in on the lapse of pararoountcyf Kashmir 
did not accede to eit'r«r nonlnlon* 'Ithou^ India vas 
vitally InUrested in Kashmiri becauats of i t s strategic 
position, she *did not put the slightest preseure^on Vtie 
Bt'iXe to acced«£ to the Indian fbainion, or 'encourage s^ny 
rapid decision*, although Kaghmir had entered into a stand-
s t i l l 'greement vlth .aklstan soon after '^ ugust 16, '^ 947. 
•t f irs t .aklstan tried '-ard to foice Kashmir to 
accede to t'aklstan by applying economic pri^ssure and stopping 
t^e supply of essential commodities such as food grains, s3lt, 
sut^ ar and p«trol» ^hen these tactics failed, J akisf^n sent 
armed t^nds of raiders into Jamsu in ^too«sr. They succeeded 
in occujtiying a large part of Jamriu .'rovince, especially in th« 
t^ oonch urea, on October £4, they broke through '^ussffarabad 
and started marching tovards rrinagar* 
Una ale to cope with tht. situation, th** aharajs of 
KashJBlr asked India for arms and amBunition* )n October Zb 
and 2u the T e^fence Committee considered the gr^ve situation 
in iashmlr and the Maharaja's rtnutst to India to intervene 
vlt^ t'fc armed forces and accept Kashmir's 'accession to India, 
'Ithough India finally accepted the accession It w s^ condi-
tional upon the holding of a plebiscite after lav and order 
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had b«en restoied, rht attitude o^ the Govemnent of India 
with repaid to r.ashnlr's accession va» made clear by " e^hru. 
•!e *'madtt It pbr^'octly clca^ to th« M'ih r^aja that hie Goverru 
m&nt oust be c rrled sn in future according to t!ie popul':>r 
wil l , ^it ^ieo made It cii^ar that %B Boon as lav and order 
had oeen restored In Kathalr 'J^nd Its so i l cit-ar^d of t^e 
invaders, tht (jutsstlon of t^ fc state's accession fhould b© 
settled by ref-rence to the people.** 
in )ctooei Jt/, tJe Indiaa forces vere alr. l l fted 
to Kashmir* ^hey succeeded in driving uack the invaders sind 
recovtred the valley of Kashmir. 
TUdia reptatedly renuested the .^sklstan Government to 
prevent 'the use of Its territory foi Aggression of India*, 
but she p^id no htJtd to i t , "ence, India was obligi^ to 
formsliy refer the matter to the United *Titlons '"ewrity 
t1 
Council on D«ce3tb«r 30. 
"s a f irs t step towards peace the five msn.United 
'latlons Commission on India and Pakistan succt^eded in effect, 
in^ a ciiuse^fire on January i , 'f949« Tuusi^ quently efforts 
w«re Q^ dtn by th(s united -^^ t^lons, to solvt^ tht: probl^ t^  xoa^ 
oO* J.L.'^ehru, suu&ll*t P* 44b. 
w1. ffee y,:i.mfiMagnta, 'AS^S, para 13, p. 143. 
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rs«dlatlon tfut they proved afc^rtlve due to the failure of 
Indlb and iaklst&n to re^ch autiv&l &gr««ia«nt. Pakistani 
forc«s occUj^ yln .^ a part of Kashmir rtfaalnsd In po68«S8lon of 
It . 
"eanwMle, V^.e Fashnlr Government decided to convene 
t 'e Cmnptltuent 'BSeaibiy to draft a constitution for tbe state 
as p^rt of the Indian Union, 3y February 't9&4, t>e Consti-
tuent 'ssetably ratified Kashmir's Irrevocable accession to 
India, From nay to December 19k»i» t^ fe process of Integration 
of Kashmir with the Indian Union vent on unchecked, 'nd on 
January iiO^ I9w4 India categorically told the ^ecurlty council 
that "under no circumstances can ve agret to the l^oldlng of 
3 pleolsclte In i:vuehffilr.** 
Xh.e 'merlc'^n i^sture on Kashmir Is a very complex 
p> enomenon. \hun It vas f l i s t orought lo tht. Security Council 
/'merica largely followed the liarltlsh l ine whlc^ vas coloured 
with sympathy fo: i^klstan, mainly because the logical Imple. 
mentation of the ''ountb^tten foroMla about accession of the 
princely states should have brought Hyderabad to the Indian 
Union 'md Jammi and Kashmir to i^aklstan. 
tot. Chanakya ""en, *' India and the United f'tates • Vll-'^cope 
for Identlf5cstlon'*9 hiAinrntrmam^ Vol. I"^ } No.SOf '^ smiary 
T&i I9<u4, p. ^4. 
• tS6 • 
But i&t«r 'mcrlcan position on the Kaahnir issue was 
largely dsterolned b^  Ymr cold war strst«gy« Ihci miin concern 
of 'a)(«rlca at that tia« vas contalna«tf)t of CoBummJsa and as 
i&kistan waa on thb front l ln« of th« "ring of deterrence" 
i t Involved 'merlcan security. Hence American interest in the 
Indo-t'aklstan disputes ^B a vhoie» ana Kashmir in p^^rtlcuiar* 
In i t s ze'iX to cornedt coa^iunismy the iserihover 'dainistr3 tion, 
vithout c losely studying the sequence of events that had made 
thb holding of p lebisc i te d i f f i c u l t for India, aggravated t^e 
d i f f icu l ty oy eigning a mil itary al l iance with f'akist^n much 
to the chagrin of India. From then on Kashmir became involved 
In 'aerlcan cold \rtir pol ic ies in 'touth Asia and the "'ort^ern 
Tier of tVe Middle J*st. American support for i'akistan brought 
fort^ the counter«bal'mcing '"ovlet support for Indlrs, T i n 
today this s ituation largely prevails . 
'hen t^ti 1 :^ 8hmir problem arose, the Communist expansion 
was very rapid and the 'mcrlc^n t^<ar was based on the delicacy 
of the s i tuat ion. >B L.K.nosinger aptly observed that placing 
the internettionai aspect in the most extrtfse terms, Kashmir 
could provii to be "the graveyard of the remaining n^lo-
'mt^rican position on the 8ub.»ntinent of "sia", or ^t the 
bi). .^ o^pl^ ii ^nd Talbot, fiQ>cit.y pp. 70->7^. 
04. Chanakya 'en, otlifi3it«> P» "^^ 
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Y«r/ i£ sty It oould lnp*de 'Bshington in vhat vas spparantl/ 
Its current tendency to lo^k tov-ard India" as s partial policy 
8U08tltut« for China,** 
Therefore, biitveen ''947*46y ^ai«rlea's najor concern 
VTJS t^^t t^fa dispute mlg^t not conflagrate Into s genersl 
war or eis^ we!iken the two countries and thus push either of 
thiiB Into the i^ rns of the CoiSfflunlets. Expressing this fear 
Raymond '.'iare, 'sslst^nt '"ecretary for *^ fcar :• stern and 
routh *slan 'ffalrs^ s^ l^d in a statement before the 'ouse 
Loomiittee on Foreign 'ffalrs on 'arch £«., 9^&oi "^outh sia 
Is t^Hi hi.artland of non-coamunist mainland ^sia. The v i l l 
and Ufeterratnation of the p«ople of this region to vithst'nd 
the pressures froa comaunlst ChJn'^  v i l l i in the long tntif 
0£ar decisively on the cuestion vheth^r Mmflninlst Chim osn 
be contained ^nd broUi;ht to respect thu Am dictates of inter-
national lav and society, ' e should not l e t this view of the 
66 
import' nee of the region b^  obscured*" 
"nother American belief, whic^ %ms lisaifetrlcaliy 
opposed to thfc Indian stand^ was that the partition of India 
was uased on the two "Nations Theory • '^Indu state and 'tuslin 
state. Thfertfore the "disposition of hashaJr" was the basic 
<u6« :,.K*.^osln^er, ^p.glt>, «^ "^obm 
«^. i^ ftUjLi*! Vol. LIV, *Jo.T4u;, April Lo, ISH^ o, p.''w9. 
• lae • 
w Isfua o%foi9 thti Unlttd Hatlont vhlch bad boooae" lnt«nl|ov«>a 
with a ooiBplttX of r«iliilou» f«t)llni;8, national prtst lgt , legal 
sut).t:i«ties and econoalc pressures*** 
''«nG«y It was United ' ta t«s aost "earnt^at desire to 
see the tv^ fere' t s tates 'jf the suU-continent Join together 
to a»rurJ their mutual peace and security as wsl l as t^elr 
mutual pros^erlt/f*' t> e K^shalr Issue Delng s ''eoneem" of t^t 
United ''tates fr(^ the vury beginning oecsuss of Its Impret 
on t>e pol ic ies and progress of India and Pakistan Including 
t>ie5r pol ic ies tov^.rds tVe United ''tates, 's Phill ips Talbot, 
U.*', ' s s l s t i n t '"ecret^ry for "ear :.astern unA ':"outh Asian 
' f f a l r s , admitted In Ms address to t^e United "Nations ' s so-
e lat ion of Wichita on October £3, 19t4, that "rashalr i s only 
one :iEi*v.ct, of course of our larger Interests in the sub. 
continent of 'out)" ' s la ," 
o7* iiiLi*! Vol.>>I, Mo«6S9, ictober a i , '«949, p.t»b4. 'ddreas 
oi&de by Department Under feoretaryi Husk, oefQT€, the 
Conaonwealth club of California on )ctober £"', "'949« 'Isc 
see l i i l i , , Vol. J'LVII, *fo. 1227, December S**, ''962, -p. 
1 9 ^ P.99&* rpeaklng befoie the ^evs Conference of 
Deceaauer "'O, I9wi,, fecretary of ^tate i-usk said that *u 
dlsputb had long h is tor ica l and sentimental n^d pol i t ics ] 
roots among t^e people of both countries* 
tit* llii^^f Vol. >MfIJ| *'o.7ti&, necemijer 29. •»96£, p,103£, 
Keoark of l m e s t ^ 6 r o s s , U.r, iiepresentr t lve to the 
utentrai / .sseabl/ , In tht ' »3curlty Council on '^cemoer 
i^ , 19b2. 
<y9« IjQtli*, Vol* LI, *'o.1i£6, *JoveiBber '•w, '»9fc>4, p* 70£, 
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'n equit^^Dle solution af thv Kashair problam, t^e U«r:, 
t' ought, oouid b% found on thu basis of the principle of 
70 
aelf-tleterm'nation. ' 1th this vl«v In aind ! t endorsed the 
United *?Qtlon8 resolution of Tanuary o, 1949, '"peaking on 
t^ls occasion f 'e U,? ,^ representative to the U.*?., Cross,saldj 
"Ir Tn our vlev i t is eminently fa ir and sound, and In 
fuiflifflent af oux duty as a met ocr of this .ouncll dedicated 
to yt^aceful St-ttleaents, to recoatniiind to the parties that 
the^ acce^it a princlpi*s vhlch strengthens the concept and 
value of thti ceasefire l ine and avoids tl^ e^ risk of an exten-
71 
slon of military act iv i ty ." 
*Tot only should the p lebisc i te be fre^ and impartial, 
accoxd'a^ to u . r , , iaut i t vas equally important that the 
Interests of India and Pakistan be protected by a plebiscite 
held undei w.t'. (iusplces, so that t> e results could not be 
Influenced by coercion if intimidation. 
70. '"or deta i l s on the United ''tates stand on t^e Kashmir 
Issue see ZMS^*9 Vol. L, 'ro.1290, f'arch lii. 1964, pp. 
4£&«i.>. *'India and iSklftan urged to make^  ?«v ffort 
Dri t.ashair proolea'*. '^taten^it by 'dial "tevcnson. J,'', 
aeprosentafclve In t'jfe fecurlty council. Made In t? t 
'ecuxity Council on ^'eoruary "'4, (U.<",/U,",?ress release 
43c2>. 
71. U.N'., r .L.j .K., {bt^ y tar j , *!o.9, p.1ii. 
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Xh«s U.r. favours any course of ' c t lon that v l l l produce 
^ settlement of the i,&B\m^t px^uli^ wht^ther the approsi^ Is 
t^rou£,h bl iateral n*iig3tlatlonfi, or mediation, Is of no 
consequ^ce* Ihv. fact I s , however, that only rarely has 
either side shown any interest In bi lateral negotiations with 
72 
a flna and specif ic agenda. The IMlted rtates is also v l l l lng 
to offer i t s ipo6 off l e t s to help s e t t l e tbo dispute, ' s 
rferco, U.r, representative to the U,''^, said In the Security 
Council that the u,*", <xfnaid9ts the Kasholr Issue on the 
merits of t^e case and U^t the U»r,^ seeks to a s s i s t both 
India and Fakietsn • and I nt^y this vlth great sincerity ^ 
In finding a just ana equitable solution of the Kastailr 
73 
problem* 'c aguin ur^e then to cooperate to th&t end,*" 
3ut fundamental to th i s u.r , assi ' tance vas that the s e t t l e . 
mfent could bb achieved only i f i t vas acceptr>bl« to both 
part ies , otherwise,Kashnlr v l l l become *'an irr i tant which 
wi l l e f fect ive ly prevent the bring ajout of peace and 
74 '^ 
security in 'outh .ftsla.** *^ecretary /cheson made this more 
7£. {-r^n^ruBfilnnBl JiM^dnrA^ ;'roceedings and Debates of the 
67t^ Congress, Second fess lon, Vol. "»06, t^art 17, 
Xitobex 6, IQtdSi.October IS, I9b£i, p.$£2l9&. ^peed^ by 
'^ pa^ rtcaan in the ''enate on October 9 , I9b2, on 'India 
and Paklstanl*-
73. iklijiki Vol.>XVI, «fo.Q£b, '^rch Ifc, 1967, p.4b1. 
74. Tbld.y Vol. >TIV, ro.bOQ, '^ arch t , 1961, p.395. 
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explicit In a sp6«o^ before the ?7atlonal i>r«ss Club on 
Tanuary ^2, ^960. '^e «aldt 
"In India and .'aklstan ve are willing to bt o^ tuch 
^elp as ve can be. 'gain t^^ rttsponelblllty Is not ours. 
/gain ve ci»n Oe only ^elpfui friends. A-^aln tl'^ e responsl-
b l l i t / l i e s vlth people who have von thair freedom and vho 
76 
are very proud of it.** 
•^ fccretary larshall extended support -o tbe contlnuatloi 
of the mediation and negotiation between the great nations 
of India and /aklstan with respect to Kashmir* In order t'^it 
t^e process of peaceful settlement might bring to a oonclu. 
Ho 
sion an Issue which had b^&n charged with great dangers. 
I^e principles which guided "aerican stand on the 
Kashmir issue were once summarized by ^rrnst *. Gross, U.^, 
representative to t^e General ^ssemblyi 
**In the f irst place, a lasting polit ical settlement 
cnast i^ an agreed settlement. *"Secondly, the recurIty Council 
wil l always welcome agreement of the parties vhic^ they them-
selv«,s can reach on any theory that wil l se t t le tlib dispute 
7b. iJtiU«f Vol. ».1I, No.tol, January 2a, ^960, p. '^ '^ 8. 
To. ii2ld*» Vol.^IX, 'lo. 483, October 3, 1948, p. 434. 
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which Is con8i»t©nt with the prlnclplas of the C^a t^e •^ 
**Xhirdly, It Is th^ role of the "ecurlty Council to assist i 
the partl«u6 In seeking to r^ach agreement* In this case the 
Security Council has omde avaliaiiie th« service;" of 11r*Fratd( 
Graham as U.N. repr<jEentatlve. 
"Fourthly, ajtreement n»st frequently Is reached step 
by step t'rough nttotlationt and nefptlation involves an 
eltment of cwBprcMilse* 
"Finally, t>~« f^ecurlty Council should consider with 
care thi, views and tha rccom'sendations of Its representative 
and Vindicate to him and the parties Its views on the positions 
77 
he has taken." 
I>UB, t'-e position of the United rtates on the Kashair 
question corresponds to i t s position on other outstanding 
International disputes* The United ""tates Is primarily lntc;r* 
estfed in a peaceful tettlement of disputes. Hut i t Is dls . 
appointed iaiy the persistent refusal of India and ^'akistan to 
set t le their ;lffer<£nceB on a real ist ic basis* These two 
countries are the largest recipients of 'merican aid* ^ovevtr, 
instead of making the most effectlv»i use of thi resources 
available to thtm, they frustr te developaimt by their unvill . 
ingness to tre^t the Kashmir question realistically* '^reover, 
77* JJM^f Vol* XXVII, f7o* 706| December 29, 196£, p.iO£8* 
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lacking cooperation In joint a l l l t a r / planning for protection 
of their borderSf each government appears to be OMlnl/ con-
cerned vlth the Intentions of the other* 
In 19029 President Kennedy proposed that India and 
Pakistan avail the good offices of ugene F. Rladt, 
President of t^e world Tank, to sett le t^e Fashnlr *!lfpute« 
78 
Thiii Initiative was rojt cted by 'lehna. The Indian !>ifence 
Minister, V,K,Krishna Manon conci^tedt 
Tnare are v^ry few countries coapetent to arbitrate, 
because they are mostly on the other side*** 
The Kashalr qu&stlon, like sther disputes of Its kind, 
has tvo sides, rherefore, the United '^tates has refrained 
froa oj^mly favouring the position of either disputant. But 
the failure of the disputants to rslse the level of discussion 
on Kashnlr - their failure ev«i to undertake discussions, 
bliatfcral or othervlee, on a real ist ic basis, Is ^ source of 
concern and continuing disappointment to the Americans, 
imin YI1.V* 
In the context of Indo-^merlcan relations tfce legality 
of Kashmir's accession to India is rtflevant. Tndi§*s contoitlon 
is that "Kashmir has at no time been recognised as a sovereign 
7e« Tee J.k.Galuraith, ou .c l t . . p. b&l« 
s tate under IntematJonal lav. I t hsf« elvaye be«n C9n8ld«rtd 
79 
an Integral part of India." During a debate on ^oreJgn ^ff^lri 
In Parxlament an i%rch 2S, IQbT, Nehru declared i "The acc-
ession of Kashmir to India i s ent irely in conformity vl th the 
Indlsin Independence Act and th« negotiations that preceded 
I t , i t Is s i s o fu l ly In accord vl th a l l that has happened In 
80 
case of the oth«r princely states vhlch acceded to India," 
<*ince "neither the U.N, Commissions nor the recurlty 
81 
Council hag suggested that -he accession vas open to qutstlon," 
and the l ega l i ty has been fac l t ly or expressly accepted by 
International comralsslons such as UHCl? and Officers, and If 
the presence of :^aklrtan troops In Kashalr territory has been 
declared by such coocsisslons or off icers to ba Inconsistent 
with International x law, would I t be just for the U."., India 
asiks, to sponsor or support the stand that Pakistan should 
have a voice 'n matters of military security v i t a l to legal ly 
recognlztod Indian territory ^r\6 that i'aklstan should hr.vo 
82 
equal status with India In the f inal settlement o^ the Issue? 
Further, ?:ir Jv&n Jixon, thy u.n. mediator, also clearly 
declared that i-'akistan's action In moving Its forces Into 
79. N«hru, M i a * a Tf^rtikn i^ nliiCY, o p . c l t . , pp. 4b7^B» 
80. l a i d . , p. 4u7. 
81 . 2jM»f P* '^8 . 
&£• yh«^  rfcatcsmany January Bb, 1962, 
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..shalr va8 Inconslstimt with internutlori&l lav* Iloncoi India 
£<i&lQ that :j!:i9Tleti. did not ad^^pntQly appintoiate tho faets of 
tli9 ot.s« wli«n she fmppo«*tofi the vi«w that reMstan h..g ^ rlEht^ 
o»^uiiy witl» Indii.f to bo consul tad on m.tt^rs sfAoeting d4ial« 
l l t t ^ s a t l o n utid tho conaiwt oi* t's® rleblsolte* xh® GKihaei 
: i|-ort by !|»iiorhig tlia sugL«iitlon o* . rbltx't.tlon, vlth i uiilrtac 
having & vole© in th« c^ioio* (£ the arbi t ra tor*, nman to 
iouliae tiie Injtujtleo mA ^utSlHy oT -tidi st^r* 
Ixn&iu was not, ' repArad to tiQ tta&t«<3 on par with rukl^tur 
because she wue tha ugf^rleved pv^rty* l a her vlen «t th the 
efriux of time tho 3uWelders mid even pakiBtm. forgot i Jcistani 
actress Ion in Kashalj tm(!l tho Taai,in eoaplalnt f-gUnat I t aid 
they 9mB t r ied to a^iimto tlioi'^ rre.ienee in iJneSmiv with thut 
of India* ..ccordlnE to i ^ r u , "The fxinficrniantal fjiotor ^s the 
5 St:^«53ion of FaMstan on '^T^.i<ir t e r r i t o ry , sarjorrfly, tha derAal 
of the fact of th«.t %c0yo38!ot'., th i rd ly , the r^esont :^ <!n1'»fji.on 
84 
of the feet I" and not nieb1seito» The rrecence of three 
iassistanl brigades In Kashnlr niwjm IM^ c.-T-^etltiited a materIcil 
change in tho sltuittlon. Therefore| Kshrti declared in rm^lzr 
to <4 dot..te on i?'orelgn .-fr.^lrs in tho irok .ii>bhu on I'arch HT, 
IDC'e, t ha t , *»all tJils talk of r leb ise l te oik! otJier tltln^^s is 
ccnpletely beside the pointy ?^ >o^ o^ qs^ostione woold farina only 
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lAion i't^tntun had t&3£«n n e«rted» .ntop, ^ a t i S | vSthdrawtil ^ 
i t s ujm»d ir9re«s« ..nfi faJtistan Is owt of omrt t i l l I t t#yfor 
l i s I rlaaJT «5«ty by getting oat Q£ tho r?**?* <>i' tho ntuto on 
"sHil^ I tJM ©ocaaitted ^gt^'assioo. Tjiis is a rsajor fjftt to U 
86 
Trrll0. in to ta l ly orro-'ft^ "> th^ fceli«r th*»t *'"-t!tion 
took rlu«C( on rollSj^<y'3 j',v-cs5Tn'^ «, ' '><Jit jneristm^ huv>"> ^ov, 
^m^ilo to r i4 thecasalv'a?' ot' '.h^ ' -i^^l^r nolLif thut rH l s^ 
Iradlti was partitioned fo<>tvfien 'llrJ^'ta wsA "UEllao on tbo t:'ioj7 
Uiat t&ay constlti>t« t%w> dljTi'r'^snt : atloiis* In - t^ivar wordSf 
tlioy occt^t th*» t'40 nation ^Xion^^/m > i t t?\t^  a.-inrr^^n i^var 
£aa<i«pt«d tha v . l H l t ; ' ni' t'll.-. t; >jp:,*, .'tiay j.|:r.i;-d '.r^  ths 
; ortltlt^T' *ia thm€» wivs c,o A -^JIQ - wjiy of ati,.'jn'r,g 1n«39'-ar4e»f.c9, 
I»^ii'ns f-AtJ to »m<l^ ntt.'i-i\a hn /^ T -"^wr.r.^ t^Sne t!iar.selv«s u 
sul t i»re l lg l0as '«opl«, e x I'-ifllevo 3ct tM f:.ef'ioval -ria out-
dated concert of u r0l lgi«:r st&to. t $ t th©y i^jse^t i adc tan ' 
elSilia tlu*t iiushKir lu.vl£c -^ rroSor/v t^ntly :.i3*situ ropul>.ticfij 3 
ssliculd £0 to >iusll?K Ie!'d£t4*r rcUiijr thu to itii^a In? ic.« iliis 
S*- fir overpim^lifoitl<m o* *J.o :'?oil«e:. u ^ sc!:.''letely teoT.s 
tlio £i.ct t^»t IncMtj.s acrVer c/scaftc^? svch u !.i:.«t5/c i^ ovy of 
36 
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on J\m« 22y 10&2 declared* **"« ar« a secular state, a l l of 
our organisation Is polit ical »nd has nothing to (b with t^e 
rellg'ous aspect of a people, ^e arc- not prt^psied to faee a 
8' 
position vhtire religious fanatlcisa Is to be or Is protected** 
The Indian stand vas om^ ftore clearly stated In 
Fetiruary I9b4 by M«c«Chaglay Indian representative* In the 
"^ecurlty Council. '!e statedt '^lur position on Jatasu and kfek 
Kashmir la clear and ur.aablguous. Ttie two resolutions of the 
recurity Council dealing with t^  e plebiscite vere conditional 
and contingent on .Pakistan vacating Its aggression and thot 
condition has not been compiled vlth by the passage of tlae 
and various factors intervening ••• they have become obsolete, 
'e cannot porsluiy contemplate vltf-. equanimity t*^ 6 threat to 
the Integration o^ our country and the « danger to our cher-
ished principle of secularism by the h^oldlng of plebiscite 
In Kashmir. T vleh to make It clear on behalf of my Ooveiti-
sent that under no circumstances can ve agree to the holding 
8i 
of ^ plebiscite In Kashmir*** 
n analysis of the Indian and American attltudei: on 
the irAsbalr issue reveals t^at both vers holding conflicting 
vievsf and Kashmir constituted the most sensitive point in 
67. l*£jj*li*, 7th iear, 1016 th Mtg*» Jime 22, "^ ObSj, pp. 4S-6* 
8fc* r.c-n.h.^ 19th Xear, I06fcth Htg*,February 6,19»4,pp.i3-i4. 
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Iiiao»As«ricaii relations* D««plt« th« fact t^at U,^•officials 
in their tpMehcg advocated friwaaXy ralatl^nt with both 
co«mtrl«s and fsvourad i>«ae«ful and conciliatory naaturts to 
•ottla the dlsputtiy In the U«7?* aa ve i l as outtldet they In 
practice favoured the «'aklatanl clalaa on Kaahalr* *'me to 
what«iver reaaon^ either became she thought India vat In the 
vrong or through lack of appreciation of India *a position or 
beeauae of partlaansMp tovardt Pakistan • no evidence can be 
pro<!taeed to aubetantlate the allegation aade soaetiae that t^e 
U.S. vaa deliberately taking a pro.Pakiatan stand « or beeauae 
of Bh%«f lack of knovledgCf the U.S. generally took a stand 
on IntSb^Paklstr^nl Issues n^lch app&ared to be anti»Indla and 
89 
favouring Pakistan.** 
India also did not favour the ^nglo-.U.'^. draft Pesolu. 
90 
tlon of February 21| ^961. A joint Anglo»A«eriean resolution 
passad by the f^ecurlty Council on TToveaber &» *«962y fixing 
the quantiaildf ''orces to be aalntained by India end P-^kls^n 
v a also opposed by India. 
im*riGSLn decision to give al l l tary aid to Pakistan also 
had adverse onsequeneet. Indl'i re^rded that the injection 
-Jt 
89* J.C.Kimdra, op.oit«ii p. "^ OS. 
90. tftlfipQflyamtitf S^ A017» Ihe Indian representative called 
i t 'vholl / unacceptable'* Y«ar a>nk nf Umtt^^it WotJAMy 
1961, p.d41* 
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of this factor In the tub»eontlii«nt had changed the vhole 
context of th«i situation and therefore ahe euapended an agree. 
sent vlth Pakistan to appoint a pl^blMlte adainlstr^tor lateat 
by the end of April 1964* India regtirded the United states 
91 
decision at a "fon of Intervention^ in Indo^i^aklstan relations. 
In reaction, India soon denanded the vlthdraval of ^ e U»e, 
milltar/ observors in Kasfc«lr* On March t6, Y964, '^ ehra 
said in the Indian Parllaaent* 
••A situation has arisen whereby any officer of the 
92 
U.'^ '* ^ray cannot be neutral in the dispute in Kashalr.** 
one finds i t difficult to understand vhy in ^ e Indo-
Pakistan dlaputea the U«n«A« generally took the side of ?akls« 
tan* Prok^bly, the reason vas that the United ftatet consU 
dered India*& neutral position as a constant factor and feared 
that Pakistan vas oore vulnerable to align herself vlth one 
OS the other sidCf If she found that one or the other bloc 
91* N«hru*8 speech in the Lok rabha February £0, 'fdb4| Inrfia 
JiMSAf Hardi t>» 1964* f^— also feaa ^^varup,''^* 3ovles. 
I t T)urts« ''oae Facets of /aerlcan Intervention in Asla^\ 
IrriPUtfi Vol.19, »o. l9 , Dece«ber a>, 1966, p*8" . . . . , . . 
It is nav fairly clear that if Aaerlca had not intervened 
in ^ila region and had n:)t supplied arat to Pakistan there 
vould have been no Indo.Pak conflict and no Kashalr 
problea. Indo^Paklstan relations vould have settled long 
ago in accordance vlth their natlon&l laportance* But 
the 'aerlcans disturbed the possibility of a natural 
enullibriua." 
9S* lfill*t March 20, '*964« 
vas supporting India on thg Kaslmir lS8U« and oth«r Indo«-Pak 
disputes* '/hat«v«r night a^ir« b««n t^0 ultltitat« e^niidtra. 
tlons, tha 'miric&n position on th^ Xndo-^^kistan dlsputas 
vras of such a natura as to craata suspleion &nX BlsuRd«iiirstand» 
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lag of th« u.c. Botlva In tha imisn sub^-oontinant* 
In 'M^ 19o£, vhll« iisshalr was b«lng discussed In tht 
eourlty CounclXi a ur 'enate Consittat votad for a 26^ out 
In thti 'm^rlean aid to India, '4«non's pras«iea !n th« 
Tecurlty Council had nuch to do vlth i t slaoa a larga aajorlty 
of tha /4&avlcan people found Ma unbaarabla* thtn In an affor 
to St ve off tha KashBlr d«bat«« rrasldant Kannad/ suggestad 
mediation by :ug«na 3lsck| India fS^ted and Pakistan aooapta 
t^a suggestion. This annoyed Kennedjri ^^osa anthutflasa for 
Ir^la oooled off. In reaction he postponed eeonoalc assist&nc 
to India* Later he realised t^-b Importance of such assistance 
to India, the most populous deoocracy In the vorld. *t Its 
meeting on July 30t 19t»2y the consortim vlth Kennedy's strong 
support sanctioned India a generous asount of 1*07 bill ion, 
94 
Nehru reciprocated vlth (Xiirery vara lettei to President Kennedy, 
In 19^ ;^  t , r , / . put pressure on Indi&f In tum of i t s 
iBllltary aid to h(ir« that sh« should reach a final settlentnt 
93, J.cKuadra, ftp-eit>, pp, io(»«6« 
9 ^ Chanakya Ten, aMASiXl*9 P* 46, 
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of th« dispute vlth <*akiEtan| and urged that !f ^ « dispute 
%ra8 to be iwacefuJLly reaolved^ there shouid be bilateral talka 
between th{» parties, ^t thti instance of y«r«A«| India and 
A\oklstan held a fev rounds of talks but ttiey failed to achieve 
any agre«(a<;nt aa the Chinese threat had by itov receded and 
96 
India could act Independosntly of U«r*^ « 
The Kashmir dispute a^in cane up for discussion In 
t^e recurIty Council during February-Hay 'tQtHk In the wake of 
tVe ''asratt^l incident* The Indian ease was presented by 
M«c*Ch3gla| : ducatlon '^Inlstert who reiterated that Kashnlr was 
already ^ part of India and that India would not pernlt the 
unity, integrity and aolldsirlty of t^e country to be sacrificed* 
re aiao pointed out /akl&tan*s fl irtation with China, Chagia 
strassi&d t^  u importance of K&shalr in the defence set»ttp of 
Tail"* India vas thw only democracy In ' s la , t^c only cokmtry 
cS'paoi. of controlling China's forvard policy. But the Indian 
arguiaent slaply msdu no lapresslon on U****^ . In Ms speech 
'dial 'rtevenson s&r«6Eed t^e Importance of India and /aklst'in 
resolving th(6 Kashmir Issue, which he said bad become ImmlB n^t 
In view of the chln«»se menace to t^e sub.contlnent* 7e sugges. 
ted th? t tbe two countrlt^e accept a mtrdlator to sett le the 
96* ^or a detailed account of t^t role of U,*"./, in bringing 
Irklla and Pakistan to the taole for talks on Kashmir, ''ee 
J*r*nuibrQltv, omJilS^f PP» 4?&-b81. 
• 162 m 
dlsputt peacefully, ^»plte Indo.^m«rSean dlff«r«nces an 
KashBlr, military sld «tc«, t^« ynlt«<5 "tat«t contlnuad Ita 
econt^lc assist'^nce to Indl&* 
Thtt «{a«rg«nc« of China a« a aajor povtr* Pakistan's 
flirtations vlth r«iklng| and th«» e«trang«n«nt lMiti#««n ?«klng 
and .'bsGOV «3m«what aiadlfltd t^« hlt^i^rto mwletn potturt^ O^ A 
riashalr, i'rlor to 19o3, naottly, the rino-i^ak ?xli , th« U,r,«, 
had alva/s sldt^ d vlth . .klstan In th« r^curlty Council* But 
since raklstan b«c^ m«; lnt«r6it«d In Chlnai and 8p«cl&ily t^e 
19b64 In<lo.»i'ak vaa? a ©llg't shift 1« notleer^ble In the u,r. 
policy on hathalir, 7hu U.S,/*, now r^ f^uscs to support t'aklstan 
In th«i feourlty Council und >^&a insistc»d on bllat«>ai t^lks 
06tvtt«>n ti^ e tv«o partitas |BS SJ at$ t> flfkl out a ssttliaent of 
t^e dlaputfef. l'"'t' vii- b©tvt»«n India snd aklstan v^s ^ trsglc 
fe35p©r?-t>nc« for *'3erlc'inE :;r; t^0y value damply the friendship 
of fcoth ""ndli rind -sklrtan. Ui*^ ' f'-toured '>n iBmedlott oe«se-
^IVK. £^ 11 cven ipprecl'ited ^nd 'applauded tha efforts of t^ 'e 
' ovlet Untoni to brlni^  ptttc^ to tt ti sub-continent* 
India contlnuttd to t>« fairourabiy inclined tovards U*^,', 
for 1 er s l l l t a r / and econoalc aid* 9ut this did not las t long* 
96* {.'•.Gupta, "n runrey of Tnda-U.r, l.aatlons t i l l '?964-3r, 
rrttuXnn ^tUUn jiaaartet voi* >:viii» ^o*4» May i9bOyp*&o* 
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In th« sufflii «r or 1 9 ^ ('aklttan cossBltt«a ^^ggrestlon In 1 uteh 
in vMoh ''mi^ rican &ra« v«r« unbuS^^atincly tnpldycd* 2hl« 
pjR)V«<3 tfu«i th« f«art vhioh India «nt«rtain«d tlno« th« eotim 
elusion of th« Military Aid «^ aot b«twtt«n i^klttan and ^a«rloa. 
India protesttd to th« U.r«A« and amt photographs of the 
•nulpnant to t^ e^ ntata Departaant* Th« Unitad '^tatas protea-
tad to {'akistan against tha usa of 'aarlean araa in violation 
of th« outuaX dafanea agraaaant but vas unabla to pravant tba 
97 
fighting. /Itt-iough t^a U.«^#'. fully supported tha efforts to 
re^cb ca&se-»flrti. betva^n the tvto countries i t conveyed to both 
^akii^tan and India i t s anxiety to t^ void disputes like this 
wliich Bigl't it^ ad to EBor<» serious trouble, i^aacaful ne^tiatlon 
98 
vas th«i onl^ ^nsver to probleae l ike this* L'owavar« the U»r,^. 
did not show any guts in dealing vlth i ts CEflO and f^ EAirj ally, 
Indeedy th«s ^tate fWpsrtaant %fas aora anxious that India should 
n3t eauiatt.' ^'akistan and seise soas Pakistani terrltoryi to ^ol 
i t as 'hostage' ftyr the nreas i l legal ly occupied by Pakistan 
than to t a l l Pakiatan that i t should vlthdrav froa t^e l l l seai l 
'>ccupied territory* 
97. Tee fuss el Brines, ItiAdmnk CflnfllBta (London 1 Fail Hall 
Press, 19t8), p*290« 'Iso ^arikekar, V^ftnW Xw f?t i f«l Ifta 
98* "^ ee Pr^l&dant %. Johnson's state£ient in r^r.i^y Vol* LIT I, 
''o.i3t>9, «!apt^bar £0f 10W>. ne saidt '•ve are naturally 
greatly concerned over any TUtta^Vip involving India and 
Pakistan* Our longftanding and consistent stance has been 
that the Kashair Issue aust and should be solved by peace-
ful Means*" 
99* Znaian Xttftliat Hay 1, 19b6* 
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Not long 5fter Vriia incidittnt^ a crit ical point v^a 
r«ach«<| amon^  tbe V rm count^rles • Indl&i r'akiitaa and U.'^,.'.. 
daring t^m undeclared var of "t9t)6# It 1B Indl&*s vl«v t3".it 
tK« r««ponilblllty for the tvln i'aklstani aggression of 1966 
r«st9 v^lXy on u,r«A« Th« United ''tat«« cannot tinply say 
tbat It had be«n Bal8l«»d by .'aklstan's false talk* It vas only 
too proifc to b«» ml»l«dd, F«f«rrini to President Eisti^wer»s 
BUBurhndi. In isrch 19o^ that t^ «^ U*n«/« vould taka action if 
anyon«) mlsUud 'ia«iricsuni r^msy .^ rlna Miniatar '^ «hru had aada a 
blunt atatasent vhlch ^^ aa not haadadi **! hava no doubt tVa 
President i s opposed to aggrasalon* But va knov from p^st 
emparlance that agirasaion takes place and n^t^lng Is dona 
about it* 'ggression took place In Kashmir 8lx»and»a*half 
years ago and tttus far t^e United *'tatas has not only not con-
d««ned l t | but ve h;^ ve been asked not to preSB i t In the 
Interest of peace* Aggression siay vail follov in spite of the 
bast intentions of the : resident and then a long argument will 
ensure on vhat exactly is aggression*** But %y*t U*r*** must 
have oeen «a^«r to ^et the fac i l i ty of certain air and espionage 
bsisas in th« northern part of W«8t iakl:t»n vhlcV vtre at that 
time . i*a*,btefor<» tie dt^ velopment of the oost modern mlsailus 
und sutellltte6 • ust^ful to i t s concept of security* Xhst ^na 
the t€«ptation* It Is tht-refore r«>aaonablt' to conclude th!?t 
If this U*r,% had n')t provided Pakistan with a large arsenal of 
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arsBCi «h« ,^ould n^t h^ve atteaptt-d this arfventurr, Thi? po^ f 
vat also made by ^rliac Minister S*T stpl duplnf t^e K l^te^  
100 
cr is is . 
'^tartlng froa this prtnUe i t say ve i l b« Busp«cttd 
t^^t t^• United '^t'tes nlg^t hav« eneourftgsd t^e Kuteb crlsia 
3- i (iiversloiary move to divert t^ c focus of vorld opinion 
froa lh« Vtetnao cris^Js, In fact, so«e coasscntators have 
8Ug„ti8ttd that /resident -^ o'^ nson cut out the L.,*'. vis i ts of 
loty. i^ rlffle Minister ^'h'istrl nnd i-rcsident *'yuD because he h^i 
prior knovit*dge of t^ 't. cisshj in oV'ei* ^ords, tht hutch dis-
pute V3S planned In advance vlth st least the acquiescence, 
101 
I f not conlRlitnce, o^ t^ e^ U*'". Oovemnent. 
"gtilnst tMsy n counter argument may ue advanced. '1th 
Its h'-mis full of the Vietnam crls lS | the Johnson 'dmlnlstra-
tlon ves hardly In a posit on to take the Initiative for a 
msjor Intervention In any other Asian theatrei • ncsldes, 
instead of making a gnln In terms o*" political aj^vantage, t^ e^ 
i^Sto-tes prtstlgc In Tndl« has be n bndly pi^ uled a?? is result 
of the Kutch cr i s i s . 3n line vlth t^^s Argument, t^ -e U.". 
rovemment, a^ter ^tivlng pumped In ^n enormous nmount of arms 
100« ^ot details of the rutc^ crlsi: « st,. t^ am (iopal, iaiJa-
t^ akifffia^  t ^ar and .e ce '^ S^ d^i (Luoknov s 'ustak >endra, 
19^7), pp« i«1&. ^lao husfel Brines, n^^eit.^ pp,290*96* 
101« .'nftlyst, "Kutch In aetrospect i rifc,nlflcant F-icets of 
r'Sklstan Fortil^ i^ollo/*t mXntlfti&at 7oUUJt '?o*46, 
July to, 19W», p.©. 
into ^akietAn« found I tse l f unauxe to i>r«»Vttnt lUkUtan using 
ti mi uti&iTmt Ijidlfi m ju»t ae ibhiu h&ci «/x«dlct«<2 /«ars b'-dk. 
In fact , V;.8lilngton vas c&ught in a Quftndry of ! t t own K»klni 
t^t aras buXong to t^« U*^*! actually given to i^akietan as a 
allit£.ry a l ly , and I t found it8«lf uaabl« to iirev«nt th« us* 
of Vr.M araa against India* 
. ncourag*^ oy I t s 8Uoc«&£ in Kutcr unA t>«» U.r,policy of 
^ppe9S«RJent, aklftan vag #abol<»©nod anij th« view t^at 3g»,re« 
aslon payi« Therefore, in 'uguat '»efe>6 I t eisbarked on t^e 
course of wrencking Kashalr from India by force. *n unspeci-
fied mxBber of Inf i l t ra tors crossed Into Indian Kashnir fron 
t> e ;&klstnl sJdc, wltr t>^ « hope of Igniting a successful 
r^svolt a»ong t>.e people of Kaslmlr, 3ut t elr calculations ali 
fired and m^ny Inf i l t ra tors were rounded a^» In t^# beginning 
i^akictan continued to deny i t s vomplcity ^ith the inf i l t ra tors 
but the reports of Impttrtiui sources, pacti&ularly uen*''Tiaao 
of tl e »-*? :)oserver liroup, confir«ed tJ»&t infiltr-itors had 
coste into India froffi '^ «id Kasbmir. The vaahin^tf^n .'aet also 
reported that , *'h*itports reaching t here froo ^ variety of 
sourctsS in ' rin^t^a. and t^ lte iiforiaatiou ;;:a5n«»d froa Kashalr 
and i'aklst^ini sources li ist week hn i>avalpindi, .ssshavar and 
102. lor dotuliff of th*t aggression in Kashmir set iiussel 
^^Ines, np*Clt»t PP« £96«;»&£« ; iso air. Copal, aji«jclU, 
pp. 1to.l49« 
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Karachi lm'99 l i t t l e doubt that at l^'9t ^600 i^aklstanl-
offioared comsandes hsvd eroaa^d th« c«Eit«»flr« Xln« flnet 
Aut^ ust 6. Ih«y hair« aoVttd in dtifcnets regrouping in conpany 
foraatlons at agreed point* vlthln Indian held territory and 
proceeding on preplanned •itaiona to oo«b bridg^a and ana depot 
India*a repeated vaminga to i^akiatan to vithdr^v t^e in f i l . 
tratora,oth«rvl8e ahe v i i l reply In the only language (via. 
force; vhlch Pakiatan undfiratood f e l l on deaf ys ears. Left 
with no other choice^ India croaaed the eeaae-flre l ine and 
e 
oecupi«d three poata in Kargil to defend her aupply routa* 
pakiat&n then declared open hosti l l t iea vith India, The war 
vae finally brought to an end ^ e to Intenalve efforta of the 
U.^.Teeretary Generai| U« Hianti and the vl i l ing cooper^tldn 
of FuBBla and U.r,/.. 
The var l e f t the Indiana oonpletely dlaillualoned vlth 
Ve United *"tatea, ? general feeling prcivilent saj^ ng Indiana 
vaa that th« United rtatea waa reaponaible for tVla var* "ad 
t^e United ^tatea not aupplied ama to i^kiatan^ thla var vould 
never b^ve taken place* Even aooe 'merlcana held their Govern, 
aent r^aponaible for the Indb^ t^ ak conflict, rpeaking in the 
renate on the Military 'aairtance and &alea ^ct of t9b6| TenatDr 
109* ;;t§hingtfin r'aitt '^ uguat 14, 9^66« 
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Chur^ r«nark«dt **Xh« ams v« supplied under tMs policy caused, 
and I underline t^r.t vord| th« v«r l&st autusm b«tv««n India 
nn^ Pakistan ••• But if vc had n-yt supplied axua» Pakistan 
vouXd not have sought one thing ve v^ anted a l l to a\>oidy viz . , 
a ailit'^ry solution. That beyond the slightest possibility 
of doubt was t^ € price of ^ l l e s policy* **nd of the policy of 
h!s disciples in continuing it*** 
The Indian 'aBb&ssador in vaohington, B.K**Je^ ru, lodged 
a strong protest with :>ean husk| *ai«^ rican '"ecretsry of "tate, 
on '^epteaber u, I9u5 against the use of U*r* eQuipaimt including 
.atton t:inks» F.&o sabre Jets^ and P»104 supersonic fighters, 
by Pakistan in Kashjsiri and pointed out that this violated 
^ssuranc&a 4.1ven to the Indian Govenastfit by c^residwit risen, 
haver In I0b4 t i^at e<^ult»ent supplied to i^akistan vould not be 
used agulnst India* 'n Indian Oovernmtfit spokesaan alleged on 
th<i same day th^t the i^akistan Governnent Kad refused U*r, 
)bservers pexnission to v i s i t the Chaab Sector to chedc the 
presence of U*0* tank^S| and eonfflented that vithout t*r« tanks 
and aircr f t P^istan %40uld not have dared to launch i ts latest 
adventure* The Indian Governsent,on the other hnnd, provid^ d^ 
• T^ e Miiit^^ry Assist nee and '"oles *ct of '•9^6, specfh 
In the ?"enate lay C»^ urch on t^ -e Tndl3«;>aki8tan debacle, 
ttnrvgrfliiiangl iffiarti PraBtidlniia inrt '^ akitfia o^ the 
eoth Congress, 2nd ^oslon, Vol* US, Part 13, July 87, 
19t^ «>, p* 1734* 
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affipX« opiK>rtunlV to 'awrlcan allitsiry officers to satitfy 
theasftlves rbgurding u«« of 's«irloan vtapont by IiuliA* {^any 
Indians could undsrstand that thtt acrlcans vera hardly 4n4 a 
position effectively to prev«nt the abuse of veapons i^lready 
given to ;'akl£t3n as nllltary sld. ''ardar 'Sf&ran ^ingh obaar* 
ved In t' e Lok '"auKa on ''epteaoer EOy that the United ^tates 
ooverruDtent had oire or less "confessed i ts inability^ to do any 
thlHi^  about Its assurances biy etop»;ln£ allltai*/ and econoaile 
aid to both the countries* 3uty India va» a l l the nore Irrl . 
tated t^ statt^ents etoanatlng froa hl^h 'aerloan quarters to 
t* e effect that uoth In<lla and ."aklstan were using *aerloan 
^^mipor!iS^ TMs was mother atteapt to equate India and Pakistan 
These statenents vere ^actually Inaccurate since vhat India 
had received as alHt'^ry aid vs^s aeaot aalnly for sK>untaln 
warfare and would h ve been of vry l i t t l e use In fighting 
a^^alnst x^aklstan* 
•isterica 41d not Intervene in this atmed conflict for 
over three weeks* v^hether for hon«st opinion or policy^ the 
United r tates dli not vote for India In the United *^atlons nor 
dlU i t apportion blaae to t^aklstsni and preferred to remain 
nulet. Th« lapact of the long drawn out proceedings at the UW 
was; th:it instead of wasting time ovt Investigation as to who 
atartt^d the|conf&lct, It was aore useful to achieve a eease-flit 
106* '^ ee I.^.C^akravarty, pu.c l t . . pp* '•39-.40* 
• 160 • 
t^e U.*'«reertittry G^nsr'-l's appeal for o«a8«»flre ••(^•d s 
vam rtsponne r^om U,% *• and I^ltaln, 7^e U,«'.^«cr«t«ry 
of "tatwj^'m :uik,8«nt a oabXe t© India sppeelfng ^op an 
Imm^latii oeas€).f ire* 11<« U«r,d«i«gatlon to t^  c U.^ * also 
ast^erted that the imiaediatt task vas eeseatlon of conflict* 
It vas only vh«n thu tvo countriite ^ad aiaoat tixhaustad and 
p^ralj^ a^d t^ <»ir arlltary «>otentlai trst Johnson sto^ ^psd bo^ 
107 
t ie ariBs and ths econ^lc «id to th« tvo countries* 
Ithough the U**"*% did not play any active roie In 
bring'n^ th«j tvo bc^UlgertintE to ttm conferfioics table i t was 
106 
ke«nly desirous of a cease-fire and ^mc* in the 8Ub»continen^ 
lOu* Tor detail Set. s^m Qopaly aiUfiiUUt PP« ^«^6* 
107. r.vijyanand ^larathl. Can M i l f t i ^fictat YTlll Cr.allingft , (UlahalKid : Vora and Co* jTt ^ 8 ^ P* 479* 
'ISO see TligMigntB nn faifUan fariten atiatloni 
l£lt£L,Council on Foreljpi Helstlons* 1966, p*113* ""tatenent 
made by ^abasaador *rthttr J* Goldberg^ u.'^^^iiprfesentative 
to t^e United 'Nations, to the '"•curlty Council of the U.*?. 
n^ Tepteaber '^ 7, 1966* !'e saldt *'The United '^tates snjoys 
<»nd hopes to continus to enjoy fxlendly relations with 
both India and Pakistan* I should like to enp^aslx• t^at 
ve h&ve susptindsd Mtas 8bi];»ientB to bot^ comtrles since 
\m want| In support of the recurlty Council's resolutions 
calling for a cease-fir^, to help bring about an end to 
this conflict and not to escalate it* It Is the sense of 
the * ecurity Council's Ivesolutlons that there be a prompt 
end and not an Intensification of hostilities*'^ 
'«« iiku*ikt ^*ctober lly 19i»6, p*toO& and U.Nf. 
?HeiiM«nte« VK«e/gnQMat>s \. Tepteaber 4, 19&6* and V 
he8/2l0(19b6}, repteaber t^ i 19l>6* 
1C6* U**^ *: ndorses 'Secretary G«ieral*a 'ppe^l for ceasef ire 
in Kashalr. "tatement by 'mbassador G->ldber|, U,^ */u*M, 
Oantd***** 
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and vas partly reSponslt>l« for th« ultliaat<i ^gr««m«nt between 
Indls and Pakistan, Init ial ly, Pakistan had cold«shoulder«d 
the '"ovlftt offer of J «lp due i^artly to iusiiiclon of "ovlet 
Union's partiality for Illdla and partly to the hope of gaining 
'sjsrlcan goodwill for Pakistan, Tn f 'c t , on r^pteBiber 16, 
'yub Khan apj^eiied In vain for » U.^, or Cosinonve^lth Intsr. 
ventlon to bring about a c«ase»flrc» *'3V«vsr, on *^ ov«»ber ^&m 
100 
^'resident *yub told t*e I'aklstan 'Tatlonal 'ssenbly that he 
aecepted the o«ase.flre "because v« were given an assurance ty 
Ue 31g ?ov&TS • particularly the urA, the rovlet Union and 
tlie u«;r>. • that th«y vould use their Influence and good offices 
to bring auout & settleisent of the Kaghair dispute*** To 
Pakistan's dlsappolntaent, hov«vcr, President Johnson was no 
long«r*after th« ^erosion of Pakistan's alignment vlth the 
Test, P'iklstan's Increaslnjjly close relations vlth chins, &nd 
(Continued tttm tS^'^ previous page) 
i>r9Bu I elease 419, Tepteisber 19«^« **The United ^tates 
fully (indorses the appe'^ 1 made ity the Secretary.General 
vlth regard to Kashmir (U,'9..lbc. ''cytt647). It Is said 
t' &t thtrt should be an Immediate ci^se^flre, that a l l 
anaed personnel vhlch have moved scroas the cease»flre 
line should be vlthdravm, end there should be the fu l l , 
est cooperation vlth t> e United Nations un6 Its obser* 
vers on the ground* The United ''tates at ac^es the 
iiroatest Importance to the restoration of peace In the 
area and the avoidance of any action likely to t^^reaten 
f^ ^rther the mslntenance of International pesce and 
•"ecurlty*" 
109* I&Mnf 'November it>, 19t»b* 
and Pakistan's alauas of Aasriean utm» agalntt India«.vUlln^ to 
pXa/ Ui« Paklataal game and advlasd him to s««k Mttlafsent 
through th« United Hatlona r«curlty Couneil rasolutlon of 
reptaa&tr 20t >^lch th« United rtataa had supported. He even 
velcoBed and blesssd the oviet init iative to arrange the 
Tashkent aeetlng* <^ lnoe t'aklstan depended solsly on United 
states for eoonoaic and Bi l l tar/ assistanosi and could not 
eas l l / sake up for the losses incurred during the v«r without 
Ur aid| andy furthsreaorei sinee the United ^tates supported 
the Toviet inltiativet President ^yub was ultiaately forced 
in ffoveoiber to accept the r^viet good offices to arx^nge a 
aeeting vith the Indian Prlae Minister to iron out their dlff. 
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ersnces on the neiptiatiag table. The U.fr.A,, on Its part, 
%ras content to see the USf2i pla/lng the role of the sediator 
and successfully bringing the host i l i t ies to an end througli 
the faaous Tashkent Declaration, According to an Associated 
Press report, there was in London a belief that Washington 
and Moscow co«»ordinttted behind the scenes their efforts to get 
i l l 
India and Pakistan to Tashkent* 
7n fact, Aaerlc^ applauded and praised the Tashkent 
Declaration as beneficial not onl/ for India and Pakistan but 
110* H«r.,KaJany *'Xhe Tashkent Declaration i Eetrospect and 
Prospect**, intairaaUonai rtwdiig, voi.e, NOS. L S , July. 
:>ctober 19l»6, p,^. 
111. UloaiiMUU IJMUf January 17, 196«>* 
also for Indo-'atrlcan relfttlons* T^li Indo-Psklstanl tttp 
tovards pfi3ce and am ty vas In 'a«rioan interest* ^s ^tsl^cnt 
Johnson saldi "The Unltsd ''tstss values d<*sply the friendship 
o^ both India and i^ >aklstsn« 'Nothing vt know Is «ore painful 
or Bore oostly to a l l concerned than a falling out between one*? 
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fr i^ nds.** 
' ar t>etveen India and Pakistan was a l l the mote ur.desirs-
&1<« to Imf'^t^ becausti! of Chinese designs on the suu.contlncnt« 
Addressing the national ("ress Club at Washington on '^rll ^9, 
1900, rthur J«Ck>ldb«rgi U»f* i.epresentative to the u." *^, saldi 
"It (19o6 var) vas of coux-se a l l the aore alamlne to the 
bnit&d tatt^i Uecausc India and r'akistan stre two v^ry laportant 
1i2« lkLLi*9 Vol.L, %.1fc91, :<i»rch 23, i9bW| p*44£.« 'Secretary 
rusl^ s Nwws Conference of March «», lOoo* Pusk pointed out 
f^ et Interest of '•nerlca in achieving settlcnlnt of the 
rashair dispute* Fxplainlng this he said. '*If th« two 
great countries in the Bub.eontinent could find! theaselves 
wozking together in the closest eo^^operation, then that 
sub.continent would be invulnerable froa e>temsl attadc 
and they could both proceed with their eoonoalc and social 
development programs as t*^clr highest priority* In the 
abstfice of that co<-operatlon and with high tMision between 
the two great nations of t3ie sub»continent, then this 
creates not only great probleas for then but increaser 
the burdens upon the United states to be of ^stlstance to 
tbea in getting on with their eoonoalc and social develop-
ment prograas and in furthering th«lr o%m national 
developaent**' 
n;>* ik£«J*f Vol* LIV, No* 1399, /pr i l 18* 19ot», p*t>9e* ^'reslder 
Johnson and Prime Minister Ojndhi of India confer at 
\<eshlnitton* .^xchange of Greetings, ^hite '^ouse Pxess 
;,t>Ieas£> dated Marshy £6* 
• lb4 • 
nations vh^te f}londshlp and progrose w« highly t«lu« btesust 
Just ovr the Himalayas i.«d China vas sitt ing^ eaceriy waiting 
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for a chanc« to pick up th^ pl^cvs*** Further^ ^9«rlca bollcvts 
that i t i s due to India*8 Intransigence and hariish att i tads 
that Pakistan has be«n driven to seek rsfuge in th« ^ma of 
ty.% CMness. '^ nce the Kashair proble« i s solvsd India $tnd 
Pakistan vould be a^od nslghi^ours again >%n6 act as a bui%fark 
against Chinese aggression. 'm«r)cn seems to be nistaken In 
tMs vlev, 'j^perlenoe shovs that even after the Kastwalr probltf?i 
i s solved t'uklstan aany s t i l l continue her &ntl«Indian policy 
as It is inh«^r«nt in tht; very nature of her creation and past 
history (including Xhi, «»a«rgence of l^angla nush as a sovereign 
republic;* 
Change vt^ s noticeable in • sshin^tonU attitude this 
time In ctintr^st to it& r^Siditlon &t thi;, tla% of the Kutoh 
c r i s i s . I t hhd deeply hurt Indi^ k t^iat Bshington treated the 
Kutch i i f 'a ir us an annoying side issue althouf^ Jt vas the 
116 
'meric^m a l ly vhlch had conailtted aggres&lon* T^ir^er, vhi le 
ll,K.Vehiia had found t s lbot very s t i f f towards India during the 
Vol-
114. iiLUIJ-f^I-iilV, ••O.140S. :!3y 9, •»»i*>, p.7b0. ''The United 
'T'^tlons J ^ Progress Report", Address by 'rthur *T, 
Coidberi before the '^t lonsl r>rea8 Club at 'ashington 
^n April 19. 
116. Christian ^clanca V>nitAi»j > y^ £» 1966. 
• 1€»6 • 
Kut«^ conflict • t^r«&t^in^ to coa«» out In op«n support of 
i^ukiitn in cai>« of any counter attack by India • thl« tla« 
hft found :.u8k In a different fraB« of »lnd, exprctting concern, 
and n?t refuting the Indian charge of i^aklstanl c^Bt>llelty 
In the Kashmir ciashus. Cheater 3bwl«», U.r.^ibatsador in 
India, also reported th« participation of outaldt deaents in 
Vr,% clathiis in the Kashmir Valley, th^retiy, In «fftct, oonflr«» 
in,;, ti.it Indian csise of i»akl£t:'nl inflltretlon. Indeed, accord. 
fife 
i^^ to the U«r«Con«;re88aan, Church, from the beginning 
President Tohnson hlasalf *'directvd •tserie^n policy in «n 
astute and skilful manner, '^la decision to refrain fro« 
provocstlve dtJ els rat Ions, his insistence that th« U,??. observe 
n neutral pasture, n^d ^*s 9 refusal to intervene directly in 
t^e v!ax, ax'e velcome Indications tH<^ t our dlplosiscy vas teiBpere< 
with discretion and restraint.*" !^ ot only did U,r,A. approach 
the vhole problem vlt>' caution and restraint but It also 
refrained from making moral juugements about Ue Kashmir issue* 
'^shlngton kept her S4lf«assuaed righteousness under flra 
oontrol* *h*i closest ps^nounoement on Kashair, by ' ccxetary 
liufk^vas remaikaule for tao^sui'ed care* 'hen qutstloned about 
a plebiscite that vould achieve self-deteraiaation on Kashmir, 
l l o . uhur<h, "IK^ U.'Utrlusip!;", (^a,t;r6SglaR^l r;«iagd» 
Proceedlntis and i)euates of the 69th Congress, 1st ''esrion, 
Vol* III, /art ''8, C"ei>tefflOer '•4-£3, 19&6},^epteober 
^t^ 1966, p* 2479b* 
It? 
Tm'^in husk ft^^idt "^ « huy& a^L r^nsettd our vl«v,8 on th^t suoJ«ct 
over XJ^i. y^ars* Hat Is ^ i t of a g6n«>ral piiobl«ai of solution 
of outftanding l5fUt.fi t>«tv«<tfi India and Pakistan* ^ t tHill«iv« 
t^at fifcsfe a'itters s'louid b^ t ktsn up and ruAoived by p«tkceful 
aeine, ' e do not b«llttV« tb«y s^^uld b« r«tolv«d ti|/ fo2^«*" 
It Is also not without sUnlfi^anct that th% pro.U.^'.Lob)^ 
in %^v Pelhl openly crltlcltftd -'/uis 'insl 6V<#n the ''vatantra 
i^-rty dttvl-atticJ fi-^ n its tr^JitJonai pi'a-i^ !*k stand, r*fi«ctlng 
t^ 4» ch£ine,dd cittltude i^ oviirds *'>iklatan aotlon la Katlailr. 
f^ot only did tht var c^tn^e U.S. attltttd« towards 
nashalr out It ^Xso broui^ ht into focus ''tb^ *a«rlcan h«lpl«ss. 
n«88 to (I-) '^ nytMng mora ef^tfctfve In the a'ttcr of pr«ir«ntlng 
Hxm t^ -.an the lodging of vcriwl protests, (and t^at too la 
diplomatic privacy; has txposed t^* hollovness of "narlcan 
assurances to India, tha uttsr undtp«ndablllty of Pakistan as 
a ffllllt&ry a l i / | and tKb rtfaarkalsly Insignificant influsnca 
that t^« United rtat«s has aoqulrttd vlth r'aklstan In 8plt« of 
MS 
y&ars of paapi^rlng vlt^ unduly larg« a l l t t a r y and •conoale aid. 
^"^Tit "Hjion bad n^ answer vh#n th is quostion vas posvd to hia 
117, Jo8»pb Craft, .'oice-aaiilnfi In Asia, ..L<ifhln,7iiii P^at 
'^ aptember 2L, 19U5. "^ ai) a lso , CQa7r<:gM:>?-a., rifiOfflt 
ir»roc««dtn^s and TfebataS of th« b9th woaiirfe^s, i s t 
"«S6lon, Vol.TII, Part *»£, ' epteaoar 74.23, 19^6, 
rspteta^er 1:', ""Su^ , p. 24732« 
116. .H,r>,.x3jnn, l i i t i i i - i P« '-C* 
beyond «xi>i'to8»lnfc, th*j ho**© that In futm* the U.r./^ algbt 
be aore effective. Ihete questl-int are s t i l l agltatine tti« 
siut^ioiitl^s in l^v»v Delhi* )n(» hopes tb'^ t h&ietttorth the 
United ^ tfites uouXd laerclte greater dieoretlon in eupplying 
arss to r"j^ ki8tan and to use i ts lnfiuenee« if an/, vlt^ 
1 ^ if tan to proisote lautvially beneficial relations vlth Indis* 
In t- u efteria^tl Qr(t-:« *9bo conflict, t> e need to 
reconstruct tha'r economies forced India and Pakistan to 
Qonoentratti t-elr efforts on obtaining t^€ resuaptlon of 
foreign aid. 3n India's part, this mumnt an ene^voured to 
voo tbw U.r, Into resun'ng aid contributions without vhlcK-
India hud n^  rt^ii c: ance a^  t;conoralc survival* raklstan, on 
tl"6 othfer hund, a^ loptte.. t'^ ^ policy of pia/int, u^ D^n 'aerican 
fwars of *-hlns, 'nd lot'r. used Ui^ "fancy puukaging" surround. 
Inti t^ Tc rtiil purpDS.- of thu lashkant .'«;rfe;a5ent to *n**luenc« 
the <^,''m India caudc a sincere atttfBpt to set t le essentially 
nonopolltical matte* a arisi^iis >)ut of th«^  t^ ptesiber var. :3ut 
t'tou .^ prOi,rfSs va£> oiadcj on soatt i»inor ciatters, on major 
Biati^ ers concvmbd vith X.'^'.Q resunption of coasnunlcatlons and 
t^t' normalisation of coaaercw i'aklstan was unoooprrntive, 
per^aps in t^ *." tjope o^ putting pressuj-e nn Inc'l'i tj discuss 
KashiBlr. 's 'nerlcri had nadt tl.u resumption of full-scale 
"•la. ditori*il,'»U,^, 'itss Supplies*', SMlMXf 'ay 4» '^^7, 
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foreign aid contingent on the confid^ao* V'Skt India and 
i'aklstan vouid not go to v&r again^ India vat able to point 
out at Pakistani intranalgence aa a p?oof that I t vat not 
India's fault thut the *raahkent spirit* had not carried the 
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two countries further towards r«o<3ncillation and friendship, 
XhJs lln*j apjjjd&red to h-A^ l l t t l i * ^ffvat Qpon President 
.Tohneon, 'n fact, t '«rt %'ac r- ^»ruclsc 'K:flnlt3on ^T re-
orlitntatlon >*" tht "raerlcnn att itude tovarls economic and 
military a l ! , uni vaa underllnec! by t^ )C ffict *J ^ *t tht U.^. 
B'4>uid channel JIRA a l l econtMalc fid f routjii tb« 'orld Hank 
ratKr than tVrou^. Mlaterel transaction. The U,*", had no 
Intention of •"iliovlns the Inft5,an econony to run dovn Into c'^ aoe 
t^ls vould Indeed be po l i t i ca l I sbecUlty , ""he vas not, 
hovevsr, ^xei>ared to reaxa either India or .'nklstan so tVat 
they could ^ to %mr again vhen either of then f e l t l ike I t . 
ih l s uttl iudc forcud India to p'^ -rade t>"fc fhtmist bogey, 
in thu l^ope that It '-ou^d *'rle,' t«n the 'merlcrms Into giving 
milltar.' *ild foi defence at;alnst Chln:>, .Tut the 'aailcans did 
itot appear to have Jicceptav' tht .''ndl'»n Interpi otatl:)n of China's 
Intentions, r-icr** seeaod, at the 2«>aient, Is lit^'le or no 
1£C« 'J ic 'aa d-'.rd3, " -.-hkc'it iM ' *'i&r*\ InTfitJrJLbflai 
121* Ifaid. 
appreciation of Mr?* Qandihl's theiisy expreastd during htr 
'-^tMn^ton v i s i t , that India offWB a politlesil alttrnativ* 
to China and that i t It India*s alation to provide for '^Sla 
m aodttl of success t^rou^ deaocratlc socialieai. -^oveveri t^e 
'a<srlc^ns seemed to believe that an/ sittesi^t to build India 
ali»n« tiB a txjlvark against the Chinese vould onl/ perpetuate 
iruit3i>ilit«y in Touth /sia by antagonising r'aklstan. The United 
rtates is f u l l / avare of the lapoYtance of soae positive f^np. 
prochement bet%feen India and Pakistan, and i t seeas Ilk e l / 
tVat ''4Berlcan thinking leans towards approaching the problea 
through econoalc cooperation* 
It also becaatt clear ^ a t the U.n, no longer vieved 
{Pakistan's friendly relations vil^ China vith the saae horror 
as she did before the f'tpteaber var* tt.erefore, bot^ ^ Pakistan 
and India failed to use China as a bargaining counter vith t^e 
123 
u.n. 
In spite of the fact that t*^ e fecurlty Council resolu. 
tlone of '~ept«aber ^9^6, vhich called for n cease-fire, referre< 
to t^e Kashalr issue (and Kc^  Bhutto had threetaned that 
12ii« Despite the severe strains in ^he u*r^akl£tan relation. 
sMp, t akletan occupied a ke/ position in i t s defences 
and continued to contribute to thea* General T-iood, Dlr^ctc 
of U*r«!iliitar/ Assistance,assured Congress in 'pril 9^o6t 
that^'thus far, i^akistan has not by any particular action, 
tiffected t^e essentiala of our alliance relationship," 
"^ Foreign Assistance and f elated 'gencies 'pproprlations 
for 190U*, nawlngfl fagfofa * r.ma^ fiQaaUtgfB an 'aaragrJifib 
llajQA, 9t l^ouse of Pepresantatives, 89th Congress, Ist 
Contd..,.. 
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rakistan would valk out of the UN If a satltfaotorjr aoltttlon 
to Katbair vae not foundry Pakistan ^ad vlrtudlly nadt no iiov« 
in thti r^ecuritjf Council to resurrect tt% lssu« in the la t t 
f«v years since tht^  w^r. rhls coulcigft be the result of a rea* 
l i s t ic appraisal on tt& purt of t^e ^9U\> Goverfusent as to t^e 
attitude such a step migl t evoke froB the Gri^t Povers without 
vhose tjQQking no resolution could JM passed in ^ e Security 
Council* 
The United ^tates, i t becane clear^ vas in no no^d to 
tak«i sider In this Indo-i^akistanl dispute* "s U.'^.'mbassadsr, 
Keating, made caq^liolt at a press Conference at Lucknov that 
i t vouxd kv^ ep i ts hands off the ''dispute" and i t desired that 
the parti«is involved should sett le such issues betveen thco. 
selves, 'He vant ^ s«e haraonious relations between India 
and I'aklstan) ve do not v t^nt to intervsn«£%'>^  he said. Thersfore, 
at t^e taost St oould|b€ e^cpected to endorse ^ e '^ecurH/ Council 
resolutiono of ^946 and '«949« 
(Continued froa the previous page} 
^esaion;i9t»6^, p«St>7« Thus Washington vas no more disposed 
to abandon an ally In response to Indian ocwplaints than 
i t %ia8 to take Kashalr froa India in response to /aklrtani 
coaplaints* 
124. ?4o^ amnad Ayub, "Pakistan t ^ev Hove on Fashalr»\MalnatyaB, 
^Ixth Annual No. 19^8, Vol. VII, ^os. 1.3, p. b9. 
1S6. iMtaaaan, ^rch 8, 1970. 
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tiiiCUMnior? I f u>^. -^iM ??M.Fit 
on ' ii»xU ''E, ''9to7 th« u3V«nM«iit af tti« Unlt«4 rtatts 
annotmo«l Itt poXic/ to se l l tpar«i for •<;ulpa«nt alr«ad)r 
suppll«d on oath puichase basis to ths eountrlss in ths subu 
contlnsntf but not ;o rusuns the nllitary aid suspsndsd at 
V % outure^k Qf th« "^ 6^ var and to clsta supply mltaions In 
} svalplndl and Dsi: 1* In revising /aarloan polio/f th« off!• 
e lals 6Xi^ lain«dy a prlm« objeotlva of tha U*f:« Govarnsant was 
to ancour g^ Vn^ reduction of d%tBn<i0 axpandituras in th« 
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sub-contlnant to aohlava an arms l ls ltatloni* Th« foffar 
Vicv-r'reslJent snd prospective Hspublican eandldata far Prssi. 
dantlal ©lection, ilchard "Ijton also pla'^ dad tiiat Ills country 
decision to stop military aid to the two countries bat to 
resume the supply of spare parts for lethal vaapons on a cash 
pui'chasus t»asl8 should not be hastily judged* ^^ e v^s sure 
that It vouid be judiciously lapleta^nted so as not to weaken 
Indira ^i^alnst China and not to encourage rakl&tan Into a new 
mlllt&ry adventure against India, ^e also spdke of t^e U« .^ 
determination ta "damj^ er down the two countries before they 
128 
start moving towards another armed conflict*" 
i£o. 'ee iiinJiUy nf U t a m i l 'TfaUi r t^aart '!a>7«ttB,C s^v T e^ihi; Government of Indis;, p» ii» 
127. mSLLOlSUit ' p r l l HHf 19ii>7. 
128* c:apitaiy m^ 4» igi»7, p, 902* 
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H<iv«v«r» a l l th« e^planatloii* offeftd by U.s.authoritltt 
fsllnd to ooavliio« th« Indians* Grave conctm and rasantaant 
vaa bxpr«aaad in tha Lok Sataha si^alnat this daelaioni and 
•aabars quaation«d tha Intantlons of th« Unitad rt&tai. S.M* 
l^marjaa« V.Krlahaaooorihi and V«akataaut3baiah oonaidarad this 
haXp t} Pakistan as a sarlous thrsat to Indians aaeurlty and 
intandad to suiSntsln the tjalanca of povar and foaant axtamai 
confXlct batwaan India and .'^kistan* fora i^ Minister ChagXa 
told tha Lok Habha that eonsldarlng that Pakistan vas tha aaln 
baneflciary of this ^ l i c / t slnca India had n^t aequlrad any 
appraclabia quantity of U.i^ * aras i^lla Pakistan vovad Inora^sa 
b«r offensive strength, the Oovamaant of Indl-s protested tn the 
United states Govemaent pointing out thsit the nev policy wis 
bound t i reactivate ch# entire var aaachine of Pakistan and 
hence was l ikely to pose n severe threat to peace in this area. 
Disagreeing vlth th«i United 'States contention that ''this policy 
is directed solely to serve th(& Interests of peace and to reduce 
tension, and t^ '^ t they d-) not Intidnd to act to ^ e d«triaeat 
of our security interest** ha declared It to be ^'aost prejudicial 
to Indict and far froa working for peace will incre^ae tension 
betveen i>akistan and India,** He regretted that the U.'*.^  .always 
equated India vlth Pakistan, Hy appe'irlng to be Irrparti^l 
and objective, tthe unlt««d states vms acting in a is^nner j^rejudl. 
oial to Indian interest* India could no longer rely on 'merlcan 
assur&nces since they vera unaule to enforce th«ffi, Tt is true 
189. ?^r.,D.. 4tfc '^erles. Vol*III, No.6, May 29, 1967, cols* 
1620*1632* 
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t^at India to3 can Uiy TOT ostth spares foi enuipasnt previously 
supplied by tb« c.r. Jut sines Pakistan had bsftn glvsn about 
fIft«<on tlac»s the lailltary sup i l s s India had b«sn civcRi It 
should bt. ol?vious to anybody that Pakistan sto-)d to gain l«*u 
^nsel/ fro© th« new policy* rurthfer, the enulpaent Pakistan 
received t^nks^ bombers, fighter boaberS| vas aeant to step up 
e « offensive potential vhil« th«i #quipcent India receivsd con. 
trjfcuted to a aodest reinforcement of her defensive strength. 
VltUtlng even the original pulley vas the assuaptlon of a 
parity b«>tveen two countries^ one of vhlch is four tlaes 
larger than the otht^ r vlth proportionately larger dcfsnce ne&ds 
this vas interfcrencti vlth U e natural balance* Tpftaklng to 
pressmen on 'yrl l l/^ India*s Foreign r«cretaryf C*r*Jhay said 
i t vas a pternlcious doctrine for any country to say that i t 
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h'ad a right to dtclde as to vhere the baltince vas t i t tilted* 
>nce again, in Hay iOI>&y the aembers of th« Indian 
parliaoent verv greatly agitated over th« supply of 'neric^n 
tanks to Pakistan t^rough Italy* "^ oae oKinbers asked the Govern 
sient vhtj^er i t vas contsmplating ''concrete action beyond send. 
ing protest notes to the U*f:* Others suggested that such 
sjilitary aid to "iklstan be declared an "unfrlwidly act** on the 
yn\(t o^ the y.r. The j^rioe Minister, Krs* Gundhi, assured t>>e 
130* Indian and ^-orelgn revlevf?iew U*r* Policy of 'rms ''uppi/', 
Indian and. Famlen he^Xmit 4 <i4), Hay t^ 19^7, p*6. 
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nootwrt tt'^t th« G3V«»rnment had &lr«ad/ prot«st«d to tfati 
l^ «r« and Italy, Bali r^ a fihat,at« Hlaltt^r of ^tatt for Dcterru 
*.ffair8)sald that India vag not satl8fl«d vith tt.% Aaarlcan 
argument that lh« tanke v«r« r«placcffl«at8 fox> <^attons daaagtd 
during the Illdo«.i'ak var of 10i>6 and that Tnlla had dltouasad 
thii aatUr vith th« U,r« at «v«r/ stage and pointad out hov 
Ita y:)ilc/ affvcted tli« Bi l l tar/ ^lunca In the raglon, 
hXl /merloan ttxplanatlona fail«d to lasson Indian raaan 
sent '>ver reauaptl-xi of lethal weapons to Pakistan, 'abaaaado; 
haat!ng*s atat^ent in Cochin that th«r« vtia no raaaon to thirl 
that *'the vary lloltad •marlcan of far to acl l aeveral nUltary 
Itaas t') Pakistan v l U oontrlbiate to an araa raea** vaa far 
fpon convincing, iqualiy his atataaanta that nhat the U.".', 
of^erad to r>3kist n vaa a *'drop In tha bucket coaparad to vhat 
1S1« Broadly th<r€s« ^rguaants vara advanced by U«r. offlclala 
t3 juatlfy t^ (« daclalon to aaU 'aat Oaraan tanka to 
rakl&tan through Italy* (\) *'It la n<»o«a£ary to prevent f'aklatan getting cloaar 
to China and that can be done only if havalplndl 
does nst have to depend on .'eking as Ita principal 
source of araia aupply* 
(2) rhe Indian purchaa^a from the <"ovlct Union have 
caused apprehension in .'akls^n and that th«ise fear 
vould tend to underaine the aoderate 'yub reglae 
and promote extrealsn aaong the people as ve i l as 
ti-fe araed forcea* This point has come to be aaa eap 
asieed by Washington since ?re8ldent "yub Khan 
sufferitd atvlld stroke l^ls year. (a; >lnally| the ^ovlet Union nay soon agrees to s e l l 
hirdvare to Pakistan and thus supplant 'merlca In 
hsvalplndl as It has already done in the case of 
\'ev nelhU^'-^ee IlBa» ftf Indil^t «J^c £^. '»968. 
132. n ft Itegat '^y 3 , 19b8. 
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Pakistan has oeen raceiving from aithtr th« "^vlat Uni'^n or 
Coaiiuiilst China"! of that the Iteisa Involvad in th« '!a«rl«an 
offer vouXd not upaet tht aiXltary balanca batvaan India and 
t'aklatany fallad to asaura ^&v Dalhl* 
Flratl/y tha 'mt^ rlcan aupply vaa not very l la l tad| 
Ti'ys vas Ita affect ineonaaquantiai on the miXltar/ balanca* 
Froa Ue Infortaation available i t saatia fairly aatabliahad that 
tha U.n.A. had off*srfcd to auppXy 16F-104 '"tar f l^tara , 73t^7 
TboberSy and 300 armourad parstmnal ^rrlari* ^11 ^aia ara 
It:thai V apona, offenalve veapona and oartalnly tha F.104 
pXanes aro aopbiatlcatad vaapona, %JHin though th« Bi^ 7 I^ oatjara 
ffl:iy not b« regaxdo^ £»a highly aopMatleated* rhia vaa bound 
to upset the military balanoa and| theraforei India cannot 
133 
Ignore the au^antati^n of Faklstan's military stranfth. ^hat 
singerod India aore vas t^at ^oaric^i vhloh could n'^ t pravant 
Pakistan from using military har<?wara (gifted by U.r.f . ) against 
Tndin in utter vlol'itlon of Vu U,**, assur^noa. should i^v 
134 
coaae forvard to nake go'jd the lossas inflicted by India, 
136 
Th«irafore, an off ic ial spokesaan of India warned that, "/^ ny 
133. r^ <^  fflfKlita -ffatoa fiiflQrtff Vol.16, '*o.7. July ^9i>9, 
p* 142* In a atateaeni on U*r«Mllltary aid to i^aklatan 
in the Lok Taisha on Tuly 24, 19b9, Plnosh ring i^ sa in 
*'OovernB«it have aade i t clear t^st araa dsaistance to 
i^aklatan v i l l incrfaaa the threat to the security of 
India, encoux^^e Pakistan in ita aabitlolits and deaands 
on Indian territory n^d conseru^ntly retard the chances 
of noroaiisation o^ relatione betvaun the t^vo countries* 
Tt \«ili also i.o against tJ.e Idea of econoaj^ cooperation 
in /^ sla and ad<l to tension in this part of the wrld," 
134* nfiUfXta gftgfty P%UikiA9 Oc to bar 19, '*970* 
136. Indian jaraaat January i7, i97o« 
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att«apt oy tUrm U.f^ .A* to fflak<« axmt svalia]ai« to Pakistani 
%^«ther directly or lndlr«otiy| vlU. bt contrary to India's 
Intertsts &n^^ ai,«lnrt the pboc© and stability of th# srsa.** 
Prime Minister Indira OiindhS also told the visiting Unltsd 
rtatss r^cretary o^ rtate ,1 . l l lala i<og«rs,thst i%8hlngton*s 
decision to r«suBtt i^rms sales to P^klsttn eould seriously 
daasge Indo^'acrlcan rt^Xatlons* Tvaran "^ ingh oonsldered ^ e 
^cierican decision partlcuarly regrettable at this junotare^ 
'^wh«rA vt» weTto beginning to Sbi some ^ope of noiaallslng relation 
137 
with r'aklstan,*' 
^hat caused India mott> vorry vas the conspicuous atisence 
this time of any American aesur nee that the arms would not be 
used a(;r,innt Indl^. '^ o 3t v3s feared that t^e supplies ml^t 
have j«un offered ay the U,"..^ * vlth the fu l l knovled^e and 
belief that these would be used against India In offensive 
action and not in s«lf«»defenee, conti«ry to the previous s t l . 
pulatlo'^ when U.r,^. originally agreed to give massive arms 
aid t> P'aklBtsn, 
^Insily, t^ti argument advanced ly recrt*tary of '"tate, 
' i l l lar rj3t;ersjthat t*^ c move w s^ meant o vean Paklrtan sway 
from China ani that U was only a "one«shot affslr** d!^ n^t 
1^« liima&t ^tober 20f 1970* 
1^ 7* Nritlnnai A^rttiAf 'roveaber -^Oy 1970. 
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find favour vlth India, partlcul rXy bucause th« AsMrl«an side 
httd n^t eared to stake t^ (» assurs^noe puttlle and ther« VA« no 
^araat«« that th«r« vouXd not b« oth«r on«»8hot affairs In 
the future* 
In addition to a l l th i i | in the ladically changed olr. 
ouaatancea of i^^kist n*8 alliance vith Chlnai reinforced fay 
th<i receipt of military auppliea and financial aid frofi the 
latter, l-^ ow could th«* Jovernient,people of India agree with 
the contention th<it streni:;thM)ing Pakistan i«uld Help in (Mn. 
talnlng CVIna vho haa never concealed her aggreasiire Inten. 
tlone? If there vaa any justification In the past to sro 
Pakistan ae a Cf,*^ XO or '*^ *T') al ly th^t ground no longer exlstc 
as t>aklstfin could no longer b€ expected to fight ->n the side 
of U»r.A, against China, Pakistan had declared une'^ulvocably 
that > er only enemy is India. ven If the U.r,administration 
had tl^ ought of azning Pakistan vlth -a view to aaklng v^ er less 
dependent on the chlnesye^to vhos It had turned for axas suppl; 
when /laerican nilltary assistance iias cut o f f , i t could not be 
regarded as realistic^ for t^akistan had esta&lis^ed close col l 
Doratlon vlth china at a tiae when 'aeriean military aid vas 
pouring in huge quantities* 2o expect contrary results nov vou 
be nalv«i, especially In vi<;V of coresident ^yub*s repeated Stat 
mentf t;at nothing vouid impair P'^ a^rjA^ N»s friendship vlth Chi 
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^or vas an^ further anus supply by U«r,/v, going to stop 
his succttssory iah/a Khan, from going o¥«r to China* If 
United rtatss' glottal policy is not to appose ^^istsn at 
t^e cost of India, sb^ ^ should take «orr«ctiv« aiensures 
otVervise India could b« forctd to take suitabls eeasures 
against ^nj fresr accretion of ars«d strsngldi hy Pakistan^ 
(as happened in '^9Tt )m 
C H A P T E R III 
tb« strategic vsilut of th« r«glon and th« tiidiBlG 
oecurr«iic« of crises tK«re| as ra^rds both th« g2x»bsl ssttiag 
and local j^hysloal chua^ctaristiOf Is ths rssult of that 
drtaialBlng forea vhlch ^upolaon onoa daserlbad as "tha aothsr 
of polltlos% l«a« gao^ ri^ phjr* k eursory glanoa at tha w»rld 
aap shovs that "the Kiddla ::a8t oeeuplas tha position of a 
partial barrUr across t^a llnas of pasaaga bar natar batvaan 
tha oountrlas vashsd bt/ the ' t l snt ic and Its long Madlttarranaan 
axtanslon and thosa dap«»ndant for trada and oonaunloatlons on 
tlia Indlfn Ocaan • l*a*t in both gaographlcal and cultural 
tams, batwaan t^a ^ast ond ?arthar East*** Thust to a isrga 
«xtant tha countrlas of t^a Hlddla Fast axaroisa control ovar 
tradai transportation and coBMiimleatlons in tiaas of paaea as 
vai l as war* NaturaU/i thsraforsy th« polit ical orientstion 
of th« paopla of tha Mlddla Fast is a nattar of utaost eoncam 
to th« powers vhlch sack to establish vorld hegaaony* 
Sesidas being the aeetlng place of tbree continents 
an(I 1/ing at^vart v i tal land| sea and air oo»«ttnicatlonsy the 
loportanoe of the Middle Fast has increased because of i t s 
possession of aoout aore than half (nearly ^Qf) of the vorld* s 
1. Halford UOosklnsy P}* Mindi^ saet i Problea Area in ^r ld 
Polit ics, (Nev ^xk t The Macallian Co., 1966), p,3« 
kfi^vn o i l r*Evrv€S, Tn an a^e v'^^n ;>etr'3leum H^s boc-jse f^  c 
^c^y i i f c - l l n t , t>'" c-vUlz'^tloniB, thfcjt, Is rtaStei' once rn tsnr' 
vlL»lJL^ Ir^ovt^nt oil rys-JUixics 'r\ t^  t "adUe ' s t . 
)il s t i l l fonas t^  ts ni-jst s t r a t eg i c rav tnaterisi f-^r t'^c 
a,L3~i ojr.« : v£ a.>; iwSJife;"!^ «v: t! ^^  deT-na f'jr i'^^iuld fur l j indetd, 
t' fe . i't3alu'n or -ili t run^^oi t is ' 1^  u r md anetlWr V-.n t e 
3".ips« itiQ^ t: t. uorai^  i t s t i f c innot f ly , I t ''^s to De can-ltti 
%') I t t ^ujectiVc uy plane :>r r a l s r l l t vMc'; uses ol l» 
•:.iu^ I j iv ' aud cfflj>':aslz€U tJ'e laportnnce of o i l to 
/ixslaittfit rjiiiiBlSn 0»looseveit , whtn t* «/ t'^tt in ''945 during 
* ox*id " ^r n an «n ''n^rici'n va*» ' ip in t^c *uez Cans,!, In t ' x s e 
v^i-ap ; " -.otiVer cont ro ls t" t-, ^ t U l unt'ippf-l o i l ^ '^Ids •>'' t'^e 
*'1J^lfi I 'Jst *;.41I f'ive povei to m'^ r^  pt'icfc or v-or.'" ' ^erJc in 
ijeolo-.'lc-: ' "ve dffescrllocd t^e '-il-^ile Tis t ^r "t" e cenrez- tir.d 
t ' c '-€^rt 0^ f-t: ' n t e r n s l o i l production*'} •'t^c world 's / r t ' t e s l 
r tservi .e of o U , v:-st tJeyoid iau^lnat lon, ^Ith u n p a r i l l c l e i 
:iuun''jnct-*'J f 'n "p'Oteiitia.t D'i;t,t,st 'levelopnt^nt of n ' i tur- l r^sou-
rctr; t.ver undcrt^ktn. u^  'ra-.ric-in fnvectnentss*', Inciupla f'^ e 
V'iSt nttvoik 0'- j^lpt i^nts from *r^& l - n : s to V^a ' '« i l t icr i ' jne ' in. 
i.oi'ix X Cornell wrJvorslty stress, 19t>£;;,p."'9, 
«^ * |vi,fi-t ^« "^b* 
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Th« o i l agfs h%B e^nverttd the H5d(51e Tait Into that 
inter.eontin^tnl and Interocerinle eontr« of '^ Ir conmtfaleationc 
vit'out \^lc>' no round-t^e-vorld and *all«ve'tVcr aJr route Is 
ptjBslble. T^ut| In addition t^ i^nd and sea pover th« Intro-
duction of i^lr povttr his i;reatly Increaafr. t^€ geottrate|io 
unlnu«mc6L of the Middle lae t | as 'i nev eentre nov covered 
vltb air I>at«i8« mfcvlo'.n and ivltlth,around ^ e ^ditterrane'^n 
from tir.Q tiantlc to the Indian iceaiu 
It Ss true tr"^ t the ruez Canal t^ ate has no enuaXt and 
in t^e vlev of many 8tr&tegittt| can -^ave no counterpart in 
arrani^esents for thu defence of t^e free vorld. The bese %iould 
iose much of lt£ &i)^ nlf tcance &» t'.e vorXd's aiK>st h l^Iy 
developed militur/ position «jt if It ooaes under the control 
of 3 minor i>over a«if Iclent in nodern ai l l tary fclenee* rurther, 
the adjoining amrltlne canal i s s t i l l useful, even In a.'&tters 
of defence. T» rough the ''ues C n^l i^cset a good psrt o^ the 
petroleum lo necesssry to t^  e nll ltary and Industrl'il ©staijlish-
!&«nt8 of the ^''hl'J nations and supplies and e^ u^ipment rtsqulred 
mt only for the Canal Tone base but also for ' ast Africa, 
*'ersian Gulf area, In parts of ^out^  *sia, and In t^e antipodean 
CoauBonveaiths* wnce, the probliffi of control of t^e Suez Canal 
involves % a security interests of the trntire fr^t world* 
4, '^alford L« .'osKinf, np-cit . , p, 77« 
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The 4;«o«trateglc concept of the '^Id.lt Tagt va» «jc« 
i^ r«ii£«d bt/ botJi .«tcr f"!* 'ire-^t ttnd "apoleon, In aiaost s la l la r 
tortast V^e" t* «y pr3cialmod that vhoigVT contiwla Conatantinopli 
tThe Mlddl« r&sty can rulu the warid» .resld«nt " Isenhover 
of th« United ' tate» contrluutfed to th is eA^^andlng geostratagy 
Oy pointing out t* nt If Uiu -tedltt«pr«nesn should be closed 
to f^e United ^tutes , t^a i-^tter vould 0€ closer to var, re-
vlousiyf t'^o t , ^ , CovdrneB^nt had hinted that the IrHepcndence 
o*" the Midaie fast nations vap essential to ^aerican security* 
^y 1940 t^e centre o^ the "Id ' brld had become in th.fe vords 
of Franklin J^.-kjosteveit, "tYa "^-MV 'o r id Contra of grtJvlty*' 
bec^-usa the Medltterran^an as a bridge between t^  e t l ' intio 
and thte .^idlfic, beciiffl© for the United r t a t e s almost as indls-
j^ens^Die &s t' i: /anamn Csnal and the Cstriouean 'ea« 
b 
l U ::rltl8h geoftratcglst , '^Ir slford 'iCklnder, 
explained the Importance of th is llrflt in the folloving v^rdsj 
"If t ' e 'or ld-Islsnd be J'^ovltably the principal seat 
of huaanlty on this Ulobeg and If ' rablai as the passage imd 
fpoia uro^e to f^ i^  IndleSi and from the *'arthcrn to the '"outherri 
l*aartiand, £><> centr:>l In the 'orld-Island, t' en the »^ill c i taiel 
of Jerusalem has s s t ra tegical positio'i with reference to vorld-
re-iiitltes n-yt diff(bring ^issentiriiiy from I t s Ideal position in 
b« '^ir ^'alf^rd ^idtinder^ nfitancratie Ideals «t and Reality, {•Tev 3^ork, 1942;, p» 89. 
» %B5 
%h9 pmTBp9e%U9 or tha I'liliSI* i ges, cr I ts strat«gl«al iXMltiOTi 
oGty«Qii anoient i^ v^ bylon i^ M r;e^pt*** 
This aooounts for Uia graat pw^r rlvlaiTr la t!ti% c*r«a 
2u d inU)r«at la tha hr^X)<'»lnrml oojiTllet* Jn u norld dlvido^i 
Isito t^o wt^rrlng cararSf tlio r^jl itlv®ly w«isk nationi d th« 
-liddle i'.ast oc3«Fy - r^ -QW l^lcirXy r.tr;-..t#gla anft «^05«rt position* 
t.oth po'/er allijosant^ • ra vyiiig w i^tb each ntfmt In b^li^ able 
to win £Ti&\ dshlp of aid dstulilsh control ovor tho rr.b states 
ZTA tlwjs onimro the '^roiieotlon or rei?v»lar floir of olX ^^nd f?e« 
-.^ssage of the liuea •^ -••n i^ ^*ic^. :^ .s the ahortfsiit rotate to laaieu 
-fse polarlai-tlon of th© j^ol^al c'-^r.illat aj.d the proKlisSty of 
th© Joviet UKIO t '4i.lch *IU1L? tha north| to the wrei of conlllct 
hc^ ole&rly leat {jj^sater wgonoy to the ptohXas* iathovti^ the 
pr39er.t otraggl® h&s ideological o^erwt«^teS| I t remains baaiealiy 
the ccKiA'llct of n«tlo:wl Intarasts cjf the great powers. The 
QlLSh of 5ot@rests of the world pwiers vihether ollf eoBBnmloatloe 
or world hagemongf ag^^r^vates the local eoafllcts &ridl tension* 
dhe ^allonge of krcA natior^^Lii^ im4. AralMlisrael eoni'liety con* 
vorsely^ Intensify the aonfliet ceong the big pmrers* 
^i;rUie]>| Isruelf tl^ e ohlLd oH l8i],erlt4.iBt stn^tecyt ^^ s^ 
irj.|acte<3 tiie explCKive f^ -ct-j-r iW raclU. a. ta^^rilsa totiv-oen th© 
^'.mbs i^iid tlia jews. *iie sesain^y irrecooclllable eomllet 
lot^ i©«r isr£*ei iiiid hoi' .^tJt .ioi^liLours liii'lwoac^s: arid '^hatTem 
tli*a big pov^ er rivalry In the area* 
• 1B4 •» 
'Xhuji9 w« s«e that the geostfategio iini«ju«n9se of thd 
:middle ^M.ct rostc on twin plllt-ys •— world ccEinmnleatlons 
and o i l , "together, s t rategic posltifin k awi petrolai© reawr-cas 
si«k« or th© MddXe '.wt « . urea %^05« attitoidea uuti oi:^logk 
n^ v I X . « r c l » . * , e l B l „ l . . . l t : .«» or. t h . « ,u i , . , things 
to caaa**^ 
The <^ ral>8 look at isruel iM a st-^te earved out ot the 
rab lundf on outpost oi' dstexn jtjsperiallm tnd forood upon 
ua timdXling poor la tJiPoui^ t*j« #f^ort8 of not only Jetfs Init 
oiren Qreat Britain bnd tha united t^tes* Hanoe the Atuh-
IsraeXi eo;j,'ilet \s J.< politioo-econoBie struggle between 
^ o n t s t s who Wi.rt to eolonise J# ?s TroR *4ll w e r the world 
und the ..rate inhabitants wno Wv.ot to l ive in peuee arid dignity 
Q d cunnot reconcile thar-coives to being seduced to the st;-tus 
oi* secosd class s i t i sens ii^ thei r native lai^d* 
.lthw:gh the original l<lai. v;*? thht cX a •^itloncil hoao'*, 
IX reruge in ralest ina far Jewo tbr«&ten«d with •persewtlon e lse-
w!ior3» 5t was ^HaediutaXy tra^^isfosTied Into the tot&Lly dlfrorent 
2doi; oi' i MJonlst st ' . t0 3n rjiXectina^ Anem th i s s t . t e was 
lni;o::ed wlthoi^t eo:^'tat,.t2.;n '^^ r Va@ ©xlntine ro'iil .tion or tho 
lUidj I t Xoet till truee o^  1.5aitHHCiy« -s *-?« ; or^ar t oints ©"^ ti 
C» auX.'orc? L.»Kouiciiis, t^^^glt., ;„, j># 
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•*i.1^ ! d e s t i n e r-rotlo?: i,r^7\r w t or th© simple fi*ct thot ^<i<mim 
QmU not dovaloT ,'.: f^  ertc^Ulsh a ' lonlst stfct^j wlth^^'t infrlngl: 
7 
ilia r3 gilts of tha i aostlnluns|.** :s^ « rU.estlnie^r, Arcibs, th©ro« 
^j^i'^i vs.-o i'iced -^dtl-i tha choie© o!ther to €©lgrate Svm thsl i 
*ix:9lv5na 0? Eulimlfc to iJli^n nil«» lh»T9 Wios oo othar vay open 
t o thaDt oxe«pt to m rd&l3t| c^ uci wh^n thty rftslsted they round 
^i9!2is«iv#s In cor-i l lct | not wish u r^w s«ttl®/St but *flth th« 
^ r i t l ah al^^ht wd i£.t«r th« j.ovor oi t2i« wr.lt©d ^tut«8* 
Ahe dlijpls^car^ent * the . iantInter, ..rats fervor th« 
ij'iugraphlcJL objactlvar o-' ^icr.lSR; :.nd the consistent I s r i ^ l l 
rel^iiJvJ. to coc|.i,.' with t:.ok;11i of tl^ ^^  yorld ccmsunlty nf nutlo s 
€j.:,.-r©su@t^ . In the T'nltafl i,atir>ns i-ocol^^tion of ' eeeeber 1 1 | ITAr, 
'^ olfcdr'tttifd every yaar cluoo, alloiflng tho lalsstlttlanB c fre« 
f^ IiOice batne^n y^ r^ t r lu t lon and oosfensatlon, ir. the root c^tiso 
r^C thQ ialeattnf.4i r-rolfleBi* Is rae l i s h«Sld that their ral^usi-l 
to ne^rolt a«oh frsodcxB oT «holce Is just i f ied bacjairo to icogido 
to tholrleht »*«3«1<1 i>30p>rdla<s the t^ -^ -^nh oh ,j ' c ter :£ tS%'5 
^-srooll 5!tatci» The rJhs^ on tho other htmil, iriSi-t t'.^.t tJ-JO 
r''>^3 ^iyr ono aUl lon nrwfiees ( tha i r aaribar h»n Inc"'-*-sot- 51n: 
Uie 1?^ 67 war) bo gl/an a rro:; dtioice t o return to tlQl- htrios 
in , ^ .lestlne or receive carsr.onsatlO' Tor tl.<&iT lossses. br-a ^ 
s ra ln oiT '->olitles 5r idse lr7ol*/??a in .r .b i^ttltr.aen, Jnc© 
•lonlss am l£raei,(i^«ilrut i ;he Institi:t® c U3"'tl!.© 
.^tidies? i r7P) , p«4« 
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i ravlcles? >^a ar.'aotlv© propogiiwlc* t^apcm ugi<inst Israel* alsof 
hc^vlnc so lorsg daaosdod th© rdtism Qf rerUi^ods to iu lds t lmi 
no .ir.-fc isovonaaerst eoiild ^^utlonaUy dllseuss us^ othor GoListla 
or. '^ ich :sra3l i3 cff? thij ..r«in 5'r' not i.gr9®» T'-^ o ''* fcrj a^n-.n-l 
t 'mt ' s r so l Rl-?© vp cl i l.i:-kdr. *:< ssr.cosr. of 'li« te r r i to ry a^ n'^ rngt^ . 
t o th© -T0',-rlnh rtc.t9 by tha rnftad *'atl€»is, faptftlon l-4i of 
IC>47» 'Jht^ axoacs^ .*t«ist 30^ of t^ >a pr^-isant t^rrlto^^y ^r ' n r ' ^ l 
( t 3 "Jhlcdi nec^  ac>jp3lsltionr !i-vo bd^r. -rjad^ s throw^ tho wars of 
1966 and IPC?) vuo •«7or» dr-'lng tlio i^;:.r oT ial©st4rs.>. Trrci'jl 
fu3l\j,^ ^3 to ce^Q tti£i53 liit^^a on th© groundc ti;at t!^y v.3r,-3 von 
i:; ;- yt,r I I -..l-ildb 'sraal VL.O th«3 v lc t l c >i.a !»ot t^s . rn'tssjo"-, 
-T:t tMo tlo^: : ot C-Vtj !'^".^l ant l-^gi"! clDla to «. « torr l tor lec 
vsll&satod to th^ r'Hsroted '.rL!: r.t.-Ato 'jhloh I t n^lsocl In ®TC«r.r 
or tho ;»radn oT tr.s rK.rtltlor. r33al"itlon# 
oooclri!od by -ivol in i r^r with t-o *OUJ' riUtJLcy ri '^: riX 
s ta tas did :»u:: r-sconi i^a tiic it•.l^t;ioo lis«t? ..r, 'or .r t i t"tIre X 
atl .nl^t© Ui^l tao .-^•olrlleo lii^slt^ra dtlo^i.^taa u:!tf.crt •^'•0» 
jiidio© to tiia rltl'::iit0 SQttXo.-isnt 'C the i&leBtim t#^«-tion» 
.ionooi I s rua l ' s obstir.«cy it; r<3tulnii-;g th« taTHtorl^f: •r'^ leh it 
^ 
- 1S7 
li-.® occ«] led iintil th-s/ATut tfttas rnrraotter to i tn t ews «— 
ii3Cdt'tu»o o* vLut Isrf-.al ^onsicart; to be •soenre ard rooognl^Ad 
tenindiiiles*, l«a«,tcio i-niiBs^tioei of 4*ddltl(K;s»l ri.b territory^ 
or.dlf.g oi* b-^ilisoramyt th© right -^ f nevlgwticm In • ?.nt®irfi«tior,ul 
yritorvays', yiiich ^ctv^^^lly 11^ '-n T-..t- torri-or:!..! w..w©sst ur^ d 
t! 3 'jor.iJlusior^ u^  p«»v».oa ^uaty •««• <hov ML.t i t is * ot re4JLl:^tl 
to dxpQct laruei to i^»-*.doii ihs i©arito?l«s wlilch th«y tisorptd 
ir* 1D48 QV a- U ^ ii* li'C7« Is. i'i*st| Xsrwsl i s <* a i l i t 6 r , t | 
vi^i^i^tssly^ uTid 9xpu:.i^iui.l-t stuMd with Cko a«4liiit« 4'roQti<ftrS| 
u^  Ich uid to be detersiixietl i'ir«U.i^ iy UMI oolonising oi' the 
ve. s utid i t s a l i i t u r y bissug^h* 
• rJciS 'v.d I To&li', il .^ •* ;„ ?i on t :o '-. tt«r "l"" nfgotla-
coiui ict iy (-^"-ict JS>,, >iri-i.lcg-i5 lol.'OGfi t?-'^  j-.^-tlc-., r ore 30 
^uQi thj irC7 w^r, u'iij ' >' ' a .^ .:, : .i^nie .:> nr.5''-t tii: t, *iia;r 
Jha /.rats know t>i..t '^-at '*~'M!*1 h-.r In miAd 'wlj^ n i t •^ r'"'-^ '^  of 
QjjQQ and nagotlatloi.s Ir., r i r s t , !ui» f"'iOOr:;nitlon :vi o otata 
by tha f.Pf»bSf and seoondi ..rab ce^ftaro* ojf I t s iimi*T .^itiORS 
<^ id torritOTlal ooDsjOeata* 
-.iiU-i ;.lii?ao cstr,t^ ^<sIo . t..A:: i a tIi-3 u-.;* oi' :x>. c-5 'r.'^ t'jf^ an 
.arfiusl «ad tlxs .r^ fc J t - tao j I j . wd*3 -a^'i'y**%Um c ' . I:.nd 
•jhieli Ic :.ot i t s ow» aiwh^a: I', im or Tact^ nft i t s ©^'^"Islon 
m IBB • 
oi* tha OTlit^rr.l 5.nh-.Mta!its Trcr '..'-i*- ha:^! 4.d,' uxJ it;; '-..scl^r;. 
!3,^9 to •^ i-ov® tfcar.© Idpsdisentf r i * s t | poao© {:«tv»9K t^ .9 .-ruts 
l3gari i4't«r the ©r^ ! »i* ..orid - v.^ - i l , hits sjnea showr i. st^ SiMSy 
ir»ar@as«. -dv >«t t^oliey T»latl?riS tstwetn t'.io United t£t«s u:4 
t JO J4dlo -i^atern ^oiwirirassrts -T'S . cewrarfetlV'^ Xy ?«c0nt davo* 
iofoant s jt c. .'$uult oi' f.iiil'U. ycstt'nclrm^rt oif £!r3tla^i wai .r«8neh 
r.i»^ iiaufc0 o^'Ai ecl&Ll&l if-lQf-^r.tsi, cna rroR tha f"->oagi3titJ€m af 
o 
.i.ny t a r r i t o i i a s a:: ii*a0»,>; .ttx i.^^-A'^ns* -aia polioy :i/oiv«d 
ir^ipoti Oi All k^y, uL'^ sr, t to u L rA i'jjl* uthljj u i rjjt cit 
mil i tary w.iilwtc®x», ..t:^- *,- '.... *1;.H .-i^ ivyci LOX tltx.'n *^. ih® 
•joi^'iiett? fif'twrlSnt' t i a ..'u«u0 . :,. ;,«tj©e, ts jool ' . l ly .^ .i-X* 
v.. J aiXituiy d«»v«iojiaoBv Oi tii^ rou • SQT a ioi t: 15*^ 41 thcs 
,tc,ti9 iv«iai <-.3«£4t cotife4d«si9«i tl^ -j d€uid ;Lat. -^ & r.tli^h ithsro 
C4' :r*i"i'-anc« <* 4 loiiac* Ofi i^j.tii^h ^'oliovisiii .^  ooXioy wi ii which 
t?^te, i&6. ) , p«xU -«e, ac^ tYy .^ •Hc*r&v.d, ^h& ^avelomant of 
%'&P<^rtnQnt at' . tulQ ^-"llic. Hon 444€'| ;.«ii«.r and ''16(10 .&{?t 
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th«y gentraiXjr agreed, ^^el^ actitrity %fai confined ai«rvly 
to (;h« I'aXettlas letu*, vhleh r«fltct«d tt^ te influane* of 
^ev jLoxk*e two aiXllon J«wS| and a s^p&th^tie vl«v of private 
mltslon&ry &nd cuituiriil «>nt«r|)ris«B, %ttb t},« lapse of Brltlf^ 
paraoountoy in th« Middle East, the United "^tstes vas dravn 
Into shouldering responsibilities vMoh It had hitherto 
9 
avoided* 
'Bierlea*s Involvenent in the post»var Middle East vas 
Influenced by considerations siBlIar to those t^at had so 
deeply In&ensed i t in the struggle over "^outheaet ^sia, '^ere 
also the basic concern of 'aerican policy Is to prosiote pc^oe* 
ful developBient of the nevly indapeadent nations to keep in 
check t* e forces hostile to both local and aerican Interests* 
The problens of the preservation ot the state of Israel and 
t'e continuous flov of o i l sade United tates keenly avare i f 
the inherant dangers in the region. She U.^.n.E. oaae to be 
idtfitifled as the principal threat and rival in the Middle 
wast Because of the expansionist saibltlons aanifested by i t 
10 
during the t tt^lln eJ^ a and suosenuently* 
Ihus, t^e roots-of aerican policy He in the dttemU 
nation of the United rtates to deny the Middle cast to the 
9. K.C«>^vat, fl^ ddlft 2 i^iti i'irigtfitSlftt (London i 31andford 
Press, 19bB), p«4S« 
10. .dchard ^.rtebbins, flie United rtat«« in t^rld t.ff^^Tf 
3SkZt (^av jLotk t PuuHshed for the Council on ^'>reign 
Relations i3^  rliaon and 1 Schfester, 16<»8), p*79« 
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CooBunisU. Aooordlog to Jack winsoour* "There can b« m 
question but ihat the u l t laate Anerlcan ala le ta uilXd up 
positions of strength In the Middle l a s t against the threat 
of fov ie t external aggression or Internal suisiverslon,'* 
Henry A,£()rroade, Assistant Secretary of rtate for 
Tear Eastern, fouth Asian, and 'frlcan Affairs, speaking 
before the House Coffliaittee on Forel^ps Affairs explained that 
the primary a la of ^merloan policy ves to aeet** the danger of 
the 1«S8 of the Middle ?ast to ^ovlet Influence and contwl ," 
Further elaborating the theme he salds "Our position, I vould 
say, has besn in the past s i x sonths. Increasingly affected 
by the tensions between the Arab states and Israel . As those 
tensions aount, the j^Tt that the United f^tates played In 
establishing Israel and in aalntalnlng I t , eoaes aore to the 
fore**«««**** 
" ver since I havt^  had this Job, I have wondered when 
iiusela vould take sides in the Arab-Israell problem, and she 
11. Georgians U.Stevens, ed. , Tha Unitad rtataa and the 
Mldfiia Last, (Tjiglevood Cl i f f s , N.J. s PrsnUce TTali,Ino. 
igt»4), p. 118. 
1£. Jack vlnocour, "The United rtates and the Middle Fast", 
The Mutual Security Act Hearings *»964, Middle r.a«t<ifn 
Affairg. Vol.V, Ho. 8-9 , Aut^ust-repteaber "^954, p.261. 
13. Quoted I n l i z i d . , p. 2o2. 
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^a» nav cieariy dorm th&t, sh© has vetoed twice, vlthln the 
1301 Bix. aanthsi resolutions in th& r^^curity Council on tliis 
siatC«r« My /raD friends fi.i«sl that Tovi^t loassla's s ia Is 
ta t r / to btt fr lwidl/ to thea." 
'*s a corollary to th is ^»terlc&n concern for t^« contain. 
sent of oolwntmisin In ^ cist Asia is i t s Interest In the ^rsser. 
vatlon and sainten^inc* ->f tihse glt>l:3l structure of peacs in th*3 
14 
£^ r«ia* For t e pr«s%nt re la t ive qul«t osny st^rvs /asrlcan 
lnttrtt.sts fc«tt«r than instai i l i l ty rjid tension In the region, 
*.1:#refor«, "^'merlcan Interest lltes In defusing the "rata*. 
Isra^ell titst boab, n^t in supporting Israel under every e i r . 
ouast-noe* H means that sier^cmn coaaltments &re secondary 
to v i U l in teres ts and thus cannot be slloved to dictate 
16 
*!aerlcsn policy tot^rd t*~e ^rab vorld,** 
the United ^ t t t e s , as a action vl th global Interests 
requires an effective presence In th is s t rategic area to count 
fovlet Influence SLtid lessen the chances of aaJor»pover confllc 
ihus, t^e bitternese of the 'raia. Is rael i conflict and the 
14« Tee Pi-.iiichaid U^3K>a, ** Internation&i ^^sitlon of the 
United r t a tes ' . Txtferpts froa President Wlxon*8 Beport 
to the i*«r. Congress on February £6, 1971, Faiilgn ^ffaln 
HMSaA Vbl.J>, % . 5 , May 1071, p. 102. 
Ibf John r«Jadeau, apxaiX XIIM, ABirtfiHB 'ilBiaftfih to t^ iC fQJi jQSMt (^«v ^ i>i*k t Harper 4 Ftov, l&»B)f pp« S5|£&« 
!«»• Georgti LencEovski. r a i liiiMXa ^ a t iR tefltl, / f f a l r i t (Nev JCork t Cornell University ^ress, i9&£>t P* ^ ^ * 
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subte<',u«nt r^ c^tii in 'inaamtnts esnnat tn& vl«v«d saptrattly 
fpoa thb gent-jra protd«« of Wfeion&i security In the Middle 
rast and the overall iwsltion of I»rfi«l In relation to the 
Jsajor povers, T*^ e Unlt«d *"tat«e ha* »oug^t to achieve this 
objective In four prlnelp»l waysj Xk F lrst l / , by const'mtly 
ss^lng to prevent outright bost l l l t i«S | especially t**rough 
thii instrunent of United ^stlonsy secondly maintaining fr«€ 
and aut^ally advuntag«M>u8 relations vltb i l l countries in t^e 
ar«&| tMrdly i^ slovlng the ar»» rac«i i^ nd last ly by s«(Aing 
17 
a final and staul^ {j«3ice« 
'notht&r oean; of securing 'ssrieaa Intsreftn In the 
Middle raftt Is Itai In teras of "nllitary pactS| arms atrsements 
IB 
•j>ttd avivnnce bases." Adequate defence of the "rab vorid In 
t^ b context of tii^ ; 8«£curity of the free v!>rld Is as uuch <^n 
19 
''ner^can inter«^8t as an International Interest* 
T^ .« prl-^ary und direct interests of thfe Urltd ''tates, 
t^ xjugl" fev, are mostly related wlt>: the strategic location 
17. *"%]•:% ynttBl '"tataa indtMa /labeihgyaiia PUaBto"! ^^ddress 
niade before tl^ e ^mnal Heetlng of the Amerlcanff ^ead^y 
of Political and '"oclal Tcl^nce at rhUcdelp'^lfti on ^prll 
'^'» iLJIjL^ M V«»i* ^'» ^o^l^dS, May 6, 1909, pp. 391-9S, 
^B0 Vi% tllrtrtlt r.&flt and, ntetr.flfn .ittWBlf ^-port o'' ^emitor 
;ubert •Huaphery on a study Mission, July 1, 1967, 66t^ 
Coni!.res8,Ist f'dsslon,(Washington t Unlt<^ d rtates Govern. 
ment i^rlntirig )fric©, "'Db/j, p* !• 
19* John S*3a,2aau, a*uiJuto*t P« 16« 
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vhlch th« !^lddl€ I s s t occupies !n r«Iati9n t^ ) global t teur l ty 
and Inttrnatlonai ord«r# X' *8« countries 11« at the cross. 
tohdB wjtv««n ruxt),.e» 'sls< and '^rlca and control f a a^-irttet 
route farom ^urop« to & i;s8t '»la and tJ^* F'lr l a s t , ^he/ H e 
i t t-e nastepn flank of the *rTa countries to th« south of 
jiusrln from vtilc^ t>8y a r t st^arated on the »%rt only by the 
ws'Jk and unsUbie Iranian buffers, Xh« demonstrable weakness 
of f-ese gountrlfcS adde to the deteraination of th« Big .'overs 
to prevent f^elr fal l ing under t^t control of t^e ot^ier. 
Xbtts acosss to t^ t^t land*>£e3i*air routes under reasonable 
conditions, fret* passage throutjb the "ues Canal anJ rlgbt o" 
•f 
overilfeht fora a basic 'aerlc-n interest and any threat or 
danger to I t will piNoduce u strong response* 
ngtsroinlng the various t;hread« of United '^taten policy 
Is t^e interi^tft in th^ middle nast as i mures of ^m world 
o i l . I t i s the uval l lb lHty of o i l , and not eonciiSsSonary 
^rrangeffl<;;nt8,which interes t the United ' t a t e s , Beneath t^e 
desert sands of thk Mlddls Jast l i s spproxi^te ly 300 bil l ion 
barrels of petroleum,a yout thrst»fourtbs of the non-Comnunlst 
:c:l« *'adav "-afran, I^ fe tinUid ' %^tM »nd Iicaalf (Caeorldfet 
"arvsrd dnlverslty PTWB^ 1963), p. 28e# 
2£« Georfciana G«"t<biVttnS| ftp.cit.^ p« 11&. 
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vofid*8 proVdc! r«ia«rv«8. nally output of tbe v«ll8 totals 
sore Vr'iTi 9 aUHon barrels, vuittr Lwy an o i l (^nguxt^nt, 
has s:ild that the compl<it« loss of t^ils o i l could not 09 aads 
u^ oy any combination vlthin ^ dsead* at &11* ^ b.8t«ni lurops 
Imports &|^ QOfOCC barrels of Arab o i l •uo^ day, ob^ of Its 
r«jquJr»»«ntB and Japan ty200t0Q0 (t»0.^ ;» If Huftflans arc sbls 
to g«t control ovtir 'rab countrl^Sy th^y could blackaail bo^, 
vest«ro ;urop« and Japan by holding out tl& threat of stopping 
o i l so as to crippls th«lr eoonoal^s* Xhe importance of ilt 
o i l CM! Bt. gauged from tJ e fact l^at vhcn Sn )ctober and 
November 1973 th« siain r&b o i l axporting countries took 
concerted action to reduce supplies of o i l to Furope and Japan 
and to withhold supplies entirely from the United "tates and 
the ^Netherlands, because of the support given by the tvo 
latter countri«!8 to Israel in the Middle Tast coi^fllct, "ttie 
spine chilling experience of th% : uropeaa countries, Tupan 
and of tht, developing countries in thti vake of the o i l crisis 
created numerous forebodings about an impending catastrophe* 
Ih«4 sy spectre of an internatlon&l recession on loans loosed 
largt. and the leadering economists predicted a rero or nega. 
tive rat€ of i^ *ovth In the currtfit ytar* 
rhortfall In o i l imports affected about ''0*' of 'merles*8 
o i l supplies, auout ao'f of Vest^rn turop«*s and practically 
2d« Fi^ytuif (;iaga£in«), r'«pteaibax',1970« 
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a l l of Ja|»an*«* vsatbin^ton vat m oo«paXl«d to raftirt to 
urgant stiasuraa In otdmv to ov«r«osa th« o i l shortage* / 
ragla« of fttrlet aeonoay on liquid fual vaa Intioduetd in 
th« oountry. In N v^aMbar, tha *'«nata appin^ vad a bi l l er^nU 
ing th« Pratidant vida povara in ragulating th« «narg]r supply. 
Th« ihita Lousa pxohibitad ^ a tjranaftfj* of Induttrial «ntar. 
priaae froa coal to fual o i l and daclarad a reduction la 
the voluaa ^f fual allottad for tha naeda of c iv i l rir linaa. 
'^Coording to ur praas in raaant laonths 200f00C voxliani loat 
their Jobs in lutonible Industry alona* 
Tha fuel abortaga Kit bard on the eoonoaiy of ^rancet 
Britain and other rrc aa^nbara. o i l prices rose svlftly 
thxoughout ti%stem liiuropa* M^id gavtmsent contanl over the 
production and sale of o i l has been Introduced in ^Tolland, 
BalgiuB and l;axaabarg« Tha speed of aotor transport hua been 
strict ly lisiitad* Britain and the r^deral liepublio of Gemany 
aa a result of the acute short'^ge of fa fual« cut the nunber 
of fl ights by c iv i l planes and tv^elr 9pe<*d of Trans-'^tlantlc 
routee vas lovercd* 
In Japan, frtHs lioveaibar 1973| ev«i th4i aohedula of 
TV prograoQ^ and tii® nuaber of shavrs In cineoa t' eatres vera 
reduced* f^tioning of electric pover and paraffin i i l for 
household needs vaa introduced and the supply of o i l products 
• 196 • 
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to Industrial tnterprlses curtailed* 
Another aspect of /^aerican policy which could b« consi* 
dsr«d an Aaerlesn interest Is th^ - flrn and consistent support 
of Israel* Aaerlca had playsd an active role in the creation 
of Israel* The Idea of si Jevlsb ^futlonal none, as propoun^ tad 
hjf the Balfour Declaration of 1917| enjoyed n general synpathy 
in t^ ie United Ctates and v&s quickly tfidorsed oy President 
Vilson* In 1944 and 194t>9 th^ support for the est&bllshaient of 
s Zionist Ctate: In Palestine fortaed p!*rt of the election 
campaign of both the polit ical parties for reasons of winning 
the Jewish vote In d^Bestlo politics* In 1946 and again In 
194S President TrtUBan appealed to Prlae Minister Attlee for 
the lamedlate admission Into Palestine of lOOfOOO Jewish 
refugees^ without however assuming any responsibility for per. 
suadlng the ^rabs to agree* In November 1947 the United rtates 
played a najor xole In securing t^c necessary two«thirds re-
cooaendatlon of support In the General Asssnbly for the United 
Nations partition Plans in Palestine^ and was the f irs t among 
the 3ig Powers to recognise the new Jewish ftate* Anerlea 
granted ful l <^ * lura recognition to Tex^el In January '^ 949« 
and appointed a pro«>^ionlst| Or* James GtHcDonaldy as f irs t 
UnitiKl i^tates ambassador in i:el Aviv* 
£4* See JC*hi|in, "The Em r^gy Famine and the U«?*Monopolles**, 
lattgflalilciMt AffaUiy May 1974, i: A.K.Ganguly, **r4iergy 
Crisis I Po^arlng Oil on Troubled ''iters'*, Fnriiii^ Trad a 
£jSltt(, Vol* IX, Wo*1, April.J«ie, 1974* 
- tw • 
f l^noc th« b«ginnlng| Amerlean •eoiii>aie| t*ehnie«I and 
financial support for ler&tX, public and private, has b««n 
iaprusalva, Fr^ 1948 to Juna 19&£| basldat th» high laval 
of dlr«€t private Inv^etBttnt, gov«raM«nt grants and loans 
totalling I 880 Million and private gifts and bond purohasas 
totalling ipproximataly ^ 1 . 6 l»lllion hav9 flovad into that 
floall oo^ntry# Having a population of about tm ni l l ion paoploi 
this reuresertts nearly ^ ijSOO for evary Isrfieli man, vonan 
or child* 
fhit vhole«haart«d 'ii«ricsn backing for tha establish. 
a«nt and growth of Israsl raprasanted ths f i r s t substantial 
polit ical involvontnt of thm United ^tatss in the Arab part 
of tha Middle uast. 1^ « aaln purpose of ^ estam support for 
a sUt«) l iks Israel i s to aa)f« sure H^t the pariodic putsoJh 
and occasional full»sc^le wars oontinusi so as to keep the 
/rao rtates we'^ k| subnissiva and divided and thus to ensure 
guarantaes against losing l&rge o i l interests* an the other 
handf th& continued econoatic prosperity and yrogrm»B of Israely 
tile only desocri^cy in the area, servaa the purpose of presentin 
the Arabs vlti^ a sho«bpiece of the v^stem eoonoaic aid a irads 
hencfci providing an incentive for the -^ rabs to be dravn towards 
26* For Israel Iki United States relations see, George 
Lonosowskl, au*islii*| ?• 409* i>iao Georgiana u.'tevens, 
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th« Vi8t* ?racticaxiy| this Is sought to b« achi^ avsd by 
•nsurlng a steady supply of amamsfits to Isrssl by a muiber of 
^^stsxn oountrlesy W provldlnc «v«ry possibls eoonoale assls . 
tancs and by proootlng soelal and eultoral linics vlth ^•r• 
HsrelQ l i e s the Interest of sucoessiire ^aerloan Govennente 
86 
in extending unwavering support to Israel* 
Ihe Indian attitude to ^ « •'rwb.IsraeAi proolen has bean 
conditioned bssJcaiiy iiy t^ 3« historical attitude of the Indian 
?lationaX Con4^ r«ss tovards the i^alfistlne t>robleai| an attitude 
vhich has prevailed even during the post»3948 yearsy to the 
dctria^nt af t^ ie iFr'iellc ani the af«vanta^e af the /ral>s. The 
r«;iSOlutions adopted at th# annual ffleetings of the Indian 
*'atior»al Congrcsr Indlc-Jte a deofdoflly pro-Ar^b position, and 
at best, skepticism taward Jewish efforts to realize a "^ Tatlona. 
lome'' in ^'alestint^. The resolutions of 1938 and 9^Q9 ^pp^led 
to the Jeve »*nat to seel: tha shelter nf the Hrltish ^nnd'Jtary 
and not to allov thunselves to be exploited in tlie interests 
of British icperialisB**, and wished the Palestinian 'rabs 
27 
**eoaplete success in the attainsent of their objeetlve*" 
£6, ''ec John r'«3adeau. QSUJill*^ P* 26* 'Ito rafar TmaD, "'^ OSM 
LwSBons of the Ije? Iliddle las t '^ar»', ^fm-J'.«l«n and ^TIA 
;'iffairt> V^l, 4, i^o.a, August 1967, pp. 220-21. 
S7« *;«V«Kajkuis:^ , 0P»cit#. pp* 49^ 64«^« 
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In addition, the f««iingS| •aotlons and Idaaa of nany 
Indians, partlfituarl/ ^ataru, about laraal, the 7araali*8 
and tha fxBtm pzovlda baoksiound and undartonu of Indian 
policy* It vsa ^na of ^hni'a baaio f&ltha that India ne^ dad 
cloaar llitka with th« Arab worid ev«n at tha riik of losing 
support fsoa tha pro«Israal oaap. a^ haXd that Irraal vas 
a eraatlon of those %^ ^ s t i l l baliavad In lapariaiisn and 
pursuad tha polioy of dlvldad and xula in ^sla. It vas for 
this raason that at th« Unltad ffatlons in 1947, tha Indian 
dales tlon arguad fl-rst for a fadsral state of Palestine, and 
v^an that plan failed, for raoognitlon of Palestina as an 
independent state, with vide autonoay for Je '^t in areas vhere 
thegr vurtt in the i^jority* In fVoYcnber 1947, India along 
vlth the '*rab states voted against the partition plan for 
Palestine in the General Assenbly* The idea of an independent 
stskte of I. reel never found favour vlth the Indian Go varment, 
^Ich saw Zionlta to be a fora of Vestern lapexlalisffii enjoy-
ing the patronage of the British, naeriea^eto* Indla*s ovn 
experienee of 3rltlsh oolonlallsn and partition further 
strengthened ^ I s oonvletlon* 
But the Indian leaders are real lst le enough to realise 
that Israel la hert^  m to atay and also that giving £ree rein 
to sentlaents towards ^raiss and follov Asians v l U not alvays 
benefit India. Avar^ness of this reality led India t9 grant 
• 800 • 
r«oognitlon to l8i^«l>« out ttila does not cov«r th« vhol« 
g3«ut of India*! r«latlonf w i ^ Isra«X« It la qualified 
and doaisated tv conald««ratlont of Indian Yva.tlonai Intartat* 
Explaining tha Indian poaltlon Krlabna Hanon onca vrotai 
"Xhara aira i)«oi>la In ay country^not aan/.who soaatlaaa aay 
that our poaltlon In this auittar la althar partlaanthlp for 
Arat>a or baoauaa our graat laadara ara friendly to Prealdant 
Naaaer or anything of that kind. But In the poaltlon that 
va take up, In regard to the Mlddla Eaat| In regard to the 
Independence of ''rab terrltorlea,In regard to the juridical 
and polit ical position of the rues Canal, ve are only seeking 
our ovn Interaata* Beeauae If ruet Canal was not optn for 
navigation peacefully l^ the recognition of ^ e aoverelgn 
rlghta of Igypt, It la ira tliat au-ffer, • • • • thla is not merely 
8 aentlisentai app^l. It la a polit ical appeal of mtional 
aelf.lnteveat as aueh." 
3ut often, the pursuit of aajor policy goala leads to 
contradiction with sent le^ta l Inclinations and hl|^ prliwlples 
As ?fuhru frankly adaltted, **thls la thdi price nations pay for 
the preservation of their national Intereats* In the atteapt 
£8* V.K.Krishna Hamxu *'£he Israeli Aggression Against the 
/"jrab Countries", ftftn^Ailan and j^ ftgAfl Afffcinif ^1*IY> 
no«3, August 19&7, p«te7* 
29. Vemer Lavl, "Indian, Israel and the Arat>s**, iSkMXMJOEL 
JiUia$ Vol. ISf I70.4, 'prl l 3S6S, p.}5« 
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to solve these dlleamas In her relations with the Israelis 
and the ^reus, India naturally considers her Interests firsts 
3eyond that the beneficiaries of her policy are at tlaes 
the /'rabs and aometlffleSf ffluch more rarely, the Israelis,** 
First of a l l , Indian strategic interests make i t 
Imperative that we should have a friendly Mldf'le East, The 
Middle Kast Is perhaps of greater Importance to India than 
South east Asia. Iksides having strategic importance, the 
area is vital to India because of Its link vlth Indo.Pakistan 
pol i t ics , as a buffer against Communism and as the main 
supplier of oil* 
Furthexmore, strategy Involves Indians relations vlth 
her neighbour Pakistan* It epitomises India«• desire to prevent 
Pakistan from gaining the sympathy and support of the Muslim 
countries of the Middle Hast on issues such as Kashmir and 
other Indo>?ak tensions* It also seeks to abort the efforts 
of Pakistan in forming and leading a Muslim bloc from vhlch i t 
might gain active support for i t s cause* India is anxious 
to achieve this objective by maintaining friendly relations 
with the Arab states even at the cost of deflection frcw ^er 
foreign policy principles of seeking friendly relations vlth 
a l l nations and regarding each issue on i t s laerits* 
30* See iiichard tr«Kozicki, oo.clt*. p. "^ oS* 
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Another arguatfit advanced In favour of nalntainlag 
frl«n<Sl/ rctl^tions vlth th« ^rab s t s t t s and ngt oatablishlng 
fu l l diplomatic relations vlth Isratl i s t^at the /rabs bave 
a solid block of votes In t^ e^ UK vhich India needs for her 
case on Kai^ uBlr* Ihe/ can act as a st2T>ng pressure group 
and hJiVe the support of other non-Arab Muslim countries. If 
Indivt recognises Israel i t will a^ jan the support of only one 
state as against the l4»stility of about twenty-five 'rub 
states In the U.N. This important fact Hust be borne in alnd 
31 
while considering our relationship with thea* India, being 
a *'not-so-gre»t power^  cannot have friendly relations with 
Israel without jeopardising her own interests.Today» the aiost 
l&portant single factor binding th« Arab states with India 
in bonds of friendship i s our opposition to Israel. 3y 
disassociating herself with Israel India can hope to win over 
at least eoae Arab states to her side in her dispute against 
China (Jordani Lebanon, naudi Arabia, Kuwait, Tunisia, 
Ho2x>coo and Libya; ot persuade thea to reoaln s i lent in the 
case of an Indo-Pak conflict, e.g. U .A,R. , "Mdan and '^yrla. 
Besides, the vooln^ of Israel at this st^ge vrili nalign 
India in th« eyes of t^e Arabs who consider her a leading, 
31. A special Correspon^Jent, •'Tndo-'rab relations J ''earch 
for A Policy", iMQAixmua, Vol.4, ^0.39, May 28, 1966, 
p. t9« 
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friendly, norwalign«d and tecuisr p9v«r« Thug our "Inttrcgt 
Ilea In winning the gupport or the gll«nc« of the neutrality 
32 
of the 'rao gtatea," 
India*g econoMio Intereate In the area algo have 
gtrateglc lapllcationg* India ladcg gufflcien*y In o l l | 
v?iich It ))adly needg for itg Indugtrieg* Ihe reflneriyg 
near Bombay depend fros eouroeg aerogs the 'rabian T^ ea* 
The inportance of Middle i^agtem o i l for India*g indugtria. 
l igation efforte can be gauged fro« the f'ict that iaportg 
froB raudi '*>rabia alone roae froa Rg« £i*7 Bill ion (^ 1t800f00C 
in 1960.^1 to lig* '*i>0 Million (S d1,60C»000} in 1956..^ )• 
Ag regardg trade progpecta. India hag ti«de of a hundred 
34 
crore rupees with the Middle "laat* India hag one of the 
biggegt narketg in the 'vab oountrlea* In 1966 alone India's 
trade vith U«A,R« aaounted to Rg«a6«4 cror9$* vith '^ udan 
t^e trade vag vorth Hg*££ ororea and with Kuwait over Rg«eo 
S6 
ororea* In 1972.73 exports to Iran, Iraq, Saudi 'rabla| b^u 
32« h*K.«^:rivagtava| **Indo«>Iaraali Relatione t Pulig and 
?r«gaureg**, ^^iffatyaaaj Vol* Vlf l9o.16, DeeeBber 9» 
19fe»7, p. 17. 
33. hfcBnyfll anU n a t t l U a i i ^ev Dtlhl, Vol. v. July 1964, 
pp. Se.29 &n4 VoLVIt J'uly 19b6» pi^* 0ci.S7* 
;M, ftatefflent of Foraign Minigter Chagla. ImLJU^t 4th geriag, 
Vol. VII, No.41, July I f 17, 1967, ool. 12073. 
36. K^noraaa Devaa, "lerael • Oagia or Mirage?", MlOMXUtUh 
Vol. IV, Ho. 41, Jtne '^i, 19l»&, p. 14. 
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nhsbiy Kuvalty Mufe«t and Oaan, Qatar and Bahrain alona 
aocountad for Rs« 81 eroraa and i t If axptotad to rlaa to a 
36 
AaxlauB of Bs. 160 ororas in 1974.76. ?4>raovar« MiddXa Esat 
l» aXao a aouxoe of highly naadad Egyptian eotton for tha 
Indian taxtiXa induatry and i^ovldaa an unlialtad fiald of 
aaployaant to Indiana aa th«re la > Xaok of akiiltd labour* 
FinaUyt '*Aa a olota aUy of tha Unltad Arab Rajmbllc 
in tha non->allgnad oafli|>, India*a intaraata in Mlddla naatam 
37 
Affaira hava aivays baan v%r/ pronouncad*** Thia deap 
alignatnt vlth natlonallat Arab stataa vhieh ara ooanlttad 
to aaouiar, aocial and daaocratio idaala haa aarvad vaXl 
Indiana OKB intar^tats and idaala* Ih«ra ify Indaad* no doubt 
that the nationalisation of 1^ « i^ uaa Canal by oi'ar^roving 
ruropaan oontrolt tiia dianantling of th« British al i i tary baaa 
in ''uaa, tVa fallura of th« naghdad Pact and tha vietory of 
aacular nations and aoeial ist ie idaala in v«at Asia, **addad 
38 
prastiga and auscla to our o%in foraign policy*** Th« libaratlon 
of Aral) and African tarritorlaa furthar advanead the rale^anca 
and ut i l i ty of our ovn Intarnatlonai pollties* 
^ . Th^  itenkiii.^  Vol. X>I, ?fo.3, >tey 1974, pp* 10-11. 
37. Anirudha Gupta, *'Vihy India i s Pro-Arab?**, Vantaf ^  
Vol. 19,Ho. 7, Jttly./>ugust 1967, p.9. 
38. A rpeeial Corraspondant, op^cit.. p. 18. 
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•' Xat«nt Indian int«r«st^ vhlch Is v«h«a«nUy dtnl«d, 
1» tt» urg« to k kc«p th« nig Pov«rs avay ftwi th« 'fro-^slan 
•eene and to org&nlied a Urlted /-tlan front w>tercln Indians 
should play an Irportant rola, saykHi of priisiia int^r nar^a. 
It Is thia IntarfcSt vhleh largtiy explains Indlla*i Intansa 
diploaatio act ivit ies in t*i« ^rab countriss and i t s r«tl6«it 
attitude tov&rds Isrs^ aX, 
In shorty India•• intertsts in th« Kiddls rast • dssand 
that there should o« a friandly Mlddla £ iSt tnjoying peaca 
and stability* laphasising th« inportanca of Mlddla East to 
39 
India, the Foralgn Mlnlstar, Chagla r<iaarked;**It is aost asssn-
tlE l^ tl^at the rues Canal should ba in friandly hands." Ihars. 
forti Chagla coneludady '*the justice of the 'rai> eausa and our 
ovn national interest (lict^ted the policy we pursued ••• &nA 
thfe reit>8on why Indl« Bt-jni fay ^^asser, ind stands by 'Nasser, 
Is i>ecaustr he rtj;:>ras(!tnted in the 'r-^ b vorld certain foroaa 
w '^.lch w© aust support. Thoa© are t*^ e forces of prograsS| of 
socialism, of non.?ili£;r»ent, "i^ saoularisn. 
He %Fas opposed to Moslla fanaticism he vas opposed to 
the Muslia brotherhood, and, therefore, i t vas in t^ fe Interost 
of India to support and strengthen the causes for vhlch 'lasser 
stood. ** 
39. r.e«t Chagla*s statement, r.-r.fi., op*oit.» coif. tS704^. 
v' Ic^ o n f i ^ n t 'i .Dverrcsunt in V K. pursu i t '5** nMfoTil I n t d v e t . 
I t Is Lr^ «t t ' s t •»f*'Ici'>il^ ^n-^ l^ - ffi^is t^ ' i t r*-lfc<t5nl'-.n 
'aid Jipjjiavjki f>-oUid ri->l bt r ovn ^f f c ''^^ in • i lch \T ' ' t . i 
'•'js Civ.'. :,'-f' .>ut I t !r c.4,s::. ti-uc t ' t 'n t^^ ^^-••t^£t t i r c i t s , 
f 'eru IK l i t t l e ' n s t l i t t ^ ov prejudice a/s1n*t Tgr'^el, ' e r e 
^ t. vy -)'1is« -'".e •-jverran'^nt ^•^ Jnr't'j I t s e l f ^eids t '• Ter*'el 
lb ^ ^""-j^. 'r(?t?7^v.)L?' ' '" "^  *•-'• ^n-.^j'vtt^v In *"ev .oi-k, " 'rs, 
.'itidM ' l .n l^ i t ' i ' In'-!!-:! was '*ntl-Tsiv-*el. '^  v. s-t^'s * '^sr . ta , 
Tnai-> ffiit , ^ ud ovsry i 'U' t l-j ^ l e % , iMt t t s'-jai-I l ive In 
^it'iCt and undtrgtindlfik, '-fitv i t s n^lj;'bours,'" 
4C* <;(< |y;l(3i» 
^1« r e Imilun ^^^sitlon :)n tJ.ls Is tue v.is t ' u s es^Kl'i'^ C'O 
oy i'.,K«*l©hru, '^^uci'«tary»a«nerrii of the ' t lnlstry of 
^ternui. ' f falrsj t *'Iiiuls '-as a^t tst^ioiis" C a l j i o r o l l c 
r€l:»tlons wlt*^  t'^tj nev s t a t e . I t Is not nects- 'xy "^r 
- country to wSt^ulls^i fl^plo'^'stlc r*?i'it3o'-!£ "ulf^ cv^ry 
otj*er country. V^*'t ^Jf^o t '-^t Indl-^ns c*^^v^llj f&k.l 
t^ '-^ t, iap;irovui should not oe s'-^ ovn of t^t, -''a/ in i,i ich 
i iBei viis crcstfed tnd i& Tunctioilnti, onilKv; t «, -^ t cz 
'fro»'slJ*n countrit>B vblch " av€ i J i i t ra tcd t^c^seivtjF fro's 
fjixJ^/i i u l o , Ic i ' . c i iw t* w r ccu l t 0^ T v t - •>" 5 UJOKU-'O' 
fron ou t s ide , r # cr^Jitlon of t*:ls nev s t ' . t e Is lo t 1n 
l i n e v l th t'it« i^fencr^i tr«sne o^ t^c *fipo»'r.1^n rcsur^^nce. 
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* ' ' i f • T " T ' '^* I i ' ^' . '» «•>, -"'TTM . I •»'C'{••"'. 
)f tfefi ' l tarial «*Jtj/3nslon. Tsfjei^S a i a , ^n t i c '>t'.t.x 'i-nd, 
V 3 to rduintSi.lri u l i l t u i ^ sUijerl:)r5ty - .'>->ti quaUfj-tl^c "jr*' 
<iu'intl-&&ilv€ - ovt* ".(Pi' «^»«f:3les eo I" r^v's-ti -tJ:^ / cn.rce vict-^i*y^ 
In t; •, ri^xt toun-5, ' " ' l ie Vn ' r i : B c'«'J<nds(! fsir t iy 'in ^, ' , ' . . 
f-ir r^Uf'-ary ^:*iJvaffe, TsrT'-t;! siur* t '^-e ""clp of t^ ^e ' a s t e rn 
T't^ ro-^ts ->** t^!c •'tJo? c->n*"llct "src •almost ".s o l " 'if "'"e 
' jfSU-Tgjp'ifcii fCSyj^^te i t S f c i f , -'-KV't5!V€t**| Tifl Uir.ljs^T -J^ t ' fc 
tsvtnt; ..rttce^ini; %>.iit conf l i c t sh->vs t'"j>t t ' y ot.iln-lnt;© >•*" Vy 
«>nfxlct iay in coi-t-Jn •'i.i.:>V3C'-.ilve ^.clj; c^st.clttc.; by Tsr'.t^i 
*it.forv t ' .c ciosui'tb of t ' c o t r ' i l t >f ilr '^n in oioei- to ^,rc'-"o 
t'.fe i'«»ft-iiXvJ CKoncitia'JS **o*' t^  u :icMtVcmi'nit oT cttrt'^in -^IJ^S « 
vhlch Inclij . td fcl«?. ^fcaU'uctlon of ;;yi^ti-n !ai l l t ' : ry forcts • 
in 'a v:*r for v?hlc'n t>i; t>i-^ 3e coui'5 ^c t^iovn u^ o^n t* c ' r ^ o s , 
X'to • yii'-n*Isr..fcii -Vaiiiilt:irl2<s^ "one v^s t> «* sc«nu tnd s t - r t -
irii,, a)5nt of t K t e provoc-tlve ' cts.*' 
' c a r e ' '^or j u s t i c e , ( lonHn 5 Longn.'nn, ''9^:];^ p.b£« 
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ItraeXit n«v«r adhered to the Arailfltloe fgreeaients and 
violated then on several occasions by their acts. They not 
only refused to take back the Palestinian refugees but even 
forced other Arab Inhabitants to leave their hone and started 
cultivation on their lands. They fortified the Demilitarized 
Zone and stationed police there. Several times they also 
took military action against the Hyrians. 
The series of violations began on February l , 1962 
%ihen Israel attacked and occupied the village of Tavajik. This 
vas condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission and the Secu. 
rity Council as a gross violation of the Security Council's 
44 
resolution of January 19, 1966 and of the Armistice Agreement. 
However, in 1966 a new element appeared on the scene 
vith th(^  organisation of Palestinian Arabs into independent 
guerilla organisations aimed at harassing Israel. They 
received support mainly from tyria v^ile Jordan unwillingly 
46 
allowed them to operate from within i t s borders. Israel adopted 
retaliatory tactics against Syria, from where the guerillas 
operated. 3oth countries continued to accuse each other of 
building fortifications in the Demilitarized Zone. On November 
44. y,if,nfl(fyBflau, s /6 i i i , 
ifiuaanU on tfat Hlfldli F.ai 
Public 
46. Halph H.Magnus. ed., fti iUBt  l F.aitt (V'&shington j American Knterprlse Institute for Pu 
Policy Eesearch, 1969), p.189. 
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2 | 19bl^ i In his R«port to th« Security Council on the ttatue 
of th9 Am^Xit^rifA aonc^ th« r«cr«tary«General rcferrsd to 
Israel's violations of th« 'mist loe 'gr««a««nt8 and of ^ « 
'^•curity Council** resolutions on the Deallitarlsed 74ine« 
Etim on "yrJl 3 , 1967 Israel announced Its intention 
of cultivating al l irisas of t^e T)e«llitsr1f.ed Tonef speel&lly 
lots 61 and 62 ^ l c ^ belonged to the 'mb fa«i«rs» Tn April 
7| an Israeli aanaaoured tractor started cultivating a disputed 
piece of land In the DeallltariKed 7on9 backed by regMl^ r 
Israeli forces* Hyrian small ax^s fire aguinst the Israeli 
tractor vas ^^ nswirfred by a nassive Israeli nilitary action vhlo) 
included the use of 3rtllXery« tanks and air craft* Syrian 
vlllatscis ver^ IsoBb&dL and Isr&ell jet flg-hters ev<n reached 
*7 
the l^aoascus tout ^rea* After this thit i'&lestinian 'terrorist 
raids* increased and brou^t forth a strong reaction froa 
Israel. )n May ld | in a radio interview Israel*s Frieze Minlsti 
t^re&tened to take drastic Measures «i|^inst <^ yrla *at the 
48 
placet t^e t lae, and in the aanni>r ve boots'* Cuch stat^aents 
by laraell o f f l c l s i s though intended to deter r%ld« convinced 
thfc ryrlan ani thi U,'»F^ Jovcnments f^'t »uch rtt'^llatlon 
«»• U.?^>I>^gmfirt, ry7673/'^oveober 2, 19l>a. 
47* '^enry Csttan, QiisSil»9 P* ^7. 
48. g t^i ffirwiaeB i*a»%,OvramB edition), May 14, 1967. 
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v'is de f in i t e '^nd ra^y ' '^vt led tbe"> ^nJ t^e ovle t l^vemnent 
49 
to beiUVfc t ^ i t t^e "yrlsin regime I t s e l f vas in jeopardy. 
I s r a e l i f rtiitB i§>^  rallltary act ion v t rc relnf-jrced by 
traop movfc-ncnt: and c3nccntrt.tions« ")n May "fij, Iciir-l ->rn-
nlEed a miilti^rj parade in J<»i'Us*siie!T) In compifctc disi'©taid 
of tt t imlstlcfe r^««Mntint and t : « United Ttitlon's resolut ions 
deallrifc, vlf" f t st-vUs o^ J&rusalem. ' i t l ough Israel lenle'^* 
tro>p concentrat ions '^B ailt^-e'! bj -tjytjt, '^ yr:!^ * anu t"ii; 
Dvlct UnJoHi t' tt dt^nlM VC^ L n>t •u^^olly onvlncln , , in v5ev ^f 
•sricx'fa c'viijaclt^ to denoblilz© "st '- iJoment'r notice* 
)n 4uy 19, '»9w?, tl »i ucret'u-y-C»€nfe.r3l reportfc<« to t^c 
ticuxit^ Council t> b "Etfe-idy luterlorr^tlon along t"?.: l i n e 
cetvftsn T. r j e l and ^y^'ii, p s i t i c u l a r l ^ v l th r tg^id to d l s -
ijutcr over cu l t*v : t lon r l ^ ' t s In V"as r iemlli tarlzt^ ""one, sine*: 
t'<- ^ l i s t of t^t jifesij:',' "fc -ilso recounted fnt •' '.ctorr vMc'" 
, \r 'V'. iuc' t'-.'is^on; " ' 1 ^-qteh's . c t l v l t ^ c s , i ^ c r s l ' t t i t report ' 
'i ,o-t t^roop sioVfc'nents jnd concentrat ions .»:>itlcaictrly on t^ ^e 
lar'^cil? side of t> e "j^rian border, and intfefSjer'-te smd u ^ l i l -
co£.t. at^tiiffienta." 
t r ' saps, t» e^ pai-po8« ")^  Isr- ie l i f^reats ' :-£ to orlnt, 
so much ,^r«issui-u on ' yri-. ur. to foroo \ typt to tntfer t^tj fr-i^. 
49 • ^or fcvents ieadlnt, t-o vn s e t also C^'^IIK.S ' .x .ost , •*!'t 
' r ao -Te r iu l l "t-r i '^jv I t I^tiStn'', IL f^el^ Ln '•ff;'?rfit Vol. 
iC, " '^o.i^, aTsnMxyaj; Jsnu-^ry '•9t»B, p, S'fS. 
O0» uotfcd in c'Uy C'it:an, o p . c l t . . j>, 9 t . 
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Egyptian armed forcM posed the only hurdle to Israel 's 
expansionist desl^^ns In the area and, therefore, she vas 
most Interested In engaging Lgypt in the var. 
Israel sucoe«ded In Its plan t? trap Nasser. The 
opportunity catae soon, vhen the other ^rab Governments, e.g. 
Jordan, t ired of betrlng the brunt of I srae l ' s retal l s tory 
attadct and being unable to stand up to the msiic, accused 
President Nasser vl th ^king shelter behind the shield 
of the UM:;F, while others bore the burden of the struggle. 
Greatly embarrassed Nasser at once Invoked h i s obligations 
under the Mutual Security Pact signed between the U.A.R, and 
?7yrla in November 19bo, and declared h i s Intention of support-
ing ryrS't In the event of war. Nasser was reluctantly forced 
into assuming thisji posit ion, for dfsplte h i s talk of a 
retal iatory*total war* which could be tex^ed as a morale 
booster, i t Is hardly credible that he would have actually 
resorted to war a t a t ine when he was faced with problems of 
food shortage and economic reconstruction, and almost one-
third of h i s h.i:xk>i was engaged in e^m«;in. This vlev vas relter^. 
ted by President Nasser in a cable sent to ^rab students In 
London, In which he told that the time was not ripe for war 
51 
with Israe l . Xlius, Nasser vas not in favour of war at that 
61. gjfl ^fcrttg^iea fr)gtt ^^z ^ «^ "YS^?. 
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tine, alt^ugh h« vas v^ry nruch disturbed b/ the onaed threat 
tn ''yrla* He refrained fron taking any offensive action 
against Israel even after the isobllisation of his ajned forces. 
He only assumed a defensive posture in o?i*e Byria vae attacked 
by Israel* 
fs tension Increased on the ryrlan.Israel border in 
the spring of I9b7, President Nasser in a dranatlc aaneouvre 
demanded the withdrawal of the UlTLF from the U.A.a. frontiers 
In Eln:?l and also from the Qa^za strip and ehaxauel^^elkh, 
2he r^ecretary General informed U«/«B« that i t must either 
request complete withdrawal of the troops from a l l positions 
or allow them to remain in their present position* At U*A«B« 
request the UWIF withdrew on 18 **y and * gyptlan forces 
occupied rharm el Sheikh on May £1, 1967* ::3cplalning his 
position* U Thant said thst the force was there w l ^ the con» 
sent of T-gypt, and could not rtmsln If Cairo demanded Its 
wlth^lrawal, Since tht navigable channel in the strait of 
X!ran is eitusted lese th&n a milt from the r.jiyptlan coast, 
and tl ti straits themEelves l i e In Tgyptlan territorial waters, 
Egypt announced on May £2, T967 the eXosure of the "trait to 
Israeli shipping and to strategic war material destined for 
Israel«Zhls meant tl^ e restoration of the situation as i t exlstei 
from 1949 to 196t» before the rues V&r.and Egypt was legally jus. 
Its 
t l f led In the exercise of i t s sovereign r i ^ t t over/territorial 
%At«M as v«l l aa Mttrclaa of Ita b«lllg«ntat righta. On 
23 Ma/i th« laraall Priaa Kinlstar laau«d a vamlng to th« 
U,A«H, to th« affaet that any lnt«rf«r«ne« vit^i the fraadMi 
of ahlpplng In th« Qulf of Aqaba and the atralta of Tl»an 
**conatltutea a gross violation of IntarnationaX lav^ a vlo« 
l3tlon of the aoverui^n rights of t*^ e nttl'>nB and an act of 
aggroaslon ai^alnst Isrriel.*' T>e United rtutes and Britain 
also declared tho olo^^de to be "Illegal** since the Qulf 
was an International vatervay* They even proposed the taking 
of International action ta uphold the rl|i^t of free passage 
through the strait without a ruling from the International 
Court of Justice* 
The position of Israel and her a l l i e s on this Issue 
was untenat^e on the following grounds i Firstly^ according 
to International lav a gulf whose entrance Is 1£ miles vide 
or less constl&ttttes territorial waters and since the Oulf 
of Aqaba Is only 9 miles vide It wadoubtedly come^vlthln the 
territorial waters of the U«\li, and ^udl Arabia, *^eoondly, 
a channel Is recognised as an * International waterway* when 
It connects two seas and since her« the Gulf did not fu l f i l 
this condition It constituted an Inland sea. Thus the U**»R« 
claim was unquestIonsDie* Thirdly^ the Geneva Convention 
of TdbS on which Israel t»ascd Its claim i tse l f stipulates 
t>£« Henry Cattan, ai2«fili»t P* tOO* 
that "th« right of p&seagtt to foirttign shipg i t not ftbtolut*" 
b«lng lubjttot .o th« sceurlt/ arrangvatnts of th« nation ooiu 
e«rB«d« The Lav Comlaslon alco authorise! m such aetloiu 
And slnca Israol inat«»iid of protriag Ita iiinoe«oo« vat ]Miiit 
upon rfftortlng to var to •nforea Its «lalat| tho U«A«R« vai 
vai l vlthln Its irl^ts to dan/ then paaeaga thtou^ ^ a Ottif* 
Lsatiy, If th^ are vus an/ cXaln of lMra«l i t \m» Baral/ i s a 
rasult of tha *'frult of aggraaaion*" of 196&1 tha O.W« did not 
rac»> '^nlxe It and tha auujaet wasjf s t i l l opan to lagal oontro. 
varsy* H«n«ai parhaps, the £«iuctanea of larval and har 
and 
principal a l l l ea , the U.r?«A, i s th«a U«K», to take ths aattars 
to thtt Intarnational Court of Juatioa* 
rh« Giosura of tha Crulf providad larati vlth tht badly 
naadad axouaa to erippla igyptian Military «aohiiitt and fu l f i l 
ita tarritorial anbitiona* lanaion b«gan to Bount on lioth 
aidas* (in M^ty ee» 19&7, Nassar fozaad a Joint Military 
ooBsaand vlth hia arstwhila anttSiaSf Jordan and ryris* But 
«^m than N^asar declared ^ a t Egypt vould not start tha var^ 
though i t vaa raady to maat lsxa«ii aggraasion against any 
Arab country* His ala was '*to datar Isxaal rathar thsn 
piovoka i t to f ig^t.'* 
63* The fjiariean reoratary of ^tata in a lattar dutad January 
169 19^3 to the *ttomay Qanaral said. "Ths Gulf of 
'*qaba, th« oxact status of this body of %rater is s t i l l 
a aattsr opan to eontrovarsy*** D<»ptt* of rtataf JQIiiAl 
af IntMoaUanal InSkHt vol . iv , April igi>6| p.e33. 
64« rig aiMgntf» J^ ma 4» 1967. 
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In the period b«tw*«n the ijaookad* and th« outbrtak 
of th« var on JUB« 6, 1967 t^*t% vat int«nt« dlploBatle a c 
t lvity in th« Oait«d Nations and vorld eapitait and starch 
of a foraula aeotptabXt to both th« partiat to that tha 
lapandlng var say b« airartad* Tb« ^^erttary^Ganeral apptsltd 
for ^ *iaraathing spaIX% vhich ^ould alXov tha axplotiva 
situation to oool dovn* In a atttlng vith th« Tteratary 
Gancriiy ^atatr shov«K! readlntts to diteusa th« Xtgal atpeett 
of th« right of patsaga through tha Gulf of Aqaba* Daapita 
th^e ^fforttf th«i two Big Povart th« U«S,/« and tht f'oviat 
Union, Qontinu«d to support ^ a i r ratpaetiira t eXiantt 
Israel and U«'\H« IsraaX was SapatiaBt and i t s Foraign 
Minister daclarad on May aO| 19t»7 that IsraaX was raady to 
"act alona •«••• to braaJc tha bXockadt i^ 
At the baginning of Jurai in rasponaa to tha ^nariean 
aovemaant* s suggest ion| Egypt agroad to tand Viea - Pr as id ent 
?aQharia Hohtyuddin to ^ahingtan to discuss a paaeafuX aoXu. 
tion* 3ttt IsraaX vat aagar nst to Xosa th« goXdan opportunity 
"to strlka a haavy blov and aaainistar the proalsad '&i9i 
fib 
Xasson' to tha rabs*** 3asldasy an isnadiats %far wuXd 
riaiaira IsraaX of t^a baaty oost of oiobiXization {$ 10 aiXXion 
a day;, sind beXp to tide oirer tbe iwimlgration and aoonoaio 
erisasi and ansura saXf^suffioieney in oiX* Thsraforai Iara«X 
bb. Tut Haxlna hodinaon, l»r&i>i tmd t^ .^  /.rabe/*Ti>^ Xbsk t 
t'anguin Books, 19t»8), p«206* 
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jLoit no tl»« in tr«»tins th« closure of th« Ktrtltf of f l t tn 
at & oagut b«uif although th«rft \»» no urg«Rt natigatloiwi 
nc«d,f3r BO ««rch&nt v«s8«is fXylng tht Itra«lJ flag had 
66 
passed through tht Strait of tir&n for th« past tm yaart* 
Xhua^ dLisTagarding tbe dlploaatlo efforts and apptaXs 
for restraint by t^o 8up«r povors, Isravi struek f irst dn 
t^« morning of Juoa 5, T9i^ 7« In a surprias air attack la 
the f irst few hours of JUnt 5, th« Isra«Xl air forca dattroyad 
most of tb« U.".R. air-crafts s t i l l on th« ground* This 
vas the dacisiva faetor in Israel's viotory in tJh« Juna var* 
It took just six days to eapturt th« final datarti f^i«.aX. 
rh«ikh, tha Qasa atrip (U.A.JFUj^  tha t^agtam baric of Klvar 
Jordan Including Jarusaiga (Jordan) and ths Golan Hslglits 
(ryria;* Israel's sucosss vas also dua to i t s vail plannad 
arasd praparatlons B«ant for offansiva aotlon in tha fac« of 
a disunitad and veak anany and tha aviftnaas and f lexibil i ty 
vhloh characterlsad taraali attacks vhlle tha 'rabs vsra slov 
to mova« 
Israel olaiss that i t acted only in 8«lf«defene«t yat 
In vidv of Israel's oontlnuad occupation of 'rab tarritorlaai 
i t s <iatabllshBcint of Jevlsh aettlenenta in the occupied araas|l, 
66. Tea M»Hovard and h.Hunteri jgraftl ftUd thi -'rib Itflrtd i 
Ihe Crisis of 19b7, Adelphi PaperSf Ho«41t p. 17. 
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and I t s ennexation of the old ci ty of Jerutaiea, i t is 
reasonsul& to assua« that the ol&im vas meant only tojcover 
I t s aggr«8&lve intentions* Israel not only achieved a i l i t a ry 
success but also sc^jred a diplomatic victory in vhich aggre-
ssors vere presented as victims and the victims vere made to 
B^ppe&r S8 aggressors* TMs hss been Isr&el*& strategy since 
1d48« Otherwise, if I t really f e l t that there vas a thre'^t 
to i t s existence, it could have sought the Intervention of 
the United Nations Security Council* 
The <u-d:^ y war created some nev problems without solving 
the old on«iS* Israe l hue adopted an intransigent attitude* 
Having occupied an area of more thstri £0,000 square miles i t 
is not ready to revert to the position vhich existed before 
the hos t i l i t i e s unless i t s demands are fulfilled* I t s condi. 
tlons are t Kecognition of Israel by •^rab s t a t e s , opening the 
ruez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaoa to I s rae l i shipping under 
a legal guarantee, retention of the Gaza s t r i p , Jerusalsa and 
the Gol&n Heights including adjustments along the frontiers} 
conversion of the Sinai desert and the vest 3ank o" the Jordan 
r ivar into demllits^rized zones; an end to Arab belligerency* 
That Israel wants to bargain from a position of strength is 
borne out in a statement made by I s r ae l ' s t Foreign Minister* 
lie said ; "If the General Aesembly were to vote by 121 to one 
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In favour of Israol raturalng to th« a n l t t l c c lines tomo-
rrov, Israai wuid r«fus« to conply vith that dacltlon*" 
Ihart has b««n a further hardening in the attitude of Israel 
because of the failure of the United Nations to find a vork. 
ing fonmla regarding vlthdrawal, except for the one on 
ceasefire* *hile the Western countries want an overall sett le-
ment o*^  tb« 'rabb.Israeli conflict through direct neestlations, 
othersy including Fovlet Union and India, argue ^ a t f irst thing 
iBUst cone flrst^ i«e* Israel must f i rs t vacate the territories 
i t occupied during the var. The U*lf« is s t i l l unaisle to 
resolve the deadlock* 
thtt oUi«r prooXtiins rei^itv to the agt^avJtlon of the 
refugee proal^ m n^d t'a«i 3Ccup:^tion ana annexation of the Old 
olty of Jt»i*usalea* Xo the one million Palestinian refugees 
have beun added anoUier 400f000 t't^lostlnians who have either 
ween expelled or have fled the country* 
^^en the crisis f i rs t erupted In }iay '^ 967 over the 
rtr^it of Tiran, the United 'tatas urged restraint on a l l 
parties and tried hard to achieve some sort o^ " collective 
action by the Great Povers. On the one hand It sought to 
Involve the Tripartite Declaration of "^ 960 which pledged the 
Unit«d states. Great Britain and France to collective opposltio! 
• 219 • 
to u»« ox threat of forot in tti* H)ddl« Engt ant? prevantion of 
67 
vioktlon of frontiers and ^araistlee lines* At the SBSM t lat 
an attaapt was msdaltn con^perata vlt^ Pr^iar Koajrgln In eooX* 
Ing dovn tb« "rab ''tataa. 
Hovttvery tb« IMited <~tat«a VJS ri^thar nore ooncamed 
ofer Israel's navigational rig^ta than wltl the legal it ies of 
t>a situation or vlth Vrw U^ ialc: cuuse of 'raWIaraell conflict 
t't'eaident Naaaer'a dt»ci-ration ret^ardlng tho Gulf of Aqaba 
was f e l t ^« 'J' Qliect Kuhtxft and one vhicli caxled for a pufalle 
rep^./* Tile f i rs t Aaarlcan reaetloa eaa«$ on Hn^ 23, 19379 whan 
^resident Johnson aad« a^  stat^aent raafflralng the U*% basic 
eoaaltnent to oppose »g rasslon and support the political 
Indapendsnee and territorial Integrity of a l l nations In the 
j»r«a« He deplored that the Gensral '*x«slstlce 'gr«ea«aits bad 
**fall«d to prevent varllke acts** against one another* Coament. 
Ing on the withdrawal of the UWf:F, he said that the United 
rtatss vat "dlsaayed at the hurried withdrawal of the United 
"Tatlona risergi^ey Force fro« Gaza and Slnal after mite thon 
t«n years of steadfast and effective service In keeping the 
psiee, vlthout action by elthrr the General fssenbly or the 
67* "Crlslp In the Middle Fast" t Broadcast '*tateoent by 
i'rttsldent Johnsony Hay £3| 19^7* ret> lext In i^ d^UJC 
yiagUafclan 7f fmidiBtlitl DnamtnUt ^ / £9,19^79 pp. 
776.77* 
t)B» Iula*f -^y ^^ 1M07* 
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S«ourlt/ Council of thd United Nations* ^*^ continue to rflgard 
th« pr«s«i6e of ^ e Ualtad Hfatlont in the 'ireA as a matter 
of fundaaental Inportance* <% intend to eupiiort ita countea* 
inee vith a l l poaalUle vlior.** Indeedy «^> Itate Dtpartaent 
opposed the L^^tlan aove b/ eaying that t^e xole of the foroe 
should b« Incre'^ aedy not dlalnlfhed* In Ite irlev i t ¥^» the 
reaot£.l of the U*JlT vl-ich perpetuated tn« oriels* 
yn the Oulf of A<iaba| the United rtatea* position v^9 
t^-it i t *'conaidcr8 the Gulf to be an International %Aterva]r ant* 
feele t^at 3 olockadc of laraeli shipping la l l l e i^ l and po* 
tentialiy disastrous to the cause of peace* The right of free« 
Imiocent passage of the international vsiterva/ is a vital 
interest of the Interns*tional ooaBRUiit/*** This reafflraed 
t^e assurance t;iven by Tuiles In an alde*ai«iioire to the Israeli 
Foreign Minlstert >^^ Etian on February iy 1967* Fe vrotei 
**' 1th respc<.t &o ttie Gulf of /*<^ at^  and access thereto^ 
thdi ur Uilit^ves Vat Xhtf Gulf eompr^ ohcnde International waters 
^9* Yh^  Timtdty editorially coaracnted t **th« anger snd oonteapl 
for U Th&xct aaounts alaoat to an meriean vlthdraval of 
confidencte 5n th* Tecretary General," 
6 0 . f!hrl«tiaH rciiinee MBBitory fiy 19, 19&7. 
61* ""ee Text of Broadcast by jTesldent Johnson on ?fey £3,1967, 
in AMbklM JdmAUttXma nf t'yii^dtntlal aacM^g^U, ^^7 
PO, 1Qb7^ pp. rXi«y7. ^\mt% Tich^rA P. «-t«ibKina, ftp.cit.y 
P* 9t»* 
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and that no nation bar th« r lg^ t to pfevtnt frte and lnnac«nt 
paieag© In th« Gulf i^nd through t^« ^ t r s l t giving 9i99§» 
t^«r«to ••• In thdj ii3c«ne«^ of soffits overriding dsoitlon to 
t^« contrai*y, &» by lh€ Inttsraatlonai Court of JUstic«, the 
y.S. on behalf of t'r€ vessels of the U.'", regis t ry, Is prepare 
to exerels^ th** r ight of fret^ n*** Innocent aa«s''ijo and to 
4oln vlth ott-s^rs to s«.curt. general reco^ttltlon '^ f t* l^8 r ight ," 
^2 
iiiii s^ae ^ I n t itias made 1;^  Keimedy in a pres& oon. 
f&r«nce in 19fc»3, when h« o^servedt "In the t^vent of sggre* 
ssloHi 7r ^repaxations for aggression, wh«th«r direct or iJUlir 
indirect, ve vouid suj^port appropriate ae^sures in the United 
Nations, adopt other courses of action on our ovn to prevent 
or put ^ stop to such aggression,** 
Fret pa8s;ii;€ t>rou,jh the " t r a i t of Tir*n ind the Gulf 
'if *qtba fons thu 5)edrock ->f U,*", policy. That Is w y^ I t 
considered the blockade of Tsrsell shlp^jlng l l l ec^ l , Although 
the United '"t«itea recognises that half aUt the ^ t ra i t Is in 
ii,A«li. t e r r i t o r i a l vatere and the other half s< in raudi 
t e r r i t o r i a l vaters , s t i l l i t contends that these waters have 
^e* >1anfili«atag (iaayrtliB» ^^y e^t ^9i^7. 
bd* Senator Hike >^nsfi«ldt the »aJority le&der, called 
t e closing af tti^ Gulf »t to Isr&oll shlpplf*^ ''an act 
of. war toder international lav,*' 
a sptel&l ftatut bccsuet they pnsvlda entry into th« ouif 
v» l^ch tsrvet aany courtri««* The rights of ^ai these nations 
are subject to International lav* In this connection (Soldbsrg 
saldt '*Xh{i U,'«r,* i s a coast&l <ttate an<S possesses terrl-
torlal arsa -iiong tht strait of Tlran snd th© ouif of qaba. 
''ovever, i t Is ^Iso necessary to recall that It Se the terrl* 
64 
tori*! fie":* oi* ^our states." 
Die United "tates just i f ies i t s <-tand on the follovlng 
groundsi (1) It Is pointed out that the 1968 Lsv o^ t^e sc% 
Treaty states, "Thur© sh 11 U no stttpsnsion of the Innocent 
passage of forelj^ ships through the straits which are used 
foi International navigation.** 'Ihls Dutch proposal was intea. 
ded to apply to the rtr^lt of Tirft»» 
(£; Xh6 position of the rtraits since I95c», 't the 
end of t'lte. war in tnat year, the ii.A.H, agreed to th€ station. 
Ing of a U.K. Force at "harausl-rhelkhjthe point which over. 
tooks the ^tri it of Tlran, The U.f», • li,'.Ft. agreen^nt «eant 
th^t the U* .a, accepted the arrangeaent which has since 
permitted free p^ aesut^ e to the Gulf to ships of a l l nations 
66 
avsn If specific on frctu pasaage* 
t/4. Xyiamut '^^ / ^h 19»7« 
o^. fee ItflM Qf la&iikt > y^ dO» 19k»7. 
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'IthaUfi^ th« Ualt«4 rtaUt did m t tay clearly v^at 
tfcaoU/ It v9Uld do If Lgypt faU«d to r«Oi>«n th« Guif, the 
fflovsm^t of the U«f;« flxth FI««t tovard th« FAtt«m M«di* 
ttttrraiittan sugi^ested that It intended to be ready for a l l 
eventualities, letf Washington did not atteapt to end the 
blo^ade by force, or «v«n aUov t^ e^ Israelis to toke any 
forci&tle action in this regard* 
The Onited '^tateSi tlius sssaed anxious to avoid getting 
dirsetly involved In the conflict* As the President hiaself 
told the Israeli Foreign Minister, f^ Lban,on Hay es , aeoordlns 
to Howard and Huntsri that he had probltias in {yursuadlng the 
Congress to sanction any action l iksly to involve, the United 
ntates in war* H^nwhilsi "he eaphatically urged Israel not 
to taktt any unilateral action* He gave equally eaphatio, if 
soaevhat indeflnits assurances that so long as Israel did not 
act on her own, sh« could rely on the support of ^ e United 
' tates**" In the «md he appealed to both Egypt and Israel to 
*'Balntain sslf.control* He a^ed for two vesks to suable 
the United states to atteapt to set t le the dispute peacefully* 
Ultioately, the United rtates appro&ehed ^lasser directly 
hoping to be able to persuade hla from taking any precipitate 
t>6* Michael Tbvard »nd liobert Hunter, aJU£l£*f P* ^ * 
<7uoted in Leonard Beaton, "The Great t»overs Abdicate", 
Tnl^fmattf^nal Jniirnal^ Vol* > x n i , Yfo.1, "^tnter 1 9 6 7 ^ 8 , 
p* 76* 
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aotion« A nev U.v*:, 'mbaesjidor, Richard W,'<roite, reached 
Cairo on May i,l and, according to ^,gyptlan sources, brought 
with hln h l e t t e r from Presldtnt Johnson containing rletilled 
proposals relatlnt;^ to Fgypt's future conduct. I t reooomended 
a autual withdrawal of U.A.B, and Is rae l i forces from the 
iaorder region and urged the U,/,R, to abstain froa entering 
the Gasa sector at the Medlttcrrane^n wnd of the frontier and, 
*n addition, keep I t s forces out of '^harm-el-J^helkh unt i l I t 
had off ic ial ly guaranteed fr9^ passage through the r t r a l t of 
67 
Tiran. Rejecting these proposals, t ie U.A.R. * Foreign Minister 
warned Aabassador Nolte that ' 'If Is rael carr ies out any 
aggression against any Arnb country, we shall consider you 
as partncars*** 
on May 2t>, Tlusser received aieseages from both t*ie 
United r t a t e s and the Soviet Union asking him to refrain from 
66 
being "the f i r s t to open f i r e , " A s in i l a r messsg© was sent 
to Israel i(^ th«£ rovlet Union on M^ y 27* Kosygln also sugges. 
ted to President Jo^lnson that bot^ sides phould exert pressure i 
on the opposing sldus, >n Hay 28, Pz'esldrnt Johnson wrote to 
Israel urging res t ra in t and hinting at the possibi l i ty of 
fovlet Involvement in case of an i a I s rae l i a t tadc. 
«7. »f#.^  Inrk TlKPfl, !fay 27, "t907. 
oBm iklil*» June to , f9t>7« 
t>9« IfW.toril ytoMi (Magaglne;, January 7, t9fc>8,pp. 102-4. 
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The 1967 June vi&r, which brought victory for Israel 
had unhappy consequences for the United rtates* In the ^fter-
ffl'^th of the cr is is the Amt>ricsn position in the Arab world 
reached i t s lowest point* '*?7ev«r before had American influence. 
70 
In the vords of John r»Dadeav, '*been l e s s , diploaatlc relations 
so kx shatteredf vi tal Interests In coomunlcatlons and pet»leun 
so Interrupted and Amsricun reputation so low*** A \^ve of antl-
Aaerlcanlsa swspt throughout the Arab world* 1!he Arab fe^rs of 
Aaerican Intent and collusion with Israel had proved true* 
President Nasser alleged that It was western Imperialisa which 
had planned and supported the Israeli attack. F7e held thst the 
nuBber of planes Involved and the intensity of the init ial 
attacks pointed tovards Aoerican and British participation or 
at least provision of air cover for Israel o*' Israeli planes. 
/nother convincing factor was that the air attack had come 
froB the West and that Jordanese rader had pldted up plane 
foraations flying In from the direction of the sea. The United 
71 
rtates cateiorioftlly denied i t s participation In the war. Howu 
ever, these charges werey hovevsr* subsequently dsnied by 
both President Nasser and King Husssin of Jordan. 
70. Jame S.3adeau, afi»filt«» »• ''78. 
71* Cee U.A.B. rtateaent of JVine 6^  and !Taster*s spesch of JUne 9 in W«M itKA Timaay JUne 7»10»19&7. 
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Th« Unit«d >^ t&t«s was also accused of practising decsp. 
tlon* It was said that while the United states was aware of 
Israel's aggressive intentions It continued to warn Eg/pt 
of dire consequences If It started the attack* The ^tate 
r^epartment was also discussing plans with the U.A.H, about 
the probable v i s i t to Egypt by Vice-President Hubert ^uaphery 
and of ^akarla M6heyuddln*s going to the United '^tates to dis . 
cuss over things* Thus, when the Israelis launched a surprise 
att£»ck the U«A.K« was caught on the wront foot and lost the 
advantage of an Init ial attack* It is further said that the 
arms build-up of Israel during the crit ical period before the 
war was facil itated bj^  equipment and planes flown from H<Mo 
bases in the Heditterraneani Germany and the United states* 
The economic aid and intelligence work of C*I*A. siso helped 
72 
the Israeli cause* 
The United rtates was not ready to brand Israel as the 
aggressor nor was i t Indisposed to allow Israel to exploit i ts 
major gains* The ri^ ecretary of ' tate« T)ean Husk, took the 
position that the United states was "not a billigerent" but onl 
aimed at fu l f i l l ing i t s responsibilities under l^e United 
Nations Charter, achieve an immediate cease-fire, and "devote 
a l l i t s energies to bring about an «id to the f l irt ing and a 
7£* L*M*Kenn|r, Otf*cit** pp* 96-99* 
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new beginning of prograewaes to assure the peace and development 
of the entire area," "•feutrailty" In the Arab-Israel conflict, 
according to Husk, was not njt eynonymous with Indifference and 
he refused to endorse the view that United ftates was neutral 
73 
in thought, word and de i^d. Actually t^e war generated pro« 
Israeli feeling in the United states and had i t s effect even 
74 
in government circles* 
India's Involvement in the last 'rao-Israel conflict 
may be traced to two»principai reasons i f i r s t , ^s 'i close 
ally of the U.A.Fu In the non-aligned group and second, the 
foundations of her policy in this region had already been 
laid durint the Anglo-French invasion of 1966 in ''avour of 
78 
the "rabs* 
In the case of the 'rab-Israell dispute India has never 
been non-aligned. It has adhered to this policy even In the 
post-Nehru period. Hencw, from the very beginning, even before 
the war started, India esctended full support to the ''rab cause. 
73. uhjte J^ouse im v'tabetn^nt, June 6, i2afiUAital&, ^b.^ pS, Also 
Busk*8 Ftatettent in I^^IA^. June B ,^ 1967, pp. 949»b0. 
74. Elchard P.Stebblns, oiUiiltM P» ''O?. 
7b. Anirudha uupta, op .c i t . . p. 9. 
On May £2, 1967» Prims Hinltt«r Indira Qan(!hl r«lt«ra^ 
Ing Indiana support to the Arate stated that, **V6 ehould l lk t 
our ^rab friends to know that Indo-U.A.R, friendship Is 
76 
firm and abiding." In a statamant to the Lok '"abha regarding 
the situation in Vest Asia, Foreign Minister Chagla daelared 
that "Tha craatlon of Isrtel has given rise to tension between 
77 
Israel and the Arao countries," Although India reaffirmed Its 
gsneral support to the cause of the Palestine Arabs, i t also 
appealed to th« nations involved for moderation for the sake 
78 
of peace. As ti^e Indian Foreign Minister told the General 
Assenbl/ of the United M'^ tlons ''during the weeks preceding the 
outbreak of hos t i l i t i e s , It %fas our constant and earnest effort 
to counsel restraint on a l l parties to this s tr i fe and to a l l 
the other states \it)Of one way or t^e other, were Involved in 
this cr:lsls ••• yh^n. U Thant made his mble, and nearly succ 
easful effort to gain a ureathing spell during which quiet 
diplomacy could help solve the cr is i s , India stood solidly 
79 
behind him,** Actually India had moved this holding resolution 
76. Hindttatan ItoM» *^y ^ ^t i667« 
77* ^ 1 Chagla*s statement Begardlng situation In Vest Asia, 
r-S^p., 4th series, Vol.111, i^o.d, May £6, 19 )^7, col* 671 • 
78. ainaugtan I4afta» -^z 2^ « i9^7. 
79* Document on United Nations Oeneral Assi^ Btaly special 
session*Indian Foreign Minister's 'Speech, Afrn^^aian 
and 'fk\Tl<i ''tT^XSti Vol.lV, ?lo.£, my, 19«>7, p. 161. 
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Elthou^ I t was not adoi»t«d and i t v^s a l to prlakrlly du« to 
lndiii*B e f f o r u that th«» f:«cr«stury»0«Ei«»rftl v«»t to s « t t 
N&vsttr io as to find u pottibI« solution of fto-^ tht problea, 
Indlii had also vant«d that the C«curity Coimoil b« adjourned 
SO 
t i l l U Th:int csifflt bade with a rtport* 
Than on Jttn« 6, Israel suddtftily url»i»hed \mr gn the 
'rtJb countries. Ind!**, siding oi,i«nly vltb the Arabty took 
t^  e poeltlon th^it Tar&wl %rt*s the s^ggraasor In the confl ict 
slnve i t itruck the f irst ulov* ''I do not wl«h to utter h»nh 
words or us«) strong l&n^a^e,** Mrs* Gi^ ndhl said in the lak 
rabha, out *'on the )»asls of the information available there 
can ix; no doubt thuit Israel h:*ft i.scal:ikt«id ttin situation into 
an araed conflict, ^iloh has nov acquired th«> proportions of 
81 
a fulX-sc It; war**" rince India believed In the pe i^Ceful solo. 
tlon of dieputeSf i t disapproved of a pr«N.eiiptlve strike or 
a prttventlve v^r, which < as igalnst the l«itter and spirit of 
t^e wN Charter. If Israel was tr/ing to solve i t s disputes 
vlt! V.m / raas Urou^ force of ar«s tien It aeant a breach 
af t; c ^rinci«4.es t^shrlned in 'r t ic le £» p^ra 4,of the Charter 
which states unequivocally that "An se^ibers shall refrain in 
&0* '^tateaent of Indla*s Foreifn Minister. Chagla, in the 
lok rabha, yr^D., 4th •"erleSf Vol. VIi, '?o.4i, JUly 18, 
I9*i7, cols . 12700-1. 
&1. r^r.^ 4t}i serlfetSf Vol.IV, f^os. ll*20t 'aeond ''ession, 
June C), 19t7, coU 3298. 
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their Intornatlon&X relations froQ the threat of use of ^oroe 
against the territorial Integrity or political Independence 
of any state." Th« only exception to this Is provided In 
Article &lt viz* In case of ara&d attack. Hence Israeli 
attack in anticipation vas totally unjustified and vet essen-
t ial ly alaed at gaining a new status quo and balance of power 
In the region. The points on the bQsis of vhlch India oonsl* 
dered Israeli action ^s against international law, pri^ctice 
and morality, vere susuaarlzed by Foreign Minister Chagia, as 
follows* First, i t i s not legally open to a country to start 
a war merely because i t feels that a threat to its security 
exists . Such a threat could easily be met through the U^  
Cliarter which elaborates various courses of action open to It 
through peaceful means, as well as through resort to the 
f?ecurlty Council. J^ econd, the international (»>mtsun1ty should 
not permit the aggressor to retain the fruits of aggression. 
Third, i t Is not permissible for a country to acquire territory 
of another state In order to be able to bargain from a position 
of strength. Lastly, and most Important of a l l , ri^^ts cannot 
be established, territori::*! disputes cannot be settled, nor 
82 
boundatles adjusted through armed conflict. 
India also expressed i t s d«ep regret over the fact that 
Israel had, lay violations of the armistice agreements sought 
h2, i.-r.>n., 4th series. Vol. VII, No.42, July 18, 1967, 
col. 1E701. 
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to consolldato Its position, acquired n«v territories! expelled 
/rau8 from their hones by using Its powerful a l l l t ar / nschlne 
In s^lte of being censured by the r«eurlt/ Council for vio-
lation of the general armistice agreenents* Indeedf It ves 
haughty enough to Ignsre even the Assembly Resolution on 
Palestine refugees, neither allowing th«m to return to their 
63 
homes nor compensating tbem. 
Regarding th* withdrawal of the UNKP forces In res-
ponse to a requ i^St tty -gy?t on May 18, 1967, to the ?"ecretary 
General, t>)e Tndlan position VBB in complete agrewaent with 
the Hecretary-Oeneral, India supporived U Thant's deelilon t) 
accede to the request for withdrawal of the 7-Ratlon Inter-
national forces* India had slways opposed any nove for supra, 
national status for t^e UK. It, therefore, unequivocally main. 
talned, that U Th-int had no option, but to comply with the 
request of the U.'.R., the hf)st country, since In asking for the 
withdrawal of the u.'Ul.F,, thg United *rab hepubllc %ras only 
exercising Its soveri»l&it/« The Ir^lan Minister for Lxternal 
Affairs stated clearly In Parilamentt 
**^ 'e •ppreolste the reasons which have Impelled the 
U.A.K. to ask foi th« vithdrawal of th« UNSF, vh«n the IWSP 
63*. Iblrt, 
• Sd2 . 
v-s rtatinned In V^it^ l i . ' . h , , It v^t vlth th« content of the 
u«\h« Uovcrnment and t::v w7i: F could not continue to rtnatn 
In u.'^h* territory vlthout tl'iat Oov«rni8ent*s continuing 
oonscsnt. India could n^t lie a p^rty to any procedure v^lch 
vTOuid make U*Ti F Into an occupation forccy nor could the 
'Jovernment of Tndlti agr@e to U*frFS continued presence In 
U, ' , l . In ac;8tince of tbt intt^r*B content and in any eaee 
Indl'in troops could not renaln p-art of IWEF vlthout the 
U,*.h»«8 approval," 
The Indian position vae in accordance with imetM t^ry 
internatlon^ijlawi the ii,^» General Assembly resolution and 
V:^ 'i{;reement rt^ ached l^etveen V^% Haaaierskjold.than U»N, 
85 
r€crt>tary.G($nural| and t^e u«.\R* (joverment* The present 
stand of India i s similar to the point mad^  by ^ehxu In the 
Indian ?arlia!B«nt on ^Tovesber ^9| 1966 vhen he salit "v'e 
taade It clear that It was only If the Government of gypt 
Q^Tnoid that ve would send then Indian contingent to the U*fi:F, 
Ve arc not ^rep'^ red to agree to our force or any force remalfw 
ing U'ere indefinitely.*" It wae on tills basis that the 
Indian '^elugation at the United ^^atlons deplored the 'merlc^n 
and Israeli crfttc^wi of U Thant's action in ordering with-
drawal of U*TrF. 
86« "tateaent of Chagla r^egarding situation in I'est Asia. 
T--^-n-t May £i»y 'tg67, OJUJGLUM col. &7£^. 
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Ch-igla contlderec! as "baseless*' the charge Bade by 
some countries that the vlthdra val of the U*^ F had preolplta. 
ted the rocent conf l i c t . Tie vholcuhe^rtedly supported t*ie 
stand that once the UNfF v-is withdrawn the security of n i a n . s l » 
^^el^'h and wherever e l se the UT^ F was stationed became tho 
sovereign responsibi l i ty of the G9Vernfflent of the U./.R, He 
declared that "the U.A.H, has always maintained that the 
r t r a i t of Tlran Is s part of I t s t err i tor ia l waters*" 
India, aloni; with other countries^ had held this view 
for more than a dec&de. Jn !^ay 26, 19^7 Chagia observed in 
the Lok BtibtB that "so far as tiie Qoverment of India are 
concerned, we have taken the position as far back as 1967 
that the Gulf of Aqaba Is an Inland sea and that the entry 
to the Oulf l i e s within the t err i tor ia l waters of U•^•B• and 
87 
s;audl Arabia, Ve adhere to th is view.** Belteratlng India's 
stand, the Indian representative, G.ParthasarttM, told the 
<;ecurHy Council that *'no s tate or group of s tates should 
attempt by force to challenge the sovereignty tttt o^ the U.'.R, 
88 
over the ""trait of Tlran.*' 
8&. IJiBrt Of Inflla, June £3, 19t7. 
Also -peech of Indian Foreign Minister at the U.N, 
General Assembly special Session, op.cit .»and u.W-S.c.n^r. 
2£nd iear, 1341st Meeting, May 29^ 1967, p. 19. 
67. HilA^t co l . 875. 
£8. Pa trio ty May 31, 1967. 
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VIth r«gard to th« orisis resulting ttom th« cloture 
of the Guif of Aqa^ to Israeli shipping^ the Indian spproaeh 
has been to concentrate on the aalntenance of peace and to 
evolve peaceful conventions for the use of the disputed Gulf 
for innocent sMpt^ lng^ v^lle slaultaneously recognising 
89 
the sovbrcslgnty of the countrlec concerned. The fact that th« 
U,A,R, had blockaded the straits could not Justify the use 
90 
of force* 
The main reasons determining the attitude of the 
Oovernnent of Tndls on tha Gulf issue are the follovlngt 
In 1966| vhen this Usue was f irst raised the Govern. 
ment of India h&d ftUbaltted that it Is even an Inland sea 
not oni/ ttiirritori&l vaters, It Is a olt of sand jutting 
Into Egyptian territory, or In other words, 'rab territory* 
Therefore, thi; question of freedom of navigation does not 
arise. lht» viulf of 'qai;»i does not connect two seas, even 
of th« Suez depth, and ends up in the /-rao territory. No 
douut th« Gulf is 97000 tailes long and over 9 miles vide at 
i t s mouth, out of the coast strip around the 'qaba which 
Is 230 miles out, 126 belong to ^gypt, 94 miles to '^ audi 
Arabia, 7 miles to Israel, and 4 miles to Jordan. iJence, the 
area of port of l:;llath is Insi^lf lcant compared to others* 
89. Thy mnm ^'^y so, 19^7. 
90. IlBSS af Int31S» ^ne 23, 1^7. 
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^«on41r, ttmf Is no •ntry into tti« Ovtlt «xo«pt through 
territorial watws of uandl ..rabtB and r.gypt. Therefor©, 
iDdla doos not rvoogciiso th« oluSas put forwafd ty Isratl 
and h«r si^pporters aM holds that ilgypt and Caudi ,.rebia ar« 
th« tifo otGtos ^ o Gontrol the fcortor territories* Xhe en* 
tranoe is only ^ s i les wide, uM in the aiadle of t.^ iat, ^^ite 
to one eide, is the islend of linm* now the olaio is aade 
tliat ligypt foms one side, <ia«idi i.rabia the other, .i^ ^ba is 
in Torduc and there isithe poxt of iiUath vhieh belongs, 
aooordiiK to then, to Israel and so she i s one of the four 
partosrs* The ease aeaiost those elaias Is, first of a l l , 
tliat the territory now called tho port of -Uath, la tjot 
orlglaiJLly the port of .^ l^lath ct aU, bat was conspired to 
be put on thitt part of the lalestins i'^ aodate by the division 
Into one part for lorden and the Lritlsh :iandute proper. 
Jeoondly, i t i s no doubt true tl &t when the partition arrange* 
neat was aade on 29th fJoveaber 1D47, tho tmited rations had 
gl<?en this place to Israel. lut Israel occupied i t only rxfter 
tlie invasion und not at the tiae of ^ e temisation of the 
!4as)date« This steant that Israel oosie into this area by invasion, 
so the Vt,U0 throti|$iont 1948 odhorod to the resolution thi^ 
'*k'ou cannot make any claiia to any territory vhi(& you h^ ire 
tdkmn by iRvasico'*, und tiiorefore there is no elate of loreel 
dXm f wK* Krishna Henot., "Xhe Israeli Agression /^gainst the 
Arab>3oontriesV^rar&aatin infl rfarM ftlltftlMf ^ol*2V, i:io«3, -ugust 1967, p*l^^ 
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ovor tho ooast of A«^ ba« ^ a for as 2Qdl& is ooiiMi*ni4 4tP^ & 
i s an inland ssa in th@ sisi® "tfay us oth«r inland Moe in tht 
92 
tuorld* Mor«ov«ry in 1P©6, the Indian del«g;^t« to thm II*!!* 
pointtd out that tsy :i ^^ Irnar; grontod by the Saltan of ttxrletsr, 
igypt was aU.oi«»<l to cut c£i tho rort oT utws* ZT tho Iii»d«v 
had th3 right to etit ofi' the port of JneSf thtre is noticing 
to prw«nt tl» king of u^ Jdi J^^ alia and tho Go»«mB»nt of iJgypt 
P i^ttlnig snoagh sund, in tho QulX M.d th«n filling i t up* 
i^^ilarly« i f th«]r oi>n out ond m& l^ana into tfat«r| th»ro is 
no rd«i8on vhy thoy sliould not saka vatmt ifito lend* tliat is 
the legal position 1;. both oi^ ses* 
Lastly^ this isotKi is ulso cotrorned by the oonrentions 
of the %omti iitinople treaty of IBim t^iidi i^pplies i ts artielOf 
unuer oleair>e 10 to tlio 2vma as woU as to ui^a^ that etet^ ns 
my asvigation in both territorios« in these inland vaterSf vas 
FO?aittea to states thut are hostilOf i*e* the seet^rity of the 
Gtate v&s to be tul:en iiito aeoonnt* It is on this basis that 
countries like Israelt '.'hich is er^ oay mciber one of tho urabSf 
hi^ s been denied the right of navigation to cuez us orraneed, 
in ^ positive mannerf by the st^to of ^^pt uith tho United 
:<ution8 in 1087* jChey were Idft to oonoode thc^ t if C4iy eo ntiry 
hu^  any right iinder t^e ^«nnrentifx.s of IBBB^ i^ioh has been 
violated^ let i t go to the International c^ ourtf tiia vay i s not 
rs. £yia«f PP» 189«&O* 
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blocked. Since provision had already been aade under the Con-
vention of 1888 for the redreee of grievances by reference to 
the International Court of Justice, It i s Important to examine 
whether the control of the rtrait of Xlran by the U.A.R. vas 
enough Justification for the resort to force by Israel against 
several ?rab states. In considering this the Indian Foreign 
Minister made the following points at the special session of 
the United Nations General Asseu»uiyj 
(1) U/B i s not a, party to ^ny agreement reeognlflng 
the Gulf of Aqaba as an International vaterway or guaranteeing 
freedom of passage to Israeli ships. 
(11} There Is no universally recognised rule of Interna. 
tlonal l&v on freedom of navlgfttlon applicable to such bodies 
of water as the Gulf of -^qabe* 
( i l l ; The status of this body of vatt^r Is s t i l l a matter 
of controversy, and referred to a publication of the Depart, 
ment of rUU (April 19l>6), Vol. IV, p. £3i>) containing a 
le t ter from the fecretary of ''tate dated January -tS, 1963, 
to the ^ ttorney General, setting forth t^ ie views of th« !)eparti 
ment regarding the extent of territorial waters and the closing 
width of bays. On Aqaba, the letter stated as follows, and 
he quoted. ' The Gulf of Aqaba, the exact statue of this body 
of water is s t i l l a matter open to controversy.** 
(Iv; Even under the Geneva Convention which Is often 
quoted, the Innocent t»BB'^i,% of foreign ships through tdie 
93. Ibid., p, 191. 
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tdrrittorial ¥&tor au,* of^ oUior stato^ is not m> al»soluf» rl^tiii 
tmt r«3tolns subjaet to th« 8««iirlty r««|uiraa9nt8 oT tliat 
8t&t«« 
Th9 GoneraX -©n^U.y also do«8 sot i^oognts© or «v«n 
aeeopt th« condlticwis vtiloii Isya^l tri«d to link vtth Its 
«'i«tio<if uQd«T Int^riiiitiouwi i^v the right of frao 
|i438&ge throu^ tha Jtruit of lir-^ *s r*ot; rooo^ l^s^d* /»na, 
'J.^T9£oT9% this right Canu»t t>« a .roroed tliroi:^ th« UM of 
. «!"'^ "farRiiSPW#®#»i'"*1'IW LI 
.irtn bcforo th« war bogai^ « tho United ..tatae end 
India got Qf.gi^ od Ic int^ns* dlplo^ntlo ooti^ity bo^ insidt 
ii£i6 outsido tho unit«d .nations to avort mf headlong olagh 
l^ tvcMfi th0 two paytl«s, Indiu^u approach to the r^rdblwi vitas 
to sotiMiitrato cm tlw Daintom^neo of poao« ai^ .a to &^dhfQ peeuso* 
ful ooii?«ntiond SOT tlia twa of t!i-> -.lif^ putod Gtdf for lonocant 
chipping, ^.i lo Ttoognlfjing ths 'jw«»ignty of the eonstrlos 
oOfio«rn«d» It vas with this v iw that Indiu docided to s»^ proTt 
tlio rtvivsUk of tha Esi:-50d IsraolO.?* .,iU and loraol-^ ^yrlu 
.^raistieo Joaaiasio s first prorosod by tha -^ oo-jrlty :o!''in«il 
^ « IUia*f PP* I64«e5« 
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in 1948. The United ntat«8 also eupport«d efforts to have 
the t^ecurlty Council take preventive aotion, Meanvfhlle, 
the U.S.A. vae a^intaining pressure on Israel not to take 
any unilateral action. The differences^ if any, betvean 
the Indian repreaentative, Parthasarathi, and the '^eatem 
delegations were only vith regard to procedural inatters • 
the V'estern povers wanted a meeting of the Security Council 
iaisediately after U Thant l e f t on a peace alsslon to Cbairoi 
while India wanted to postpone i t t i l l the return of U Thant 
96 
as i t would oofflpllcate the nisslon of the Tecretary^Genrral. 
The .*?ecurity Council held a series of meetings to 
discuss the Middle fast situation and considered threu draft 
resolutions suUnitted oy Canada and Denmark on May 24, another 
by thfi United ""tates and a third by the U.A.R., sponsored 
ay M India, both Introduced on Hay 31, 1967. The draft reso-
lution of Canada and Dennaiic \Alle supporting the peace 
efforts of the Secretary-Gentsral requested a l l ffle'nbers to 
refrain froai any steps which o i ^ t vors«i the situation. The 
U.S. draft resolution moved by Arthur CSoldberg asked for '^ a 
breathing spell*' in texns of U Thant's report which also 
appar«itly appealed for a cessation of belligerency, Includ-
ing the blockade of the Oulf of Aqaba. The proposal o*" the 
9 b . U>W.Monthly Chtvintelia^ V o l . I V , b J ^ e , 1967 , pp. 9 , 1 0 , 
Also She rUntStt, Hay 30, 19t7. 
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U*^»H» prosenttfd oal / the Arab tld« of t>^ .« canttoverey and 
required Israel to SkOc«pt a l l provisions of th« 1949 ^miatitu 
'*«;r«ia«nt« Jut u spokesf&an of the Tjctamal / f fairs Ministry 
«aplalned to reporters that India supported only the **oper'i* 
tlve" part of the U**.,P.« resolution ariclng for secsptanee 
of the reoosmendatlons of the United l^atlons r:eeretary 
97 
General* ^one of the resolutions could muster sufficient 
support and were dropped* 
However, once var broke out on June 6 | 1967, Washington 
vas ruiok to deaiand that the reourlty Council tict to halt 
tbc varfare* India too, addressed Itself diligently to the 
tHsk of r«^8torlng peac^ In the region and vlthdraval of 
Israelii forces fioa t^e areas occupied o^  then* In •Tune o, 
the day var broke out,:ir8* Oandhl Informed the Iiok .'^ abha 
that, **ln thu Security Council ve are making earnest efforts 
for a cease-fire and vithdraii^l of a l l armed forces to the 
positions they occupied on J^ne 4« ve shall persevere in 
96 
these efforts*** Xhe eame day In^id. put forth a draft reso* 
99 
lutlon which enjoyed the support of many members of the 
9<»» WtNal^ antfaY fihannlfilBt ibi<i«, PP. b^« 
07* Tec ?rifl ^tatiaaam June L, 1967 and XJauft af India June £t 19(»7* 
96* LaJJJl* ^th ''erles, Vol*IV. !fos* H-SO* 'Second ''essIon, 
Juns 6, 1967, col* 3294* ^Iso Ptat^ MBan^  June 2,1967* 
99* feo text In rtataapiy^y June a, 1967* 
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Council* It called upm **ttie Gavernmtfits oancemcd to tak« 
al l stepa nocetssry to 4ff«ct a ceasc-flrc forthwith and 
vlthdx^w their amad forcea iaraedlately to potta they occu-
pied on June 4" and requeatad the 5?ecretary General" to keep 
100 
the council infAxaed of latplementatlon'*. Ihe United f^ t^atea 
oppoaed the draft as i t favoured a airople cea8«.flre. The 
U.P, allegation that originally India had agreed to the 
101 
t^nigh proposal for cease-fire but had nov reverted i ts 
demand to withdrawals to positions held on June 4, was 
off ic ial ly denied by an Indian spokesman. On June 8| in a 
statement in the Lok <7abha, ^ e External Affairs Minister 
•ni^aalzed that the cease-fire was only the f irst stepi and 
the question of withdrawal of a l l axved forces to June 4 
10£ 
positions oust follow iofflediately. India strongly believod 
that **no agt^ res&or should be pemitted to retain the fruits 
of aggression, that no aggressor should be peraltted to nego-
103 
tiate froB strength derived as a result of military conquest." 
The second step envisaged by India was withdrawal. 
India did not disfavour the discussion on matters such as the 
100* Ibid. 
101. The Danish President had earlier suggested a nere cease 
fire which would have enabled the Israelis to remain 
in the positions they occupied in the fighting. 
10£« 9ee IMil*, June 9, 1967. flso luJUl't op .c i t . , col. 
3924.26. 
103* T.-r.n., 4th Series, Vol.VII, Nos. 41-50, col.'l2200>1. 
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naiflgatlon of tlie fUttz Canai, the navigation of the Culf o^ 
*qaba, thw rtootjnltlon of I s rae l , the question of rafugtes 
btc. Out, i t held that "f!r«t thing should come flrit**, and 
the n«3ct step after ceae«*«flrc vac t*^ e wlthdraval of troops, 
ot'^cr matters could be discussed aft t rvards. rxplalning 
104 
t^e Indian st-.nd M,c,Chtigla told t*i« United *Tatlont General 
Asseciblyt 
*" e t^ rc second to none in desiring a return to peace 
in the arest ixit I t must ut« £» Iststin^ on«>. I t Is laportant 
for uu to xt^^^u^Ff i)owev«»r, tii^at an enduring ^cace c&n ue 
est'^ullS'^ed in v^st "sis and elsewhere only If in tt^ls vorld 
ijody, ve c r -^ .11 act together to ensurtt s t r i c t adherence to 
certain basic valuer ^nr fundt^ia%ntal principles of Inter , 
national law, practice, morality and behaviour,••••** 
/gain, "ve had repeatedly ur^ed In the Tewrity Counci 
t!"at: thte Cf»a8e«.flrti wil l not be effecte! unless I t vas coupl( 
vlth vlt^tjl^svsl8• Ve adhere to our bellt>f t*"jt the cease-
f i r e I tself , cannot be mxa considered complete si? long is an 
nllen 3r»ed force occupies large are&s of land beloneing to 
i t s nelg'r biurs, and ae long as l^rge nasses o'* r D ijooples 
l ive and suffer *n suL^jugatlon In t'r'ese occupied are*^8« T!-c 
foundation of a las t ing pei'Ce in the region c^n be bS8e>l onl; 
104. jUti^-f col. i^roi. 
on t^taXy Imsfedljtc '^nd unconditloa^i vlthdraval of Itra«l 
from t>e areas now under I t s occupatio'^i ^nd rightly belong 
Sng eit-^ur to th« U.'.H, or to Jordan or to Tyrl-i. ^* aust 
106 
di8tln4,ul0h oetwe^n pesic« and mere cessation of fighting*** 
iiovever, at u ^&«;tlnt; on June ^ a draft resolution 
t^resfcnttid ijy the .resident of the CounciX| vorked out after 
consult i t lons amoni; se^noers nrxA cal l ing for deese^firet vag 
adopted unanlmousl/* n^ June 7 t^e ''ecurity Council adopted 
vlthout dissent a resolution presented oy the Soviet Union 
derssndiig tVst thk$ Governotnte concerned s^ould| a? a f i r s t 
step ceaso-fJrfe and discontinue ' i l l a l l l t a r y a c t i v i t i e s f^at 
day :it C^CC hours 0,!i,T« )n June By the Council v?is con««aed 
at V^e rtqufost of the rtpr&sentatlves of the United ''tates 
and tht! TovJet Unlony e'^ ch of >^ om a^ed for an ur^ e^nt neet-
Ing, ac tht flghtlni, continued in the Middle i^st , in s^ite 
of f .^e Council resolutions* rv*o resolutions vtrc j^resented, 
one Iv the ovist Union vhlch vented sn extension of thes 
previous resolutions as Israel ha?! i^t taken the f i r s t stvp 
denanded &/ tht ' ecurit^ Council, and the ot^ ^er by t^ se Unltel 
' tutes vliich combined a ct^ll for cease-f ire vlth longer nnne 
discussions* )n June ^C, Joint 'rgentine, Brazil., thlopls 
lOfa* United "atl">ns G«mtrul / sem-ly special ''esslon, Tndl^ n 
^or^lgn Minister's '"peech, iiQ^elt.^ p, '»6^, 
. £44 . 
rtBolutlon as also a resolution by U.S. represtntatlvs vsrs 
Sntroducad. an June 13, the ''ovlet Union Introduced a revised 
draft resolution which was rejected on June « 14. However, 
ttie revised version of the three power draft resolution was 
unanlBousl/ adopted by the Council. On June 14, the President 
of the Council presented a draft resolution <»ndeanlng a l l 
violations of the cease-fire which was also passed unanl. 
10& 
fliously. 
/ fter the cease-fire was concluded attempts were made 
to seek a solution of the prot)l«B within the fraae«ork of 
the United Nations. Two drafts were presented for considera-
tion before the Fifth reBsion of the General Assefflbly called 
107 
at the request of the rk>vlet Union. One was the S^ovlet draft, 
supported by India, which called for condemnation o*" Israel's 
"aggressive activities" and withdrawal of Israeli troops 
behind the armistice l ines . The United rtates not only opposed 
Israel's condemnation by the United Nations but also the 
adoption of a resolution calling upon Israel to withdraw 
Its forces from the territories which It had occupied during 
106 
the war. Instead, i t put forw&rd i t s own resolution which 
10b. un ManthlY Chranlfiifit voi.iv, NO.7, July, ig^?, pp* 
pp. 13.29. 
107. JJM't P- 6. 
106. The United states did not press for a vote on Its 
draft of May 3, saying It was outdated, or on its 
draft of June o, % l^ch was similar to the one adopted 
on June le, UN flonthily Cftmntclflt op.cit . , p.6. 
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Qloed i t ^chltivlnit; pe^ce through *ntigoti'it^i 'srrang«B«nt8 
on th«soasis :»f th« r«C3t>nltlon of *srael'« tsoundarlcs* and 
t-k! auUiyi rcco<;nltlon af the poi l t ioa l Indtpendtnc* an<f 
•t t^rrl torial integrity* of a l l countries In tht area, r'r^c-
t l ca i ly , t M t oe:^nt t^' t Tsra«l could uee the pressure of 
I t s ffiilltry occup'atlon ^f the t e r r i t o r i e s o** I te neighbours 
t3 sx t r ' c t from thera an acknovl«:!g«ment of tht legitimacy 
of I t s conquests 3n<! aggreeslonsy past and prtsent* Tsr^tl 's 
occupation of the t«rritorlu@ in 1967 v&» In vlol'itlon of the 
General /^scemuly h«solutlon of Movseber £i9« 1947 and the 
' ra i t t lc© 'grecBJ nts of 1949| vhich did not prejudica the 
s&ttlam«»nt of the ."ixt^stine ' uostion* thex^iforti, the a t t ^ p t 
of thfc united ' ' tates to aake Israel i withdrawal conditional 
upon vhat ataounted to '^n laposltlons of peaosf was & striking 
departure from t'.c i>o8ltlon t'^ken tv i'resid^nt ^ i8«nho%'ar 
at V)e tlffl€ of th<u 'uez Crisis* In h is memorable '^dresi to 
the Elation on I'euruiry £0t 1967 ;'resld«mt Eisenhower haj 
challenged thfc ioifci:*lity of I s r ae l ' s similar arguaent thst 
I t 8>iould have •firm guarantee, as a conditio"" to %'lthdr9wlng 
i t s forces of Invfislon* hnd s^idi 
"rhould s nation vVich attacks ani occupies foreign 
terr i tory In the f«ce of United %tions* disapproval be 
illoved to imposeicondlt ons on I t s oMn withdrawals? 
If ve agre« that arasd attack can proparly achl«v« 
t>^ « purposes of th« assailant, th«n I f«ar w« will hav« tumad 
109 
ba<fli the clock of International ordtr." 
As a result of the conflicting postures adopted by the 
U.r.r.H, and the U.r./'v,, both the resolutions, besides soae 
otiisr resolutions and amendaents supporting either of the 
two positions, failed to secure the necessary two*thirds 
majority for their adoption oy the General Assembly. Thus 
l-'O 
the United *f>tions was paralysed and aggressloa was rewarded* 
Dr« John H.David analysed the resulting situation as foXlowst 
**t'ith the two major powers thus divided, no effective 
action %ms possible in the ^ eourity Council or the General 
Assembly. This, in effect, has given Israel virtually a 
free hand in such matters as holding and occupying the territory 
she had seized, annexing the old city of Jerusalem, and 
refusing to permit the refugees who had crossed to the Fast 
Bank of the Jordan to return to their homes In the Vest Btrtfc 
area or the Gasa atrip." 
In e major policy statement on June ?9, 19^ 7^, President 
Johnson enunciated vh&t he called the "five great principles 
109. Dvight D.i:isenh^wer£ Vagina Peace lfl6b»196ly p. 188. 
110. Henry Cattan, 2SIMSX1»$ 99* 127*28. 
111. John H.Davis, Thfa Lvaaivfi P«aee, (London t John Hurray, 
19t>8), p. 99. 
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of ya^G^* .^e St^ieed t^-^t troops must tio vlUdravn", but 
this vouii! not Lolv© tht iiroblem. **•••• tr.jjre nuet aleo b« 
reC9^l2«d t^ fc rli:^ ta of national l l f « , progress In solving 
V <c refuge- probl«a, freedom of innocent oa r i t ime passT^gei 
l i a l t ^ t i ^n of thto arms rsicei ^nd re8p««ct for polltio&l inde» 
peadtjnce and t « r r l t o r i a i lntegrlty»The t'Tcsldent offered a l l 
sipproprlatc asslst£:.nce to the Middle Tasttrn peoples and 
leaders wbo must btar V"^ ^ictuai responsioUlty for petiioe. 
mak ing« 
These f5ve pr incipl ts of ptace were embodied in i 
draft United ^^ations resolution and placed before l^e 
114 
G«nirai 'SBeooiy by Ambesfador -ioldberg* vit^out appearing 
to ii& pro^Isr cl( merlca vanttd a peace settlessent a t terns 
fuvouruUic to Is rae l . 
In the meantlae, Indl-> made an uncuesess^l bid to 
solvt thfc Middle : i 8 t probica on the basis of I ts *""ouiwPolnt 
tlan" presented oy t'^e t'emanent representative of India to 
116 
t K U.*^.jCuParf-asaratbl, before the '^ecurity Council* I^ese 
ii£« r^nchttitttr att^f(iiaa> J'UD« £9. i9<»7, a s o airUt^aa 
113. hlchard P.^tebblns, aj2*£lt«t P» '•14* 
114. natifflent of June £0, ''967 and draft res->luti')n (VI'^SO; In DocuaentSt ?fo«4S« 
116. U!? Vmlhlf C^nnlCitf Vol.IV, % . ? , July 1967, pp. l8- ia 
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Included t *'Flrtt, tb« Council should reinforce i t s call for 
ceaa««fIre and Innedlatel/ order vlthdraval of a l l armed t&^ 
forces to positions the/ occupied before the; outijreak of k 
hostllitle8*Se<»nd,it vould be necessary to reactivate and 
strc:n£then th« United '*Tations oa^inery In the area to enf-src 
the ceas€»flr€! s and secure vlthdraval ^n th( lines proposed 
oy the Cecretary.Uencral in hJs report of «:^  May {^/790o)f 
IMrdy the Council should consider vht^ther thb recretary. 
Gtficriil should not t>« requested to Auynte a personal repre. 
s«ntativ£ to the area. Fourt^, Mhvn withdrawals have been 
conpleted and the agjjression has been vacated the Council 
should consider earnestly the steps to be taken to stabilize 
peace in tht: area* Holutlons to bo N^ orked out have to be 
vlthJn t^e fraB!e%?ork of the sovereignty of the rtstes cone* 
urned and th<s Just and Imaeaorlal rights of t^e 'rab people.** 
Iloveveri by the •^ nd of June India nodlfled i ts four 
point foroaila and restricted i t to tvo basic denands* First, 
Israel should restore the position as i t %fas on June 4, 
oefore ttM outbreak of h o s t i l i t l e s | and second, that the 
reoretary«(/eneral should be asked to confer vltii t^e two side 
on its impleaentatlan and the furthei- steps to be taken. 
This also net the United states view that the osttter should 
114». ^^fi^n.CQ.L.y ££nd ir.» I3b.2nd Heetlne, June 9, 19&7, 
p. lOSf and also Ibid., I367th ^i^mtingf June i i /1£, 193 
p. ITE. 
b« s«ttldd through discussions l>etv«ttn th« tvo piirtl«s« '^aos 
117 
and l8r&«l* 
f^ eatt, India along with Jugoslavia and thlrtaan othsr 
mtlons tabled a rssolution before the emergency session of 
the United Nations General AsseoBbly* The resolution called 
for the ifluaedlate vithdraval of th« Israeli forces *t>«hind 
the armistice lines*, or in other words, the borders laid 
dovn by the United Nations in 1949, It sought to restore the 
Port of Eilat to the Arabs} txom vhoB i t was wrested by the 
Israel i 's after the amist iee of 1949. Acceptance of the 
resolution would have automatically solved the question of 
ffiaritiae rights of Israel in the Gulf of ^qaba, vithout the 
port, I>sraelis could not claim passage through t^e Gulf* 
!Chi8 naturally implied a shift in t^e previous Indian stand 
that th« position prevailing on June 4, should be restored 
as a f irst step* India, however, maintained that she had 
supported the resolution as i t aimed at st«t>rln^ a middle 
course between the American and Toviet stands* Perhaps, the 
suggestion about the restoration of the borders might have 
besn adopted as a bargaining counter* In order to accommodate 
Israel this proviso could be deleted and restoration of the 
status quo adopted as the objective* 
117* IlBftg gf India, •fune 22, 19t>7* 
l ie* Xblil*, June 30, 1967* 
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Ih« Indian d«legat« opt^osed the alttrnatiire Latin 
Aa«rlcan draft rsaolutlon supported &(/ U.B,/%« aa It "fell 
short of the &QC9yted principles and the prlosry objeetive''t 
slncsy "It couples vlthdravais with a settleaent of conpll. 
cated Issues and thus It becomes a formula for bargaining 
from a position of strength by Israel." 
India, t^e delegate saldy f e l t that the draft would lead 
to a deadlock since i t failed to give priority to the central 
Issue of Immediate vlthdravals* And no state could be 
expected to agree to negotiate as long as foreign forces 
continued to occupy i t s lands under duress • on the other 
hand thm Indian proposal vas "a recipe for resotratlon of 
119 
peaceful conditions and establishment of a durable peace.*' 
Hoveirer» the Assembly rejected the Indian draft. The 
external Affairs Mlnlsteri Cha|ia, described this as **fflost 
unfortunate." He vas convinced that the noa.allgned resolution 
was '*the only logical step**! uhlch the United Nations could 
120 
have taken. Vlthout wlthdravais pexoanent and lasting peace 
could not be achieved. 
Undaunted by this reversal, India continued to make 
intense diplomatic efforts to find a compromise betveen the 
119. Xhfi ITIndtt, July**, 19b7. 
120. Xht P8tirlQt> July o, 19b7. 
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121 
noiwaXlgncd and Latin Af!i«rlofin rasolutldn* Therefore. India 
12£ 
8yapathl8«d with th« Tito Propoiala vhlch Mere bailoslly 
slaUar to th« United rtat«« 6*Polnt plan and tha Uoltad 
Statea-roviat Union Joint fotnula «volvad tov&rda th« tnd 
of the afflerganey aaaaion of tha United ^atlona Ganarsl 
"asambly, Ihe Hoviat Unlan and the United ^tataa alao auppor-
ted theae efforts for peace, 
India's peace efforts finally led to the introduction 
of the Indla-.^fall-fUgerla draft which urged withdrawal of 
Israeli forces to positions occupied before the outbreak of 
hoatl l i t les i l*a* to poaltiona held on June 4 | 10t»7* 
"ivary atate has tha right to l ive In peace and eoap* 
lete Security free froa threata or act of war andf eonaequently, 
a i l atatea In the area should taroilaate the atate or claia 
of belligerence and satt le their International disputes by 
peaceful iseans* 
"Likewise every state of the area has the right to be 
secure within i t s bordar^ and It i s oblig'tory on al l nenber 
121* Indian Sgar^aat '^^z ^ t^ "^ d^ .^ 
l£^ £* Preaident XIto*a propoaala were t (1) Israel to withdraw 
to the pre-June positlon| (£) Aratw to renounce the 
state of war* If otherwl8a| Israel's settled frontiers 
to be guaraniceed by the 4 big powers including the 
Soviet Union} (3) The rues to be opened to Israeli ships 
flying third country flagS| straits of Tlran to reoiain 
under Egyptian sovemlgnty. but Israeli ships to suffer 
under ta rt;Strlctlon) (4) Egyptian refugees to be settled 
or indeianlfled. Tlaaa of India, August 14, 10t>7« 
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states of tht ar«a to r«sp«ct th« sovsrelgnt/i ts ir ltorlal 
intfigritjr and polit ical ind«pend«nce of ons another. 
"Xbers should be a just ssttlsnent of the question 
of t>alestlne rsfugsss* 'nd there should be guarantees of 
freedon of navigation in aocordanee with international lav 
through international vatervsjrs in the area.** 
Xlitts» the draft resolution recognised Israelf guaraiw 
teed i t s Security froa attacky free and peaceable passage 
througib the fues Canaly thougli not through the Qulf of Aqabs, 
whioh,according to India^is an inland sea and not an inter, 
national vaterva/* 
The draft vas acceptable to the ^rabs but vas not 
123 
unacceptable to the United < t^ates and Israel* Israel rejee* 
ted i t on two grounds t Firsty **it defines in advance the 
territorial and security situations % i^ch should foHov the 
cease-fire*** r:ban argued that i t vas for the soverci^i goven 
nents of the area to detemlne by negotiation the situation 
to suece«jd the cease-fire* Ihe second objection was to Tndi< 
Hording on naritiae freedom* The Indian stateaent favoured 
the UAH*s doctrine on the «xix exclusion of Israeli shipping 
froB the rues Canal and the de-fuaction of the Gulf of ^qabe 
123* ItMM nf InaUf Noveaber 9, ig67» Also ^attint< 
N'>veBber 1^ » 19i>7* 
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v&t^rvtty, "In vlev of the tol9 of the navl^tlon pmbl«B 
In the vars of 1966 and 1967. this obtourlty i t perilous to 
pencey*" he declared* 
Ultimately, i t vas the British draft resolution, vhleh 
broke the deadlodc. It was passed unanimously hy the Security 
Council vith no abstentions, on November £2, 1067. It took 
:* middle position betvesn the u«S* draft and the Afro^'^slsn 
draft sponsored b^  India leaving the guideline vague for ^ e 
United Nations special mediator In the Kiddle i:ast, as the U.5?« 
vanted, and prescribing in advi^ nce principles on \^ich he 
should conduct negotiations vith the t%fo parties, as the 
126 
Indian draft emphatically required on behalf of the 'rabs* 
But, i t was the Indian interpretation that the r«solution, 
read &s a whole, committed the Security Council to tot i l 
Israeli vithdraii^ls thou^ flmtually agresd upon border 
adjustments vere not ruled out, that actually facilitated i ts 
\manliK>U8 passage and acceptance by the Toviet Union and 
126 
four other countries* VelcKNBlng the resolution, the Indian 
off ic ia l spokesman commented, **ve have get (s lo) some move-
127 
ment nov after so many months of stalemate**' 
124* iiiJUl*, November 14, 19t7* 
126* Hlntfttatan ItoW, November 26, 19t>7* 
12b. AlBM Sf laai f Noveaoer 26, 19b7* Alio ffartiigm Jnrila 
patrika, November 27, 1967* 
127* natrtaant November 26, 1967* 
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Hovever, the Hecui'lty Council fa i led to get t*ie '«lov#n-
ber 22 resolution Implemcntei. The Jarring Mlaslon vas 
tjog^ed <!own In the Irreconclllable posit ions o^ the two 
bel l igerents . Ve\t D^lhl f e l t that Israel vas s ta l l ing 
substantive negotiations by raising proce(!^rtl Issues. The 
Israel i Insl&tenoe on direct talks vlth the Arabs shoved 
Israe l i unvlll lngness to se^k a speedy sett lenent. The 
Arab position vas that they vould not enter Into direct neeo-
t la t lont , although they were v l l l l n g to talk to the I srae l i s 
12B 
via Jarring. Hoveveri India desired that 4 efforts for a 
po l i t i ca l settlement of tin- Middle Fast problem should be 
reneved with c e r ^ l n c lar i f i ca t ions and directions by the 
r-ecurity Council regarding the resolution of '^ovenber 22, 
19^7. I t has been Indla*i consistent stand that no one 
should be allowed to enjoy the fru i t s of aggression, ^ence 
5t haB urged that there should bo a simultaneous withdrawal 
and end of belligerency by recognising the tixistence of 
129 
Israel , helter&ting India's views Ganesh, M,P., stated oefore 
the General Assembly's Third (racial and Humanitarian) Comol. 
ttee that "occupation of t err i tor ies by war Is Impemisslble 
and in order to f a c i l i t a t e an early settlement of the problem, 
the withdrawal of I srae l i armed forces from a l l the 
12&. lklii .9 February 19, 19o8. 
129. Indian raoreggf October 10, !»>&• 
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territories held as a result af the conflict after June 5, 
1^7 must take place Immediately In accordance vlth the pro-
130 
visions of the Security Council resolution. 
Another probltfi requiring an urgent solution Is the 
plight of the Palestinian refugees. 8^ the Tr*31sn delegate, 
D.P.rhar, told the United Nations, "A lasting solution to 
many problems of ^est Asia could be worked out only vhen the 
key IsEUe of ^Palestinian refugees was dealt vlth and steps 
taken to ensuxe the Just rights of 'rab peopltiS of Palestine." 
He deplored that despite various resolutions of the U.N. '^Many 
long years have passed since then but the refugees have 
received neither compensation nor the opportunity to return 
to their homes. Ve cannot but regret this lade of progress 
and viould once again remln^d the ^ss^bly of Its moral obll^a. 
tlon to Implement the resolution and thus assure Justice for 
131 
tl'ie p^ple of Palestine.*' India also supported an appeal to 
Israel to pextatbt **nev refugees" to return to the Israeli 
occupied ^est 3ank of the River Jordan. Britain and U.c.A. 
also made a similar appeal, but Israel Ignored It.India, 
however, f l m l y believes that a Just and lasting solution 
to the refugee problem was possible on the basis of the 
130. SSJtXis^f December 7, 1968. 
131. NQtiftnai Herald^ December 17, 19&7. 
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'ioTeao«r 12, 19t7 r«curlty Council Besolutlon, India aiea 
lent It i support to th« appolntacnt of e 3*!!Bn consltttc to 
lnvtstigat« Ters«ll practices affecting hu«an rights of th« 
133 
ix>puI&tlon of occupied t«rrltorl«i« Otivlously th« plan vai 
uiiaec«ptaui« to th« *rat>St ^^ « ravl«t Union und Its a l l l«s 
Xndl:^  and others vho sympSithlssd vltb the 'rab stsnd* 
jrr.tf"'T;'?f -'^ p a « - ^ v - 'NP 1T??FB fi-'^a: rr^fiTfit 
')n Jun« £e, l3?a«l took certain 9<!ffllnlstrQtlve and 
Idglslstlve !B«8sur«8 vlt^ a vlev to IntegrAtttif the flninlelpal 
adslnlitratlons o^ Israeli and Jordanian Jsrusalsa.President 
Johnson sharply rebuked Israel for annexing the Jordanian 
sector of Jerusaieaii Including the historical places^ to the 
sovereignty of Israel as **a hasty, unilateral action,' A 
United rtates statement declared that It "has ntiver «t recog. 
nlsed such action In J«rusale« In the past**, and ^a t action 
today cannot be regarded as detemlalng the future'* either 
of the historical places or "the status o^ Jefusales*** This 
Indicates the extent to which the (Resident vas prepared to 
go to supplant thte results of territorial conquest through 
m military force b^  larger agreenents establishing a new and 
sore stai;;le arrangeotent* 
132. llnfiUat^n XlBtl» I>e©ember 1, 1968, 
133. l^atrin.tt neceaber 7, ^SttS. 
134. ChrlatiMi <^.oAsmtit, Vif^nibsr^ JVUie 30t 19&7. 
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7hm t^r^stdtnt't public etattfB«int on .Terugal«B Indies. 
t«d his Intention of r«l/ing not only on raare private pertua. 
tlon tMt aXso of finding ways of opposing any *'h&tty,uni. 
lat«ral action tqr Israel as the al l l tary vie tort ililch al |^t 
preclude r«adjustfflent and n«£otlated settlement* It also 
served as a varnlng that even if Israel should apply i ts 
nev leglsli^tion, v^ l^ enipovcred the Gnvemment to aet and 
was not asndatoryi the r^ x^ esident vould not regard that as 
final, 
Later^ vhen i t Deoas« known that the a<talnl8trative 
action had actually taken placOf another strong etateaent 
%#as Issued by the Itate Oepfrtaent ditavovlng this action, 
as i t conflicted vlth th« United ^tates deelar'^^tions f regarc! 
Ing the need ^or adequate recognition of x Jerus&ltfi*s 
special status as a city sacred to Christians* <Tevs and 
Muslims* Its object, therefore, vas clearly to prevent any 
unilateral action by Israel fron autoaatieally beooning a 
pollt:!cal settlescnt, In plao« of the broad, tvo-sided settle 
nent that th« i^resident vas Insisting upon* A tiallar 
ld6. U,?TtiaBfi\«aattf VU6S3, details in ijll CtlfOnJ^ fliBf 0B»fil1 
p* 3;>* Also se«^  Text of Department of rtate statement 
In £*£JLS*» «^ uly ^7t ^9i»7, p*60 and Text of ^hite ^ouse 
rtatement In Viritly CnBpJlIatlftni t>f ftti^dfUMal 
TVtgUMaiits^ J u l y 3 , 19&7* 
• S6B • 
Indletatfit of th« Oovtrnasnt of Israel ve» mad* by feoretiry 
Ru«k on July 14, 19t>7« 
Xh« situation continued to be explosive between 1968 
and 1970. The United Nations cease-fire lAS interaittentiy 
violated by both sides, following aueh the same course as 
that vhlch led to the cr is is of 1967* UuerUla raids by 
Arab commandos were met by Israeli army and air attadcs 
aimed at both the Arab guerillas and the -^rab Governments 
vhlch gave them protection* The United rtates joined the 
United Nations condemnation of the large scale Israeli raids, 
but at the same time also condemned txue violations by the 
.^rab side. '*«^n indication of this shift In policy vas found 
in the condemnation by the United states Government at the 
r^eeurlty Council of Israel's strike on December £8, 19&8, 
against the c iv i l International airport of Beirut, as an 
"arrogant act** and an "unacceptable form of international 
behaviour" for which Israel should apologise. This vas the 
f i r s t out»spoken criticism of Israel's aggressive action by 
136, Text in n-S.B. Judy 31, 1967, p. 149. It i s to be 
noted here that the U^s.. %foose attitude could have 
been of gr«at weight in this matter, shoved on this 
occasion a remarkable indifference ko the fate of the 
Holy Places and the city of Jerusalem by abstaining 
from the almost unanimous vote on the two resolutions 
of the General Assembly ^Ich condemned Israeli annexatio 
of Jerusalem* Oee Henry Cattsn, op .c i t . . p. 119. 
• £69 • 
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thtt Unitttd ft&Ut a9V«rfM«nt ev«r tine* th« /tar 196&. 
7h« %!ilt« Houst Fortlgn Affairt advl&«r| BottoVi 
«xpressla^ concern said thst t'rMldcat Johaton Ylewd th« 
fttUok at imwit* and a earloua devalopacnt** Ve thjnk i t a 
gjrav« sattttr for r<jgular for««s to attack a c iv i l international 
airport in a country ^ 1 ^ has )»«n striving towards flR>d«ra« 
tlon in th« Hiddls last ." 
Th« raasoas for U.^, reaction M% vtrled. First of 
a l l , i t did not -dppreci3t« In principle Israel's policy of 
on eye for an eye against Its 'rab nol^liours. But In thl? 
case t^e United ''tstes believed tl^at the Israeli retaliation 
v&s disproportionate to the outrage coaaitted by the tvo 
-rab saboteurs against the i^ L.&l aircraft at Athens. H^reoveri 
the United rtates vas particularly embarrased because the 
attack caae within a fev hours of the announcement by the 
rrtate Departaent that the United "^tates had finally agreed 
to s e l l Israel i^ hantoa Jet Fighter boabers. Fornai U,f:. 
protests handed over to Israeli counsellor were couched** in 
139 
the strongest teras.** India also condemned the attack on 
Beirut International airport as she has ai^^ys dlaapproved of 
137. Henry Cattan, op«clt«* p* 130. 
'^ 38* jjttUC^ UJU>» Hecea&er 30t 19&8. 
139. IMd. 
• 260 • 
th« polley of r«prl8&Xs, *n off lc 'a i spokesman of th« Exter-
nal "ffalrs Ministry detcrlbtd It a» a "imnton act**. T t^ 
Indian d«legate| speaking In th« •nergcney session of tJ^ e 
"•curlty CounelX termed the Tsr-aell attack as "blatant, 
reprehensible and Intolerable* T^e declared ^ a t tMs shoved 
t>^ e utter dlsreijaid of Israel for t^e U,*f. and the world 
opinion, rucb an action by a statt for a sporadic terrorist 
action MM vas unprece^ t&ntody ulaost w£irlikey if not **3 re^l 
act of va/« If ptiaca was to bo) promoted such an asuivalent 
attitude on th« part of f i t tc*stern powers vould provt le"ist 
helpful* De sug^^sted that Isrut^l must bti firmly told that 
140 
she could not get avay vlth such savage acts. 
In Harch 19i<>& the Aiaerican position on t^e issue vas 
stated W recriitary ho^^rs before a <?<jfnate Comtsitteb in 
vashington* He ^eid that an Israeli vithdraval to boundaries 
held before the June igi»7 var vas an essential part of a 
pe^ Cb settlement. ' peace agreeisent should **not reflect the 
weight of conquest** and any changes in borders should not be 
confined to those renulred for **mutual security. The Israel! 
v5 Uidraval vould be deptindent on thu rt^eopiition of Israel 
141 
by tie 'rat states. 
140. /Jfftte aa»r t^atrUtat December d1» 1908. 
141 . nai^y Tftlfegraah^ Harch £&, 1»>9. 
^ft«r Nixon took -jfflc*, he declared In h i t vtry f i r s t 
press conference that **»•• ve are not going to etand back and 
rather va i t for soaething to happen* 
.'^ ow, v^re goin^ to aesuae I t on what I vouid eugte<t 
f ive fronts ) vJr«i ^lo^, to continue to give our aix.i«ut 
support to th<u Jerrlr^ alseloni ve uzo ^ping to have bliatera 
talks at t! n United ^atlone, ijrtpar-stoiv to t^ e^ talks between 
the four poversj ve s? a l l have four-power t^lks at the United 
N:itlonsi ve shal l also h^vt talks v l th the countries in tht 
area, with th« Israe l i s and thuir nelehb^urs} ani In tidditlon 
we wsmt to i:o forward on ooao of tht long ran^e pl^nSf tht 
I Isenh-jver-'trausE r'lan for reilevlni: so'nfe of the v%ry grave 
economic i>r'5blea9 Sn that area* 
'Ae believe that th© i n i t i a t i v e here Is one that cannot 
be simply uni lateral , i t must be aAltUateral , md oust not 
be in one dir&ctlon, were goin^ to pursue ^iVBry possible 
14S 
avenue to peace In titu Mideast that we can*** 
i^ctln*; on this i i o i i c / | in ear l / "19t'9, i resident "ixon 
took thts inltiativfc in invit ing other povero to Join in 
the ntigotlatln^ effort -o r^ach a settlement of the Arab. 
Israel i dispute. The U,r,^. f e l t that It alone should not 
I4fc. i»resld«nt rflxon's M©vs Conference, February t>|^9b9* 
.ifcJ^^S*, Vol. U , •10.1646, February i.4, 1St»9, p. 169. 
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shottldw responsibility for ks«plng peacs In th« Middle ::ast| 
for a durable peace could be secured only vhen the '^ovlet 
Union and sther povttTB vlth interests in the region also 
accepted some measure of responsibility. ''ence/Presld«nt 
NJxon tried n«v approaches, aalnly t^ r9Ugh bilateral talks 
%flt^  the U,r,r,K. and four-pover talks oetveen the United 
r.t:^tes^ Britain, France and th^ rovi«t union vlthln the 
fraa«tvork of t:ie United Nations ''ecurlty Council lesoiutlon 
of rJoVbmber i-t^ TSi^ ?. The U,'?. delegates '>f these Povers aet 
at "'wv xork on "prll 3, 19U9. Israel at once opposed the 
procwdurfr adoptt-d b/ tlie ur«at I'-jwers, fearing an **imposed 
solution** unfavourable to hersv^lf. President TTij^ n denied 
th-^ t thtsse talks sought Co Impo&ti a solution, out held that 
they could dt^flnltely contribute tovnrds a peaceful settlcaent 
^hiio thfc mDdtsiatfc and radical ;rab governnents such as 
Jordan and I ^ ypt accept© the t«alks, th« f^alcetinlan guerilla 
organisations condemned them. i^t Toviet Union set-aside 
thnt effort 2t the tnd of ''9to9. 
Besides tho uilateral and multilateral efforts, th« 
Unitsd ""tates slso continued alploaatlc efforts on i ts ovn, 
Ve most notauifa in this respect was t^ fe uogeis Heace t i^an, 
i t raqulrtid almost coaplatc isr-'^eli vlthdrawtil from terrltorl< 
14^* i.'^ lph H*:ki^ nus, xui*iMU*t P* "^ d^ * 
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s«is«d In thtt I0b7 vari vouid pXac« Jtrusalea under joint 
Isiii«ll Jordanian controiy and %iould o>)llgo th« IgxQ«lit 
to aocapt an unsp«olfi«d ntnber of ^rab rofugDet* In return 
the Arab t:,ov«ma«ntt vouXd b« requlrtid to give binding 
ooBoltBienta to peace and to Iarael*e exlstenee at a sovereign 
•tate* 
:ncouraged by the coaplaowriey of the "estem Povert 
!ind the inactivity of the vorld body, Itr^el puzaued unpur. 
turbed i t s policy of JUdaitlng the Holy City of Jeruiaieiii 
3nd vhether by Israeli connivance or indifference and ineffi-
ciency, a portion of the faaoua '1 Aqee !4osque in laraell 
occupied JerusalcB vaa oumt do«n which hurt th« feelings 
of ^iuslilBt a l l over t^t vorld* There vas a strong reaction 
in India against this action, f l l sections of Fajya ^abha 
strongly oondeaned Israel for the burning of the 'l-Aqsa 
144 
Hssque on ^u^ust £1, 19t»9» rpeaklng at a public seating 
on the haa LUa Grounds i^ rlsM Minister Indira Gandhi described 
i t as an *'uhholy act** or a "deplorable act**, fhe said that 
this ^ot had increased tension In the area which could have 
146 
world^'ida repercussions* Ihe ilaLtemal 'ffairs Minister, 
ninesh rinf^, expressed **grave concern^ at the flouting of 
144. itoMH nf ln(11a» ^Ue^ust 2 9 , '(9&9« 
t46« Th« TTinito^ ;7epteBI;jer I t , 19&9* 
th« UnlUd n&tlons* ramJUition ty Israel and urg«<! ianediatt 
Ixeplementation of th«) rMoXutloQ* H« d«cJLar«!d that *'Isra«l 
cannot be absolved of rsaponslbl l l^ for t^ls outrfts««** *t 
th« u.N«, thtt Indian reprss^tatlv« told the r«ourit/ Council 
that "to us the Incident r«pr*t«nts a ouch vlder malalt* and 
i s a direct cmsequense of the lllei:^! occupation fa/ Israel 
147 
of th« fJoly city of «r«rusaX«fli and aany oth«r /rab arsas*" 
Th« Unltsd tatcs also Joined vlth ths others in condesmlng 
the incldtfit* 
laving los t hope of eo«operation froa ^ e ''ovlet Onion 
and being convinced that no step tov^ r^ds peace vas possible 
unless the parties theaselves participated dlrectl/f on Jva%9 
19, 1970, the United ' tates took a aajor Initiative to get 
both sides to t (a) re»establlsh the eease»flre and (b) 
ouserve a military standstill in an agreed cone on both sides 
of thto Isroal^U'li cease-fire l ine (e} 'gree on a set of priiw 
clpl««s as thu basic starting point for Arab Israeli talks 
148 
under the auspices of ^sibassador Jarring* / s recretary o^ 
rtate i^ o^ers stated publicly that the naln objective of this 
proposal vas'^to encourage the parties to stop shooting and 
t4b« ^tTint^ i'ueust £7, 19u9« 
147. '^Induwten Xlmali repteaber 1 ^ 18&0. 
148* ^'ith regard to the U«n, efforts to establish cease-fire 
and start negotiations see Ti«ii« nt inAia^ Jime £b, 
^970 and Da»y I^li1g^l8^, ^une £b, 1970. 
start talking." X» c partlfes accepted t^• proposal In April. 
^'«lcoBifi|i the end of h'5itllltl«sE India's rxternal 'ffslrs 
Hinlstart '^ varan ringh, doscrio«d i t as a "positlvs dsvsloo. 
149 
osnt** in th« V©rt *slan situation. ITovevsTy in th« sutuan of 
1970 soa« n«v ^tooXamB cropped up • the rovi«t»Eg/ptlan 
violation ^f the standstill agrs^tosnt, th^ br«akdo%ai of 
doacistiv 3rd<u:- In Joid^ n^^  and thb invasion of Jordan b/ 
r^rlan forct*».vhlch soB«vhat daaphered ths United '^tstss 
ViO 
p«&c« efforts. 
novsvsTi U.€, dlploaats strov« b^lnd the scsn^s to 
8av« the month old ct^ase-flre and to revive ^ratk»Isra«li 
p«^co talks at tl:b U.N. In :K:tober ^970t the United rtstss 
proposed that the United "Nations General ^sseobly reoomsad 
a three-Bonth extension ^f the Vest Asian standstill cease. 
f ire and prompt resumption of the deadlocked p^aoe talks, the 
'merican resolution ran counter to the one placed before the 
Gunur'^ 1 Assembly by sixteen members of the from'^si^n group, 
including IndiU| calling for resumed p^ ^^ ce f^lks and a report 
by t^ fe rccretaxy.Gener^lt U Xhunt, vithln tvo months on 
140. IlUiUSAt August 30» 1970. 
Idc. kaStFagftaai k*QliQV for t^a '^ a7Q« t The merging rtructur 
rixon 
161* UftXidBaat Tepteaber 6, '«970. 
Dr* Janrin^s efforts ani on iapliacntation of the Q»unoil 
16S 
retolutlon* 
In January 197*, Aobsttador Jarring onee again engaged 
In 1 final round of talks vlth the contending partlee, e^ a 
baele wt for future negotiations he desired an Igraeli 
coBmltnent to vltbdrmr i t s forces fio« occupied United *rab 
hepuollc territory to Vie former intexnational laoundary 
between : gypt and ^ e British mandate of Palestine | and 
reciprocal Egyptian OMmitnent to enter into a pesos agrse. 
Bent vith Israel* I'gypt gave a qualified ooaaiitaent, Israely 
on the other hand, vas willing to enter talks looking tovsrd 
agreeaent on secure and reooi^nised borders iaut i^t willing 
to assure in advance to wltiidraw to the foraer international 
border* B^ the end of Fetaruary Anbassador Jarring* s efforts 
once again got bogged (!own« 
The United rtates exertid strong new pressure on 
Israel to withdraw to i t s ^967 border with tgypt and warned 
that *^nd "^ar III hinged on the outooae of peace negotiations 
Secretary Bogsrs sharply disputed the policy of preaier Golda. 
Mier that Israel aust bass i t s future security on territorial 
positions estaolls^-ed tvrough a formal peace settlenent* iie 
U2. IJMU nf InMh October 3% 1970. 
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urged Israel to accord equal or greater laport»nee %9 a poll , 
t ioal arrangea«int tiased on the pretence in the disputed area 
of a United Kationa Middle ! aat peacetJceeplng foroe joined 
in bjf the United rtatep, the Tovlet Unlon^ Britain, Fiance 
and perhays snaller natlona. 't the saae tlae he pledged 
long.range econoalc and Military ald« 3ut this propotal 
also failed to evoke a positive rcsponsa* 
United ^tates then tried another approach • an Interla 
step tov^rd peace In the form of an agreeOHint for reopening 
the '\iea Canal and a partial vlthdraval of Israeli troops* 
This idea, originally suggested publicly by both Tsrael and 
154 
J'-gypt, vas pursued fciy th* Fecitt.ry of ^'tate Bogers In May 
1971 during his trip to the area and subsequently t^rou^ 
othisr diplomatic channels* Xhe main principles Involved in 
the negotiations verei 
i6d. totwmtiiinai ^araiil Irtfauntt ^^ch i7t i9rf* 
154- ^e« IMUYlfllBgJBht October 6, 1971. 
The rix Point Peace Plain envisaged )3y itogers and 
present<id to United nations General 'sseobly vas t (1) a link betwesn an interim agreeoient on the canal 
and a pezaanent solution that l^ouid make i t plain 
that the reopening of the vfttervay is to be regarded 
as a f i r s t step towards a vldeiwranging settlesMnt* (2) i*hyslcal opening '^ f the canal as a practical 
matter (d) A further agreed ext^slon of th^ current 
cease«flre« (4) Vlthdraval oy Israel from the canal 
l ine to allow the rgyptians to operate the waterway 
to restore i t (6) ^^angements for supervision of the 
area vacated by Israel* (6) T^ e status of Egyptian 
presence on tht$ Hast 3ank« 
« 2f»8 • 
*'Ih<i r«Xatlo!ishlp btitw««in stn lnt«rla agr««i«nt snd 
an overall ••ttlea«nt* 
Duration f^ th« c«ate«fire to yr«t«rv« ft tol«r&bX« 
olUBt« for on goini^  talks* 
Th« t>xt«at of wlthdravai of a l l i tar / forces froa the 
Canal* 
Ih(i nature of supervisory arrangeatints* 
The nauire of tho l.g/ptlan presencs sast of the 
oanali and 
The use of the Canal by Israeli during the period of 
an InteriJB at^ reement*** 
Ihese vere not teohnleai questions but vore directly 
linked to the lAslc isaues of security and peace* Tgypt >;a 
rtiady to agree to an Interle agreement only if It v^uld help 
recover a l l the occupied territories* But Israel %«uld accept 
It only If It did n:>t ret^ulre restoration of conquered 
territories vitbout negotiation on secure oorders* Therefore 
the success of this Interla approach depended on the adoption 
of certain concrete steps^ which In turn required the tetaporax 
removal of the fundamental differences between the two sides 
regarding the ultimate settlement* Israel, however rejected t 
proposals* 
166. £mxAlSM9 October 9, 1971. 
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IHiroughout th4i negatlatlont ih« two «i4«» ver« •ngsgtd 
in sn arms r^c^ »3 &u to talkt f j<oa 3 pogltlon of ttrflRfth. 
uhlls thfei U*%r«h. vat tryinf to r«trltT« i t s lost prtttlgc 
In the 'rab world by giving 'rabs Incre^tad a n t tuppllet^ 
U«'*.'« also did not lag behind In tupplea^ntlng Itt proteges 
s i l l tar/ reoulrementt* This ttate of cold Mtkt vat broken 
in October '^ 97 ,^ at t^e InltUtlve of^the Arab* vho vanted 
to drav the attention of the world to%iardt thtlr probleis* 
rlnca th^n, p€ace efforts have onoe again baan ranevad kqr 
t ie Jreat Powsrs, «>8iieci3ll/ tha United f^atas, to bring a 
lasting peace in the srea. tvhether the Oraat Povers vould 
ultlniat^ly b% si ale to find a solution aecaptable to the 
"rabs or not, In th© long run It la the Arabi theasalves 
v' o should decide tl'<$ir future without outside Interfersnes* 
A by-product of the v9>v \nkB the dlploaatlo wedge It 
drove bstvsan India and U*S,A, Pollovlng the outbreak of 
the Vest ^slan er i s l s , t»^ t victory of Israel and the collapse 
of the >'rab ai l i tary pover^ Indo-U«f* ralatlons racelved a 
satback* It was not so aach the avents which affected Indo-
ll*S* relations a& ttie imwaverlng and often eaotloml support 
whleh India gave to the Arabs, a party to the dispute, both 
in and outside ths United !7atlons when ghe oouid ^a^e, 
acordin?? to *>««rlc»n8, played » wore constructive rols by 
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adopting a eaacUiator/ attitude* Throughout th« crisis 
India and ths United ''tatat voxksd at erota.jfmrposaty (••£• 
on Istuat Ilk4} vlthdravai of UlftF, tilookada of th« QuXf of 
Aqabfii and vithdx«vaX of laraal to th« pra.v«r frontiers)| 
instead of co-operating and eo-ordlnating thely effoirts 
for pease. 
'1though the United rtates at f i r s t did not off lelaxi / 
crit lolze th($ Indian sttltudtJi but It did Interpret It to 
mean vllfuX antl«'aericanlsa« This studied silence V&B 
Interpreted in India to be an Indication of suppressed annoy-
aneet v^ -^ ch vas later accentuated by the United rotates public 
re^setlon and the app^ranoe of the reeurit/ Council prooeedU 
156 ings on the oo^st-to-eoast television pr'^ grsMies* Ti«re i t is 
interesting to note that the UnitedlStates warned our 
representative in the Heourity Council that his aoves would 
im considered sn unfriendly acty vhl is at the saas tlsoy 
ignoring, Pakistanis vociferous support to the ^rsbs* Goldberg 
in an article in the ^'httairht. oiprssssd shock and deop diSBsy at 
vhat he temed *'the narrowly partisan attitude** of India in 
156. See Itert (if InaHl» ^«ac ^t 1967. 
157. Ldltorlalf "India and the Vest Asian t«ar*', Jg&xUaicllMCZ 
JUUkUAAt vol* VI It No* 7, July 1967, p. 13* 
. S71 • 
tii« 'r^t»mlBt3niii cris is und "Its laplication* and proteUl* 
results! He vrot« that "IndisU iasge ss a eountry d«irot«d 
to calA oidJttctivQ lapartl&llty ^»t b««n shatt«r«d bsyond 
reeo&nition*** :!« hsld t><^ t by abandoning the noa.allgai«nt 
policy Iadl--> roduc«»d th« possibility of scnrlng a8**a oridga 
batveen contestants'* and h4>ld nagotlatlons ^b&t mii^t lead 
to restoration of p«^ <ui« H« furth«r biased India for axa. 
cartoatlng t«nslon« » for insf^nca Mrs* Gandhi pourtd o i l 
on the fl'^ mee vh«n aftar oondaanlng Israel for being the sole 
aggressor she added t^aty "The seeds of tbe currMt conflict 
began vlth the olrth of Israel." FurtJ^er, India's silent 
acquiescence to and identification s i with the vlevs eipresret 
by the Jugoslav Foreign Minister at a press conft^rence ^^nt 
**tl a United frtates and Britain are solely to blase foi the 
crisis ther«i*«*«(th«y; developed pressures to remove the 
Oovernnent in "^ 'yrla and to isolate ITasser and to resoYe hla 
finally ••«** • and similar Indian attitudes estranged her 
froa those vbo vere stttfiptlng to lessen tension by seeking 
solutions vhich would help achieve a oore durable peaoe*^^^ 
rfflerlcan of f ic ia ls complained that India did i^t 
understand the vital Involvenent of the Onlted states in the 
future of ' est ^sla, and area geographically closer to the 
168. ^arry Goldberg, "India, the U.S. and the Middle las t 
crisis", maamlt Vol. x n , %.a&, July 1, "«967, p.6. 
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'^avlet Union, Xh«y argued thst though India did not h&v 
8laUar Interests In ' «»«t Ada, h«r Interest lay In creating 
a t>%rinoe D** pover a«tv«ien the 'r^Mba 'iod the TErielis* They 
also potnt<i3d out thj^ t th@ 'rabe have reauilned neutral or 
supported .Pakistan vhenever lndo*?ak Issues eame uy in the 
recurIty Council In ti« *>aet and thiy may not behave diff-
erently In the future* Thus the 'merlcans regarded India's 
u«,st 'sla pollcyi ^rt lcularly in th« ''eourity Counelly as 
faoili'^r asi^ect of anti»'aerlcanif«. :bvevert •^'"•^ ^ contln 
to 8«ek India's oo-oper^tlon in resolving the crlslsi bec^us 
of htei* position as V itjading non-aligned nation, vlth oonsl. 
deratae influence in the Arab vorldy and her aeaberthlp of 
t^e ' fccurlty Council* 
''uch crit lcl iBs floved from two convictions vV^ lch nj 
self-respecting /elan country, least of a l l Indls, could 
aoconoodate while s^ s^plng Its forslgn policy* Plrst| It hai 
a l l alon^ been the attitude of th# Vest to allov freedom to 
the 'fro«^8i'in countries only to the extent that i t consldei 
advisable* ''ny.Jthing said or done otherviss has been the 
target of attack* In the present Instancci if Britain ooul(! 
remain pro-Israel for re'^sons of national intersst, i t Is 
diff icult to understand vhy India could not be pro-'rab for 
ib9* Indian rjtartagt i^eihi, Hovefflb«r ao, i967* 
160* liBtfi fir iMJAt ^ ^ ^ ^«n« ^Ot 19b7. 
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the same reason* r«condlyy countries vhloh reoftln poor 
and d«»>«nd0nt are not •xp«cted to shov th«lr indsi^ cndanoo 
of Bind* Xhis Is InooBpatltae vlth th« prlnelpls of nations. 
soYsriilgnty* Finally, i t would not bt correct to say that 
India's role in the v^st Asian cris is v«it against the 
interest of aalntaining peace in th« region* India's attitu 
did not nark any deviation from her previous foreiip policy 
goals ifhich energed fros the principles of the U^  Charter* 
It i s agaltist this ba^ground that India's role In the crisi 
should be judged by th« Unit«d 'tates* 
India, on the oth«r hand^ beli«ves that It i s the 
U*?* appeaseaent of Israel taQT advancing huge var supplies 
and econoaic funds vhlch has sustained Israeli expansionist 
aabltloiM ^nd encouraged i t s Intransigence against her - rsb 
neltihbours, in defiance of world opinion, international law 
and fflorailty* fp^^aklng at the 17th Coaaonwt^ alth ?SirliaBenta 
AsBociationi t^ <e Indian delegate* Derbara nlngh, biased the 
United ''tates for the continuing ^ est 'sian crisis* fe 
declared that the United rtates Vest *sian policy had been 
directed against Tgypt ever since the revolution overthrowing 
161 King Farouk* 
•)61* i^ T^ f<<an FatDra»«y September lb, ?971* 
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Iiiii««di India i s 60 auch sus^icl6ui of fBmris^n 
intentions in v«st Asia that when i'mcrlea oondtfmtd Isratli 
attack on 0«lrut airport, an Indian n«vtpap«r ooaa«nta<! adito-
rial ly that i t **ls n intlnoara attampt to appear ri^taoua 
in the «>yc8 of th«i world* ^uat two days bafora tha laraali 
crimai ?r«aldaQt Johnson had authorized the supply of f i f ty 
phantoa jete to Israeli if concern over Israel's gangsterisa 
vas genuine i t should have led to rescinding the decision, 
162 
as a varnin^ to Israel to Bend i t s vays*** 
According to Indis, there is a vide gap between pm^ 
fesslon and practice in United "^tates* policy, while India 
adheres to both theory and practice. <^6 the Indian delegate 
obst^rved In the General Assembly that the U.f;* while lapress. 
ing upon others their duties as »effib«rs of the United !?ations, 
Itswlf *'in practice shows a greater concern with the letter 
of the Charter and les& vith i ts spirit* Ve (India) cannot 
quote the letter of the Charter and that too selectively and 
altogether forget i t s spirit* ^^  cannot ignore the fundaaenta 
values and realities*** 'Te maintained that protestations of 
United rtates support for p4;ace should not be accompanied wit^ 
actual support for t^os• who doainated territories by ail itary 
163 force and deprived people of their inalienable ri^.ts* Peice 
l&E* Patrit%t, December 31, 19^8* 
163* Xl^ ga nf IlKli8» Deceaber 13, 1971* 
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and harmony vould prevail In W«8t Aila only yMwi the rights 
164 
of the dispossessed people arc respected* 
Henee, sis long as ''nerlean policy renalns conmitted 
to holding the ring for Israeli acts of usurpation and agg. 
resslon. It Is difficult to see hov a polit ical settlement 
can be achieved* The hope that after the presidential elec. 
tlons the American policy would overcome i t s pro«Itrael bias 
sufficiently to promote a real ist ic Middle East settlement 
proved Illusory* Assessing the pi>llcy of the Rlxon Admlals. 
tratlon the .iflrttft,,, aFMf i^ &trll^ a vrote editorially that 
President Nixon's^utterances have made i t amply clear that 
he iSf despite a l l his promises of the pre-presidentlal days 
of fi new approach, unvilling or unable to vrlgtle out of the 
165 
Johnsonian rut*" Tndeed, Nixon*s x call for arms limitation 
in the Middle rast, issued soan after supplying phantoms to 
Ismely was '•• crovning example of the double-talk character i s . 
ing 'merScan policy* Thus, VJashington's half-hearted and mild 
protests have failed to prevent Tel 'vlv from pushing ahead 
with ics dangerous moves* 
l ^ * iilld*! November "10^  1967, Adltorially observedi "what-
ever the compulsions and rationale, such a V,^, policy 
v l l l be self.frustratlng if the objective is to promote 
a reasonable settlement In T^st Asia*** 
l 6 5 . Aarlta aft«ar l>atrHcay September £3, 19^9* 
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The solution of the ^'eit 'tlan problMi XaSlan believes, 
(!tpend8 mainly on th<& t^grement reached betve«m the super* 
poversy and especlall/ U»r,A, l^ the U,r,A» exerted pressure 
on i ts client there vouid be sone ehance of settlenent* 
Insteadf Mrs. Gandhi nr>ted dlffioultles In the vay of 3 
settlement were Increasing because *'soae people** did not 
want an agreement sod ver« adopting certain postures* This, 
she polnttjd out, v^s a short»sljghted vlev and would create 
166 
new dangers for t^ ie world* Her warning came true In October 
1978 when the ' r^bs, realizing that the/ would not be able 
t-) i,9t justice until tliey vcr«i able som«hov to redress the 
all ltnry bal&nce vMcb ouved against thai bec&ust of their 
defeat In June 19^7, op^td a war on Israel* *lUiough the 
war v;as Indecisive, It did fu l f i l the 'r&b aim of brlngln^^ 
the Issuo In tlic l imel l^t* fince ^len 'mtirloa has Intensl. 
fled i t s uffoits for securing peace in the Hlddle rast* 
lt>o. "tiSt^ enaani January 4, 1972* 
C H A P T E R If 
JfDUl. O.S.4. AHD YimiAM 
Mamamst 
"Llkt tm rle« b&tk«tt at the oppotit* ends of th«lr 
carrying polt** —» that i s tv<« vay Vletnaaata often detoribt 
tbeir country* vteographically Viatnaa i s in the shape of 
an elongated "a**! very narrow &t the ctfitre and vith a 
UaXge at ^aeh end* It i s about 4600 miles north and south, 
about 300 ai les wide in the north^ 300 in ^ e soutb, and 
only 40 in the centre. Vi'bile the liekong River delta provides 
the south vlt2i a very rich agricultural area, the lied liiver 
i s the l i f e of the noithern bulge. 
t> 
Althou^ Vietnam is a small oountryf i t has for »->re 
than 2000 years played quite an important rolt in the history 
of the Far naat| a role disproportionate to i t s sise aad 
economic resources* The hi»torieal importance of Vietn^ im 
ia partly due to i t s strategic geographical position* Vietnam 
l i e s at the southern border of China, vithin the region >^ich 
since ^brld %%r 17 has generally come to be kao%m as >^outheasi 
^sia. 'Southeast ^sia consists of the peninsula jutting out 
1* Bernard 3*Fall, Tht TWl Ylt^ iTIMII t A Political and 
Military Analysis^ (New XoA t Prcdcerick «^ Praegery 
i^uDllahersy ^9ob)f p*d* 
2* Amry Vandenboaoh and Richard 3utvellt Th* ch&wying Fg«>a 
^f p^utiim&mt A«iay (Uxington t Kentucky PaperbBDf£s, 
1»>7)9 p*162« 
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b«tir««ii India and China and tlia v«at ftr«hlpdLXag» aoutti and 
a&at of i t that includea Indonesia and the i>hilippin«t* 
Viatnaffl l i es on th« nainland part of foutha&at Atia •»• 
the eocalled Indo-Chinesa Paninsula. Xhrve of the fix 
countries on that Peninsula.Btiraa in the vest and north 
vestf Thailand in the oentref and Vietnaa In the east • 
3 
occupy Borti than «i^ty per eent of i ts surfaee* 
HISTDBlCftL a^GKQmWfPt 
The proxiaiity of Vletnan vith Chinese borders has 
subjected i t to intemittent heavy Chinese pressure* For 
over a thousand years (186 B«c« to 039 A.D.) hfmwMf as t^e 
country vaa then known» vas under Chinesa rule* The long 
period of Chinese rule vas foUoved by an uneasy independence 
under a sureoession of Vietnaaese eaperors* The division of 
/nnan into the tvo states of Tonkin and Cochin China in 1<d73 
led t9 a series of dynastic qusrrels %ihlch invited foreign 
intervention, ^ithoui^ the first initiative vas taktfi in 
1789 by a Catholic bisbop vho landed a party of French sol* 
diers to support one of the varring partieSf i t failed to 
establish French control* ^ nev enpexor succesded in uniting 
the vhole Annaa and French influence declined* n6vever» 
4-
3* Joseph Buttiner* vi«tw f^f i f Political History* (London t 
Andre Deutsch^ i9&9)9 p*d. 
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acvtnt/ years later the pcriecutlon of missionaries provided 
an exeuse ^'ot a detexMined Frenoli intervention and by 
4 
1^3i the Freneh conquest of Indoehina vas ooaplete* 
la Indochina the ^ajLlenge to Freo<tft eoloaialis* 
began in 1940f the year when France f e l l in Europe and vhen 
Japan aoved into North vi«tnaa« It %fas in this situation 
that Dr« HO Chi Minh founded the National Independttnoe Pronto 
The Indo»Chlnese Com-aunist Partyy the leading force^ vas 
bom in May 1941* Xhe Viet Hinh Front led the struggle 
against the French. But vlth the oocvpatlon of the whole 
of VietaaM ixjf the Japctnese troops on July 24f IMty the 
character of the struggle changed* 
The JEj^nesei for reasons of expedleneyi had allowed 
French to'govern Indo»Ch!na fox then* Heaawhile the Viet 
Kinh stirred action against the Japanese near the Chinese 
border In Northern Torkiru >» March 9, 1946, the Japanese, 
realising that their fate was sealed, suddenly overthrew 
the Trench administration and put Dsperor 3ao Dal as the 
head of th^ nominally independ«it Vietnam Admlninstration 
uniting Xonkin with Annam* Hie Viet Hlnh under Ho Chi Minh 
4« For deUila see '-iAit^ Vanden^!bsch and r.ichard Sutwell, 
5« For details sse, Frank N.Trager, v^v vintnarf, nt•%> Yoiki 
Frederick A.Praeger Publishers, I9&d), pp. S4i^2« 
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r«fUf«<l to r*QQffii%% n^o Dfti*B ^vtrmciit and proeXalatd 
th« ind«p«nd«AO« of Vl«taaa on Stptembtr 2f 1946* Aft«r 
th« %i«r| Ia(|>*Chlna vas oooupl«d by British and "rationalist 
Chinasa txoops vlth tha 16th Paraxial as tha dividing Una 
batvaan than, Iha Brltlah rafasad to raoognlsa tha Viat Mlid) 
and halpad t^ •a Franeh to seize p^var In ral^an In aarl/ i946* 
It nov 1»«caffi6 ^^ u prlnary objacti've 3f the French to fight 
t^a Viet HlQh guarlllaa operating a l l ovar the oountryslda. 
Butf tha Chinasa lapadad Franeh control and rafusad antry 
of Fraoah troops and civilians Into lonkln, until t^a 
Franco*Chinasa Sraaty vaa slgnad on ?%t>t%»Ty S8f 1M& Ity 
vhloh th# Chinasa ugraad to vitiidrav aftar axtraetlng 
ganarous concassions froai the Pranoh, Xh«y also Insistad 
on th« Franeh antarln^ into an agraaaent vlth ilo Chl Hinli 
bafora bringing thalr troops Into lonkln* 
ConsaqUiJitlyi Uib French also concluded an agraacant 
vith tha IDeiBocratlc Republic of Vletn.'imi as a fraa stata vlth 
Its ovn Govarmantf t^arllaaant, amy and flnanoas^ fonlng 
part of the Indo»Chlnasa Fadaratlon and the French Union. 
The French Govamaant pledged Itaalf to hold a referendun 
to datamina vhathar CoohiiwChiiia should be united vith 
loxdcia and Annaa* 
On J}m9 If vlthout holding a rafar^dutt^ Adalral 
Thierry d'^rgenlleU| High CoiSffiissionar for Indo*China| 
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announond th« Frtooh rtoognltloii of tK« *'fr«« rsputaio** of 
CoohiiwChinai In dlffiot oontvavintlon of the Fr«neh pl9dg9* 
Cine* th«ny th« n^aneo-Vl«tnaBe8« relations rapiaiy 
datarloratftd and flnall^r raauXted In optn hoatUltScs 
batwoan ttit two parties* r«rlous Incldants took place 
batva^ tha T'limch troops £^ nd the Vlbtn&n«8« troops nt 
Langson and lalphong in t^e North In Nov«ntbar 194& • on 
*7ov«a)Mr 2 & Sy Haiphong was boab^ad by tha ^renoh* By 
Oacaabar thw Vlatnamess Oovarmant atartad evacuating 
H:^ noi« their eapital eitjTy and on Deesabar I9t Frenoh strong. 
holds y^r* attack i4 by ^« Vletnaaasa and t^a folloving 
da/ fighting began at T'ue« Turana and various other placet 
a l l over Vietnaa* fhe clioax of the battle vas reached 
vhen Dlen 31en h^u f e l l to the Viet Minh on Hay 6, 1064, 
vhlch sounded th« de^th knell of French doain&tlon in Indo* 
China and transferred the question of Vietnaa froa the 
battlefield to thfe Conference table* Xhus, ^ e fight that 
started in Oeoeaber *!94& ended only with the signing of a 
6 
cease«fire sgreMient in Geneva in 1964* 
Ihe Conference on Indo*(^ina opened in Oeneva on 
April £&| 1964| and after aome pr^liainary oonsultations 
6. B* «"*!»*Murtl, YktnM Dlyldtrt I The Unfinished r t^ggle , 
nev &»k I /^ ffla Publishing Trouse* '!964), Also see 
F^ ank N.Trager, aaaJiil^t PP« 7<6.7&* 
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on th* qiitstlon of partlclpantf to b« Imrlttd, the f l i i t 
pX«nary Miilon v«8 held on Kay 8« P«l«^tloiii fioa nine 
oountrl«« partlcipmted in the Beetlnft. These vere Caabodla, 
Oenocratic Hepubllc of Vietnani France^ Lao»y ?«ople*a 
HepuoJLlc of Chinai ^tate of Yletnaai the Sioflet Union, the 
U.K« and the United ftates* in July 21, the resulta of 
these negotiations vere incorporated into #^at vere called 
**Agre^ants on the cessatl-^n of ibstUltles** In Caabodla, 
Laos and Vletnaa« 
the Geneva Conference produced Uie follovlng doeu. 
aentst The Final Declaration 0 3 Paras> the three signed 
agreements relating to the cessation of hostUltleSf Caabodis 
(33 art ic les) , Laos (4^ art ic les) , Vletnaa (47 articles and 
^nnez), seYen separate, Halt ing riselarations of one or 
aore unnuabered paragraphs i Cambodia (£)^Laos (2), France 
(2), United rtates (*»)• 
T"ie ceaacflro agreeaont vas signed on July 21, 
between th« High Coamands af th« French Union Forces and 
tht: i'eoi>Xe's ^ray by vhlch ttii> tvo partl&s agreed to stop 
fig> ting ikn6 Vletnaa vas provisionally divided at th«> I7th 
Parallel between ttm French Union Forces High Coorsand and 
the People'6 'rt&^  of VUtnas ,^ c«rt:.ln a^ u&s vere agreed upon 
by the parties for the purpose of regroupoent of troops of 
the tvo pai-tles und gen^i^uX eloetions in the %^le country. 
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whloh 6la«di at unifying Vl«tii!iS| v«r« to IMI h«a.d b«for« 
July 19fii6« An iitt«m»tlonal oomlftlon coBpos«d of India, 
Canada and Poland vat appolntad to itiparYlte th« ami t t i e t 
vlth India a» chaiynan* The partlaa vera tpaelfieaXly 
prohibited fxoa alXoving astabllshmaiit of foreign battt and 
iaport of any var sateriais and military ptrtonnal txeapting 
by vay of raplao««ant« It %fat agraed that a l l priaonart 
of var and c iv i l intarnaes vif to ba llbarat«d vithSn thirty 
days of the eaaaa^fira agraaaant and both parties agraed 
to refrain froa reprisals against a l l those %fho foui^t 
against then during host i l i t ies* Bignifieantlyi Oouth 
Vietaaa vas excluded froa the caasa»fire agraeaent a^he 
Inaistanee of D*h.V*!7*« v h i ^ probably %fanted to proire t^at 
they vere thv only Vietnaaese party vhich fought for inda* 
t^ andenee Si^ainst Frmce and siaoltanously to iapress upon 
the Vietnaaese that Bio Dai Qovarflaent vas not independent 
but only a puppet of th* French regiaa* Henccf the r«uth 
Vietnaaese Governaant danouacad the Geneva Agreeaent and 
held that i t vas ft)t bound by the tezas as i t had not signed 
the docoDient, The ^aerlcans also did not aeceddH to the 
conference declaration and refused to consider theaselves 
bound by the decisions taken at the Conference althou^ they 
declared their intuition of respecting the teras of th« 
Agreea«^nt as long as there %fas no violation fxt>a th« other 
7 
side. 
7* JLbl^f PP* C^ f 9lm 
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In «ff€Ct, the G«ii«va Hfrnivntt aeant thu practical 
vlthdraifal of Ttuoa^ twom Indo-Chlna and the evacuation of 
th« CbmBimlct Vict Hlnh forces fioa Caauodia and Laot as 
vail aa Vietnaa, fhusi on the diploaatie level| t^e Indo. 
China eettLement aoounted to aerely an adjuataent of pover 
reiationsf concealing a full *«a»ttefn retreat and a eiaol. 
taneoua Sino*Soviet advance* Xhe Vestem Povera contidert^ 
the Geneva Agrewiont primarily ae a tiae»«avlng device* 
alloving theffl, so ^ey hoped* to build up positions of 
strength vhieh vould enable thea to return to the conference 
table under iaproved conditions* Thus* the real political 
8 
issues were not faced at Q«ieva but only postponed* The 
Agreaasnt vhieh vas written in haste and aade excessive 
concessions to the CooBuaist poverSf vas an act of political 
folly* It not only encouraged the North Vietaaaese eonau. 
nlsts to initiate further strug^e against Couth Vletaaa 
uttt also prevented any objective peacciJcteping aaehinery 
fxoB perfbadng its assigned fuaetSon* 
It is significant that the Final Declaration of the 
Conference did not include in the body of its text| the 
three eease»fire /grseaent^, nor did i t deal vitii the ceass. 
fire line or the rogioupiag of fordes* The ceasefire 
6* 3*r.t* Murti, op*cit*i p* 20. 
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agr«flB«cits of Vltttnaa and Laos also did not rafar to alao. 
tlona or ^6 ttuSlUI Jlluadl of a final poXitieal tatUtfiant 
in Vlatnaa and Laos* Intarastingly snoug^ i In Cambodls 
vhara tha CoKBunist noveaant and rati stance vas futlXai tha 
partias bad no inhibitions about inoluding a politieal sattXa. 
•aat In tha Agraaaant itsaXf* It la» tharafora, XogleaX to 
saparata tha aiXltary froa tha poXitieaX aspacts of tha 
Gan«va Agraaaant ragsrding cassation of hostlXitiaa In 
9 
Yimtxnuif aXt^ iough tha tvo raaot on ona anothar* 
In shortf aXthough app r^antXyt tha Oanava Agraaaant 
brouip^ t about a partition of Vlatnaa at tha 17th ParaXXaX} 
taaporariXjri thay broa^t about % a oaasa-flraf but thagr tgr 
no aaans andad tha hostlXltias batvaan tha two Viatnaas and 
10 
batvaan tha Vlat Mlnh and Laos* 
A^KBXCAIf HyvniiYQftflfT Iff Y I T m H i 
It «as t^a victory of tha Coaaunists in China in 
1949 vhibh graduaxXy Xad to tha 4^Barloan invoXt«iaot In 
9* IMA* I P* 81* 
10* Frank K.Tragary aiufiil*! P* 9%» For erlticls* of 
Gan«sva Agraaa^ts axso saa rnoXd Biaohaaui "^uth 
Vlatnaa i That ParticuXar Llnk**| in sibnarayan Ba/i 
ad«,XU]UUa » a^an froa Eaat and vaat^ (Boaba/ i 
Han t^aXasy 196<>)9 pp. 47«60« 
« 880 • 
Vi«iaam« Xh« lM#diat« rtQoeaition of th« D,R«v.!f, ^ china 
and Biisala l«d Franot to vl«fv It as the vanguard of tha 
Cowunlat thrust tovards fouthsast Asia and this intarpre. 
tation thay p&sead on to tha U«r«A, hoping that i t would 
suit tha gflOttial Aa«rioan stratagic schaaa* In ordar to 
99A Aa«rlean aid th« F^ -«nch ev«n triad to ehanga tha 
charactar of th« war by iaprassing upon th<i 'ji«rioans that 
the Indo«C3iinasa conflict ims ouiinly anti^ooommist in 
11 
eharactar* Althou^ tha Unitad rtatas agraad to aid tha 
Franeh afforts, aha rafusad to 'Barloaaisa tha vari as tha 
vhola of ''outhaast Asia lay bayond har dafanoa pariaatar in 
tha pacific w^ich, as definad by recratary of *'tata *ch»son 
on January 1&9 1960t passad through the Aleutians, Japan, 
thm g^ridc/tto Islands to tha Philippines* 'Stio problaa of 
ffl<i«tlng tha threat to tha aacurity of Viatn^m, Laos and 
Caabodia was th«rafortt the eonoarn of Franea and tha raapao. 
IS 
tiva uovaniaants* t^iiiie refusing to participate in th« var 
11* Iht French were not fiMiting Coaaunisa as such, th«y 
weare battling against It in pursuance of their main aia (to aaintain and preaarva their polit ical and aoonoaic 
doaination in Vietnaa;. for the IT') Chi l-linh • directed 
Viet Minh was a Coaaunlst as wall as an anti»Frenoh 
nationalist B3vea«,nt« Ideologically Ho Chi Hinh was 
cleaily a ComaiAiat| pol i t ical ly , the aovesbnt he headed 
wae undanitably nationalist In teras of i t s aass support 
Ihereforey *'the crux of the problea for the Vest In 
Vletnaa was • and continues to be • the difficulty in 
dataxaining where nationalisa ends and Coanualsa begim* 
r«se *ary Vandembosch and Richard Butwell, OjUfiUUt PP« 
Contd****• 
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direct ly , the Cecretary of rtate nevertheless admitted that 
the U.S. "must be prepared to meet wherever possible a l l 
13 
thrusts of the Soviet Union." The United s tates , therefore, 
recognised tiie Bao Dal regime on February 7, 1960* This 
recot^nltlon was wholly oonslstwit with the fundaotfital policy 
of giving support to the peaceful rind democratic evolution 
14 
of depisndent peoples towards self-government and independence. 
In May 1950, France approached the United states for 
aid to f ight Inlndo-Chlna, and since then A.merlcsn aid to 
France averaged|600 mil l ion annually. But, at the s^oe time 
the United s tates was unsympathetic to the French reassertlon 
of sovereignty In Indo-CMna after the end of the Pacific 
war, and stressed upon the French the need to give greater 
rea l i ty to their Intention by granting f u l l Independence to 
Vitttnam, Laos and Camoodla as this would take avay from the 
Communists their claim as champions of national Independonce. 
They sui^gested greater rel iance upon the national armies 
16 
which vouid be fighting for their homeland. 
(Continued from the previous page) 
12. n-S^B., Vol.XXII, June 12, 1960, pp. 77.78. Statement 
by Dean Acheson In Paris on !>fay 8, 1960, following an 
exchange of views with Foreign Minister Schuman of 
France. 
13. Quoted In B.E.N.Hurtl, op»c l t . , p. 8. 
14. n.S.a.|. Vol. >1}CX, February 20, I960, pp. 291.92. 
16. B.S.N.Murtl^ o p . c l t . , p. t». 
• 288 • 
In 1953, thfi United "States agreed to Incre&ee Its 
liutual recur It / Grants to France to approxlmtel/ ^ 750 
fflillion per y^tf excluding additional Military supply 
iteas* In IQfid-^ ,^ the United "^tatet was bearing between 
two*thirds and three-fourths of the cost of the war* In 
r&ptember, ^9bi>f the United rtatts also agreed to extend 
support o the Miivfirre Plan^ the otain eleatnts at vhic^ veret 
(I) ftall independence of VietmuBy Laos and Cambodia 
vlthin the French Union so that their peoples 
vould have a clear stake in the struggle* 
(II) g i l d i n g up the national forces of Vletnsa, Laos 
and Caabodiai and 
( i l l ) ''one Init ial addition of euned strength froa other 
parts of the French Union. 
ft this stage the Indo-Chinese war appeared to be a 
conflict between the two power blocs* vhlit the United 
rtates was supplying ai l i tary aid and equlpoient to France, 
the People's iiepublic of China was supporting the DeBocratlc 
hepublic of VIetnas* Ihe intensity of war Increased and 
negotiations proved abortive* Lven after the battle of 
Oltfi Blen Phtt had begun the United rtates was considering 
to, Jjbld*! p* 7* 
. 289 • 
Vnu poseibl l i t / of reXisvlng the besieged are^ by an air 
attack. But this ^nd 9th«r prop^s&ls tor dlr«€t U.r.ai l l tar/ 
int«rv«ation b«cafi« bogg«d dovn In the lQt«ni« dlplam&tle 
conflict that d«Vttlop«d asong th« thr«« major a l l i e s , 
m March 29f 1964y addrafslng th« Ovaratat Prasa 
Club in f?av Xoricy Cullaa had oall«d for united action by 
the all iea and the employnent of vhatever aeana vere required 
to neet the threat of ConmuniiB in Touthestt /"aia. thla 
might involve stirioua riakif bat these riska were far leas 
th^n would fac« 'merieana a few years later* The Dulles* 
approach was neant partially to avoid the unilateral oharac* 
ter of a major 'merican air strike to relieve the defenders 
of Pien Bien Phu« But the other alii^Si especially U^K., 
did not agree with this proposal. It %AS against this 
bade ground that the F3reign Ministers of Franccy the U.K., 
the Coviet Union and the U*C,/,y who met in a conference at 
Berlin from Jamiary £6to February I89 1964f decided to have 
this problem considered by the Geneva Conference i^ieh would 
discuss the Korean problem* 
the United rtatesi howevery took an Inactive part In 
the Geneva Confertincey although American military strength 
17* Frank N,Tracery 2Mx&ll*t P* ^ « 
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and stntiaent Infiu^ctd tb« final outoome and d«cltlont, 
Th« CcKBsaunlttft d'a^ .^ d^ not yrass thtlr dcaands too far for 
foar t^at France al|^.t turn ddaperatc and the Unltad 
rtat«s might be forced to large-scale Intervention, Hovtver^ 
the United States suffered a great set bade in Indo«China 
vhlie the Chinese prastigt^ In t^e region soared to unprece* 
dtfited heijg^t as tlie/ easrged tj^phei-rd from the Conference) 
they also von an important ideological a l l / vith strategic 
location and fflin<i»ral resource;:}* IHie plublsoito due in 1966 
vas never held* Th^  tragedy Is th.t the United 'States a 
decade later was struggling to foree the Conaunists to agree 
to the holding of such a vote* I3ty the iBid»19&0Sy hovever^ 
tv.e Comniunists v&ta even stronger in ''outh Vietnaa than 
t h ^ hid been at the tiae of tho 1964 Geneva Conference* 
President Elsenhover velcoaed the results ofthe 
Geikbva Conference and vas glad that agreeaunt had been 
reached to stop bloodshed* Since the agreenent contained 
certain provisions i^ieh the United ^ates did not approvcf 
i t refUs«<d to be a part/ to the agreeaent^ In a unilateral 
declaration^ hovevert ^*^shlngton to(A note of the three 
araistice agreeaents along vlth certain o^er provisions 
and declared i t %«ould consider **vith grave coneerif the 
18 
violation of the araistice throu^ the reneval of aggression* 
18* Ettssei H.Fifieid. mmtiiant Aflli in \inlu<i ^tatta 
iJallflXt (^^^ ^OJK i Praeger for Council on Foreign 
Eelationsy I9k»3), p*26* 
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Iht attitude of tht Unlt«d rtat«s aadc i t clear 
that i t had l i t t l « oanfidenoe in the Confer«ne«*t Dvelaratlon 
and AgrAusentSt that i t txpected troutati and ity therefor«t 
provided tetta b/ vhloh the United f^tatea oould legally 
and ^^nour^bly determine It t courae of aatlon* a^ ot»jeetive 
aaaeaaaent of the yoat-Oen«.va oonduot of !?orth Vletaaa vltti 
regard to th« key «lea«nta of the aigned Agreeaenta -M» 
ai l l tary Batterai treatment, of oivUian populations, and 
aiding and abetting Internal aut>ver0ion — yielded enou^ 
proof t h t the D«noc ratio Hupubllc of Vietnam violated the 
'greeaente as Boon as th^y y^x^ signed« Hence, thase people 
are aistaken vho regard United rtates guilty of "violation**, 
when In thu cr i t ical y«ars 19ft4»S6 i t applied the testa 
vrltten into the ^greeaents to detezmine the bontifides of 
the contracting parties* 
rnoouraged by the reaazkable success in guerilla 
operations against the French in the Indo*ChJna conflict of 
t94&.64, thto Viet MInV in aid "^ 967 began to increase the 
teapo of araed act ivit ies in ':'outh Vletn&a, In !Iay 1969, 
after two y^rs of mounting raids and assassinations in the 
vlUat^es, the central coaaltt«« of the Cofflnunist Party in 
N3rth Vietnam stated as tI.olr i^al the creation of a unified 
Vlethaa through a l l "appropriate c^nsl I^ July the party 
assuaed reaponsibflltle^ for the liberation of ^outti Vietnam 
and In r«pt«no«r 19^0 tho third Congr«s£ of the Party approvJ 
a resolution vhlch called in effect for the direct overthrov 
of routh V1etnaJ8*t govemaent at an laaediate tatic* Tovard 
the end of J:inuar/ 19^1 broadoaeta froa liadlo Hanoi referred 
to ^ e creation in the previous month of a '*^atlonal Front 
for Liberation nf Touth Vietnam", to destroy the *'\i»r^mf>im 
Clique*** *s 3 tactlci t> e Co8n:un!stc later called for the 
establishmeat of a neutral regime In Calgon pending unifies. 
tion* The Coisaunlst t>arty In routh Vletnan Is undoubtedly 
19 
an extension of the northern party* 
Keallslng the gravity of the sltuatloni the United 
states continued to provide generous c iv i l and nilltary aid 
to routh vietnaa fro* ^964 onwards, vhlch helped to restore 
lav and order and rapid econosiie recovery, s^ the spectre 
of Insurgency beeaaie a reality, Aaerlcan ai l i tary aid vas 
Increased to enable South Vietnam to meet the groving strength 
SO 
of the Vietcong* an October 2d, 19&0, Hresldent Isefl^over 
vrote to *?go Mnh nlen 9f ''outh Vietnam assuring l^at the 
United states vould continue to aeslet ^outh Vietnam ae long 
21 
as Its pover vas useful for the struggle ahead* 
19* Hussel i'.Pifield, mu^U** P« Sot* 
£0* r*J»Boney, "The Origins of the Vietnam 'ar". In 
rlbnar^yan hay, gpafiit.t p. 31. 
&1* For Taxt of letter see, J^^LAJ*,November lb, 1964, p*736* 
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2h« offer oade b/ ^roldent El8«nhov«r to acelst th« 
Govtrnatat of Vl«tiiaa In developing and aaintainlng a strong, 
viftl;>Xe ttate* capable of resisting atteapted subversion or 
aggression through military means vas soon lapleaented* this 
eooBltBient b/ the United rtates to the sovernaent and people 
of r^uth Vietnam is a continuing eoaaltBeiit| f i r s t ststed 
by President Flsen^^ver and reiterated by President Kennedy« 
Johnsoni and ^lxon» 
*hen i'resident Kennedy assusied office, a subversive 
effort of the Viet Hinh against Couth Vietnam vas well under 
v v and tl u s1tult^^n in l^ o^s vas also deteriorating rspidly« 
The in i t ia l measures of tho Kennedy Administration to meet 
ti.n 5ltuatlon~millt«<iry aid and tl«> addition of a few hundred 
men ta th«» 'mdiilcan al l l tary training per^onel vere a 
oreach «M> It may bb urgued •«» )f the limits of the Gemva 
Agre^ent. but justified in view of the sc^le of North 
Vietnamese violation of the basic non»interfc;rence provisions. 
As the Coamunlst Insurgency mounted, Kennedy had to 
enlarge his oommltaent* The decision to ffl^e a major effort 
to prevent a Coiauiunlst victory In Touth Vietnam vas taken 
22, D.S.3., Vol. Vfll^ ^?o.i471, reptomoer 4, 1967. ,p,£eo« 
**The Path to Vietnam i A Lasson in Involvement;an 
address by ^ i l l iaa ?«3u&idy, Asstt. for fast 'sian nni 
pacific ' f falrs , before the Congress of the Kationsl 
rtudent Association at College i^ arK, Hd« on August ^6, 
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aft«r due consideration of th« situation and various a l t sr . 
natlvas of action. It was th« v i s i t of Vict-Prssldsat 
Johnson to South uli»tn'^ a fron May "^ l to 1d| 19i»&y and sspe. 
oiaxiy Osn^ral Maxv«ll B^Iaylor's v i s i t during Octobsr l&«2t>, 
that l«d th« United rtates to ds«i>6>t i t s comaitBitfCits* In 
October f^r«sldl«nt Lennedjr ord«»r«d a aassivs incraass in 
nlXltar/ and non-allltary aid* Xh<£ to::al nuBoar of officers 
vas SkXso increased from <>^k7 to approximateXy 700 aen and 
officers* /a t^ .t \^ ar grew in character and inttfisiV* Unltec 
I tates coBialtment to tne hepuolio of Vietnam also grev* In 
190^ the number increased to lu^ OOOi ther« vere rd|000 at 
the beginning of 19t>6, and between SOOfOOO and £60|000 s t 
the beginning of "tik^ o which also included direct eonbet 
personnel* Before February 19i*6| the task of tha MA.AQ was 
to train* supply and advise the Vletnaaese aray, but not 
to engagti in direct combat* Tha duties of the mission ehangi 
with the changing situation* ' t that tlaei non.classifled 
aid by the Unitud S&ates to /Ititnam, aside from the cost of 
i t s own military efforts In tha country* was estimated at 
23 
approximately $ ii million dally* 
In retro8t>ect9 i t n->v appaars that the decisions 
taken by President Kannedy and his advieerR vers basically 
23* Frank *T»lrafe^ r, op.cit*. p* 173* 
of a defttnslve naturei th«/ pr«v«nt«d tb« all ltfir/ eolUpie 
9r thv K«putaic of VletnaJB and pr«¥«it«d the Vittooag fioa 
£4 
9V«r^ruimlii£ routh Vlwtnda* I^ndon B^Jobaaoiit saoceeding 
to thti ?r«sld«ney &>ft«r th« atsatftln&tion of ?r«sSd«nt Rcnntdy 
in Nov«Bb«r lOtidy Juat thr«« veeks after tha overthrow of 
niQB^  vas faced IwaediateXy vith the tuiaoU in S^ ou^  Vle^fiaa. 
For a year and a half f^ outh Vletruia valloved in polltleaX 
confusion} and power finally pateedy with the agaent of 
clvUlan po l i t l e t i leaden, to the Thieitt»ky all ltary led 
t^overment in June 19b5« 
In early 19^4 {"resident Johnaon reafflraed a l l the 
eaaential elements of the Kennedy ^dainlatr^tlon's polielea 
vhieh he had helped to fozttulate In ^ e joint oomsnialqiie 
vlt^ Dies in .Saigon on Kay 13, 1961, and aa they vere further 
anpllfled during T9&2-<»3, the United ntatea continued to 
train, advise and S o pply the Houth Vietnaaeae axmy on an 
increasing aeaie* It ia not correct, therefbre, to aay that 
there vaa any ahift in policy during thia period tovard 
greater fflilitary eephaaia, nuch leaa major nev military 
!iotiona« Indeed, further actlona ver« not excluded as they 
had not been in 1964«61 but e^reaid^t Jbh&aon*a f i n object 
right up to February 1966 vaa to make t^e policy adopted in 
late 1961 voxk if It could'possibly be done, including th* 
£4. Ibi^M PP* ^77, 179* 
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ful lest posaible emphasis on pacifiestlon and the vhoia 
|K3lltieal and civi l ian aspect* 
Th« siuuBsr of 19(^ 4 brought a n«v phass In ths polio/* 
The situation M&B s t sadl l / dsollnlngi Infiltration IAS Inersa 
ln£ and nov Included qult« a nuBt>«r of native nortSi Viet. 
nam«s<(« Bttt| the oost drasaatlc developaent vss tiie attsc^ 
by Narth vi<«t»wes^on u*n, warships on patrol In tiie Gulf 
of Iboklni and on "ugust 4y the U^f* aircraft loaedistel/ 
struck against fbrth Vietnaaese naval bases* On 'ugast 7, 
'vg64y the United ''tates Congress overvhelmlngljr approved a 
resolution which eiBpovered the President "to take a l l neoe* 
ssary aeasures to reyel any arRMd attadk against the forces 
£6 
of the United states and to pr<3Vent further aggression**' 
rince th«i America has followed the course of reta. 
liatory attacks* The essentials of this retaliatory policy 
were stated in Vice-President Johnson's Baltlaore speech of 
April TSK>6f and the isajor ooabat«force cowBitment was explain 
87 
In the President's statement of July £8y 19t»6* Ihese have 
i>«en the cornerstones of /saerlean policy in Vletnaa* 
£6* ^ee ikL«J*f Vol*LVI 1,^0*1471, 'u^ust 24yfgt>4, p*£t>8* 
£i»* For text see JULld*t Vol*LlII, April adyl966, p*wO(>* 
27* ikLd*t 'Ugt»t 1«>t \9bbf p* S3&4* 
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!m« baglo change In the ttolt«d f^tat«t* polioy ctae 
in F«b£t>ar/ I9b6» vh«n th« Vl«toongt vlth fairly topMstiea. 
t«<3 weapons of Fuss Ian and Chiness manufaoturs suppllsd to 
th«g by Flanol, launefisd a ssrlcs of attacks against ths 
^a•rlean forc^u in Plslku snd at ^ a Trang. ?r«sl<3«nt 
•Tohnsoii) charging t>^ at -provocations vere ordered and directed 
by the ^anol reglacf t>>er«upon ordered an air strike at aajor 
staging and transportation centres around Dong Holf in ^ e 
southern part of N^rth Vietnaa* At lastf after years of 
politiot<l provocation and alllt'iry aggresalon directed froa 
Hanoi) the Vietnaaese • United '^tates aixiance responded 
against the enesy on his ovn soil* The battle vas nov joined 
on the guerina level praotleed by the Vletcong, Thus, the 
United states vas ultimately led to recognise i t s otd.1 gat ions 
to Its al ly, and gradually to assuae & rt^sponsible role in 
this alil&nce, a role vhlch vas defined as late as February 
t9t>6, as one of assistance and advice only* 
ven soy the United States had acted vlth restraint, 
pausing twice i t s boablng attadcs to explore the possibility 
of negotiating an honourable p^^ce* Throughout a?st o^ 19&6 
and 10l>6| the United Ftates aade i t clear that it was prep^n 
for "unconditional discussions** aaong the governaente involve 
so as to achieve peace. ^11 such efforts failed to e l i c i t 
£8 
any positive response froa Hanoi* 
£S* IHMM »• '^^* 
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l U r«tsiltory bombing attacks on ^orth Vletnaa 
vttre st«adlX/ Intensified t i l l th«y lost nn^ real rslation 
to Stt>««ific coamunlst attftdcs* Thc: int€srnfttionai oharactsr 
of thb war aoM bto'^ ae doalnant. 2^ th« early spring of 796(>, 
the United Ttfttss had sucesedsd In aehlevlng th« negative 
ala of preventing the collapse of the raigon Govemsent* 
Although t>e guerillas nsv found i t difficult to cope vith 
the nountlng nipber of U.^ « soldiers and i t s huge supply of 
Modern equi»«tent, they s t i l l re«alned urdefeated* In fact, 
at the «aid of "'Ub? ti^ey verc even stronger than in the spring 
of ^9^6* Contrary to Johnson's expectations the boablng even 
failed to stop Infiltration or break the anyrale of the nort^ 
Vletnaoittse leaders and people* The Vletcong s t i l l had a 
stronghold in the c<wntryslde v'hii« the ''outh Vletmncse 
S9 
C/overnBent only controlled t^e cities* 
XhuS| i t was evident that tvo and a hsilf years of 
steady escalation had not brought the United "States any 
/y^ a^rer to i t s re'^ 1 boal^ vhich vas to force the ^nvmy to sake 
peace on South Vietnaause and United < tates terns* Infiitra. 
tion of troops and supplies continued uninhibited despite 
the increased bombing raids. Shfi ^iV ILoA Xtoii In a report 
from raigon sumaed up the achievements of nearly 6OC9OOC 
29. Joseph Buttinger^ aaaJBlI*! PP* 48b»487« 
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30 
/B«rlo&n coabGt trooptt" Tha 'Derleans are no longer loeing 
laattles« but th«y are not vlnnlng t^« var*** 
t)««p concern vms expressed throuf^out the vorXd over 
the Intensification of the vnr as It vae feared that i t aif^t 
<,scalau Into a third vorld vtir. U Xhant, United Nation's 
fecretary General, ap^e&led on February IE, l&ib for *'sMft« 
Ini, the quest for a tioiution avay fion thw field of tattle 
to tihti confttrtnce table**, and on Fetasruary 26 he declared 
at a press conference thi^t he had presented soae **concrete 
idet.c and proposals" to the parties directly involved in 
Vietnam, ?!%, had r-lso tried to arrange informal, secret 
discussions uetveen Hanoi and vi^shington. Pope .^ aul pleaded 
vitti polit ical leaders to find & peaceful solution for Vietnam 
31 
On April 1,1 1966, A group of seventeen nonuallgned countries, 
Issued a st^ttfwnt urging the parties concerned to start 
negotiations vlthout preconditions* In J'une the conference 
of the Commonvealth Prime Ministers proposed the sending of 
a pesce mission, headed b:^ British Prime Minister Harold 
30. ffttif %nsk 3:iaei» 'u^ust 7, igi»7. 
31* Xhese countries vers Afghenistan, 'Igeria, Ceylon 
Cyprus, I thlopla, Ghana;Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, 
Hepel. ryrla, Tunisia, Uganda, United *xab republic, 
iugosiavla Jc rambla. 
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l«ll»on| to th« countries Involved* ath«r atttspts w«ret 
Frano«U propose fox a n«v u«n«»va Conf«r«ncet r^vlet tndor. 
««a«nt of i Caaoodiun Confarene^t and India** tut^^ttitlon 
32 
for a e«tt««.firtt policed W ^n ^fl?o*Atlan force* 
' • a result of pressure at hoae and abroad. President 
Johnson defined United rtates purpose and conditions for s 
peaceful eettleaent In an address at John! Hopkins University 
on /'prll ?• Ve aade an Inportant concession to Fanol by 
declaring that h« was prepared ^or **unconditional discussions 
on pe'^ ce In Vietnaa although previously he had dsMinded that 
the CoBiBtinist cease their attacks in routh Vletnan before 
any discussions could take place. But 'lanol rejected the 
offer. 
Several timeti Johnson reiterated the offer of ^ e 
United rtatt:is to hold discussions vith any government any* 
vhere and without 'oiy conditions but In vain, / s a proof 
of his t^odvilli Johnson unilaterally suspended air attacks 
on n-irth Vletmim for six days In May fa»6, and for a 37-day 
period in December I9t6 am! January 1966. 
Various statements continued to be made by bot^ sides 
Indicating t^ e^ conditions under v^>leh negotiations a l |^t be 
be held» 8p<:elally during the pause In American bombings. 
32. IUZ*M*t Vol* LVIII, No.161£» J^e f7» 191^ 6, * Paper on 
Third r'arty Peace Propoa&lB* 
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The %rth VJetnaaiatci pofltl^n va« bQsed on t^e four points 
33 
of March e, 19b6. In brlttf th^st ver«» 
**i:h(^  ia&slc national right*** of the Vletnaaete people 
.** In4«p«>ndencet soverelgntyi unity and territorial inte-
grity »mm Should tm recognlssd* The United states Oovexnifiit 
should vlthdrav i t s troops and a l l var untterlal froa Vletnaaii 
dlsnantle i t s "bases" ther«» abolish Its *Bllitary alliance" 
vlth Tout}) Vietnam and stop i t s attacks on Ifarth Vietrna. 
Pending the peaceful reunification of Vietnae the 
military provisions of the 1964 Geasva ^grseaent aust be 
respbcted. There aust be no foreign al l l tary aiilanceSf arai 
or troops in either N-»rth or "outh Vletaaa* 
The affairs of routh Vletnaa aust be settled by the 
^outh Vietnaaese people theaselves "In aooordance vith the 
prograaae of the '^ outh Vletnaa {Rational ^ont for Liberation 
vithout any foreign intervention* 
Bie r<}alixatlon of the peaceful retailf Icatlon of 
Vi«tnaa aust b« settled by the people of the two sones without 
any foreign interference*'^ 
The basic elesaents of the United 'States policy and 
34 
attitude yr*i elaborated in the fottrteen.point proposals 
3;^. For details see. Wi mi Vint "»noif 1966, p.M and 
t^ritim fifr,¥ii¥f No* 17, AprU £3, 196t>t PP*o-9. **1» 
see ikluJ^t Vol*LIV, !fo*1393» March ?« 10d<»,p*364* 
34* ^ee ik£«i}.9 Vol.LlV, 19o.1387, January 24, I9a6,p*ll6* 
• doe • 
1* Zh« United ^tat«» accepted the 1964 and i9i»& Qeneve 
accords as a **«>od enouglt bails for negstlatlon, 
S« 7t \iould vcdcoae a conference on foutheast - ela or 
any i»rt of A8la, 
3« It vat ready for unoondltJonal negotiations* 
4. It vas also ready» if T^ anoS so preferred, for Infomal, 
unconditional discussions* 
6* ^ Cease-fire could be ttM f i rs t order of business at 
a peace conference) or could be arranged prellKlmry 
to such % conference* 
«»• Zhe United ntates was willing to discuss the North 
Vietnamese Four Point £>rograwie* 
7* It sought no all ltary bases in Southeast 'sla* 
8* It did not seek '^ continuing /merlcan military presence 
in routh Vletnan* 
9* It would support the holding of free elections* 
1C« ^ e question of the reunification of the two Vletnaas 
could be deterained by the free decisions of their 
peoples* 
11* The countries of r^utheast Asia nay choose to b« non. 
aligned or neutral) the Ignited ''tates sought no new 
all ies* 
12* Ti^ e United ftates was i^retiBr^i to contribute $ 1 bl l lUn 
to a r«dgionai dvvelopoient prograoae in which Worth 
Vlefcnaa could taktt part* 
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13. Th« Vl«tcong would bave no difficulty In bating lt« 
vl«vs r«pr«sent«d at a conf«r«nc«, aft«r hottUitlM 
hav« ottasfid* 
14« Xhc boabftag vould be stopped if It vas stated what 
would happffi as a raault of ^at« 
Ther^ was t»o major change in th« situation throu^out 
1967* But in eax-X/ I9k»6 th« Vlutcong raorganlsad and launoh* 
a a&s^lve attackp known as tne Ia | t offenslvt, on 's^rican 
nd routh Vieto^aes^ oases* Jy February 3^ 19681 the eneay's 
let offtfisive had coBpl«teiy shattered the confidence and 
optialsB of the /^nerlean and r^ outh Vietnaaese leaders. The 
Vletconii and %rth Vie^aaese forceSf were able to aouat 
attscks on no fever than to^ c i t i es and allit^ry installation 
Xlils deaonstrated that no part of th« country was effectively 
controlled by the naigon regime or was held secure by the 
al l ied troops attainst the attack* In raijjony where street 
fi^.ting lasted alaost two weeksf the Vletooog siren succeeded 
in penetrating the aerican Embassy during ^« f irst hours 
of t^e offensive. In Hue* i t took alaost ftur we^s and a 
near total destruction of the city by 'aerican artillery fire 
and boabing raids beforti the stubborn and ski l l ful eneay 
f l i t t ers were forced to withdraw* Thus, i t was with the 
greatest difficulty t u t the Aaericans were aole to hold thelz 
own in Vietnaa* 
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A lot of hue tnd cry va» ralsr* sgainst the ''iwrlc^n 
InvoXiTflttent In t^ .e ^mr, ev«n by t^« *»«rlcans thoaselv^t vho 
nav pr«ferred eoaiproalse ta prolonging t^e var. ThIt 
pressure of yubilc opinion pre'vented Johnson froa further 
esealatlng the var by sending another 2CX}f000 U,r, soldiers 
to Vietn'is. ^s a f i r s t step tov&rds serious negotiations 
vlth Hanoi ^% even ordered restricted boablng raids on 
36 
North Vietnaa* Even U)lfi 11a.ted bombing could coae to an 
earl^ end If this restraint was aatehed W ^ s ls l lar restrain 
in Hanoi* 
After four veeks of vrangllng over a aettlng s i te 
autually acceptai4.e to the parties* negotiations between 
Washington and Hanoi opened on May IS* I9k>8 In Paris* These 
talks could only Bucoeed if the United ^Utes vas ready to 
accept & comproalse peace providing for the right of the 
?^atlonal Liberation Front freely to participate In the poll* 
t lca l l i f e of '"outh Vletnan* 
On October 31, 1968, Presld««nt Johnson announo#d 
his decision to stop a l l "alr^n^val and artil lery boabardaent 
of N^rth Vletnaa.*' He took this action in the belief that 
It could lead to progress t^ v&rd a peaceful settleaent of the 
var and also on the basis of th« developaents In the Paris 
36* For details of statement see ikMh8*» Vol* LVIII. 
^o. 1603, ^pril 16, 1968f p* 46£r 
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Taikt-Yis* . SM2. vould not b« violated and understanding 
^ 3d 
vlth North Vietnam on oth«r crit ical itsusa* Th« Italtad 
f^tatas took oth«r uniXataraX ataya to aaaa the aehitvaBant 
of paaoa —« i t ooncadad to tha daoand of ^LF participation 
in th& Parle talks and not only aeeaptad the prlneipXa of 
vithdra%mX iMt &X80 nada ini t ia l vithdrav^X? and in affect 
agreed to reaov« eventually a l l f^fleric»n troops as part of 
^n overall sett l^ent* 3ut t>ie reaponae of the other aide 
vas trat ^werica a^ould unconditionally withdraw al l 0.<?, 
forces i^nd replace tbe present Governnent of Vletnaai with 
a coalition government* But tbeae propositions vera un» 
37 
acceptb'&lt» to the U«S« 
In a continuous effort to seek a n^gotlsted ssttlenent, 
to vhich th«t Nixon Adslnistratlon attached the highest 
priorityy the U*r*^ * offered an ianadlate eease-flre through. 
out Indo»China which iiiould end a l l U«r« all itary activit ies 
in the region. But this proposal also failed to evoke any 
response from Hanoi* 
3o* IkU^M ^oU LIXt No. 1634, November IS, 1968, p.6l7. 
Addreas by President Johnson, recorded ^t the ^hite 
House and broadcast to the Nation on October 3"* Chite 
House Press release). 
37. hlchsrd Nixon, g,: , Policy ^ir t^ij 7Q'a I : merging 
structure of Peace, aa>iiiJf«^p. 115. 
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d«sld«6 th&fie uAli.ac«ral proposalSf /m«rlea gublicly 
off«r»d 8«VfiraX conttructivs ittopow&ls for an overall lolu. 
ti~>n to th6 \%t, On May 14| 19699 Nixon proposed that t i l 
ouUld« forces be r«aBov«d from South Vietnam and that tha 
routh Vl«tnaa«s« be allovad freai / to choose thiir o%in future 
throuijh Intarnatl^naii/ suptrvlsed elections* 'M Ji4jr 1^, 
19C»9 President T^ e^iu offered sl^jctlong, vlth a l l parties, 
including the ^Z?^ free to pirtlclpate and to s i t on a Mlxtd 
Electoral Comalstslon. Again on ^^rll 2Ct 1970 ^Tiion spellad 
out the principles for ^^  fair yol l t ieal solution* '^ a 
envlaai^ad that such a solution must (1) reflect th« vUl of 
the Touth Vietnamese people and allov thca to determine 
their own future without any outside Interference* 
(2) Tt should reflect the i^xlstlng relationship of poll* 
tlc'd forces In ''outh Vletn^ a^* 
(3) u,r«', vould abide by the outcome of any political 
process agreed upon* 
m Dctooer 7, t970f Nixon presented another set of 
constructive proposals which includedt 
(a) **kn Internationally supervised ce^se-flre throughout 
Indo*China* 
(b) "^n Indo-Chlna t^ eace Conference* 
(c) "Tae withdrawal of a i l "merican foices from f:outh 
Vletnaffl on a achadule to be worked out as part of an overall 
settlemont* 
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(d) **l poXitloal s«tU«MBt In South Vi^tnaa testd on 
the principles outlined on April &0« 
(•} "The inredlate uncondltlonRl release of a l l prisoners 
36 
of iirtir»" 
Me«nvhllet private obannels vez« also exploited In 
order to open a va/ for a negotiated ssttleaant* In the early 
part of his adalnlstrsktloni seeing that no progress vas being 
Bade In the ?arls talks even after ten aonthsi ^Ixon decided 
to estauilsh a prlvita and saeret ohamel so that both sides 
could dlseuss traxiklyf fre« fxoa public pressures, Henesf 
betvean August '^9&9 and !:«pt«aber ^971^ r»« Klssengeri Assi-
stant for National Ceourlty Affairs^ had secret neetlngs vlth 
the Horth Vlutnaoiesa representatives twelve tlaes* 
On January £6, 197S Nixon sade another concerted atten* 
pt to br«ak the Impasse* He along vlth President Ihleu of 
routh Vietnaa offered a nev elgjht point peace proposal, vhltih 
vas prasented In detail at the Paris Psace Talks two days 
later* It provld«9d that vlthln six aionths of an agreeaiant 
there would bet 
mmm **/ coBplet« Withdrawal of a l l U*E* and all ied forces 
froa routh Vletnaa* 
MM "An exchan^ e^ of a l l prisoners throughout Indo«»Chlaa, 
38. ]JM. 
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lii^ "A cease-fire throu^ut Indo-Chlna, 
— *'A n«v presidential election in Houth Vletnaa. 
— '^liespect for the Geneva Accords of 1964 and the Laos 
agreement of 19&2| 
- w "Settlement by the Indo-Chinese parties themselves of 
problems existing bet%reen thMi, including the role of 
North Vietnamese forces| 
— "International supervision, as necessary, of the 'Agreement, 
-i— "An international guarantee vhidi could involve an 
international conference." 
Nixon also reaffirmed his willingness to undertake 
a reconstruction programme for In(k>-Chlna, including North 
39 
Vietnam. 
Despite America Is keen desire to conclude a fair sett le-
ment, the North Vietnamese continued to block a l l possible 
openings* However, a major breakthrou^^, as though by a 
miracle, was achieved at the Paris Conference throuf^ the 
untiring efforts of the American President and his /"ssistant 
f^ecretary Kissinger on January £3, 1973. 
The essence of the bargain at Paris was to provide 
the PPO (Provisional Revolutionary Government) with a 
39. liJAM P* 1I7. 
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nofuallltary alt«mativ« co achitve Ita polit ical goals* 
Ind««dt ®' Ki0«ing«r pointed out on the •&«« occaflotSf th« 
identity of the legitimate ruler **le vhat the c iv i l ver hat 
been a l l atout.**^ It^ thereforei seeae clear that the etaence 
of the tenaa negotiated at Paris vaa that the c iv i l var vouid 
stopt to be replaced t^ negotiations tatveen the ?RQ and the 
govemaent of the Republic of Vletnaa (RW)| i«e« the thelu 
/'dminlstratlon. In this regard the provisions of the ^gree. 
sent are definite in th^ir Insistence that conditions be 
created to permit the subatltutlon of polit ical struggle for 
military staru^ g^le* Article 4 prohibits U«H« Intervention 
in Couth Vletmmese Internal affairs* Articles 6 and 6 call 
for Van total vlthdraval of /merioan advisers and paramilitary 
personnel and the dismantlement of U«6« military bases* ''rtlcle 
8(0} cal ls for negotiation looking to^^rd the release of 
polit ical prisoners vithin ninety days* Article M establishes 
the necessary c iv i l l ibert ies for polit ical competittoni 
including freedom of speeeh| press,movement and assembly* 
Article 12 cal ls for the formation o ^ three*partyJNational 
Council of National BeeoncIllation and coneordf and assigns 
I t thti responsibility to organise national elections designed 
to select a Touth Vietnamese Government that commands alie* 
giance from the entire population* Xhat vouid satisfy 
Kissinger's goal of finding out ««• by pol l t lcal | rather than 
military mesne —-» who Is the legitimate ruler of r^uth 
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Vietnam. Not only i'm«rlcant| but th« whol« norld h«avtd a 
a l |^ of rel ief as fmarie&riB began to vlthdravi leaving Sou^ 
Vletnaaeae In a position to deal vlth the c«>n»Btmlst subverslor 
The United rtatet* pasltlon on Vlettiaa has been based 
on the following basic assiaptlonst 
1« Thfit the heart of the aatter in Vletnasi ifas ^ e 
fact of oppression. After 1964 Hanoi had Infiltrated thousandi 
of traliMd and amed aeQ| Including units of North Vietnamese 
regular army, Into Toutb Vietnam for the purpose of Imposing 
Hanoi's wil l on '^ outh Vietnam by force* It vas this external 
aggression which was responsible for the presence of U«f7« 
combat forces. Indeed« It was not until the summer of 1966 
that the number of U««^ « military personnel In f^ outh Vietnam 
reached the number Infiltrated by Hanoi* If this aggression 
were removed, U«S« combat forces would withdraw* 
2* The Touth Vietnamese wanted to defend thtfuselves, 
and Vre Government of South Vietnam sought United states ass Is. 
tance to repel aggression to which It readily agreed* There. 
for#e, the United states had a clear and direct commitment 
to the security of South Vietnam against external attadc* 
40* lilchard ^*Talk| '"The Paris Agreement t Breaking Faith 
in Vietnam "^ Tha nntinn^ Vol* 218, Wo.2, January 12, 
1974, p* 38*' 
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This comBilta«nt vas bated upon bilateral agr««n«nt8 b«tv««n 
t^ .« Unitttd rtat«s and f^uth Vletnaa, upon the epJTO Trcat/i 
upon annual actions by Congress in providing aid to TouU^  
Vietnaa^ upon t^« polio/ sxpressed in such congrssslonai 
action as the Au^ u^st 1964 resolution, and upon the solsmn 
deoiarations of three United states* Presidents* 't stake 
vas 031 just Houth Vietnaoi or southeast Asia) there v&s also 
at stake the integrity of a U«r« cowBitaent and the iaportance 
41 
of that cowsitiient to the pe&ce right around the globe* 
3* Hext was the prcaisc that the fight aust be priaarlly 
of the Vietaaaess theasslvss* It could not be a var of 
faerica against Viutniaa* Thusy laportant thouf^ the role of 
Aaerican advice, transport, ooafflunications and supply vas, i t 
vas primarily the role of an outsider assisting the Vietnaaese 
4* The pol it ical , econoaic and social aspects vere of 
as great an iaportance as the al l i tary aspects of the strugi^le 
llovever, a l l aspects of the strugi^le vere to oe organized 
42 
into a unified vhole* 
Other considerations influencing ^aerican policy in 
Vietnaa verei (a; the nature of the Coaaunist challenge in 
Asia vas mainly a i l i tary. Therefore i t could only be checked 
41. JkMt^t Voi*UV, fla* 1367, January 24. 1966, p*116. 
Vice-I'resident Huaphery Heturns froa the Far Hast 
Mission* 
42* IjbXii.y Vol* >LIX, Ho* 1266, July 16, 1963, p*&1* 
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through ^ netVDrk of fflllltary alliances around the ooinaunlft 
vorld^ (b) fatlonailtn la Asia vag nothing sore thin an 
embryonic form of CoflSBunlaii* (o) l9o natter how corrupt or 
undeaocratic a regiae ailght bey If i t vag prepared to f i ^ t 
43 
etgalnst comaunlsa, i t vat friend of the United '^tatee* 
Hoveiier, the war in vhlch tlie United States found 
Itself en(;aged In vas a guerilla vart sloillar to th« one 
with which France %m8 cursed from 194b to 1964» It vet more 
or less the same conflict with the difference that the United 
Eta tea had dlsi>laced France and held the command position In 
that local battle of t^e global confrontation betveen the 
44 
Free and the Communlat worlds* 
Indo-Chlmi has be^n the testing ground of *merlean 
policies In rauthe-.st ^sla, although the evolution of host l . 
l l t l e s betveen the French and ^ e Viet Mlnh, Involving a 
complexity of factors > U*^ « support for the freedom movement 
of colonial peoi^lesi U«S« policy towards the United " '^^ tionsi 
U»r« Interest in French Internal stability and economic strengU 
Vestem European military strategy and defence against the 
43. K.li.Sharma. "U.f.Polley In Vietnam", SoM* Vol.1, 17o*26, 
April 16, 19&e, p.7, 
44* Victor Bator, YltliaftB A DlalnafttU XrftgidY s Origins of 
U,s« Involvement, (London t Faber and Faber Ltd«, 1966), 
P* 16« 
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•xpantlon of coofflunlaD not only in Indo-Chlna but In th« vorXd 
46 
as v«U, prevented the U.S. fsoa aaklng eatlsfaotory policy 
decisions in the beginning towrde Indo-Chine %^ile reoognieing 
that thii probl«B of meeting the threat to the securit/ of 
Vletreao, Ltios and Caatodia vas the concern of France and Whe 
respective Govemnenta. Ag yet, the U.S.A. vas In rk> tnood 
to shioulder any deep ooamltaent in Vietnam although It was 
beginning to realise the isportance of the struggle that the 
47 
French vere % g^ing against comaunisn. * communique issued l)y 
the rtate D^partaent, following a conference on Tndo-China 
vith a ^rench delegation on June 18, 1962, stated that the 
struggle In vhich the forces of the French Union vere ''engaged 
against the forces of coa-iiunlst aggression in Indo-Chlns is 
an integral part of the vorld*vide resistsnoe by the Free 
Nations to ConcBunist * attempts at conquest and subversion 
(thoughj l^ance has th« priaary role there*** wlmlisrly, 
Vice-President Nlzoa, in reporting to the nation upon his 
return from ^ tour of Asian countries, lauded the French 
48 
•fforts in defending the Free Usrld. He said: "Indo-China 
46. L&vrence S.Tlnkelsteln, AawrtBfln follfi/ 4a gflBth Salt 
^jdSLt (^ w^ » *iork ^ a^a-arican Instl;;ute of Pacific Relations, 
Inc*), p*l. 
46. D-S.B^i Vol*X7II, June 12,1960, pp«77«>78* Statement by Pean 
Aches3n in P'^ ris on 'In^ 6f 196C, follovlng an excV^nge of 
vievs with Foreign Minister f»chuman of nrance. 
47. Ibid., Vol.Je:>:VII, June 30, 1962, p. 1010. 
48. Ibirf., Vol.XXX, No.768, January 4, 1964, p. ie . Speech 
by Vice-President Nixon on December 23, 1963. 
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i s Vitally laport nt, Th« day tbe Fr«noh v U l leave Indo. 
China, th« eoafflunista v i l l take over* The Free v^rld oves a 
debt of gratitude*^^ 
Between Januaxy i960 to f&nila Treaty 1964, the United 
ncates established n cl«ar policy vlth respect to its Involve-
ment In Southeast Asian affairs* It vas based on a detenil. 
lUition to contain further Coaaunist advances in routheast 
Asia vhile assisting the indei;»«nd«nt states to r«tain their 
49 
freedoB and to build up, or rebuild their econoaies* In 
Vietnan just as th« origin of the war has been a i l i tar l ly 
obscure, proceeding frost training assistance to total arned 
conflict, so the rationale of the l i^ le enterprise has appeared 
obscure or uncertain* It appears that the United "^tates found 
60 
i t se l f in a posture rather than asauaed a position* For a 
long tine the /merican response vas essentially defensive* 
The ^'Berican policy in Vietnam night ve i l be described In the 
words of Polyblusi ancient Greek wise nan, who said that, "The 
purpose of war i s not to annihilate the eneny but to get hla 
61 
to mend his ways*** Only since February 1966 have the Pouth 
49* Frank N.Trager, naafllt*» P* Id* 
60* H*a,Nichola8| "Vietnam and the Traditions of /onerlcan 
Foreign Policy**• fattrPi ISlfintJL Affalri» Vol*44, Ho*2, 
April 19681 p*t90* 
61* Quoted in AaLkJB*! Vol.LlII, Ho.ldb?, September t>, 1966. 
p* 436* Transcript of an intervlerw with ' rthur J.GoldbeTg 
IT* %E«fpre8entatlv6 to the U.N., on Columbia Broadcasting 
System television programire on August 23, 1966* 
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Vl«tiiam«s«, th« United rtatM and their al l i«» erabarked on 
th« policy of attacking the attackers in their baaea in North 
Vietnaffl, The presctnt course of Aaerioan policy can l>est be 
desorlbed in the vords of Thomas Jeffersont **!! is the ae. 
laneholy lav of human societies to IM compelled sometimes to 
choose a i^reat evil in order to vard off a greater* Americans 
have chosen to f i^.t n limited var in Vietnam in order to 
prevent a larger vary a var almost certain to f&llov If the 
Communists succeed In overrunning and taking over ''ou^ Vletnai 
by aggression and hy fores*** 
A^f ter 1966 the United frtates policy is based on tvo 
Indispensable pillars «-» an unsver l^ng determination that 
aggression must not succeed and a readiness to keep the hand 
of reconciliation, peace, and negotiation extended to North 
Vietnam and Commimlst China, President Johnson reenphasieed 
theae two keystones of Aaerlcan policy in his ^tiite f^lphur 
rprlng speech* It vas, in the vords of the President himself, 
a policy of *'flx«)Mts v l ^ moderation.** Johnson embraced 
neither extreme* He vas firm in defending but vould start 
talking vhlla defending* He disliked a military solution of 
62* Cluoted In the ':'tate of the Union Address of President 
Johnson to the Congress delivered on January lO* i967* 
ikSA&f Vol.LVI, iro*14«0| Jiinuary dOf 1967, pp* I6O1.6I, 
63* CftfigyBiftnal ^manrAj Vol* 112, part 13, July 27, 1966, 
p. 17866* Also se€ cfiglatUn ! • T/filiBfla HaaXtert ^^r 
16, 1966* 
th« pribltBy but vould eontlnua th« ut« of al l lary aeant 
64 
until Hanoi was v l l l lng to u«« th« oonf«rano« tablt* Thlt 
vould h«ip th« U«S,A« to achi«v« the real task vhioh vac 
not a partial teat a coapl«t« p«aott« rtatttd slaply the United 
StatM* goal was *'to tffawvB the right of the Pouth Vietnaaesc 
peopls to detemlne their o%m future without B outside Inter. 
ference or coercion*** 
The alia of the Nixon Adainistratloni althou^ x s ls i lar 
to the preirlous aattinlstratloni s t i l l differed froa It In 
•fflphasls* The f irst and nost lotportant was t^at It w&s s 
policy aioied at peace. It was isade very dear that thta 
Adainistration was not pursuing military victory. Therefore, 
the f irs t objective of the policy was achlevenent of an 
honourable negotiated settlenent In Paris* n^d in order to 
bring this aoout| efflphssis was put on the opportunities for 
mutual troop withdrawal. Coupled with this the ?Tixon Govern, 
nent also voriced with the Oovemaent of fouth Vietnam on the 
suoject of a polit ical settlement* The Government of r<>uth 
64. ^«hinyfa,n PieAt. April 88. 19b6. For Johnson's views on 
reaching a polit ical ssttlement throu^ the theory of the 
'quotient of pain* see 'rthur H.f:chieslnger, Tha HIttag 
nmvitAifma vietnBffl and American D«mocracy 194l<d66, (London i Andre DBUtseh,l9t»<>)9 pp. 3 6 ^ 1 . 
66. ik£iJ«t Vol. LXI. No. IMti, FeU 10. 1969, p. 124. 
Text of the opening statement of /vmbassador Henry Cabot 
Lodge, head of the U.S. Delegation at the 1st Plenary 
session of the Paris Meetings on Vietnam. See also I]2id«» 
Vol. LIV, No. 1389, Feburary 7, 1966, p. 200. Arthur 
J.Qoldbergf **The Quest For Peace in Vietnam.** 
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Vltttnaa alto mad« It clear through Its ovn public etattnents 
that i t vns prepared to antar Into aarloua negotlatlona on 
66 
that subject vith the National Liberation Front. 
AoMrican Interest in the struggle developed only vhen 
Comnmist victories in other parts of the vorld posed an 
unmistakable threat to vhat were by then conceived of as vlt^l 
United rtates interests in the area. America not only believes 
that i ts ovn vell«belng is served b/ assuring dignity %nA 
security to other peopleS| but It has certain econoBlc as 
vai l as strategic interests in the area. "Vietnati is a piece 
of real strategic estate being on the corner of lasinland ^sla, 
across the East V^st trade routes and in a position that vould 
make i t an axcelltfit base for further Cooffiunlst aggression 
67 
against tba rest of fxe9 Asi^." Hence t*"e continuing concern 
and interest of the United states in Viotnaoi. nut t>'ese 
interests in themselves vere not large enoU|(h to motivate 
'"serican involvement in the area. It vas on the involvement 
of tbe glotel forces of expanding CommunlieDi that there 
emerged a complex of interestsi direct and indlreetf vhich 
dictstted a policy of active involvement. According to Hans 
b6. Ibid.y Vol.U, No.l560t ^ y 19, 1969, p.417. 
57* Xheodre J^CHeavner, **The Vietnam rituation", n.<l^ 3>| 
Vol. XLI^ , No. ia)3, September 9, 19^3, p.d9e. 
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Korganthau th« ttakf^s which Justified American presence In 
Vietnam verei reslstence to Coanunist aggression, the contain. 
ment of Chins, the containa^t of Coamunisa and the prestige 
of the United rtates. 
The 'merJcan stakes In Vietnam may be sura-^ ed up as 
follovBi 
''Irctly, Vietnam represcntad, the comerctone of the 
fr9Q world In routheast *8la, the keystone to the arch, the 
finger in the dike* The r>RV!f appeared to be "a veritable 
69 
coBssur.lst speaxiiead and a foro!dabif^ threst In Southeast Asl' ,^" 
CoiSiBunist iii»uiJK expansion in Vietnam vouXd threaten Burma, 
Thailand, India, Japan, Philippines, Laos and Cambodia. The 
fundamental tenets of this nation's foreign policy, In short, 
dependend in considerable measure upon 3 strong and free 
Vietnamese nation, A weakening of the basic will to help 
southeast sia would tend to encourage separate Toviet press. 
urfs in othtir areas. Secretary of State Dulles was afraid 
that, "if the Cooaunlsts von uncontested control over Indo* 
China, or any substantial part thereof, they would surely 
resume the same pattem^of aggression against other free 
60 
peoples In the ^rea." Hence, from th© beginning '^ merlca ^cted 
68* Hans J.Korganthau, "Johnson's Ollemma t The Alternatives 
Nov In Vietnam", Waw Republic, Vol.164, '»o.22. May 28, 
19b7, p.14. 
68. Tiusael TT.FIfleld, op .c i t . . p. e. 
&0« Q'S-Q-r Vol. >Ji^ , Ho.772, April 12. 1964, p.640. uxoerpt 
from Secretary Dulles' >^ peeoh to the Overseas Press Club 
regarding U.E.Policy, March 29, 1964. 
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on th« pr«aiit« that If i t did not Snt«nrtn« in Vi«tnim|th« 
%ihoX« of .the araft vould go ovarbo«rd ftnd b«eoa« eomunitt. 
Zhi8| in other words, i i knovn at th« doaiao theory* It 
vasi therefore, n909»BSiry in their viev to defend South 
Vietnasi for Aaeriot*! %ixoie potitlon depended on it* 
Eitenbover had been aindful of the pioblM before he beoane 
President* He wrote, *'if Indo-Chins f e l l not only Thailand 
but BUzna and Malaya would be threatened with added risks 
61 
for East Pakistan, foutl^ Asia and Indo^China as veil*" f> 
siai lar fear was expressed bgr the ^en Viee-President Hixon, 
62 
Fpeaking on the U*S* interest in Vletnaa, he said; **•••••** 
Uiy i s the United states spending hundreds of Billions of 
dollars supporting the forces of the French Union in the 
fight against Communist Chinat «•• If Indo^China fa l l s , 
Thailand is put in an alaost impossible position. The saae 
i s true of Malaya with i t s rubber and of Indo*6hina* If this 
whole part of ^^outheast ^sia 0>es under ooaaonist doaination 
or oooimunist influenee, Japan, who trades and aust trade 
with t^is area in order to exist, aust inevitably be oriented 
towards the oooaunlst regiae*** 
Thus, the United Btates oaae to identify i ts seeurlty 
interests with the outooae of the struggle in Vletnaa* !?peakin 
61* JUtld«i P« 689* 
t>S* IbU«f Vol* XXXf No* 768, January 4,1964, p*lS* 
• 3S0 « 
b«for« th« £«iitte CommittM on Foartlgn n«latlon8t ^tcrttar/ 
Busk stated that **o«rtainl/ ve ara not there merely beeauee 
ve have pover and l ike to use i t •••• But ve are la Vfetnaa 
beoause the lasues poaed there are deeply Intertwined vlth 
our ovn security and beoause the outooae of the struggle can 
profoundly affect the nauire of the vorld In vhich ve and our 
63 
children wi l l l ive ." 
reoondly, Touth VIetnas was a testing ground for 
Anerlcan policy In routh East Asia* In VietnaB, the Aoerioans 
were detemining whether or not the free world could help a 
nation defend Itself against the subversion and guerilla 
warfare which sake up the **war of national liberation** tacticSi 
If fouth Vletnao f e l l the wil l of the other underdeveloped 
nations to resist aggression would be weakened and the whole 
64 
fabric of free*world strength damaged* 
Xhirdlyi Vietnam represented a proving ground of 
demooraoy In Asia* The rise in the prestige and Influence 
of ComriuBlst China in Asia is an undeniable reality* Therefor 
If this democratic experiment falledf then weakness and mt 
strength would characterise the meaning of democracy in the 
minds of more Asians* The United .<?tates %ras directly res pons. 
Ible for this experiment and could not pezslt i t to fall* 
63* jLbid*f VoLLIV, I^ o*1393y March 7, 19^^ p* 346. 
^4* Ibjjl.t Vol. XLUf Ho. 12b3, Eeptember 1963, p.398. 
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Fourthlyi Vlttnaa r6j>r«s«nted ft test of 'oarlcan 
r«spontlblXlV iw<) d«t«zttliiAtlon in Atia« xh« Onlttd rtat«8 
x^t only pr«sld«d over Its birth but also iav« attlttanct and 
h«lpod to «hap« Its future** Anerloan Involvenent in Vletnaa 
vas believed to be a soral eoamitaent to help the Vletnaaese 
%^ vere fithtlng not only for theaselves but for a l l the 
freedom loving people* Ihereforsy i f South Vietnaa sank^ 
American prestige would also sink to a new lov* It wuld also 
have an adverse effect on the ainds of Aaeriean Aiii«Sf who 
%ioiild lose faith in Aaeriean proalses of help and seourity 
In face of aggression* This point vas stressed In President 
Johnson's faaous John Hopkins spseeh of *prll ?« 1966. ^9 
saidi "Around the globe froa Berlin to Thailand are people 
vhose vell*belng rests in part on the belief that they oan 
GOMiLt on us i f they are attacked* To leave Vietnaa to i t s 
fate would shake the confidenoe of a l l these people in the 
value of an Aaeriean eoaaitaent and In the Aaeriean word* 
The result %<ouid be increased unrest and InstablHtyf and 
even vider var*" 
Finally! Aaeriea's stake in Vietnaa* s strength and 
security vas selfishly aotivatedf for i t could be ultiaately 
aeasttred in teras of Aaeriean l ives and '^aeriean <tollars* 
Aaeriean ooflnnltaent in Vletma vas indirectly oomected vlth 
66* PCS Wt¥ Xflrt Tlata, April 8, 1966* 
th« fUtur« security of 'A^rioa* routh rait Agia vat of graat 
strategic value In the United states* strategy of for%mrd of 
defence* Its position on th« laport^nt Fast^vegt air and 
sea routesy and flanks the Indian sub»oontinent on one side 
and /ustraliay Huv Zealand and Fhilllppines on the otheri and 
doainates the t,«teway between the pacific and the Indian 
Ocean* If this area were to pass into Comnunist control^ 
i t vouid po86 a oost serious threat to the security of the 
United states and the free vorld* Thus i t vas necessary for 
America to aeet the challenge in Vietnaa* A9 Vice-President 
Husphrey observedt "The var in Vietnaa i s not an isolated 
I^ ttfioaienoni but even auch acre Idian quarrel in a reaote country 
aaong people of vhoa veJ^nov nothing* It i s the focus of a 
broader conflict idt^ ich involves the vhole Asian continent* 
67 
It also Involves basic principles of international conduct*" 
Thusf Aaerlean policy had been foraulated in the 
context of Aaeriean security* Vletnaa %ms iaportant not in 
i t se l f but as an area of confrx>ntation between United ''tates 
and Chlnay the one seeking containaent and the other expansion. 
All eyes verct thereforcy turned towards the war in 
Vietnaa in hushed expectancy* If the Ceaaunists were defeated 
t>6* Cee Fraidc N*Trager9 aaaJll*y pp* 111«12* 
67* J k ^ M Viol* LXV. Wo*1d97» April 4.1963^ p*623* Address 
by Vice-President Huaphrey at the national Press Club^ 
i^ashington^ on March 11 ^  1966* 
. 323 • 
there) this vouXd greatly aacourftge the antl-Communlsts to 
hope t.hat vlth American arms aid and support th«y too could 
successfully comi;>at Communist aggression. Converselyi If 
despite I t s superior resources the i^st 'iccepted de^'et In 
Vietnam, It vouid <»)mpletely d«Bosallse non-oonaunist '^sla 
and expose It to the expansionist pressures of Coaraunlst China, 
China's amoit'ions were already glot>al s with the ^<est on 
retreat Hs ^.g^^resslvencss vouid Inore^isey unchecked. The 
v.'esti according to the anti*CooRmnlstSy w>uld thus be respon. 
s lulb f>r vorld v.'ar III by fa l l ing to halt oonmunlsa In 
•"outh Vietnam. 
' Incs the very beginning Tndla has vleved the Vietnam 
c r i s i s from an an^le diametrically opposed to th'^t of the 
United rta^es. India and u.r.A. have never been able to see 
eye to e^ ts on this v i t a l issue vhlch has strained relations 
in recent yoars. 
India has always been suspicious of th«^  moves of the 
' s t e m povers vblch, It thlnksi are aimed at subverting 
Independence and establishing oslonies in the weaker s ta tes . 
Prejudiced by thfs view IndltJ sees "merlcan action !n VletrvMi 
as u struggle for dominant world ^ s l t l o n and the continuation, 
In some forsQ, f^* imperialisa. / s aarly as January ^, 1946, 
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Nehru had exi)r«es«d the vi«v that "Reeant d«v«lopaient| vouid 
•••••8««B to Indicate that Anerlea ia undervritlng this efflpire^ 
possibly vith suitable minor ohanges. That Is a big decision 
to take for i t i s ceitain that the countries of 'sia v i l l not 
v i l l ingly submit to any empire or any domination and v i l l 
revolt against lt«•••••*' 
1!he fight In Indo«Chlna vas^ therefore^ in his viev, 
essentially one of oolonialisa and nationalism* rpeaklng in 
the Lok raoha, on ^pril 24| 1964» Nehru observedt 
"She conflict in Indo^Csio^China i s in i t s origin and 
essenti-^l character a flk>vemi»t of resistance to colonialism 
and the attempt to deal vith such resistance by the traditional 
methods of suppression and divide«and*rule«" Although "Foreign 
intervention have ( s i c ; made the issue more oompleX| but i t 
neverthelsss riaains basically anti-colonial and nationalist 
in character* The recognition of this and the reconciliation 
of nationalist sentiments for freedom and indep«)d«ice and 
8afe.guarding them against external pressures can alone form 
69 
the basis of a settlement and of peace*" 
68* w«w Yntit TimmBj January 1. 194&* Excepts from an Address 
by Ft*Nehru to the Ajj, India i tates People's conference, 
January t , 194i&* 
69* PirtlMBtntory ntteltiMi House of the People, Official 
aeports, Vol. IV, No«52, April 24,1964, Part II|Pp«667l>.83* 
Thfi prodaaation of the "D«Bocrfttlc Hftpublic o^ Vletnaa" 
in t9pUmh»x 1946 and Its r«cognltlon b|/ the Govemai«nt of 
China further complicated the lt8u« lay trantfozalng a local 
conflict into an Intttrnational one^ and that, tooy at the aomen 
vhon the battle^linea for the enauing Cold y^r vera balng 
dra«n« 
H«no«| in an earneat deaira to aeeure peace and ^elp 
resolve sone o'* t^e differences and or a deadlo<dc ^ehru nade 
70 
the following auggestiontt 
!• "A el isate of peace and negotiations has to be pn^uted 
and the suspicion and the ataosphere of threats that prevail| 
ou^t to be dissipated. To this endy the Oovernaent of India 
appeal to a l l concernedi to desist from t^reatSf and to the 
combatants to refrain from stepping up the tsmpo of the war* 
2« A oease»fir«« To bring ^ i s about the Government of 
India propose! 
(a) That the item of a **cease->fir«*' be given priority 
on the ]&ido*China conference agendat 
(b; A cease»fir« groups ( t i e ) consisting of the actual 
belligerantsi vi£«t France and her thre« Associated states 
and Viet Mir^ « 
70. Ibid* 
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a* Zndep«ndeno«« Ih« conf«r«nc« should d«eid« and pro-
oiaia that i t i t «S8«ntial to th« toXution of th« conflict 
that thfi conplfita Independtnet of Indo*(^ina, that l t | th« 
taminatlon of Frenoh Q9V«rnm«nty should b« plaead bt/ond 
a l l doubt by an unsquivocal oomaitrntnt by th« Govsmiant of 
Franc«* 
4« 01ffeGt n«£9tiatlons betvsso the partiss lanediatsly 
and principally concerned 8?K>uld be initiated by the Coitfsrsnei 
Tnstead of seeking to haimer out settlenents th«BselveS| the 
conference should r(;qu«st the parties principally concerned 
to enter into direct negotiations and give then a l l assistance 
to this end* Fuch direct negotiations vould assist in kesping 
the Indo-Chlna question lisiited to the Issues vhlch concern 
and Involve Indo*China directly* These parties vould be the 
saatt as vould constitute the cease-fire group* 
4>* K[on»lnterventio% ' solsan agresfi^t on non-interventio 
dtfiyln^ &idf direct or Indirecti vlth troops or var«materiai 
to the conli^tantD or for tho purposes of v&r, to vhich the 
United rtateSy ti\& U.C*'".!!*, the United Klngdoa and China 
shall oe prioary parties^ should be brought about by the 
Gonfi.rance* Xhe United Nations« to vhich the decision of 
tiie oonfersnce should be reported, shall be raquested to 
foxiBulatd a convention of non.interv«ition in Indo-China 
embodying the aforesaid agreea^nt and including the provlsioni 
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for Its «nforeeR«»t und«^ r Unittd Natlont autplces* Uhtr 
states should be invited by the United ^Tstions* to adhere 
to this QORvmtion of iviruintervention* 
6« The United Hatlons should be infomed of the progress 
of the conference* Its good offices for purpose of oonellia. 
tion under th« appropriate articles of the chartert and not 
for involving sanctions, should be sought*** 
A trend avay from extremist enthusiasm for freedom 
and toward a more cautious advocacy of i t vas discernible 
in India*s|( attitude regarding Indo*China, India had come 
to adopt a rath«r noiucommittal attitude towards the two 
Indo«Oilnese eovemm«nts* Although Tfehru stated as *'a genera] 
proposition" that India was "generally* opposed to any forei^ 
amy functioning fn Asla^ he refused to r^oo^iise either 
rif Chi Minh ov Bao Del and announced that India would follow 
the developmsnts until the people had reached some decision. 
He advised against taking sides In th(j issue* '^e cautioned, 
71 
*'we should not jump into the fray** and asked, "After a l l , 
what can we do about ity except to give moral sympathy and 
get involved? v« do not think that i s practical politics*** 
71* Tee tha Hln<ftt^  January 1<» and February 8, 19b0, 
HOT XOtll I l l i l f June 17, I960. 
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7h« Indian Oov«rnBi«at also m&9 unsuccessful att«Bpt8 
to psrsuad« other British Conmonwdalth oountriss to adopt a 
slBiXarXy aloof policy. 7h« Indians suspected Bao Dal of 
being a puppet of franca, vhlle they considered Ho Chi Mliih 
to be a great patriot and nationallst| but his close lihks 
vlth China and the Tavist Union vert not liked by aany Indians* 
The Indian Covemnent was also not sure vhleh of the two 
regiaea had the people's support and syapathy nor could i t 
expect any clarification of the situation at that tiae« India 
f e l t that It vould not bifhefit her If Indo*Chlna beoaae a paim 
7£ 
in the Cold v>ir* Speaking on Indians attitude tovards the 
Indo»Chlneae issue Kehru a&de i t cle^ r^ that, i t *'is not a 
negative attitude Uit a slightly positive one, because ve do 
not want to stake i t aore difficult for Indo«China*s fight for 
73 
independence**^ Ihus ve see that India adopted a neutral 
posture in Vietnam in order to help faci l i tate the solution 
of the problea and in accordance with i t s declared policy of 
non-aliganent* 
Hovevery India played an active role In the negotiation 
that culjBinated in the Geneva Agreeaents on Indo«Chlna in 
1964* India sided with the powerful denocratie forces that 
fou^t and defeated French imperlailsa. Tven today, India's 
78* verner Levi, fliufiii-f P»^ » 
73. Xht Hlntfttt I'abruary 10, I960* 
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basic position r«aalns tbu saosf !•••% that th« p«opl« of 
Vistnaa must: h&V6 th« right to dsoldo their ovn future frosl / 
and vlthout any lnt«rfareao«« Xhls point was reitsratad by 
74 
rwaran Cln^h, minister of External Affairs* vhan ha stattd 
at a prass conf«iranc« at Hyderabad that **«• f i i a iy beliete 
that th6 only vay to solve the VletnuB problen i s to abandon 
%rarllke ^ictivltles and to hold dlsousslona with the object of 
implementing the Geneva Agreement so ^lat the People of 
Vietnam may be able to determine the future vlth their wishes 
vlthout any interference fxom any quarter whatsoevsr* Urdsr 
Article 34 of the Agreemtmt on the Cessation of Hostilities 
In Vietnam signed on July £o« 1964 In Geneva^ India served 
for over & decade aa ChajLitnan of the tripartite International 
Commission for Tupervislon and Control in Vietnam (ICV) vlth 
Canada and Poland as tlie other membra* India*a role in the 
commission has been mainly negative vlth a fev exceptions* 
It vas for the f irst time that In 1962 India issued a report 
alon^ with Canada* wito Poland disagreeing* in %diich North 
Vietnam vae found guilty of infiltration Into Touth Vietnam. 
/nother oocagion wag when the ICV produced a majority report 
on February 13* 19&6 in which the Indian and Pol i^ represen. 
tat Ives offered the opinion that the air strikes of iFetoiuary 
76 
7*r and 8 indicated violations of the Geneva Agreement. The 
74* ituLjuUkOttf July n i9^« 
76* International Cofflalsaion for 'Supervision and Control in 
Vietnam* F.Q«oial Rmoart *n tha Cft.ChaiiM«m nT tho fl«nai» 
Cftnf«r<.neayF«bruaiv 13* 19e6. Published as ^mx, 2609* 
Mtf* 1966, 
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report alto aniied th« co*ohalz««n to appeal iaaedlataly to 
tht parties concerned to reduce teneione and to take reaedlaX 
meaaures to correct the deterloretlne eituatlon. But the 
Bttggeation vent unheeded* 
The Indian Governnent bellev<^8 that the best vay of 
solving t>"e Vletnaa cris is Is on the t«slB of the 1054 Geneva 
/.greeaents and, therefore, extends full support to the Agree* 
Bent* Since the Agreement provided for the Insulation of 
the country from outside i&illtar/ Intervention *)nd has speeifli 
clauses forbidding entry Into Vietnam of foreign ail ltary 
personnel or material of any type, except in replacement of 
pemlssllfle quantities already In the country, India regrets 
that foreign interference has continued in spite of the Geneva 
Agreement and the reunlficsbtion of Vietnam remains unachieved. 
The Government of India has always vorked for the Implementa. 
76 
tion of the Oemva Agreement* 
The f irs t crit ical phase in the Vietnam situation 
began in ^ugust '^ 9^4, when incidents involving U,% 7th Fleet 
and North Vietnamese torpedo boats occured in the Gulf of 
Toidcin* The (J«n* Government requested India to intervene, 
but India rejected the suggestion* The Government of India, 
hovever, Issued a statement expressing distress over the 
Government of India, p* 61. 
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incidents and hoping t^at the situation vould not b« furtbar 
aggravatadf that at la«ft th« unaasy paaca vhioh pranailad 
7! 
bafor«i th« Inoidanta took placti vould Iwtadlataly ba rastored. 
Contrary to tha axpootatlons of India tha situation 
vortaned in the succaading yaara* On Fabruary 7, 19^6 th« 
Unitad Statas startad boabing of North Viatnaa. Tha Indian 
Qotrarnmant iomadiataly Issuad a stataaant axpraaslng "g^va 
ooneam" that tha boatoing Might craata danger of a full seals 
var in Vietnas vith disastrous oonsequances* The stateaent 
called for an iaAediate suspension of a l l provocative action 
in South Vietnaa as ve i l as North Vletnaa by a l l parties 
involved in the issucf and that nothing should be done to 
aggravate the situation vith a ipiev to create the atnosphera 
necessary for the oonvtfiing of a Oeneva.type Conference for 
VietnaBy vhleh the Qovernaent of India considered as essential 
for a peaceful and enduring solution to the problan of Vietnam, 
Further, the convening of a nev Conference on Indo.Chlna 
vould be in oonformity vith the Declaration of th« Cairo 
78 
Conference of Non.>aligned Nat lone in .October^  19(>4* 
77. iJKU* 
7&« ?tatenant by G«0,I« on Oevelopaents in Vletnaa,February 
e» 1966, Fnf 4|n Afflirg Btfiarti vol. Xl, NO.S, February 
I8669 p.SO* s^ ce also i -g .n . - February 19» 1966, 3rd 
series, Vol.XJCXVIII, No.d. 1 1 ^ session, col. 449,rv8ran 
! i^ngh*s reply to a Call Attention Motion* Also Sardar 
£varan {!ingh*s stateaent in Rajya f^ abha on Davelopaents 
in Viatnaa. February £b|19i>6 in Ffirfllgn htt^in Rgflfirdt 
Vol«3lI,No«£,p«40, in %«hich siailar vievs are expressed. 
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Xnlla also did not lag behind In condtwilns tha utt 
of (p^B la Vlctnaa \ihict vas not only 3n Inhuaan act but 
vouid alto aggravata tension. In a statenent on Mareh 2&^ 
1966 In the Lok Sabha Cardar ''varan r i n ^ , Dttamal Affairs 
Hlnlstery txprassed "distress** and "sHodc** about the uss of 
gas In ^utb Vietnam affooting the Vieteong and the eivllian 
population. He declared that India considered the use of gas 
as "against the conscience of huaanlty and sincerely hope 
that no further use of i t wi l l be aade in South Vietnas.** 
3«sldest E^ndia also played an active role In initiating d i s . 
cusslons at the Belgrade Conference which led to the Issuing 
ot a joint appeal W 17 non.aligned nations vith the objeot 
of getting negotiations started without any preconditions and 
as soon as posaibloi so that a political solution of the 
79 
probleB could be achievsd. %hile the United nates velooaed 
the appeal, the Deaooratic Republic of Vletnaa rejsoted It* 
Faced with the rigid attitude of Hanoi, ^as tr l along 
vith other neutralists began vith in a aonth of the Belgrade 
appeal to ask for the halt of the northern bombings at a 
prerequisite for discussions* the Prime Minister said he 
realised that Hanoi had Imposed conditions for neestiations. 
79* f^ ae fardar Svaran Singh's Statement in the Lok Sabha on 
ool* 6S47* 
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but h«Xd that this was not a vital point* riae« th«n the 
dtaand for an tnd to northern bomblnct without urging f laul. 
tanous da»eacalatlon by the othar slda baoama a najor plank 
In tha Indian evaluation of Vlatnan* 
India took Its f irs t bllataral poaltlon against tha 
boablngs In the rhastrl»Kosygln oomniunlqtts In May 1966* This 
Una contlnuad until th« .^aptaaber host i l i t i es vlth Pakistan 
In tha aftamath of which thara was no crltlolsa* In October 
19^9 Foreign Minister !7waran .<?lngh did not aantlon Vletnaa 
at the opening of the United Nations General Assenbly^ and 
In Deoeaber the ."^ hastrUWc ^1n Coaaunlque alao did not refer 
to the northern boablngs* After Tashkenti however, India 
resuaed orltloiaa, with the renewal of boablngs near Hanoi and 
Haiphong at the end of June 19l»i»| which appeared In the Gandhi-
&oa/gln ooamunlque of aid-Jul/ 19&6f In Mrs* Gandhi's eorres. 
pondenoe with Prealdent Johnson In late August 19(»d, and In 
the lndo*Iraql coaaunlque In early March 19&7* 
Since then India has aade several efforts through) 
dlploaatlc channels to help bring about a peaceful settleaent 
of the Vletnaa problea* India f e l t that only a political 
solution of the problea was possible* Hence^In April 1966 
India propoaed a autual cessation of hostUltleSf International 
80* Tha ninAu^ April 16, 1966* 
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polleltig of tb« bordtrs by an Afro.Atl«n patrol foret^* and 
th« aalntananca of th« prettnt Vlatoanaaa boundarlas at long 
as th« poople daslrbd. Tha proposal vas undar the Dnitad 
rtataa Qovamaant'a conaidaratlon ^ a n on }fey 4 , 19&6| Hanoi 
radio annoanead that ita Oovarmant had rajectad tha proposal 
at i t \m» at eosplata varianca vith tha spirit and basic 
principles of tha Q«nava /graaaanta and ran oountar to India*a 
81 
status aa Chairsan of tha Intarnational Control Coaiission* 
Hovavart Indiana polio/ haa baan to oontimia to aaka usa of 
•var/ forua and ohannal to sacura paaca in fiatnao* 
Xha Indian position on Vlatnaa vaa sussarisad in tha 
Annual Report of tha MinSatry of Extamal Affairs publishad 
in the spring of "^9^6. Tha basic aleaants varet tha ispossi. 
bi l l ty of s military solution, the urgency of a political 
aattlemcnt on the Geneva nodelf tha need for the northern 
boabings to ceases the ending of fighting throughout MB Vletnai 
and the vlthdraval of United Btataa foroes|rron ''outh Vietnam 
and the peaceful creation of a unified Vietnamese state with. 
82 
out f o r e i ^ troops and military alliances* 
61« n-F^ >a>t Vol«LVni| !ro.l6l2« June 17, 19t>8, P.Paper 
on Xhird Party i'aaca Proposals* 
8 2 , Rap>rt Mlnlatoir ^f F,itt>>nal Affal^i. lOfefi^ bft^  (Nev Dalhit 
Govammant of India, 19&6)| p*d2* 
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Ib« nport rftl8«d a l o t of controversy* Th« United 
CtatM sought cLsrlficatlon on the OMntlon of the vlthdrai^l 
of /JBerlcan forceSf *&d vat told by the Minister of External 
Affairs that the doeuaent aisrepr^sented Indian policy on this 
point. 3ttt a close study of Indian policy reveals that the 
d^aand vas In fsct a part of India*s position based on India*! 
opposition to /aerlcan military forces In ''sia, her interpre. 
tat ion of the 1964 Qen«ira Agre«aent« and 1966 sta tenants bgr 
Indian leaders* pressurised taQf cr i t ics who biased that the 
food cris is prevented the Governaent froa speaking against 
American policy^ Indira Gandhi and Hwaran ringh said that the 
vithdraval clause in the Report had off ic ial endorseaent and 
vas not in error* Hoveveri the Indian Oovemaent did not 
«ndorse Aaerican vithdraval before a conference as desired by 
Hanoi and HLF, )fr8* Oandhi tried to appease the Onited '"tate 
83 
by pointing out| **if you look at the reality of the situatioi 
i t i s easy to say, 'vithdrav* but i t i s not so easy to do i t 
in practice*** 
83* Prlae Minister's Press Conference of June 16| 1966, 
rnrtlgn Affatn mmrdt voi* ^ii, J\m9 i966, p.i66. 
According to their Joint coaaunique and her later accou 
of their talks* Hrs* Gandhi and President Johnson had 
only a brief discussion of Vietnaa during her United 
<:tates v i s i t , Haroh 28 • April 1, when President Johnso 
announced emergency food aid* In her public stateaents 
Mrs* Oandhi reaffirmed India's search for a peaceful 
solution for Vietnaa and described as sincere the 
President's s ial iar quest* 
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%vever| India did not hes i tate to express Its d««p 
concern and d is tress -it t^a boablng of are&s In the v ic in i ty 
of Hanoi and Haiphong In '^rth Vietnam by U*r« planes on J^ une 
aOf "!»>*»• Th« ixternai Affairs Minister, J-varan ringb,regarded 
i t as a **mo&t serious developaent** and hoped th&t the bombing 
vould stop* Prime Minister Indira GanHhi sXso expressed the 
fe'^r th%t the bofflbing vould result In the escalation of the var 
vhlch any ^OBH t^eat iantere not only for ' outh .ast 'sla 
but ult la^tely for India as* v e i l . India could only convey 
i t s disapproval of th« bombing bat %«s not in a position to 
do any thing against i t . 
)ne of the most dramatic efforts made by India to solve 
the VUtnm c r i s i s vere the proposals put forvard it'/ Prime 
Htnlster Indlri Gandlil on .Tuly 7, 19&6, o^ n the **ve of her 
86 
dep3rtur< r'>r a s t s t e vls^t to Imssla, Mrs. Qandhl»s seven 
points were: 
to* Ibid.^ July 1, 19^0* 
hto* Xh« pioyosals v«ri> generally welcomed in India, Tha ilipAu 
of July 8, igbu wrote that the t'rime Minister had taken 
*'a uoid peace Init iat ive", by cal l ing upon Britain and 
t^ .e Toviet Union to Immediately convene the Geneva 
Conference and orlni, the parties to the Vletn'^a dispute to 
t^e tao le . Ihls vas primarily Intended for the concerned 
parties to tuxti away from war. in July 9, '»9b4» i t 
wrote that j^ rlrae Minister's proposals^! "in fact constl* 
tute thu aost constructive move so f^r made to end the 
var.*' 
. 337 • 
!• arltaln and thtt Soviet Union should conv«n« th« 14« 
povtt G«n0Vft Conf«rtne« im«diattXy« 
2« Boabing of North Vlttnaa thotUd stop loniediattly* 
3* This should IM clossly followed by a cessation of 
hos t i l i t i e s as ve i l as of hosti le iBoveoents and actions on 
a l l sides throughout Ylatnnm in ful l observance of the (1964} 
Oeneva /greeaent* 
4« ^hile a peaceful settlement is being hasusered out In 
vhat inli^t be weeks of tortuous negotiations* the ICC in 
Vietnam should safeguard **stand0till arrsngeaents", with lndl< 
accepting added responsibility in their task if necessary. 
b* Withdrawal of a l l foreign forces from Vietnam and 
insuloution of the country from foreifP interference so that 
the Vietnamese paopls ean determine their OIA future* 
&• Ousrantee by the Geneva Povers of the territorial 
integrity and independence of not only a neutral Vietnam but 
also neighbouring Laos and Cambodia, 
7« The Geneva Povers also should undertake a rchabilita. 
tion and developmtfit plan for a l l ti^ree countries* 
Mrs* Gandhi *s statement was the f irs t major pronounce-
ment by an Indian leader on the Vietnam war since the late 
Prime Minister '^astri had called for an end to U.S* bombingi 
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of North VIetnas soon after the/ started In February ig66 
and ^« result y&a that ?r«8id«nt Johnson suspsndsd the 
Invitation to Shastri to v i s i t th« Unitsd rtatss whleh in 
87 
turn had an adverse sffset on Indo*U*S« relations* 
In presenting these suggestions the basis of PriiM 
Minister Oandhi*s approach vas that there could be no Bi l l tax 
solution In Vietnam, There vas no alternative to seeking a 
peaceful solution In order to avoid a disastrous %fer with ^c 
danger of aasslve escalation* A peaceful tolutlon could be 
r€.ached only at a conference table and hence the necessity 
for the conchaIzasn to oonvtfie a Geneva*type Conference* But 
It vould be unrealistic to expect a conference until the 
bonbing of North VIetnas vas stopped* India had alvays oppoi 
such boMblng* In the Interis perlodf ^ e ICC should ensure 
the observance of any standstil l arrangeaents vhleh might be 
agreed upon* The objective of the Conference should be to 
find a solution within the fr^aievoxk of the Geneva ^gree•entl 
of 19&4* The Vietnasese people should be able to decide 
their future in accordance with their ovn wishes without 
88 
pressure or Interference fron any quarter* 
87. &ingrafllteni3L Bgnflrtt n2,Pirt tS* ^uly 16,ig66,p«l6862< 
Heaarks in the Benate on Prine Minister Gandhi* s 7 poin 
Peace prograome isy Mike Mansfield* 
88* LaiLJ}*,Third faeries. Vol.LVlI, No* 1|July 26, 1966. 
rtateaent by the Prime Minister on the Eecent Visit 
Aoroad* 
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Ih« Pria« Minister*s Plan thovtd a %my bj ^i€lh a l l 
the parties ooncamed oouid honourato./ atop fighting and star 
nagotlatlng, Bhe had propotad an Innsdiata end to the ''merle 
toabing of ^orth Vietnaa, to be closely folloved bjf eeasatlon 
of a l l hosti le Bovenents and actions on a l l sides. This 
suggestion should have provided- sAtisfaotory for both United 
states and Hanoi slnoe i t sought to prevent North Vletnanese 
supplies floving to the Viet Cong In the r?outh i ^ l ^ i s vhat 
the Urlted rtates desired and It also provided for a peaceful 
settleaent vhlch vouid l e t the TJetnanese decide their ovn 
future without outside interferenoef vhloh Hanoi deaanded* 
llhe United f^tates welcoaed ^ e proposal since i t gave 
priority for a conference and Ignored the denand for a boablr 
halt as a precondition. Moreoveri the last point regarding 
co«ordinated eeonoaic aid to Vletnaa| L&os and Caabodia •«» 
a n to be protected by the Geneva Payra —* accorded with 
an earlier pmposal bjr President <Tohnson« 
But| vhen Mrs. Gandhi reached Mosoov, there appeared 
a change in her original proposals. The Gandhl*ICosygin 
coBcsuniquey issued after %s. Gandhi*s v i s i t to Russia^ aarited 
a shift in India's stand. I t d««anded an lamedlate end to 
the northern boablngs and held that the conflict could only 
be resolved vJthin the Geneva fraaework. Unlike India's 
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original propotftlf th« oofluauniqu* did not dtaand vithdraval 
of for«lgn forc«s froa i'^uth Vietnam) although foreign bates 
vera regarded aa o beta d e e to peaee* Certain reaxrangementa 
of ideag were notioeable in the Joint ooBSttniqtte* Priority 
vas ^iven to the eesaation of laoabing idhile the auggeation 
for a oonferenoet contained in Kra* Gandlii*e original propoaa 
vas denoted* Aithou^^ India kept opf^ i the option of securing 
a Russian cal l for a ^ Oen«im«.type conference, i t vae of no 
particular benefit* In tShe t l t l s s t e analysis the coismunlque 
was laore akin to roviet than Indian foiaulas* ?one pl8uslbl< 
explanations for this act on the pert of Indl^ can be given 
In terms of India's concern about possible Russian military 
aid to Pakistan following Soviet mediation at Tashkent^  the 
influence of T«N.Kaul| India's economic needs (970 million 
Nubble credit for the Fourth Five Xear Plan; and the deficit 
policy planning. On her retuxn to India Mr a* Gandhi repeated 
her proposal with the modification that she nov linRed the 
demand for ending northern bombings to a cal l for negotlatloi 
69 
and made the halt a precondition for a peace meeting* This 
caused some misgivings In the United rotates* It vas f e l t 
that Mrs* Oandhl had altered the original propesal vhlch ask< 
both parties to discontinue their actionsi and that she vas 
demanding that unless the United f lates took the f irst step 
89* Paul F*Povert musil^t PP* 749 -^051* 
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and h a l t ^ tho bonblngt vlthout tho counter»a8far»no« that 
Hanoi vould reciprocate or MDSCOV would call the Geneva Con. 
ference It vould be diff icult to hold a X Oeneva Conference* 
It %fa8 hinted that Mrs* Oandhl had aade this alteration In 
her original proposal to plicae the Russians and possibly 
und«>r pressure trtj^ thiga, Pr»9B reports ev^n Mntei tisst 
llrs* Gan<!fol sight Vxave leaned oy(&r to thv Kuaslan side to 
ensuTti t^iat Moseov did not accede to P^lstsn's requests for 
90 
Bras from the Soviet Union, Ihe i?«v Ynrfr T1B!#>« cooicented 
that Mrs* Oandhl*s nev statement WAS causing distress In 
^shlngton* It vas originally aroused Uy the comiaunlque In 
idilch India and the Fovlet Union expressed concern "at the 
deterioration of the Intematlonal situation and the oountlng 
var danger which rave occurred lately as a result of Inperla^ 
l i s t s and other reactionary fdrces*** !S l^8 shift In the JnAU 
stand greatly disappointed the United states . It vas noted 
t^at this \)S» the f irst tlae that India had subscribed to 
such controversial languajey predictably offensive to the 
\}0S*f^ Although most United ''tates off ic ials vers realist ic 
tfiough to admit that i t vaa unreasonable to ask Indie to 
take sides In the VUtnam confUcti they realized that India 
had to steer a middle course betvean the United ftates and 
the .Soviet Union* Xhey even admitted that the United states 
could not expect India to do anything other than take a jtamiu 
90. IfiV aCfflgfc IliBtIf <ruly 21, 1967* 
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balanced potltloOf atpaolall/ aftar th« United rtat«g Itsalf 
took an "airan-.handod** position batwaan India and Pakistan 
during the 1966 oonfllet, But^eoaplalnad th«y^ that India by 
aaking th« United frtatea alone to take the f l r i t step tovards 
deesealation vas t i l t ing the balanee the other vay* 
Although the Bueh trunpetod July 7, proposal of Indira 
Gandhi f e l l through, India continued to strive undauntedly 
to seek n. peaceful solution of the probleiSi or at le'ast 
lessen thw M^i pitch of aniaonlty, In early August India 
suggested th« rfsviv&l of the f Joint oonaission which would 
enable the two sides to patrol together the deiallit^rised 
sone* This suggestion was appreoiated in ^aerica and the 
Pecretary of rtatet Pean Husky quickly endorsed it* An 
effective patrol could end Korth Vl«tnaB*s Illegal and increa 
ing use of the zone as % funnel for i t s south.bound troos>s. 
It could also tind the threat of retaliation on the northern 
side of the l ine which v^uid be In tht Interest of Hanoi. 3ut 
Hanoi could not be expected to agree to this suggestion sines 
In the past also It had oostiucted the functioning of the 
ICC so as to shield from i t s scrutiny ^ e acts of Vietn^aese 
C^munists in violation of the Gent>va Confer«rtce* 
Dasplte Its peace effortSf India refused to participate 
in the All^Aelan Peace Conference on Vietnam convened by 
U,S*A. and i t s a l l i e s at I4anila in Octooer 1966 for considerln 
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furthvr p«ae« t efforts on th« ground that a gatharlng of 
a group of apoolfle natlona would ineroaao rath«r than 
91 
daortaao tanalon*** India Yiavad the Manila meeting as esssn. 
tiaJLl/ a war conferanoe batveen the United ntatss and i t s 
a l l iea to reassess thelr^ pol i t ieal and Military tactics 
and confront the Hanoi Qovemaent and the National Liberation 
Front in South Vletnan with a draaatio peace appeal backed 
bjr a nev threat of overvhelalng ail itary action If thegr per. 
sisted in their refusal to enter into a negotiations except 
on their own terns* But India vlsely refrained froa deorying 
thia peace bid by ^ e U«.%A, and i t s a l l i e s as a diplomatic 
stunt to aislead vorld opinion vhieh opposed the continuance 
92 
of ^-aerican boabing of North vietaaa* 
It was in the f a l l of \9b& that India for the f i r s t 
t iae Joined hands with other states (r.gypt and Yugoslavia) 
to deaand withdrawal of "an foreign forees** without a tiae 
98 
l l a i t . Nothing fur^er was done and for the tiae being doaes. 
t i c aatters over^shadowed the Vietnaa problea. 
In 39i7 ^ e situation In Vietnaa eontiaaed to cause 
serious eoneem at there was an increase in the intensity 
91» See Priae Minister GandhiU stateaent in Ti«a« nf Tndin 
August £09 19&6* 
92* See IMiUt September 29, 1966. 
93. JMOmt October £69 1966. 
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of ^«ri»X tonbing of lior^ Vlstnaa and an stoalatlon of th« 
ground fighting* In the aeantlB«« to aecuro Its objective of 
a p«ac«fai aolutloa of the Vletnan problea the OoveroBent of 
India continued to sake every possible effort through dlpXona. 
tic and other channelS| to proaote conditions which vould 
enable a peaceful solution of tlie problea* Speaking In the 
conteict of the Interview of !forth Vfetnaaese Prime Minister 
with Mr. Ballstaur/ of the Hw J^A Tia^ in which tdie Premier 
Indicated his willingness to start talks once boalplng stoped 
and also a slallar statenent aadc by the North VletaMuiese 
CouBsui Oea»ral In Paris, Chagla In a stateaeat extended 
support to the llbrth VletnaMese stand saying that, *'It Is 
absurd to expect anything «ore positive by way of response 
froa North Vletaaa«** He was confident that, "If the United 
rtates stopa boablng unconditionally ^9n other things would 
definitely follow*** This view was conveyed to the Unltdd 
states Ooveraaent and ^9ry possible of fort aade to lapress 
the t}*!7* about the attitude and aode of the %rU) Vietnaaese 
Goveroaent* But there was no U*S* reply to the Hanoi feeler 
tbrottgh Delhi* the U*S*A«, according to the External !ffalrsf 
had earlier hinted that It would stop boablng of North 
11 Vletaaa even If there was '*a whisper" froa Hanoi or a 
positive response* Hanoi's response was a^re than a "^isper", 
94* RXnflBllan Xmit J^ anuary 18, 1067* 
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It vaSf h« saldy *'a thout at loud jn9U ean possibly cxpsot 
fioa 1t)« oth«r aid*.** H« azpraaaad unhapplnast at thla 
laflaxlbla attituda of «ha ttaltad SUtaa alnea he f t l t th« 
Oaltad Ctataa had aiasad a "foldan opportunitgr" vhloh would 
eartalnljr hava avlotad a posltiva raaponaa fioa Hanoi and 
TfLP. 
9ajct| along vlth othar iion»allgaad oatloni India 
aupportad tha Obitad Nations 5aeratary«Gan«ral*8 initiatlva 
96 
to bring about pe&ea in Viatnaa* In an aida^aaaoira datad 
Haroh 149 U Thant proposed thraa stapst a general standstill 
trocey preliainary talks for the reconvening of the Geneva 
Conferenee to aehiave a lasting settlenent* 
On Mareh I8t the United states aoeepted the proposal 
and X deelarad i t s readiness iaasdiatel/ to enter into cons. 
truetlve discussions regarding the details of the cease*fire« 
But Hanoi once again refused to accept the proposal aince i t 
aade no distinction betveea the aggressort i*a«y U.S.A. and 
96« £ec ftetilMBini February £1| 1967* 
96. IndUn Starm» August a, 196?^- aoth India and U thant 
agreed that the VIetnas conflict was one of nationalism 
and not ideologiesy aithoui^ the latter had been injects 
into i t by the intervention of 3ig Powers, aoth f e l t 
that the f i r s t essential step was stoppage of bonbing 
of IVorth Vietnaa. Once this was done ground will be 
prepared for meaningful talks* 
tht vlctlB of aggrMiiorii vls«y Harth Vietnam, Th« Govermon 
of Hanoi also aade It o&aar that the Vlatnaa problem vaa ii> 
oonotrn of th« United Nations and It had absolutely ik> right 
to Interfere In the Vietnam question* 7huS| this initiative 
also ofise to naught* 
It vas only after the eleetlons of 1967 that some 
change occurred in India's outlook on Vietnam*Forci|jEi Ministe 
Chagla warned in April 1967 that the northern bombings vere 
countexwproductive to t^e tittitcd states for they risked 
China's intervention, strengtibened Hanoi's aoraie and hurt 
f!^Viet.American relations elsci^cre* This shoved a definite 
t i l t towards Horth Vietnam and an op«t disapproval and ori-
t ioisa of the American actions* 
But this shift in the Indian stand on the Vietnam 
var did not envisage a similar shift in i t s trade relations 
vith North and South Vietnam* kl^lle India continued to trade 
in non.lethal ^odSjVis* electrical madiineryt machinery of 
a l l sortsy transport trudcs of every description ««» vith 
nouth Vietnami an al ly of the United Statefy she refused to 
trade vith North Vietnam on the ground that "anything ve may 
send to North Vietnam may be passed on to Chlna,*^ieh i s an 
• enemy of India, and thus India's Interest and her very 
97* L>£r"-t Fourth Series, Vol.I* No*4, March £0y 1967, 
cols* 26G«69* Reply of M*C*Chagla, External Affairs 
Minister, to a question o*^  Vietnam raised by 0*M* 
aanerjee* 
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safety a i |^ t b« «ndang«r«d« India vas «v«n raluetant to 
•and raadiclnas to ^otVb Vi«tr»a|f for the saae reason* 
This policy oaae under f ire In both houaea of Parlla. 
a«nt» apeeiaily froffi the Coammlat aenlD«ra» In the UA rabha 
f«M,Baiierjee asked the r:xtemal Affairs Mlalsteri|r| M^CChagia 
vhether there vas gloving treasure froa the United ^tatea 
not to have a^y trade relations vlth North Vletnan and ^ethc 
this vas one of the conditions for giving aid to India, The 
Foreign Minister tried to expel the doubts of the member b/ 
oialalng that "at no stage vas i t ever suggested by those 
vho vere negotiating on behalf of the U«% that ve should nol 
trade vlth North Vietnam or vlth Cuba* Nothing pertaining 
to this question vas ever Agitated between the tvo negotia. 
ting parties*** He explained that there vas a clause In the 
U*% legislation aeeording to % l^eh the United states Oovern. 
ment may not extend aid benefits to countries vhlch have 
trade relationsf vhlch sell« furnish or permit their ship or 
aircraft to transport goods to or form North Vietnam or, 
except vithln certain defined limitsi to Cuba* But this ooU 
apply only to the U*S* and could not be binding on other 
countries* Therefore! India vas frme to accept or refuse 
aid* But since the aid vas In India's Interest and not 
derogatory to her sovereign r l ^ t s there vas no harm in 
accepting aid* He, hovetsTf assured the member that If at 
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any tlm« the sovereign r l ^ t of India vouid ba threatened 
the Qovemuent's reaction vould be oompletely In accordance 
98 
with national honour and Interest* 
In tile Rajya Sabha also menbers of the l e f t i s t parties 
attadced the Governnent and accused that India had changed 
her policy tevards Vietnam var under American pressure^ that 
i t lacked the Initiative vhlch It should have taken as Chair. 
man of the International Control Conalsslon. Bhupesh Oupta 
charged that the Qovexnment had moved avay from the position 
taken by Nehru and called It a "policy of cowardice! Nlren 
ahosh stated that the Governnent had sacrificed the Geneva 
Agreement In exchange for dollars and PL-480,'* and that the 
Administration had se«in to It that American aggression vas 
not condemned. The External Affairs Minister strongly repu. 
dieted a l l these charges and said that India's policy vas not 
under American pressure. India vas not trading with I^ orth 
Vietnam for fear that the things sent there mlf^t be diverted 
99 
to China* All criticism failed to evoke any radical response 
from the Government. 
India vas s t i l l committed to the peaceful solution of 
the Vietnamese problem. On October 6, 1967 the Defence 
1\ 
98. liil^.f Cols. 2&6«257. 
99. £aJa:lfll, April 8, 1967. 
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Hiniflter Swaran ringh, vbo led th« Indian delegation to the 
United S N-tlons General ^ssewbly at Its last session, urged 
the United Htat«s, in the larger Interssts of peace, to take 
a calculated risk by stopping the bombing in the belief that It 
Bight ultl'nately lead to a peaceful settlenent. He was con. 
fldent that if no preconditions vere laid to the cessation 
Hanoi would respond favourably. He reiterated that, "It la 
our conviction that the ptople of Vietnam alono can decide 
101 
their destiny vlthout any foreign Intezrference," The Prlae 
Minister and other Ooverment spokesaan, had also expressed, 
on aany occasions, India's vital interest In a peaceful solu. 
tlon df t^ ie Vietnam conflict and emphasised that unconditional 
stoppage of bombing vas the f irst ess«it lal step vhich could 
lead to cessation of a l l hosti le act ivi t ies in Vietnam and 
peaceful talks between the parties concerned. But the vJ.^.'. 
loe 
disagreed with the Indian assessment of TTanol* However, a 
certain amount of f l ex ib i l i ty was visible In the U.^.attltude 
when Arthur Goldberg, the United ''tatts Ambassador to the 
United Nations, announced at the United N tlons that U.'^,^. 
would support an Invitation try Fouth Vietnam's WLP to present 
100. Xhfi gteiat X:tober 7. 19b7. Also ^Halltry of ?:rttrMl 
htrmiU Biflnrt iab7^fi» O.o.I, (New Delhi i G.o.I.), 
p. SO* 
101. yi«*.« ftf India , October 7, 1957. 
10£. S«« ainilVtttan IlBfiat October ->% VJt7. 
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i t s c^se ti^ToriJ the ecurity Council or 'J reconvened G«neva 
Conference* rhis viis In keeping, with the Indian demand that 
the NLF sliouli be repz'esented at any future n e ^ t l s t l o n s . The 
concession \f&B a triumph of the Indian vieypolnt for hitherto 
/merles had refused to recognise, the Vlctoong as an entity 
ae^:*rate fron the Coctasunlst reglae In ^anol* Thus, at l eas t 
one of the obstacles to negotiations vas reaoved by the 
United ''t^tes. 
'Ut conditions were s t i l l not favourable for negotia-
tions as the United "^tates VHS escalatSnt, I t s bombing opera. 
t l6ns In reply to the new Vletcong offensive, Ihe bombing 
of res ident ia l areas in '-anol led India to express gr^ve 
con«em to the "aerlcun Oovernment and point out thut such 
Incidents vould aaKe i t d i f f i c u l t for the Intei-national 
103 
Control and ^u^ex-vlslon Comsjlsslon to function in Vletmim, 
India made i t uxeur in precise terms to the fmeric^in ^eabas^ador, 
Chfcsttr 3ovlb8, thr^t she did not recognise th** right of hot 
pursuit clJilffled by u,*:,/, to chast tht Vletoong across the 
104 
border. Ihe united ' t a t e s , on the other h-^ nd, urged India 
as Chali-raan of the ICC to ac t iv l se i t and Intensify eu^ervl. 
sioR of the Caouodlan border so that the conf l ic t ml^^t not spn 
10b 
to Camuodla* But tMs request could not be complied because 
103. liftftB.gf la&Xkf November £4, 19b7> 
104» l£lll«t Januaiy "'O, 19t>8. 
105. ^«» Hindu, recember 31 , 1Q6»7. 
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of the ntgatlve attitude of th« r>ovi«t Union and ?dland« In 
F«braar/ 19b&t hovovexy India acting In th« capacity of 
Chalnum of the Icc inforssd ?rlnc« TTorodon Flh&noidcy Caatodl^ R 
Haad of rtata^ that tha ICC vould ln?estlgata tpaclflc 
ooBplAlnts of violation of th« Cambodian taxrltory by tha 
Ylat Cong or any other belligerent of th« Vletnaa \t\f This 
Indian Interpretation o^ the Conission's role for Caabodlaf 
though i t had the merit of protecting Cosbodia's tovareigntyi 
which was the basic issue of dlsagrtenentf f e l l short of the 
American expectation of uti l is ing the commission as a mobile 
border patrol» a role which was n3t originally intended for 
it* Zhls spread a wave of m« angerl in ^ e U«C,/.. and caused 
great disillusionment among off ic ials and public. 
Xhe State Dep^ r^tment held ttiat the position of the ICC 
was not as forthcoming as i t mif^t have been and it appeared 
that the y«S«A« also dilded India for not using i t s position 
as ohaliman of the ICC to do a better policing job on Cam. 
bodis*s border wiili r>outh Vietnam. India's refusal to bolster 
the Commission had only added to some other irrltantS| sped-
ally India*s agreement with the r.ovlei Jnion to hold regular 
polit ical talks. Ihe U."^ . of f ic ia ls revealed th-at soae months 
ago IiHia had cold shouldered a similar suggestion by the 
U.^.A. This alleged discriminatory treatment of Washington by 
Delhi cauaed deep rtiSentment. And now i t was f e l t that India* 
refusal to accept Am«»rioan skdvioe on Cambodia implied that 
India had &b«tt«d tba ooaiounlst plin and sided vitb those 
106 
vho were responslbXc for n spreading the var« 
No doubty It vas nov beooaing apparent that India 
had travelled a long diatanee froa i t s original position of 
observing neutrality betvetm the tvo varring sides* It i s 
surprising to note t^at vhiie previously India had recognised 
that there was laflXtrat Ion an<i subs^rsion fron the TYorth 
(e*g« in the 1962 Report of t>je Coaaisslon;, nov India took 
an altogether different view of the issue* In reply to 
Hem aarua (i>np) (who had asked for Oovernwent's vlsvs on 
roviet assl-;tancc ty t!te Vletwng) In the Lok '^ •abha, Priffle 
Minister Cartdhl replied t^^t she was avare V^^t ch« Soviet 
Union was supplying ai*ns to ?Jorth Vletna>A. 3ut she signl. 
flcantly added that the people 9t In Vletnaa were fighting 
for security and so long :kr, t^ .e aggression there did not end| 
**W8 cannot say froQ ^ o a they should tako ^ras and fron vhoa 
107 
not." 
Not only thisp the Prise Minister also did not hesitat< 
to express doubts regarding v;ashlngton*s bonafides and fratdclj 
10b* Refieoting tlie growing jRiblic opinion in the U*?*A, 
the ^^Iblrtfton Pnit of Februaxy 0, 19&8 editorially 
consented that '*non»aligned*' India's embrace of the 
Viet Cong position "hard on the heels of the Coviet 
i'reBler's Hev Delhi v i s i t i s specially disturbing." 
It even expressed the doubt whether Trkllan was s t i l l 
aoo-aligned. 
107. I t e t l nf Indla> February 15» 1968. 
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told th« Itok tabha that aha did not think that Prealdant 
Johnion*a of far that tha U*r.A« vould ba willing to hold 
talka v l ^ llorth Vietnam ^'toaorroV In Geneva aaan vary 
toe 
•ach* The contrast batwaen this atatanant and har earlier 
stataiants mada at the tine of har v i s i t to the United '"tataSf 
eulogising FrasMant Johnson ^s «i "aan of pccce" vas too 
evident* It implipA « narlred change In India's offlelal 
attitude vhloh sceacd to eonflrss tha Horth Vletnaaese olaltn 
that Aaarlcft wa« an aggr^soor and the Vi«tnaoese vlctlns of 
aggression, fighting for seXf^protectlon. Indian policy 
had nov OOB« closer to ^^rth Vietnam and away froB the United 
rtatea. 
In the BaantiJie on Fabzuary 1^ « the Foreign Minister 
of iVorth Vletnaa reiterated his country's vUllngness to «itei: 
Into negotiations vlth the U,.%A, and agreed to aoeapt an 
opan agenda that vould peralt discussion on the proposals of 
both i<iashlngton and Hanoi* And on ^prll !« 1066 the United 
states announced unilaterally to stop aerial and naval bonl^ rd 
meat of North Vietnam (the only exception being a atrip of 
territory north of the danilltarlxed sona betvean NDrth and 
South Vietnam)* India riiisctsd favourably to this announcement 
and her spokesman described It aa **most veloome*' and as a 
Step tovards de-escalation of the war In Vietnam* India, aa 
30B* 2iM* 
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aiairMUB of th« ICC| aacortd Its vhol«»h«art«d eoop«ratlon. 
In an att«Bpt to de»«soalat« tha var« on April £« Zniia 
took the Inltiativa to aacartaln Hanoi*a reaponsa to tha 
Unitad ''tataa* daclalon to halt txsablng of Ttttth Viatnnaaaa 
territory* Hanoi*a reply v^t partial but not conditional, 
^o Chi MiOh did not ins ist on oonplate eeasation of boablng 
and J^8eriGa*8 nil l tary vithdraval as praoondltlons for na09« 
tiationsy though he dcaanded that the explor'atory talks ahould 
be held with a viev to detexoining these objeotlvea* In 
personal aessages to President Johnson and lir^V.o Chi Minh| 
Prise Mlnlat@r Indira Gandhi also offered Indiana good offices 
for arranging p«aoe talks between the tvo countries* She 
also velooaed the agreenent betvaen the United States and 
'^orth Vi«tn&ffl to hold pralioUnary talks in Paris* and called 
110 
i t as **an act of statesaanship*** In fact i t vas India vho 
had suggested Paris as the s i te for talks waeks ago* Although 
the talks Boon got bogged dovn s t i l l efforts were oade by 
both sides to keep thea going* To create a better ataoaphere 
for negotiations the United rtetes finally s* offered to stop 
a l l boabiag of Nortii Vletnaa and agr«ea«nt vas also reached 
on Including both Couth Vletnaa and NLF repre&entativea in the 
negotiations* Indla^ vho had aliirays deaired a p«ac«ful 
110* ibid* I Hay 6, 19t»8* 
•olutlon of th« proDtltB hailing th« Aasrioan deeltion oharae. 
tttrlMd It as **a step tovarda p«ae««** Paying a parsonal 
tribttta to Praaidant ^ohnaon, Kra* Oan^i aaid that ha had 
aotad v i ^ **iuidaratandinc and oouraga*** Tha Jan san^^ and 
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tha Congraas Praaidanta alao valoonad tha daoialon* Hovavar, 
India took eara not to ooaaant on tha Paria paaca talks as 
aha dasirad to maintain has- nautyal poaitlon as Chairaan of 
t^ a ICC and also bacausa aha ballavad that any axpraaalon of 
opinion on daolicata iacaas of pxooaduras ooneamlng Vlotnan 
ty nations othar than thoaa dlraetly involvad would not halp 
raaolva tha dlffaranoaa* 
Tha yaar 1969 %ihioh aav a aloVf tut eonsidarad ehanga 
In India's policgr towards Hanoi vaa craatlng ffBh strain in 
Indians ralations vith tha Unitad £^ tataa« Hitharto tha rala. 
tions had baan good and in Kay India had andoraad Prasidant 
Ni3Kon*s 8«point paaoa pX n^, bat a satbaok oeouxrad vhan 
Aaariaa raaetad vith umisiiai sharpnaaa to tha Indian daoiaion 
s t i l l at tiia ataga of thinking aloud—i» to raooffiisa tha 
ooBuauniats* nan Proviiional Ravolutionary Qovarnmant in 
Viatnam* Thara v«s raportadly a olash batvaan Prasidant ^ixon 
and Hrs* Ciandhi on tha Viatnaa policy % a^ii tha foraar visltad 
India at tha and of J^ aly* Sha rajeetad Nixon* s oontantion 
111. Iflndwtta Xtortf l^ oHaabar £» 1968. 
that th« Uiilt«d etftt«t had Bad« th« ultlnate conoasalon for 
pMoa and daclarad Inataad that «v«r/ eountry had th« right 
112 
to daQl«« Ita futur« without foralgn Intarfaraneo. In addi. 
tlon, India*t doolsion to sand a oablnat Mlnlst«r to attend 
th« funaxal of Praaidant ffo Chi Mlnh, thougl) i t Blgjht have 
appaarad to ba a purely protocol g«atur«| r€pj:9a9nt94 a 
-Ytev direction In India*a forelpi policy* It aailced a i l g . 
nifleant departure fTon the half .hearted attonpta of the 
paat to treat Horth and Cou^ Vletnam^a on par and could vry 
vai l bacoiM the a tar ting point of a new trend in India's 
Asian Policy. Aa If this vas not 8Uffielent» Dlneah ninHh, 
the Foreign Minister of India after having propoaed a 4« 
113 
atep prograame for peace in Vietnan to the United *7ationa 
Oeneral Aasaably on October 2 | vent on to pay tribute to 
late Vf* Fo Chi Hinhy in vhoMf according to him| *'Aaia has 
loat an indoaitable coldiar for fraedoa*" This vas liable 
to be Interpreted in the ^tate Oepartaent as an avoidable 
atteapt to needle the United Ftatca* 
118* Thl n^Ut August 1, 19&9. 
113* The proposal envisaged an iaBcdiate cessation of hos* 
t l l i t i e sy follovsd by cstablishMcnt of a popular 
0>irenuBentt vhich ale^t supervise vlthdravai of foreign 
troops and make arrangeaents for holding a fair a l e c 
tlon« The Indian propoaal dlffereAt ttom the vies tern 
approach in so far as i t proposed setting up of a 
coalition beforci and not after, elections. T7in<tu«tan 
SjMMAt October 3 | 1969. 
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Th« United rtattt rftistd a lat of ha« and cry over th« 
report that India VBB favourably considering to regr«de Its 
oon«ultate»general in Tianol to an eatMttsy level . This spread 
s wave of unhapplnese In the U.S.Adalnlttr&tloni for It vas fel 
that if Indl!^  raited Its nleelon level In Hanoi vhlle the 
aletiott In Saigon reaalned a consulte*gen«ral It eould luu 
balance India's position as the Chalman of the Internatioi»l 
Control. Coanlsslon and sees to extend support to ^orth Vl«tnaai 
at a tlae when the U,H, vas auiklng efforts to evolve a sett le-
aient la Vletnasi without reciprocation fron the other side. 
Henoey U.r^m disappolntaent vlth India steamed largely froa 
the circumstances In which India's proposals had bsen aooted* 
The U*C» coaplalned ti^t It was India who had asserted that 
real negotiations would follow once the U.*^ . K stopped bonblng 
the fforth. But e l^teen months had passed since the suspen-
sion of bomhing and meaningful dialogues were s t i l l elusive* 
They fur^er contended that t h ^ had also stopped following 
a policy of active mllit^^ry action anywhere In Vletosm except 
in defence. They wer« also withdrawing their forces. Hespite 
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th«M oonottslons Indlay th«]r ooaplain^d^ inst«ad of putting 
prttvurt on Hanoi to g«t th« negotiations eoingi %«• revar^ 
ing i t s intransigenos fay slsirating the oonsulata to a full 
snbass/* It vas faittsrly alleged that India vas adopting 
a double standard vl^ iioh deaanded of the 0,r>* to vithdrav 
and make a l l coneeaaions i^ i le at the same time It supported 
Hanoi's unreasonable stand* A l^though India's actions as 
Chapmen had sometimes irritated ^^shington but i t had under-
stood India's plea of neutrality on account of her ''delicate 
position" as Chairman of ICC* But India* vas nov giving 
up i t s old middle position althoue^ she vas avare that ^anoi 
had seldom cooperated vith the Commission vhile Balgon had 
alloved i t to operate on i t s ovn territory. Ther f^orOf in 
retaliation President Klaon varned that India's move to 
upgrade the status of the mission in Hanoi vould be considered 
114 
an unfriendly act biy the U.C* Congress* Further, the Foreign 
Cecretaryt Kaui vas informed fay a Congressman that such action 
vould jeopardise the American programme of aid to India, 
including the food aid* In fact. Representative ^lllian 
Bvooms^ield vent to the extent of introducing a resolution 
vhloh aimed at denying a l l aid to India* Subsequently, he 
vithdrev the resolution as the Qovernoient of India vas under* 
stood to have conveyed the impression that i t mif^t extend 
114* IfatlnTMIl HtnUf October 19, 1969* 
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diplo«&tlo rtcognltlon to th« Oov«rnm«nt0 of both Iforth and 
116 
South Vltttnaa. L«t«r Indian souroas denied It and tald thst 
there vere no chances of granting dljkloaatlo recognition to 
f?algon until President Thleu made his Qoveroa«it more broad-
based* 
No doubt Aaerloan threats to stop aid caused serious 
concern In Indl&| but the Inaedlate reaction vas to unltejl 
public opinion against /.aerieats Vletnaa policy and to stren. 
gthen Nev Delhi's resolve to Improve relations with North 
Vietnaa* India nov app^red anxious to estatsUsh trade and 
cultural contacts quickly vith Hanoi and as a proof of her 
desire to be friendly aade a gift of several thousand bicy« 
clesy % i^oh vould certainly have aade 'mericans angry* Dis-
regarding Aneriean feelings India decided to follov i ts 
national Interest and asalntaln friendly relations v i ^ nations 
which were geopoHtieally Important to itf regardless of 
ideology* Perhapsy India thouf^tf North Vietnam which was 
on China's doorstep* could yi9ty well become a bridge between 
116 
India and China in the future* At the same time India tried 
to soften American sensit ivity by pointing out that the move 
was not antl-Amerlean and that America should welcome It 
116. liMU nf InflUt November 13* 1969* 
116* f^ardiafiy September 2^ 1969* Editorial. 
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since i t %«ould b« In i t s Interest that a najor non^connunlst 
Influeneei vhioh hitherto ves non»exietent, vould be opcratini 
in Hanoi* It vas further argued that once pefioe vas estab. 
lished and everyone Including the O.F.f., rushed to be frJendl: 
vlth Vietnaa then there vould be no particular virtue in 
India foUovinti sult« ?o Oinesh fingh brusquely set aside 
the U*r» objections on upgrading the mission and assured 
parliacent that any decision on further action vould be taken 
117 
on the basis of national interest and not under pressure* 
-«ting on this l ine India did not lag behind in rais . 
lag her voice against infringenent of the sovereignty of 
Casibodia* India not only expressed "deep distress** at the 
entry in April and May of foreign forces in Caabodia but 
also pointed out that the U*B« action vould only aggravate 
an already diff icult situation* The External ''ffairs Minlster» 
fvaran Sin^y vent even so far as to describe the Vietnasi 
%rar as a **heroic struggle of a people of a • saall country 
to preserve i ts independence against the vorld*s greatest 
ai l i tary pover*** To crovn i t a l l he further stated that 
though India vas not at present thinking of according official 
recognition to the Provisional Qoverasent ot fk>uth Vietnam 
(set up by NLF end Viet Ck>ng}y **lt vould be totally unrerillsti< 
for tts to shut our 9y«» and gny that ve have nothing to do 
117* Pee ^SkSaJLalt Hovenber 26» 1969* 
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vlth th« NLF OS the agencies thtjr nay set up. In fact ve 
118 
hmve to haire close relations vlth thea*" ffaturally iUBerlca 
took great exeeption to this stateaent vhlch castKasperslons 
on the U,r« role in Vietnaa. The Vice-President of U,n«f, 
alleged that India had not taken a definite stsnd in Canbodla 
because of pressure froa the U*r*r«R, This astter vas raised 
t>ir>ugh a eall.attention aotion in the Kajya sabha and the 
Govemaent taken to task for i t s lade of appreciation of 
national prestige and sovereignty in not repudiating the 
a reaaric of the Aaerioan Vice-President, In reply Mrs* Gandhi 
stated that she did not attach aueh li&portance to the stateaent 
of th« Vice-President nor could i t have any influence on 
India. India was follovlng an Independent policy and neither 
liiussia nor any other pover would be able to deviate her froa 
that policy* ^he also told the aeabers that India vould not 
attend the 20»nation conference being convened by Indonesia 
sincsy according to herf such a conference would not be fruit-
ful because the nations laaediatelyr concerned with the dis* 
pute« vis* China^ Nort^ Korea and North Vletnaa,would not 
participate in i t . Instead^ India suggested a conference of 
iion.allgned eountriesy on the aodel of the 1962 '•'Oeneva 
Conference, to which a l l concerned parties and interested 
119 
Ooverments %«ould be invited* Bhe once again reiterated her 
118. LM£JJ1*9 Fourth Series, Vol*X5aviI,"^o*20.March 18,1970. 
col* 346* 
119* See Trm Prilil J f l i r n i l , i ^ Hay i s , 1970* 
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view that th«re could be no n l l l t a r y solution to the problem 
and that India vonlA readily support it any negotiations con. 
ducted earnestly with a view to solve the Indo-Chlna problcn. 
on the Invitation of the Foreign Minister of India, 
Madame Olnh, Foreign Minister of the Provisional RevoXutlona] 
Ciovemfflent of Vietnam v i s i ted India In July 1970. This 
spaiiied off a controversy in the country i tse l f* Fifteen 
members of parliament belonglzig to .9watantra, Jan Sangh, JBain 
Forvard Bloc and Congress (0) headed by Abherya Krlplani 
demanded that the Invitation be revoked and Madame Blnh 
advised not to come to India, They held that **By this Invl. 
tatlon to the representative of a movement vhlch aims at 
overthrowing the legal ly constituted Oovernmtfit of the count: 
vith whom we have consular relations the Government of India 
has thrown a shadow on the credib i l i ty of i t s own foreign 
120 
policy.** But External Affairs Minister, Swaran Singh held 
that the decision to invite Madame Blnh was correct since as 
Chairman of t^e ICC, i t was necessary for India to be in 
121 
touch with a l l concerned parties in Vietnam, Actually, this 
120. TiM«a nf India, July 16, 1970. Commenting on the Indian 
action the HlndUfitan IlBM of July 24, 1970 wrote. 
*'Indian diplomacy in Indo-Chlna has not been furthered 
nor i s the PRG or Hanoi l i k e l y to be greatly Indebted 
to the Indian Government for inviting Madame Blnh. Hav. 
Ing boycotted the Jakarta conference, on the plea thattwa 
was**one-sidad*', the invitation to Madame Blnh suggests 
a l e s s tiian partial stance." 
121. Hinduatan Tlaaity July 30, 1970. 
vat ano&i«r •xauapl* of marksd departure fxoa the policy of 
oaloulated noa.lnvolv«iaent It had so f&r b««n following* 
In the mean tin* the Paris Peace talks vere deadlocked, 
rvaran ^Angh^ speaking at a Itmcbeon for United Vatlons 
correspondents, expressed the view that the talks could pro-
gress only i t there vas a definite prograaae for the vlthdra. 
val of a l l U,r« forces, and a more broad^bssed Govenm«rit vas 
fomed in Fouth Vietnaffl, He further said that the problens 
of Vltttnaa, Canbodla and Laos, could not be solved In Isola. 
tion but had to be tackled as a vhole* ^ Qei^ r^a eenference 
vas also essential to resolve the diff icult situation, and 
India would be willing to join other countries and interested 
parties worklnti out arrangeo«Ats to ensure respect for the 
neutrality, independence, territorial integrity and sovereig^t] 
122 
of a l l the states in Indo-China* 
Hiaving now conAltted hlaself to an honourable sett le-
nent of the Vititnam problen in 1970 ^Ixon set forth another 
set of proposals in an atteiapt to solve the Issue* 'Ithou^ 
there^- vas no off ic ial coeinent in India on the Plan, ^ e 
Forel0i Office seened to regard these proposals as having 
fallen short of the expectations of the coasmnlst side in 
the Indo»China conflict because of short-<ttoalttgs with regard 
to two features of the Nixon foraula* f irst ly , the proposal 
122. Ibid.y October 3,1970* Also £iaJiMtmiif September 27,197i 
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for o«a«««firt*ln»posltion| to be followed b/ strletX/ super. 
vised vltbdraval of the 0»S«, Ni>rth VSetma and other troops 
froa fouth Vletoamy Laos and Caaabodla sought to pin dovn 
Hanoi to &n iapXied adnission of the prtssence of i t s troops 
in these countries. Seoondl/y i t did not fu l f i l the ooaniunisi 
denand for coalition in a broad.based govemaent in Touth 
Vietnaffly without any election, although the United ''tites 
President vaguely hinted that the election need not be the 
only way of deteralnlng polit ical real i t ies In r^ outh Vietnam 
and the oth§r countries. *:3nce the Indian GovemBent*s view 
on both these issues corresponded with that of the Coa^nmlst 
side, i t faced a dilentBa since i t did not wish to reject the 
Nixon proposals on the sane grounds as those given by the 
Boviet Union, !Vorth Vietnaa and the Vietcong as i t would be 
blaaieA foi> taking sides in the Indo.China conflict* There. 
fore, the only choice before i t %fas to send a crit ical note 
on the failure of the Hfixon proposal to aeet the denands of 
123 
the situation as seen froa ^ev Delhi. 
However, India gladly velootted the ^aris .^greenent 
when finally the two warring oaaps agreed to renounce war and 
solve issues through autual negotiations in January t973» 
123. Hlndmtaa Ylnsit October 10, I970« 
C O W C L U S l O l f 
Ih« l&v of polltioai gr&vitatlon oonttantly attracts 
India and the United Stataa to one ano^er becaut« of their 
physical S I M , largs populations, daaocratic vay of l i f e and 
the rols th«y play in vorld affairs. Th« U.S.A., bsing tht 
strongest povttr in tha world, cannot reaain indlffarant to \«3rld 
events »nd usually gets directly involved in whatever happens 
in a l l the fivfe continents. India, too, possessing the 
attributes of ^ big pover, b«cone» Involve in sajor develop-
ments In the vorld. Hence, they cannot avoid each other 
even if they desired. 
At the time of jKher Independence India had a favourable 
impression of /.merlca as the champion of freedom, (a cause 
very dear to India), created because of Presidsnt Roosevelt's 
role in Indian independence during ^>rld v&r XI. Naturally, 
tl^ierefore, free India came to Identify her alms and aspira. 
tlons with the U.S.A. and desired to maintain friendly rela. 
tlons vlth It . It was expected that the common values and 
objectives ^"-^ faiUi in dtfocratlc institutions and democra. 
t i c way of l i f e , dedication to the cause of peace and freedom 
mmm, would forffl thc bedrock on % l^ch good relations between 
the two countries, baset^  on mutual friendship and respect, 
could be foimded. But as the national interests of the 
United states and India came to be d ^ r l y defined, the 
in i t ia l emotional attachment was replaced by disenchantment. 
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Conflict b«tv«tin ^ n tvo eountrlM vag Inevltabl* at both 
lnt«rprttt«d tb«lr national InterMts dlff«r«ntly« India 
bsliaved that bor Intarasti oould b«tt b« served bur follovlng 
a non-aligned policy^ l«e» the policy of not joining either 
of t>)« power blocs, since she needed peace and aid from al l 
countries for the tremendous task of reconstructing the 
country* But to ^merioi^ , the Ssuiediate (bknger to her seouriV 
arose fzoa the expansionist policies of Coomunist Aissia* 
Thereforei i t vas busy gaining a l l i e s and concluding military 
pacts vith other countries to contain comounlst expansionisa* 
Hence i t could not approve of India's policy of non»aiigiuient 
i^icb nas dubbed as *ifflBtoral* by Aaerican Hecretary of ntate 
IXillesy and India vas regarded as pro*<^vlet* Indeed, i t is 
ironical that a country %fhie!) i t se l f had folleved ^ e non. 
augment policy for a century and a half should have objected 
so strongly to Indiatg non.all0iment. In fact, India vas 
neither pro»Bussian nor anti*'oerloanf but merely tried to 
judge issues in accordance vith her policy objectives vithout 
alloving her independence to be tampered vith by the <?uper-
Powers* IhttSf /merica's refusal to se« the policy vith an 
open mind crested the f irst misunderstanding betveen tite tva 
countries* ^ven after mi les his policy continued to govern 
Indo*^erioan relations for a considerable period* 
Another, though less intense, irritant vas colonialism, 
India, because of her ovn experience vith Western imperialism. 
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vas ia^pr«80«d by Toilet Union's antl^oolonlalltt propaganda, 
Xh«r«for«, to h«r colonlaliM ftpp«aMd to tM a greater «vU 
^an CowmmliB* India eouid not understand vhy the United 
rtatee disregarding Agisn feelings* supported the colonial 
countries and the return of oolonlalisai vl^ en the/ had been 
tiv>roughly discredited* Thereforef vhile the priaary alai of 
U.S. policy vas to contain ooBaunisa« throu^ pacts, India 
regarded coaniunisB as a local and not an international pheno« 
nenon, related to social and eoonoaic probleast and to be 
elialnated through eeonoale aeans* Ihus, vhlie India judged 
the consequences of the U»El* policy decisions on the basis 
of antl.colonialisB and anti-raeialitfi. United rtates tended 
to test Indian policies on the anvil of anti^coaaunisa* The 
judgement of one country regarding the other got partially 
distorted since the criterion for Judgpent had no direct 
relevance to the nature of the issue In question, 
Ihe range of differences vldened further ^en the 
Cownunists assuaed pover in China in 1949* ^ l l e the United 
rtates refused to accord recognition to China, blocked i t s 
entry in the United Nations and even organised alliances to 
contain i t s expanslonisM in Aslsi India not only decided to 
establish friendly relations vith China but also ohaapioned 
i t s adBlsslon to the U«!7« and deprecated the U,r, policy;^alll. 
tary alliances which could only result in an extension of 
the Cold v^r* 
irm. th9 Indian point of irim thm gr«at«8t irritant 
froD th0 .>!s@rioan aid* vas th« attitude adopted by that eountrsr 
on the Kushnir isstie* India vas amiogred with United states 
iot i t s reruBaX traa the very hefinnine to appreoiute the 
essential juatioe of India's stand on Kashair and for spc i^soring 
irith Britain the resolntimi on h&^mir in /ehnsary 1@61« Xhe 
II*J* support to Pakistani ^en the logal. position vas in India's 
imraar^ was clearly agaln&t Ir.di&*s national interest imd 
Xndi£» feelings were deeply hurt* .^ laerioa thus embroiled i t -
self in the most explosiN/e issue of the region* India is as 
sensitive ahout Ka^toir as /resxie was about Alsaee-Lorrains 
during the period 1870«1P14* India holds that Kasl»&ir*8 
aceessi(»ri to her is ealplete ar.d irrevocable ^ i l e iseriea 
wwats tliat India should ourry out i t s pronise of plebiscite 
and let the people exercise their rS^t of self-deterainatiim* 
India's refusal to hold plebiscite is interpreted in Washington 
as proof that the people of l^ a^slsair do not wish to reciain 
witil) India* 
India feels that taioueh i t had triad to befriond the 
United states I the United states had no ir^ibiticm in acting 
against India's busie national interests* ieerlea's eonalu* 
sioc of a military aid pact with loSdstan in 1064 In utter 
disregard of Indian orposltion vitiated tiie already tense 
atmosphere* owing to the delioate nature of relations between 
India tMid f Qklstoni AmGrieon milit&iy a8sist£r.o« to ^ad^tan 
has alvays boan eotiSlddred ol* dubious valtio* It inftuodd a 
dotponing soiiso or inltiry anS aiiti«»toorioan anSaras in India* 
India*0 attitttdo towardi Pakistan ro8«mbX«8 to a eortuln 
«ustont /iserieon attitude toimrds tito Soviet Onlor* In loth 
easos It is an attitt^o Q£ fruetratlonf olarm and distf^isty 
i'osiaed ty past uniia^jr experionoes and eontiming unresolved 
terslo •« .JMrioa'e pre^oooupation vith the eold var against 
liitssia (and C!hin& also) and Inlia*t involvenent in u oold uar 
ifith Pakistan (vhioh has oTten reaulted in hot wars as in xe47* 
48, I96& and 1073.) has had adverse xeperoussions on the relatioi 
Wtiieen the tvo oountrios ixtA deepended t^eir suspioien imd 
mistrust 04' eat^ other* Xalia*s polioies and ol^jeotives have 
been taisunderstood in the United states| and .^ loerioan oetions 
a»d pronooneeeiwits have ecaused alam and diseay in India* 
Indians foreign poliey oan be said to begin and end 
vith ^akintan* Althou^ i t oarinot be interpreted (ml^  in terras 
o£ fakistant even tbenf I akistan reaains an isiportont factor 
in ths doaestie and foreign poXieies of India, ehallenging Itor 
partioularly in South Asia, in Asia as a vholef and the world 
at large, soraatlses evoking fren India a t^Bpome (jtiite different 
froB the general trend o£ India's foreign polioy* India's 
poliey tovrards fakistun is based cm the unstated assustptiOiis 
tliat the (»ily souroe of anxiety or insecurity is lakiotan, that 
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i t should b« ««dA to r««Iik« th€ fu t i l i ty of h«r policy 
•laiiif at parity vith India, notvithttanding th« dltparitlea 
botvodtt ttio t«o la regard to s l i ^ population and ratouroos, 
and that Pakiatan b« parauadad to giva up i t s policy of con. 
frontation againat India* In particular i t i a p ] ^ that no 
graat povsr should aotuaily or apparantly favour Pakistan 
against India* Thasa asstaptions ax plain th« variations In 
i t s raiationa vith other nations, and particularly th« United 
states* HoBoa, over the years, relationships bstveen each 
of the throe eountries «»— U«s«A,, India and Pakiatan — 
have been subjeoted to a noiber of dips, tarns and riaes* 
3ttt at no tlae has the United States los t sight of i ts pro* 
found interest in the orderly developaent of the Indla«Pakis. 
tani sub»continent« Neither Have India and Pakistan ever 
really lost sight of the laportance to each of the U.S. role 
in world affairs* What hat happened la that relatione between 
India and Pakiatan theaaelves deteriorated, Moving the* fur* 
ther 9 apart txom each othsr* Their bitter rivalry/inevitably 
drew in their friends, particularly the United States. 
In i t s relationship vith India and Pakistan, the 
United Ctatea was guided in the beginning by British advice, 
^Ich led i t to supporting the Muslla League and, later 
pakiatan* H>reover, Aa«rlca*s own national intereat dictated 
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•uch a polley tloo* India had struck a blow to U.r« axpeota. 
tlont baeausa of bar policy of no(walig»ianty vhila Pakistan 
vat only too willing to obliga tha Amarioana vlth baaas and 
uaa of ita tarritory agalnat tha Toviat Union, in ratum for 
Bilitary aid* Xhua, tha Unitad Statat oaaa to viav Pakistan 
aa th« oantra of Aaarloan intarast in South Asia and Pakiatan 
vttg daclarad vital taf tho H^at. Batwaan }86t and 19^0 Indo-
Aaariean ralationa foUovad a onlfom pattam, govamad 
mostly fay tha cold war atratagy* But in tha aixtias a naw 
pattarn of intarnationai ralationa davalopad* Tha cold war 
antarad a long parlod of thav and gradual relaxation, Naw 
ahlfta in powar ralationa wara avidant. This could not but 
hava an affaet on Indo^AaMriean ralationsbip* Airaady towardi 
tha end of Praaidant Eisanhovar*a las t tara ralationa batvaan 
India and Aaarlea showad an upward trand* A certain aaount 
of undarstanding graw batwaan thaa* India cava to ba raapact( 
in Anarloa bacausa Aaarioana railitad that India poaaaaaad 
strength and fortitude and that aha would not band eaaily on 
basic issuaa* BasidaSf the successful working of Indian 
daBooracy, internal stabil ity and the hopeful operation of 
tha Five • Xear Plans aroused interest in American circlaa* 
In India, too, a aora objective understanding of 
American foreign policy was noticeable* India realised tiiat 
despite aueh sabrajrattling, the U.S. tried to avoid war* ^ e 
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aUo found that f^triean help on friendly and bonourabla 
ttnu vas asstntlal for h«r •ooaonic developaant and that 
proapacts of har gatting aid froa *aarioa v«re iaproirlng* 
Hanea tha attlcuda of India vas no longar ona of crltloiiv 
or antaigoniaou lShl» changa vaa tha raault not only of 
Prasidant Eiaanbovar*a oonaoloua and quiat afforta to laprota 
Indo*A««rie&n raXationa but also dua to oowaunlat aotlvitlaa 
In India and th« suddani unprovokad aggraaaion by tha Paopla*a 
lApuialio of China againat a oountry ^ich had unraaarvadly 
chaaplonad ita oauao in tha w»rid foriMi* 
Xh« attuBption of of flea W Kanaady m^a a happy evant 
for In4D<>Aaariean ralatlona« Praaldant Kannadyt vhOf avan 
aa ^anatori had plaadad for incraaaad aoonoile aid to India 
for hor davalopaanty took Inoraaaad Intaraat In India aftar 
ha baoana Praaldant* Tha raaaon %«hy ralatlona undar Kannady 
yf frlandly vaa baoauaa ha aecaptad Indiana Idaallatle 
approach to vorld probXaaa and tha ainoara and aelflaaa aannar 
in vhioh i t nas baing purauad by Wtihru. lfahru*a viait to 
lAahington in 1961 further halpad to davalop a battar undar. 
atandingf of a^ eh othar*a point of vlav* Th« Aaarican attitudi 
tovarda India graatiy aaturad uadar Kannady* Kannady adoptad 
a propar oouraa when h« announcad that hia poXioy waa **to 
•aka th« vorld aaf« for divaraity*** Non-all^aamt vaa no 
longar conaidar«id to ba a dirty vord aa in tha tlaa of Dullaa* 
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liid««d Aa«floa cattA to rtoo^iilM th« iaiport&iic* of n«utralitt 
i»>ttiitrl«ii l lk« India % i^ch could 8«rv« «s a bridge vltl> 
Coomunlst countri«8« %t only eontsctt b«tvMn ^!a«hlngton 
and Nev D«lhl laprovad but al«) relations bttva«n tiie /it«riean 
»nd Indian d«l«i»tions at th« Unltad Nations «h«rc tha/ 
vorkad in closa^oooparatlon over Itauaa llk« ^ e Con9>| 
pxobltfit rei^rding tha %orld organlaatioa's futura stnietura 
and th« '^oirlat Ufilon*t easpaign against tha r«cr«t3ry*0«n6rai, 
mg Hav arak jold* ^«hru*8 support of tha Unltad " s^ttlont* 
action in Congo and his vahoaant rajeotlon of roviet attacks 
vas intarpratad as indicativa of a battar uadarstandlng bsr 
India of the United r u t a s and i t s naw foraign policy* 
Unfortunately, this frlitfidly ataosphsrt was s^ort. 
llvad* vithin tan taonths of ^ a Kannady /dainlstration, Indi. 
Attailcan relations swung a%Ay froa oordiallty to doubt in 
vhlch a l l Indian uttarancas and actions vara onca age in vlswtd 
in th« context of tha cold var* the Congrassssn t o ^ a string 
vi«v of India's attack on v««tarn lap«rlallw vhlle no 
r«far«nca vas s&da to tha "^ roviat Lhraat against B«rlln« Th«y 
vara aost annoyed vith tha aquation Krishna ?4enon drav in th« 
U.K. 09tyn Russian atnotpharlc tasts and tha Aiscrican 
undargzound tasts Instaad of protesting against ^oviat 
aaiplesions* To appsasa tho Unltad rtataa ^diru, in a talevlsad 
1 
conversation vith rtev«nson, U*f?« 'nbassador to U*ff» said 
1, pmiiv Tai«gyaph, ^ovaabsr 13, 1961, 
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that *'Busfiift*t rtsuaptlon of ntiaMr tests vat ted froJi 
avary point of vlav»** This vaa baoauaa I^ ahru did not vlth 
to spoil tha naw f^ound friandship of Aaarioa* 
Bat soon anothar avant oocurrad in Oao«ibar lOftl • ^is«, 
India's saiiura of (ba • nhieti strainad ralations to a point 
saXdoB raaehad bafora* Althoui^ thara vas oonsidarabla sym» 
pa thy vlth tha Indian dasira to and eolonitlisBf vhat a %ias 
Quastionad vaa our nathod and approach in tha final staga 
of tha solution of tha Qoa problaa* Tha U*S* raaotion vaa 
•ore blttar baoausa Kannady had aant & pareonal lattar to 
ifahru urging rastraint and Russian inwlvamant vaa saan in 
tha vhola plan. Haaoa the United ntatas danounoad India in 
tha fitroHi^est possible ter«8| regarding tha action as a basic 
violation of tha Chartar. In tha Security Council tha U.S. 
Haprasantativa daaeribad i t as *tha beginning of the end of 
tha United Hatioas.* But tha reaction of ''tavenson and other 
.'Barioans was flora eaotional than reasonable. India ji had 
been ^fry patient in this aatter and took the action only 
vhan no other option vas laft to her* 
Kannady was further iiked by India vhan in an effbrt 
to vard off the Kashair datete^ he suggested Mediation by 
Eugene 3iaok| the ^rld Bank Prasidantf India rejected the 
suggestion vhile Pakistan accepted i t . Feeling rebuffed, 
Kemady's attitude tovards India cooled off and economic 
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aislstanc* to India iras postponed. 3ut laUr , r«ttllslnf the 
laportence of «oonoaic a»8lststnc« to India, the groatttt 
daaocraoy In Aala, Kannedy ^ t the Aid Conaortula to aanetlon 
IndlAll«07 binion at i t s meeting on Jul/ aO| igi»2, Kehiu 
reclpxoeated thla friendly gesture vlth a very varn letter 
to i'resldent Kennedy* 
In October ^9»2 the Peking Qovemaant appeared on the 
soenet reversing the ebb.tlde of Indo-^merlcan relations* At 
that tJxe Aoerlca b«caae a sore laportant factor In Indian 
poUfty than ever before* 3 / Its unprovoked aggression on 
India, the Chinese Qovemfflent set In notion forces that pro* 
foundly changed U*r* attitude tovards India* The American 
Interest in the dispute v* a created because i t provided for 
the fusion of various problene of deap concern to the Iftilted 
f.tates, especlaljy the problems of the 0*5:* • rgvlet and 
Communist and non^coomunlst relations and of relations between 
the non»communlst developed natians of the Vest and the ztt>n« 
W«stem vorld* 
Ihe Chinese success convinced India that by herself 
she could not res ist Chlness aggression* The freedom and 
Integrity of India could be defended only through military 
asslstsnce Tnm abroad* A major change, therefore, occurred 
In Indians foreign policy and attitude to military aid from 
the Vest* Hitherto India s had refused military assistance 
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froa abtoAd as the considered aoeaptanc* of sueh aid vould 
constitute a dsparturs tvom iioiwaXlgna«nt| althouf^ other 
noiuaiigned oomtries did not oonfora vlth this view* In 
her hour of dire need India appealed to the Vest for help* 
Ih« laerlean and British response ves proapt* Arms vere 
flovn out by the United rtateSi Britain and the ^testem pover»* 
vhlle th« fovlet Union watohed from the sidelines* "Ithougjh, 
during the last decade India had received billions of dollars 
worth of eoonoKic sld from U*r.*A«| but i t s effect on Indian 
public opinion was olnor In coaparlson with the eootionsi 
ffloaents 
impact of the howl/ anrlvals of great transport planes In / 
of anxiety and alarm* Tvo veeks of melodramatic military 
aid in a tlms of unprecedtfited cris is did more to s evoke a 
clear sense o^ Indian gratitude to America than ten years of 
much larger economic help* <inieTlca supplied mill^ury equip. 
ment worth flko fflillion dollars and was committed to fur^er 
assistance ovor a ten y^ar period* 
A definite change in Indian thldklng took place after 
the Chinese invasion* Ihe Indians were generally grateful 
to the U*B*A* for her timely help* The U*S,A* and the Soviet 
Union were no longer equated although there %«as an under* 
stan<!^ble desire to keep Russia too on our side in the struggl< 
against China and her a l ly Pakistan* Hence, while negotiating 
aid from U*?*A*9 India also struck a deal with the Soviet 
Union for six Mlg fighter planes* 
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Th« Chlii«t« Intatlon touoh«d off ft d«bftt« on India «• 
policy of noiuftligin«it and Ita raluvaneo for th« futurt* Tht 
•xtrcBlstt la India aoeustd th« Qovtf'iatnt of abandoning 
non-allgmitnt whan i t contraetad for Aaarlean BlXltary asala. 
tanea and arranged for joint air exarclsas in Jul/ 1963, Th« 
aav«niB«at ptjlnUd out to th«a that nsn-sllgnntnt did not 
ma^ n dafancalaasnaaa. Others urg^d the Governnent to align 
hdrseXf vlth America, But the Government defended i ts policy 
of non-aXlgnaent on the 8hort*run srguaent that a change in 
policy v&s not adviaawle during the eaergency as long as 
India vas getting aid from the F^oviet Uialon as well as ttie 
United f^tates* The Indian off icials sought to counter the 
deaands for an integral alliance with the Vestetn v i ^ the 
questloni \iiy force the Soviet Union to side with China by 
siding with the Cnlted SUtes . 
Actually^ tharc was no alliance between India and the 
United rtatos. XVe Unltod ""tatf^ s refrained from seeking a 
formal military alliance with India although there were •cca. 
clonal references to an Indo*ftj3«rlcan alliance In the press* 
Indeed informed opinion In t^ e^ United states came to recogni» 
the value of India choosing to remain non*aligned« It was 
realised that India could prove more useful as a friendly 
nMtral influencing other non-aligned states and exploiting 
the t differences between the fMsviet Union and China, than as 
an al ly , which would mean additional tiurdcn on the United 
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rtatM* %lill« th« Unit«d rtatts did hope to o«Mnt a itoutar 
r«latlon«hlp vlth India, aovlnfi that oountrjr avay froa i t s 
natttrallat 8tanca« o f t ^ ^nautrai* In favour of Hssoov'i 
poXlelatt i t doubtad tha viadoB of an ateupt aova l^ India 
against tha ^oiriat Union. In fact, Aaarica anoouragad India 
to aocapt eoonoaio as wall aa a l l l t a r / aid from the U« *:• % R. 
Vhan Avarall Harrlaan vaa aakad on Dacmbar 9, 1962 vhetiiar 
the IMited rtates had any objection to India*a receiving 
nil itary aid fron t^ iC roviet Union he eaid, *'!Vo, none at a l l 
• «••• It la very louoh to our Interests sa vai l as to India's 
interests for them (Indiana) to oalntaJn as friendly relations 
as th©y cun with Moscow.** Clearl/, Indo-^-raerlcan relations 
had coae to be based on H sound footing, 
About thia tiaa an understanding vas reached betveen 
India and Aaerioa aeoordin^ to ^ i o h 'aerlcsn asslstanee to 
India %iouid be deteralned fundamentally by the oonsidaration 
that the independence and viability of Ixxiia y»B in the long, 
run interests of the United rtates* Differences vere bound 
to exist as t^e Interests of the tvo countries oould not be 
identical^ particularly in the African.'.slan area, but so 
long as the Indian Government vas not controlled by the <"ovlet 
Union and so long ae India vas moving to'v'aras political 
stabil i ty and economic progresst It vas In United "tates* 
intertist to ass ist I<idl&. Though not desiring eompetltloni 
the U.^. vas not prepared to ailov total dependence on the 
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tovl«t Onion* D«tpit« ••rlottt r«t«rTatlong In the U.S. 
atfBinittratloni this gtiibral approach vat oontlnoad W th« 
laadarsy of th« Unitad Statoa and India. 
In«vltaol/| th« orlals X«d to di.aeuaslon and apooula. 
tlon In both oountrlaa* Both India and th® Unltad etatat loat 
soBa of th«l7 UXualons after 1^ « attack* Th« Unltad sitatva 
policy of military alXlano«a a^alnat China proirad to ba of 
doubftful value as i>&klstan| an Aoerlcan al ly , began to f l i r t 
vlth Chlm and aoaght to imdfralne Indla*a raalstance* Indla^ 
toOf learnt the leaeon that the prlnclplea of peaceful oo» 
exlatenoe and Panch.rhc«la alone could not ward off var and 
that India Bt»t atrengthen her defencea If not for vary at 
leaat to keep hostile neighboura at bay* No other event In 
the laat fifteen years liad brought India and the United rtatea 
ao onich cloaer» at American tyapathy and help at the tine of 
a grave national criais* A poll of public opinion conducted 
by thelndlan Institute of Public Opinion In %v Delhi ahoved 
*'a great Intenilty In favourable attltude/tovardt t^e U,£:.A, 
and a tubstantlal thou^ less Intensive trend tovarda Britain*" 
Consequentlyy i t vas expected that in the follovlng 
yeara Indo*U«i'?« tlea vould be oeaented* aut a l l such hopes 
vere daahed to the ground due to certain alsconoeptlons and 
suspicions regarding each other* Indians^ for a l l their 
dependence upon America in matters of defencci food toports 
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and financial aid var« s t i l l rathar distrustful of ^aerican 
policy in Aaia* 17«hrtt rasantad vhat ha oonsidarad aa undue 
U* ,^ pressure on the Kashalr issue* PeittapSi he even sua. 
peoted that Aaarica was trying to erode India*a policy of 
noiualignmant through inaistence on air exarcises and TOf. 
deal. Although, iVehru had accepted both these suggestions 
(a departure froa hla earlier policy) but later he had to 
repudiate thea under public pressure* The AaerlcanS| on the 
other hand« vere Irritated by !7ehru*s refusal to make con. 
cessions to Pakistan over Kashair^ on whose solution, in 
their vieV| depended the unity of HoutA Asia and the effec* 
tlve defence of t!ti*i sub-.continent§ the tend«icy of Indian 
foreign policy oakcira to put USA and Uf^ .CR on the aaae foot-
ing; Hiki hesitation of the Indian aovernsent to pubXicice 
the ail itary aid given by U*^ «>r* since 'f9bS, and the vay 
India backed out of the VOA. deal vere Interpreted by /vBtrica; 
as ezaaples of India's failure to ackno*l6dge gratefully tv^ e 
Aaerican h«lp In order to placate the foviet Union. There 
%ras difference of opinion also vlth regard to the aoount of 
military aid to India* while U.f.A, held that Indian denandi 
vere unreasonably high, Indiana f e l t that the U*n«A, vas 
bargaining in order to extract more concessions from her 
under pressure* Indian prido vas also hurt by suggestions 
floving out fzoa the ti^st that economic aid vould be cut if 
the MIG deal vacjconoluded with Bussia* 
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To thM« irritations veis adci«d th« Pakistani factor* 
Pakistan vas imhapp/ at ths prospect of proXongsd ^insriean 
assistancs to India to m««t tba Chln«s« ehalisnga and perhaps 
faarsd that Aasrica vas going to abandon h«r» Pakistanis 
fa i t thay vera baing la t down by their al l ies* But just as 
the United states had ignored Indian opposition at the ti«e 
of Military Aid x^et vith Pakistan, nov i t Ignored a l l 
Pakistani objeetions to /JBsriean aupply of aras to India, The 
distinction betwaan the neutral and an al ly was forgotten as 
Asierica realised the gravity of the Chinese invasion* The 
attitude of the United !=:tates shoved a marked ahlft in its 
policy* The United states vts not manifestly concerned vlth 
the re&etions in Pakistan of aid to India, except for the 
opportunities i t opened up for her in India. I t nov attached 
only l ia i ted talue to the alliances of Dulles and did not vish 
to be blackflUiilad by a l l i e s dependent on her aid* 
Frustration vlth Aaerican attitade tovards the sub. 
continent led Pakistan into the aras of Coaaahlst China* 
^Ithougti unhappy vlth Pakistan for siding vlth China against 
India, the United rtatas acted vlth conalderable restraint 
In i t s relations vlth Pakistan, and refused to vlev Pak.Chlna 
axis vlth the saae alara as the Indians* To an Indian,hovever, 
Pakistan seeaed to influence U*S* policy to a disproportionate 
extent* If the objective of the alliance betvean U*F,A, and 
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Pakistan vaa to ttrangthan dafenoas against Coomunlat aggra-
•aioiii i t appaarad aoaurd for U.r«A« to t aXlov Pakiatan to 
iapeda thv ^ooeas of atrangthaning India to raaist China. 
\»vai% aada India more angry vas that Pakiatan*a aisbahaviour 
vaa oxplainad in tarma of annoyanoa with India and ^UM Dalhi 
biamad for not anticipating tha Cbinasa thraat and aaaking 
Pakistan*a friandahip aarliar* 
In tbia oontaxti although Boat Americana ragardtd tha 
bahaiiour of Pakiatan ag disappointing, thay vf not raady 
to snap tias vlth i t , sinca according to th«Q, Pakistan had 
eaat ita lo t with tha Vest avan %^ an i t maant antagonising 
RttSaia, so i t vould not ba propar to drop har nov* Thay vara 
confidant that Pakiatan vould coae bade vitiiin tha Vestam 
fold If har annoyance vith India vaa sosialiov ended and her 
fear of poaaibla Indian attack aet at rest, Hovever, soaa 
of theaa baliafa y/«T« acre convaniant t^an objactive and also 
ignored the hiatorlcal and polit ical notiTations for Pakiatan*s 
hoatUity to India, 
Oving to the continued interest of the United rtatea 
in a Kashalr sattlaaant, i t night be inferred that in spite 
of vhat haa happened the United States shoved a diaooncartlng 
tendency to amn thinga throu^ Pakiatan*a ayaa. This conclu-
sion vDUid not be vholly true* The nav relationship ^ a t 
sprung up betveaa the United rtatea and India on ^ e heals 
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of tht Chinese attack and Pakistan*• border pact vith China 
eartainljT had an effect on U*.^ » thinking though the visible 
expressions of tbis night not have been as sharply evident 
as Indians vould have liked them to be* The 'merlcan position 
on Kashsir had "nov considerably watered dovn*** I'* the U,^, 
s t i l l Insisted that an Indo«Pak settleoent was inextricably 
linked with the sub»contlnent*s defenoey she did so Bore as 
an interested by-stander than as a ar t i san of x'akistanl 
position. The role|of the United rtates^ in the Indo-Pak 
dialogue to reach a settleaent was l l s i t ed to seeing that 
the talks did not break off* But they were beginning to 
realise that only a polit ical solution rather than a piebis-
cite could sattle the issue* 
Another noticeable change In Aaerlca*s outlook towards 
India and Pakistan was that whereas in the past i t had treated 
Pakistan as the ag^reived and India as the wrong^^er so far 
as KSshBir was concemed| i t now resolved not to distinguish 
between tdie two countries i f i t decided to recorasend reduced 
of 
aid in view^thelr failure to compose their differences* The 
pressure to sett le the dispute was thus to be tixertad wufx 
equally on both countries* 
the reception that India's case received in the 
Congress in ISHtd, was vastly different from the previous year 
when she was BigB singled out for sharp crit ic isa both in 
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th« Hout« and the Scmt«. In fact this was the f irst year 
tbat Pakistan bad COB® in for sharp and crit ical attadc, 
TTsvlng failed to solve the Kaslvir issue to i ts 
advantage through negotlationS| Pakistan turned to the policy 
of amed aggression In fOti^ * It ^irst tested i t s strength 
in April In the Kutch, where Araerlcan aras were freely used. 
India protested to the U.S. but nothing ^ms done by U.S.A., ts 
condean Pakistan or even to extract a guarantee from i t that 
American weapons would not be used in future. Washington's 
view that the Kutch crisis was an annoying side issue deeply 
hurt the nation which was convinced that i t had be«n aggre-
ssed against by a oiilitary al ly of the United states. The 
ensuing confusion called into question President Johnson's 
definition of aggression. 
How convinced of i ts capabilities and the reaction 
of America in i ts favour, Pakistan enbarked on a aore aggre* 
salve course sgalnst Ii^la in August 1966. But this tiae 
observers in New Delhi noticed a change in America's attitude 
in contrast to i t s reaction In the Kutch c r i s i s . The Indian 
/uubassador, S.K.Hehru had found Secretary of f^tate, Talbot's 
attitude Inflexible and hostile to India during the Ku*ch 
conflict, holding out the threat of coning out In open support 
of Pakistan in case India atxAe a counter attack, this tlae 
he found Secretary husk in & aore reasonable fraoie of slnd, 
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•xprtsaing conc«Kt| and not refuting the Indisn oharge of 
Pakistan's Involvaaant In the Kashair elashes* It vss even 
reported that Ambassador Chester 3ovies had Inforaed ^^shlng. 
ton about the participation of outside eleaents In the clashes 
In the Kashalr vaju.ey» thereby nearly confining the Indian 
case of Pakistani infiltration, 
the var ended Pakistan's especially- relationship vlth 
the United rtates, itaashington, for once» kept Its rlghteousnes 
under control and refrained from aaking any moral Jud^iente 
about the Kashmir issue* Despite Pakistan's cries for help 
and Its claim l^at i t vas the victim of aggression by India, 
the United states refused to come to t^e assistance of Pakis. 
tan under the terms o" the TAio Treaty or the United ''tates . 
Pakistan Sllateral Pact* Rlgniflcantly, immediately after 
the outbreak of var, America Imposed an arms embargo not only 
on India but also Pakistan^ and later on even terminated the 
military aid* Once again Pakistan vas l e f t to rely on Its 
o%in resources* The Johnson Administration even rejected the 
Pakistani contention that the provision of 'merican military 
assistance to Indla« tiinn suspended, constituted any danger 
to Pakistan nor did It consider i t as inoonsiatent vith 
Amerioa's treaty obligations to Pakistan* 
Hovevert the inability of America to do anything, to 
stop i t s al ly from using the veapons supplied by It in the 
twin aggressions against h«r| f ina l l / oonvlncsd Irxila thst 
h«r security lay In her o%n politie&l and al l i tary strength 
rather than in reliance up-jn the guarantees given by risen, 
hovery r^ulles and others that the equip«ent supplied by It 
irould not be used against India^ and that the elncerlty and 
genuineness of 'nerican agturances vere not adequately auto* 
taatici e«lf.exeeuting and effectivey as late Prljse Minister 
nehru had long ago varned the United rtates* 
Experit^ce has taught successive ^fflerioan 'dministra* 
tionsy vis* Johnson and Nixoni that any undue attenpt to 
press either India or Pakistan vould Beet with reUiff. '7ov. 
tivert ^ « United rtates did oeoasionaliy engage in quiet 
dlploaacy tout i t seens that i t s *counsel* to India and Pakis-
tan failed to evoke any positive response since their posi. 
tions on Kashair reaaln the ease even today* 'Ithou^ fre-
quently certain individuals and groups in the United rtates 
have i x expressed pain and anguish over Afflerioa*s neglect of 
Pakistan, i t s "coddling** of India and i t s failure to promote 
a settleaent of the Kashair dispute, i t did not have any 
significant support in the tgceeutive and legislative branches 
of thti U«<?« QovernieRt nor aaong important interest groups 
In the country* the United rtates came to realize that t>-ere 
vas no quick solution to the Kashair dispute, that i t had 
to be seen in a vider context and that the U*r, shotad take 
a long tera view of it* 3y 1970 Aaerlca had coae to adopt a 
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ooapltitttly xiorup&7tl»«m position on Kmshalr* On ^fsr^ ?« 
1870» KftonetJ-i l>.«atinsi then U«S« 'alvtaadbr to Indiftf tftlk. 
Ing to n«vtffl«n at a press conf«x«nG« ststsd that v l ^ rsgax-d 
to hs^imirt th« U,r.«A, viuXd kstp Its hands off thu **di»|Mt«** 
and i t a^irsd that ths parties Involvvd should s«ttl« sueh 
Issues id«tv«<an th^aw^lves* *'V^  vant haraonlous ralatlons 
bstvsan Inai^ ami .'cklstsn* u% do not vant to Intsrvsne,** 
m th« other handy Aa«iriea has also rsslatad tha 
Indian attampt to exploit *nsriean f«ar of China* Hhs U%r« 
no longsr shar«c India's astiMptions about tha Chlnasa thr«at 
to IndiaU sa^urlty* Although Mrs* Qandhi on h«r v i s i t to 
'••rioa in 19i»<» strasssd that th« two oountries hs*d a eoaaon 
vay of l i fe* underlined the danger fr^i China and tried to 
linli i t up vith Kashttir for enlisting loerioan support for 
i t s s^nd and evctft vent to the extent of referring to India *i 
dispute vith China hairing i t s roots in the ideologieal eon. 
f l i o t • a l ine of api«roach vhieh tiehru opposed even in th«* 
crisis da/s of 'f9«i£-she failed to sake any iKpression on the 
/fflbrican ^'resident on this point* 
l^irthfex 'iaerican astistanee to India and Pakistan eaaii 
to OQ related r&ther direetly to progress tovard seouring 
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peaoa between th«By iiiic« without peac« «ooik>mic dcvcIoiMnent 
i s not |>os8li3le and without econonlc d«v«lopiB<»nt stsbll lty 
la uncertain. Richard fflxon on his ?7ew DeXhl v i s i t In tht 
suouier of 19^ *7 warned that United ^tat«s .oonoalc aid would 
not btt forthcoBing if the t%iro statss engae^ ed in an ame race 
on a bit soal^. He, hoveveri defended;^ the United States* 
policy of resunlng supply of spare parts for lethal weapons 
on ^ cash purchase basis and tri«d to quieten Indian fear 
and opposition by assuming that i t would be S3 ImpleBuQted 
as not to weaken India against China and not to encourage 
Pakistan Into a new niUltary adventure. Nixon did not believe 
that Pakistan would allow Itself to be used as an Instruaent 
of China for aggression against India. He did not Whlleve 
th«t Pakistan's policies were influenced by China an/ niore 
than India's policies were during her friendship with China. 
(This American reaction stands out In sharp contrast to the 
eaii ier American furor© and host i l i ty over India's friendship 
with China), 'merlca, however, failed to convince India, 
In April 19b6, for the f irs t tlae In the history of 
Indo»^<inerlcan relations a conscious attenpt was fflsde by the 
two countries to develop better understanding between t h ^ . 
They agreed to hold annual informal s i t t ings to discuss the 
changing world political situation. By this means the U.S. 
proposed to bring to India's notice Its new policy tov-ards 
• 389 • 
th« tub^eoiitiRtfiti and to •noour«g<g a s iai lar aove on th« p&rt 
of Indls towards th« U*%A« fh« now 0*f« policy It saxtttd W 
lt« *'rk>i«&Xit;y*'t !••• ^thlngton pxopoaof to baso Its r«a<u 
tiont with India and Pakistan on th« baaia of known Intor. 
national noras and to alsandon the old balancing gaite* Another 
foatura of th« policy ia t^a studied Aaerican silsnoe on 
Kathairy whie^ t contrasts with ite h(bctic efforts at settlpant 
tbroufh external {pressures. Kastaslr did not ooae up in any 
bilateral tslk or in off ic ia l comonicatlons betwe«n India 
and the U«f» for nearly two years* Xhus« the U*% has ooae 
to exercise a fora of non.alignB«at between the two oountriea* 
Howevert the U«??« oosplained that there was no comparable res. 
ponse on the paxt of IndiSy that i t failed to appreciate the 
sifinificance of the step (stopping aid to India and i'akistan)! 
which worked Bilit&rily to Indians advantage* The f i r s t round 
of talks was held in Tfew TXilhi froa July 86 to ^ July2&,10&8 
and the second round in Washington froa October 16 to October 
But in 1969 and 1970 relations between India and the 
U*!^  were reaching a new low because of the U*f^ * nllitary aid 
assistance to Pakls^n froa third countries and i t s decision 
to st^ >t^ ly lethal weapons to Pakistan* AH arstaents advanced 
by i t s ^abasaador^ Kenneth K^atlng^ that i t would not contrU 
bute to an ansa racey t^at It was a "drop in the budtet coap. 
ared to what Pakistan has beon receiving froa either the ''oviet 
Union or Coaaunist Chinsy" or that the Iteas involved would 
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not «4>Mt th« ail iuvjr baI»JM« b«tw««ii India and Pakittan, 
faUad to aiiay Indian doubts and •uapielona. 
!m« Indo*y*s;« raiatiana touohad thtlr a l l tiaa lovaat 
paint In lfov«ib«r«Dacaat»«r 1971* \^m anothar aii.^ut var 
batwaan India and Paklataui tha aaoontf in alz yaarS| broka 
out. Ihit var atartad vhan tha Pakiatsnl Bixitary rolfirai 
having jraaaivt^ d asauranoaa fvoa tha ^Uton /*d»iniatr3tion and 
Pakinii baing unabla to bring the aituation in Bangia Dash 
imdair contfoJL^ and annoyed vith India*a opan support to Bangia 
Oaah, boaibedL^ l^  aigHt Indian o» basaa on Daeaaibar d| 197^* 
In thia var» vhila th« Unit ad nataa aldad vith Iaiaaabad» 
tba UffTfi stood by India, vith vhoa It had alr«ady eonoludad 
tha Inio^fovlat Treaty of Paacot Friandihip, and oo*oparatlon 
on August 9* 1971* ^bh to th^ chagrin of{lndia| l^a ^ixon 
A^faittration vant out of i t s «^y to sida with Pakistan and 
ahowad graat host i l i ty to India* It braadad I^ ia as ag£» 
r9»9orf out a l l a i l i tary and aaonoaie aid to India, aovad 
throa resolutions in th« .<:aettrity CouneiX and ona in tha 
Oan^ral Asaaably in support of Pakiatan, thraataaad to Invoka 
against India i t s traaty obligations vith Pakiataut aacretly 
plannad tha supply of U«f?« ai«s and spara parta, in uttar 
diaragard of public opinion in U,!;«A» itaalf, and to crovn 
i t allf €9&n sant th« U.f^ , task forea (7th Flaat) into tha 
Bfty of Btn«ftX to d<0onttytt« Its support to I»»kigtsn and 
3 
«Mrt psyeboleglesl pr«ssur« on India* 
How«v«r| datpita thaaa proirooativ* acts Ait«riea 
r«fz«in«d fXQB airaet military int«rvantlon» Even btfora 
t^a %iar bagan Aa«riea had aada Ita position quita cXaar. 
Eacratary of r:tata Jto^ars* statad that ths Onltsd ^tat«s 
ragardad both India and Pakistan as i t s "eood frlands" and in 
ths ttvant of «ar batuaan tha tvo» ^ a U^ A would kaap out* 
Posh&pa thla vas «hat Praaldant Hijcon aaant bty tha phrasa**^  
''apaelal ralationshlpF' %fltte India •«• a ralationshtp that vas 
as ioportant as Aa«rloa*s traaty relationship with Pakistan. 
Zhis vas for the f irs t tlMe sines the tniginnlng of the oold 
var that /aarlsa had proelaised nautrallty In a key area* 
Perhaps this declaration vas based on a rational assessment 
that aerloan Interests oould be safeguarded regardless of 
vhat happened In the sub»eontlaent» The ^Ixon m Admlnistratio 
did not ev«a erlt lo lse the Indo*sovlet Treaty. Outside the 
Adalnlstration also^ public opinion shoved syapa^y tovards 
India even after the tri^aty vas coneluded and It vas believed 
that i t vas due to the 'dBinlstratlon*s attitude that India 
vas forced to turn to l-ioscov for seeurlty against a possible 
Jdi Pindl.?eking alliance* 
For Amojiloa's role see "^ r^ff* *T Tl*****! i>aee«ber 16m 1971{ 
fitfflltWfini r)ec«siber 16^ \9Ti and Jack Anderson's d ls . 
closures in l^ihinglan rtllt since the las t veek of 
Bat What anno/«d Indls vai^^at t;h« U.e, k«pt t l l t n t 
%^ «n Pakittan owaaad Itt txoopa ajions India*a vaataxn faordars 
and «xpr«aaad eonoanwd oa l / «li«n India took oountar fli«asttr«a< 
riran vlth ragard to tha rafufaaa tha Aaarla&n attituda %iaa 
far tnm tatiafaetoxy to India* i^ tilXa Astriaan laadars aff-
erad l ip ajfKpathjT for India*a auffaring at tea buga SnTlvut 
tbttr« vaa navcrr any aoYa fron W'saMngton to crtata conditions 
in 3angla n«th for tda rafugaaa to go batik. 
In spite of unhapplnats at U«n«A»*s attituda tovards 
Bangla Daa^ t r'ria« Ministar Gandhi dael^rad hor Intantion to 
disregard i t , no «att«r liov diaappo.lntlng i t aey bs, alnca 
no X tteaful purpose oouid b« sarvad in aggravating tha alrtady 
axistlng diffarencas batvaan the two countri^* "lia vant o^ 
tha axtant of a'^ ying that avan If ^ Q J « ^ * \ dacidad to 
fuspsBd ooonoaie aidy thera vould b« no point In itaklng 'in 
laaua of i t . It vaa a **8{sail** iiattar and no ''fuss** naed ba 
aada aoout i t . Xhia vas a eoapXataXy nav Una of thinking 
and parhapa ti^a raault of a ratlonaXlzatlon of foralgn policy* 
Thuty va aaa in tha attltada of tha tv9 countriaSi India 
and 'aaricai vlth rtgard to Bangla Dash issast that in spita 
of having strong diffaraiwaa of vlava thera vss an widarlylng 
daaira on the part o^ «soh not to lat ral^tlons di»tariortit« 
further* Par)aps ^ tJaw in th«* raXations was In th« offing* 
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B*tld«t th« Pakistan factor la Indian polie/, vhleh 
it :^ui tou^ttona of Indo»^n»rican ralationa thara h&ira l»afn 
two othar eriaas in tha 10^0* a iihiA bava poiaoaad furtl^ar 
tha alraadjr tanaa ralationship batvaan India and *aariea« Tha 
U«r« raaation haa l»aan aquall/ ill*taaiparad and irritataiLa to 
^ a Indian viav of ita paaoa noTat on '^aat Asia and Viatnaa. 
It vaa avidantly quita anno/ad txy ^a aquivoeal Indian at t i . 
tttda to%iajrda ita lataat dipXoafttie afforta to «id thaaa tuo 
tragic oonflictSi vhUa losing no tiaa in virtoaily andora* 
ing foviat approach to iioth Vtif problaaa vith out any 
raaanrations* 
Vlatasa ia aao^ar axaispXa of an araa vhara India and 
Aawica hold divargant via%r8| not in their objactivaat iMt in 
thair nathods of hov to achiava thaaa objactivaa* aoth daairad 
to hata eaasation of All hostilitias and a nagotiatad sattla. 
•ant vlthln tha fraaafwoik of the Qanava agraasanta of 1964, 
Ijoth India and Aaarioa alao aharad a ooaaon concata aijout tha 
Chinaaa polio/ of aHitant axpanaloniaa* Mthou^ India doaa 
not pttbliel/ aay ao, yet in private she recognised tha iapoiu 
tanea of Aacricw'a role in South East Asia,which indiraetl/ 
aids India*a aaaurity* 
Iha diffarancaa aroaa bacauaa of tha diffaranea in basic 
polio/ aima and aathoda ragarding contaiaaant of Coaaimiaa 
and China, i^lla Aaarioa daairad to and ooaaamiaa throiigH 
aUitarjr a^ ansy India fait that th« «halltng« of Cbammiia 
eouid bast b« aat tbrougb p«aeafaX aaane hy attacking dlraetXy 
t^ a ioeiaii politioal and, above a l l , •ooaoai« Ills vhleh 
braad and «ncourag« eowtaniat aubvartion, *aariea| tharaf9ra» 
ia azaaparatad with Indiana rafuaal to partielpata in ita 
oruaada againat CoantmiaB in Touth taat A^ aia^  aapatiaXly ^%n 
India*a owi aawiritjr dapanda on t3ia eontaii»«it of this thr«at« 
XimBf th« auaaaaalva Aa«riean i>r«aid«nta aftar Kannady hav« 
rasortad to aaoaiation of oonfXictt aapaeiaXXy aiaea 19&d| 
hav« ragardad th« HLf in South Vi«tnaM at !lftnoi*t|craatarat 
haira oonaldarad avan Utenoi as P^ing*a sataXlitat and hava 
f lnO/ hsXd th« iriav that a CoMntnist victor/ in rou^ Viatnaa 
vould aadan£«r othsr non»ooaiMBist and pro»U«r« ragiaaa in 
tha ragion and thus laad to aa incraasa in Chinasa povar and 
influtfiea in r^uth saat Asia to an unpracadantsd aaais snd 
that i t ia only tha 0«S* pr^tmic^ i^iah pravaatod Chinoaa 
ocott^tion of ths vhola of "outh Fast Asia and araas far 
bayond* 
Hav D«ihi| hovavsry haa disputad aost of thaaa asaaap. 
tions. 5^ a ragar<ted Ho Chin Mistfi and his folXovars as trua 
nationaXistSf danounoad Anarieaa lioabiag of !<or^ Vl«taaa and 
vas convinead that Aas l^oan da»«aealation of boabing and 
withdrawal of foreaa would craata tha naoaasary a^soaphsra for 
nagotiationay advo^tad that tha paopla of Viatnaa should b« 
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l«ft fr«« to d«old« their ftttar« without for«i^ inttrf«r8nc« 
and h«Xd that a United Vi«tnui vouXd oppott th« ettablltha«nt 
of Chin«t« iitgtfiony ia th« ar«A and ttmt th« fat« of oth«r 
eountrits vooid dapcnd «or« on th« p«rfoi«ftne« of the ruling 
•Xit«s than on th* out^oaa of tha Viatnaa var« Indiana« 
thar<ifora« ragard tha Aa«rican attituda aa ona of aalf.rlght. 
aouanaaa vbiah bXin^ than to t^ a tragic ra^lity In Laoa and 
Tottth Viatnaa, %ih«ra| if an/thing haa baan provad, i t is tha 
faiiura of -^aariaan polieiaa of ral/ing upon Bilitary paett 
to aolva intarnal probLasa of aubtaraion and poiiticaX dia. 
eontant. 
thua India oan saka a battar oaaa to Juatlf/ ita 
poXieiaa tiian Viaahington oan« It ia India*a atrong eonvic. 
tion, and avanta in Viatnaa and 1>oa hava provad i t | that 
nautraxiatf popuXar raglaa in tha autaa X/ing on tha puri* 
phary of Coaattniat China, ia the onX/ vay to pravant Coaaoniat 
axpanaioniaa, and that aiXitary paata aarva no uaafuX purpose 
vh«n the pvobXaa ia intaraaX and ona of ataan^ng the tide of 
popuXar diaoontant and aubvartion againat an onpopoXari 
unrapraaantativa and undaaoeratie raglaa* Vw DaXhi, l^^i^ 
fora, auggaata a danottratia t«ay of Xifa, raiaforead l^ gamine 
efforta to buiXd u^ the aoonoay of t^a eountry ao as to give 
the paopXa a better Xifa, aa the onXy praetioabXa vay to 
ooabat the probXcsou 
With tb« fallur« of Aatri^n polioy otij«etlir«t In 
VltttOMi (•xe«j»t th« ditiiiBl of a Bill tar jr Yietory for Htiioi)^ 
Aa«riea has f inalX/ vaarad sound to tiia IhdlaB vl«v and 
giraapad th« n««d to oo*txiat vlth CoMRiBlflmland avolv« a poller 
by vbleh ooaauaiat and non^eoaaimltt oouBtriaa could oo« 
opayatc for th«^  jxrcoonpatlon of wrXd p«&e«« Vlth tiiia cant 
^« corollary dacialon to withdraw and laava AfU for Asians* 
Aaorl^ mat loam to l lvt with aon»P«king brand of Cowninlta 
In Asia af i t is living with noiuPaking Cownmiaai in Easttm 
Uuropa and with th« !ovi«t Union itatlf* th« agraaaant on 
Vietnaa r^ aohod in 1973 was aora or last on the linoa •U££:«a« 
tad oy India aevars^ l yaart af>« 
Th« raeorrinc irritations ovar Viatnaa taaporarily 
yialdad placa to th« doopar tUBpieions gansratcd by tho 
v«tt Aaian davalopaoata in Juao 1967* X^ a Jima vmr fTWd 
to bring to the forafvont tho eonfliet of national intaraats 
of th« two oountriaa as parcaivod by thaa in the area. Unlike 
Aaarica whieh supported thm creation of Israeli India froa 
the beginning had opposed the partition of Paleatine. Heneci 
India feels that the vary creation of larael i s an injustice 
to the /rabs (a thing forced on thea froa outside and a^ Inst 
their will} wiileh resulted in di8plac#ieiit of a aviber of 
Palestinians froa their hoaes* HeBcOf she rl^itly advoeatea 
a restoration of their hoaeland to the Palestinians* BesideSi 
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thes« g«nttitttt r«atoRt of tjrapathjr for th« ^rsbtt Xndlaa tisdt 
and o i l Intorcstt In v«ist / t l a »nd th« attd to eonbut Pakistani 
loflutfioo thttroi aXao dlotato a pr>»Ar«b poll«/* 
Tho Unitod ^tat«i| on tht oth«r handf is a partitan 
In th« Middle LU9U 3h« v«r/ survival of Itrftol dspsnds on 
it* The •aintonanot of laraol as a sovartignt Indapondont 
stata ia a sattar of dogaa for both the Aaerican political 
parties and It has been uaflinehlngljr adhered to W avorjr 
adainlatratioa slnee Isx«el beoane » state during the ?resl« 
dene/ of Harry r.Sruaaa. 
In alaott every /rtb»Isr«eli verf the United rtates 
Havy has protected the Israeli Coastline and guaranteed 
Israel's l ine of supply* Israel has no reason to doubt that 
It % u^ld eontlnie to be protested by the U«r«y sinoe bot^ 
Jews and chrletians share a eowon heritage of ^ e ^Id Testa* 
aentf *nd i^ hat la «ost iaportanti the Jevs play a decisive 
role in any c"residential election, and no Aaerican President 
ean dare to Ignore this faet* 
It %iaS| thereforoi not surprising that In 19&7 India 
and ^aertea adopted dlaaetrically opposite postures* India 
gave all«out support to the ^rab oause and lustlfied the ^rab 
stand on the Oulf of ^^ qaba* At the U«ff* also she started a 
eanpalgn, to obtain an early Israeli vithdrsael ffoa the 
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ciocu]pi<4 '^fftb tt i f l torlts b«for« an/thing «Xs« could b« doa« 
to §•%%!• th% Ar«i»»I«ra«Xi oonflloU Xh« U,r:«A«| in <itf«r«net 
to vi8h«» and int;«r««ts of i t s aXloTf Isv»«if vat aharply 
oritleaX of th« Indian roXa* a^d at ona atage in tha back 
staga diacuaalona at th« U»N*| tha U«!^ «/« vas confrontad vith 
th« ugl/ ^roapeot of ualng ita vato for th« first tlaa in the 
faeuriV Counelli vh«n i t aaaaad that India had auoc«adad 
in nmetarlng th« aupi^ ort of a aajorlty 3f nozwpaxaanant m«sbari 
for the draft raiolutioa calling for an uaeonditional lai^ali 
vl^draval as an ctsantlal first atap tovarda an aquitabla 
vast Asian settlaaant* Hovavary finally tha situation %fas 
scvad bgr finding a conproBlsa foraula batwa^ the Aacriean 
and Indian poaltiona* ^narioa supports tha Israall poaltlon 
that talka aust pracada i#ithdraval« India faals that the 
ircsponsibility for solving ^a /rab^Iaradi problaa dapanda 
•ora on 'acriea alnea i t can usa ita la?ar of Military aid 
to laraal in praaauriag i t to oosa ta tarsa vith the r^aba« 
But any proposal for being suceaaafal auat have tha bRcking 
of both the supar.povars* Xogathar tha/ can guarantaa paaea 
in %isat Asia« 
0^ a raault of tha crovding of ao aany avanta ovar 
vhich Indo«U*!';» dlffarancas arosa and daspita of tan harah 
criticisB on either alde» thu baalc approaeh of India and the 
United <"tateat is a friendlyt appreciative approach. There 
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It eoBtliiucd Q9M>pef«tlon b«t«««ii l^di« «nd ^ « Uiilt«<! " t^atM 
in th9 «Q9noalo fi«Xd« The al^ glvtn b]r th« United '^UUs ta 
Xndift i t »n iadiettioa ^ t t in tp l t t of aany diff«r«ne«8 9V«r 
tp«clfic Itsutty th«rt %rftt 119 l»««eh b«tv««Q th« tw» eountriat, 
In th« I^st twtnt/ ye&rt tht U«S« h&» glvtn Indlt oTtr Ht* 
79OOC orortt ia «09iio«le ttt l t tanett tlthoui^ i t hat involvtd 
India in a var vlth Pakittan throui^ a totally ualaaglnatlvt 
arat t id poXlcy and in the px^3e«t8 tlovtd do%«i tha paoa of 
Indian devalopaaat* !7enca» India mitt not lota t l ^ t of ttia 
t>aale fact that i t i s India vhich naadt th« Unitad ''tatat 
a u ^ Mora than ^,a Isttar aaadt Indit* 4Iaafi% India tl^uld 
ftrlva for craatar «»e9BoMio ooM>9«i«tion vltb U«f.«A« in the 
futura* 
^inea 197l| the lorld titttation hat undargona trftnt-
fomatlon^ and It taent for ^ a l}attar« H:>tt of the problaat . 
vis* Paklatatif Vietnam, Chinti ^ v i e t Union and lately Itrtel < 
vhieh plagued Indo—'nerlcan relatlona in the pfttt teaa to 
be on t>ie vay out* 3aagla Deth hat nov becoae t reality* 
Not only U^r*'* but racantly evwi ^*akiatan hat granted reeog. 
nition to Oangla Dethf the rcp'JtrlttioB of P«k POVt hat 
paved the way for ttaps to be taken to noztBaliae relational 
batveen i m i s and i^aklttan^there has not only been Soviet* 
Ajaerie^ A detente but slso .'?ino«>^«eriean detenttt a tettlenent 
haa b^va reached aaong t^ tt :)iiW^ routh Vietnas and United 
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ttatM aov«»B«tito| and after a ahort Vttt /.aiaa war la 
Oetol»ttr 19739 Asaxieaa InitiaUvaa In aolvlng th« criala aaaa 
to l>« baarlag frait* DlaancftgiBaiit bag baan a«bi«vtd batvaan 
larttali Egyj>t and r/rla« An agraaaant rafardlng ^ « dllapoaaX 
of ?L 460 Funds has baan raadaad batvaaa India and U.r.A,, 
tbttt helping to Biiika t^§ attt^aphara aiora eonduelva for a 
raaasaassant of th«ir ralatioas. It iat th«rafora| raaaonabl 
to hope that In futttra Indo*'aarlaaa raiations %«ould Xoaa aoat 
of thalr irritants and bafetar ondaratandlng mjr davalop batvaan 
t^ ia two gr^at daao(»'aeias« 
Hoi in a aanssf Indo«^aariean raiations hava tumad 
full circle *nd the two aotmtriea ara nov aor« or laas baok 
at th« Bora hoi>eful starting point froa where they had run 
into trouiblad vatara v i ^ tokh pursalaf contrary polielaa and 
O-'t tlnvoSy even working at cross purposes* But aoWi that phase 
saeas to be overt and It i s quite possible that Prasidant 
Nixon, the aueh nal i^ed boga/ oAa of the 60s (andtl^ hek w^ter-
g! te aaandtl>9 aig^t go^ down in hiatory as a *an of paaecy 
a far.aighted statawan %^ had given a More aeanlngfol shape 
to the *oarlean policy in /^la* out of the welter of parallel 
disillusionaanty a new basis for Indo»*aeriean underatanding 
baaed on a autual recognition of their reapectlve roles In 
fisia la to be evolved in th^ longer interests of pe^ee and 
•tabillty* Ihera la now a aore poaitiva basis for Inao^^aerieae 
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frieadthip without pjrvjttdlet to th«ir existing eoanitatote 
vlth oth«r Gountrl««* thti tia« i t opportua* for n«w initla« 
tivot. But b«for« any iaitlatlv«t ar« tak«n ooanon intorests 
oMst t>% id«ntlfl«d« ar«at of cooperation charted and dlff* 
«ranoai r«tolv«d« It la ti«« that sraat«r attantion t« ia 
paid to th« diatioiination of corraot inforaation in fh« tvo 
eooatriaa* Corraot information togather vlth a sjwpathttlc 
tiiid«x«tanding of differancoa and problfaa of the t%o oountrie«« 
oonatittttaa the firat pr«»r«(iuieita for building up t national 
ralationthlp of friendlincaa batvveR our t%>o countries* 
Differeneea ^ere v l l l al^ fajra bOf and aoactine th«re n&jr be 
a oonfXittt of vieva and even o^ Intereats* But in the nev 
world aituatloni the area of fruitful and oroatlve coUabora* 
tion ia expected to Inoreusei* 
Hoveveri in any ralationahlp betveen two nations th«re 
»ttat be a *glve* on both sid«s • and not just a *eive* on one 
side and a *take* on the other* ^s eJuPresldent Bsdhakrishnan 
once saidy **Hfotbin& should be avoided because it is thought 
iapossiULe* The only relevant Question i s , does it required 
to be don*f Then ve amat try to do it*" This 1? thu best 
possible advice for both India and the U*i7* in tho developstfit 
of future relations* 
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